Foreign Policy Analysis (2018) **0**, 1–20

Outmaneuvering Kissinger: Role Theory, US Intra-elite Conflict, and the Portuguese Revolution

Daniela F. Melo
Connecticut College

This study explores the intra-elite role contestation and resolution within the State Department during the Portuguese Revolution, focusing on Henry Kissinger and the US ambassadors to Portugal, Stuart Nash Scott (1973–75) and Frank Carlucci (1975–78). The Portuguese revolutionary period presents an ideal case for the exploration of intra-elite disagreements in defining foreign-policy roles; specifically, the national role conceptions that elites hold about their states' foreign-policy behavior toward other states. This case presents an interesting puzzle to test and build on the theory's explanatory value at the domestic and individual levels of foreign-policy making: why did Kissinger's proposed role conceptions not prevail when he was one of the most significant foreign-policy entrepreneurs at the time? The analysis builds on previous theory-development efforts by considering a new institutional location for national role conceptions—the State Department—and a new type of relevant actor, the ambassador. In the process, the study makes contributions to the literature on the agency of ambassadors in foreign policy, as well as to the growing literature on domestic contestation and resolution of national role conceptions.

The 1974 military-led Portuguese Revolution (1974–76) had the potential to destabilize the Cold War international order and the policy of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union (Gleijeses 2002; Schneidman 2004; del Pero, 2005, 2010). The Angolan struggle for liberation transformed into a proxy for the Cold War in Africa, as the Chinese, the Russians, and the Cubans funneled resources to different rebel groups (Valenta 1978; Dominguez 1989; Jackson 1995). Similar dynamics unfolded with Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. Furthermore, Portugal was a NATO member. How could NATO—an alliance built to balance power against and contain the USSR—allow a potentially communist Portuguese government to remain a member? And could a communist take-over in Portugal inspire similar transitions in southern Europe, namely in Spain, Greece, and even Turkey? This conjuncture generated a crisis in the relationship between the American and Portuguese governments. The US government, until then a friend and ally of the Portuguese government (del Pero 2005), had to redefine its *role* in the crisis. This turned out to be an arduous task, as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pushed for a role that would ostracize the Portuguese from Europe, while the US ambassador(s) in Lisbon supported an approach of increased proximity and financial help to the transitional government.

In this study, I explore the intra-elite role conflict within the State Department, focusing on Henry Kissinger and the US ambassadors to Portugal, Stuart Nash Scott

Melo, Daniela F. (2018) Outmaneuvering Kissinger: Role Theory, US Intra-elite Conflict, and the Portuguese Revolution. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, doi: 10.1093/isafpa/ory007

(1973–75) and Frank Carlucci (1975–78).[1] The Portuguese revolutionary crisis took place at a time of considerable stress within the US executive. In August 1974, President Nixon resigned following the Watergate scandal. President Ford was sworn in immediately, but his legitimacy was in question—he was the first president not to have been voted into either the vice-presidential or presidential offices. Under both presidencies, Henry Kissinger was assigned dual duties as secretary of state and national security adviser.[2] Thus, during the period under study, Kissinger was in a privileged position to be a role entrepreneur for US foreign policy. Role entrepreneurs are individuals who are "at the right place, at the right time to change beliefs regarding national role conceptions for the state" (Brummer and Thies 2016, 41). This case presents an interesting puzzle to test the theory's explanatory value at the individual level of foreign-policy making: why did Kissinger's proposed role conceptions *not* prevail when he was a significant role entrepreneur? The present analysis uses a case study of US foreign policy toward the Portuguese state during the revolution of 1974–76 to illustrate the emergence and resolution of role competition between elite actors within the State Department.

I argue that the Portuguese revolutionary episode presents an ideal case for the exploration of intra-elite conflict in defining foreign-policy roles; specifically, the national role conceptions that elites hold about their states' foreign-policy behavior toward other states. As Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo (2012, 6) point out, "role theorists have often made a series of assumptions about the existence of consensus surrounding roles without providing clear evidence in this regard and without investigating the potential presence of role contestation." Yet, vertical contestation about national role conceptions is ubiquitous in democracies (between elites and public opinion or between state agencies and political parties, for example).

While an increasing number of role analyses are focusing on domestic-level role contestation, a substantial gap still exists in role approaches to horizontal contestation—that is, role competition/disagreement among elites' groups and between foreign-policy elite actors. Consequently, though role theory has been touted for its strength in explaining how and why foreign policy roles change, little research has been done on how conflict between foreign-policy actors can shape the direction of foreign policy and the adoption of new roles (Breuning 2011; Harnisch, Frank, and Maull 2011; Cantir and Kaarbo 2016). In an effort to address this gap in the literature about roles, Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo (2016) have edited a volume wholly dedicated to undoing the black boxing of elites and to taking horizontal (elite-elite) and vertical (public-elite) role contestation into account. This study builds on Cantir and Kaarbo's theory-development and theory-application efforts by considering a new institutional location for new national role conceptions—the State Department—and a new type of relevant actor, the ambassador. In doing so, the study makes contributions to the literature on the agency of ambassadors in foreign policy, as well as to the literature on domestic contestation over national role conceptions.

Finally, this study also contributes to knowledge about how elite actors approach foreign policy toward states (alters) undergoing significant domestic upheavals. Previous research has linked major events, such as the end of the Cold War, with the onset of horizontal and vertical role competition over appropriate role conceptions for the state (Le Prestre 1997). Le Prestre argues that major events in the international system cause uncertainty, which in turn disrupts the normal enactment

[1] European allies in the European Economic Community and in NATO also enacted role conceptions toward transitional Portugal that conflicted with Henry Kissinger's own role conceptions. As various students of the period have noted, these allies worked diligently to also influence the United States' role conceptions (see del Pero 2009, 2011; Castaño 2015; Rodrigues 2013; Fonseca 2009). While acknowledging these efforts, I abstract from elaborating at length on these factors to focus primarily on the intrarole conflict within the State Department and its resolution.

[2] Kissinger transferred many of his most trusted men from the National Security Council to top positions within the State Department, creating a strong inner circle within the agency. He served in this dual role between 1969–75.

of established roles and invites intra-elite competition over roles. Similarly, I argue that major domestic disruptions—such as high levels of domestic upheaval, regime transitions, and revolutions—often lead to disruptions of ordinary intrastate role enactments, creating opportunities for horizontal role competition.

The case study analysis relies on primary and secondary source material. For primary source materials, including cables between the State Department, the Lisbon embassy, NATO, and the CIA, I have used the Wikileaks "Kissinger Files," released online in 2013. I narrowed my research of the Kissinger files to correspondence about Portugal shared between late 1973 and early 1976. Though the majority of these cables were already declassified and many were available through the US National Archives' website, the Wikileaks search engine allowed for a more time-efficient examination of the records by search terms, authors, date, and events. I also used transcripts of interviews with Kissinger and President Ford available in the Department of State Bulletins in 1975. Finally, I rely on several secondary sources, including newspaper reports and academic work on the Portuguese Revolution and on US foreign policy during the period.

The paper is organized as follows. First, I discuss the pertinent literature on national role conceptions and elite competition. The next section provides a historical overview of the key stages, actors, and developments in the Portuguese Revolution. This is followed by detailed analyses of the three competing role conceptions espoused by Kissinger, and Ambassadors Scott and Carlucci. I conclude the study with a discussion of how the Portuguese case informs current understandings of role contestation and its resolution.

National Role Conceptions, Contestation, and Uncertainty

Role conceptions—an actor's perceptions and expectations of self (ego) and others (alter)—are inherently interactional. In other words, role conceptions are part of social identities that states and policymakers construct through interaction with other actors in the international system and in domestic arenas (Wendt 1999). Actors embody and express role conceptions through language and action. Consequently, roles are also inherently contested because they result from actors' countering-and-complementary interactions with the role conceptions of others (Harnisch 2011, 8). In K. J. Holsti's (1970) original formulation of role theory, a key assumption was that states develop self-conceptions about their roles in the international system (what he called, *national role conceptions*). National role conceptions (NRCs) refer to "the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions, suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems" (Holsti 1970, 246; see also Walker 1987).

In this study, I focus on Holsti's emphasis on policymakers' understandings of what their state's role is, or should be, in the international system and in interaction with other states. I will not directly address the origins of individual-level role conceptions (for example, I will not explore the individual-level variables that influenced Kissinger's views of the world). Instead, I examine how different foreign-policy actors offered conflicting roles for a new NRC for the United States' relationship with Portugal. In doing so, I explore how, when, and why individual-level role conceptions changed, including the process through which the competition was resolved, culminating in the creation of a new, coherent NRC.

Much of the work on NRCs has focused on elites. One of the key assumptions supporting this level of analysis is that leaders enact roles that are generally shared by the broader population. As a result, scholars have often turned to leaders' statements for identifying NRCs (Harnisch et al. 2011; Brummer and Thies 2014). A second assumption in the literature is that, once created, NRCs drive elite behavior (Breuning 1995; Catalinac 2007). For instance, Breuning (1995) examined the

discourse of legislators in the United Kingdom, Holland, and Belgium regarding foreign assistance. She concluded that the Dutch gave more aid than the British and the Belgians because the Dutch developed NRCs that depicted them as "activists," while the British NRCs focused on "power brokerage" NRCs. Thus, NRCs have been studied as both independent variables (driving elite behavior) and dependent variables (the product of elite behavior). This study focuses primarily on the second; that is, on how elites compete, bargain, and eventually coalesce over the formulation of new NRCs.

In recent years, role theorists have paid increasing attention to the process through which NRCs are contested. One of the strategies has been to examine how different domestic groups and individuals push for contending NRCs. Focusing primarily on democracies, Klaus Brummer and Cameron Thies (2014, 5) argue that "it is within the domestic political system that potential NRCs are debated, ultimately yielding an official NRC for the country" (see also Cantir and Kaarbo, 2012, 2016). For instance, Cantir and Kaarbo offer that democratic legislatures can be the most important site for NRC contestation. Parties with different ideologies and individual politicians with personal agendas can pressure NRC change through debate and legislation, effectively checking on the power of the executive to enact foreign policy (Peters and Wagner 2011).

NRC contestation, however, also takes place within agencies and parties, when decision-makers cannot agree on a coherent role conception for their state. For instance, Wolf (2011) argues that in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, there were multiple visions within the White House on what national roles to adopt and enact. In his view, the mixture of a crisis, uncertainty, and emotional pressures created a propitious environment for a small group with a coherent alternative role conception for the United States to take over.

From studies in diplomatic history and foreign policy, scholars know that disagreements between ambassadors and Washington have not been uncommon in American history (David Mayers 1995, 2007; Young 2011). David Mayers (1995) shows that some US ambassadors to the Soviet Union, like George Kennan and Jack Matlock, strongly influenced the path of US-Soviet relations at critical junctures. For instance, Matlock played an active role in persuading George H. W. Bush that the Cold War was indeed over and that United States' Soviet policy needed to change. Others, like C. Neale Ronning and Albert Vannucci (1987), further confirm that ambassadors serving during crises periods help shape US foreign policy in important ways. They emphasize how ambassadors to Latin American countries have at times quibbled with the State Department and the White House over the direction of foreign policy and often wielded significant influence over local developments in their countries of appointment. Ambassadors are actors well positioned to influence the direction of US foreign policy during periods of crisis and uncertainty. They also have, to varying degrees, often displayed leadership in persuading Washington to adjust or change course in foreign policy.

Furthermore, within the small-group perspective in foreign-policy analysis and in bureaucratic approaches, scholars have convincingly shown that small groups of decision-makers often have policy-preference disagreements (Janis 1972; 't Hart 1994; Hudson 2007). These differences can stem from varying worldviews, which inform incompatible understandings of events and generate conflicting NRCs between individual leaders (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016). Leaders can resolve such conflicts. When leaders are open to new information and adopt consensus-based decision-making styles, they tend to incorporate the views of other foreign policy actors, advisors, and subordinates. Further, leaders who are closed to new information can still resolve role conflict by imposing their views on others (Kaarbo 1997; Hermann 2003; Cantir and Kaarbo 2016).

Alternatively, under certain conditions, minority positions are able to successfully challenge leaders' or majority positions (Kaarbo 2008; Cantir and Kaarbo 2016).

The research on role entrepreneurs is informative here. Recent scholarship suggests that role entrepreneurs whose NRC conceptions are likely to prevail share a number of characteristics. In situations of role contestation, entrepreneurs are more likely to make their NRCs prevail when they have institutional power, political skill, and passion; when they are resourceful; and when they display leadership (Brummer and Thies; Kaarbo and Cantir 2016). Additionally, role entrepreneurs trying to persuade other foreign-policy decision-makers sometimes activate alternative action channels, which can provide sufficient leverage to resolve NRC contestation in their favor (Hudson 2007). Action channels refer to the "regularized sets of procedures for producing particular classes of actions," and they can be formal or informal (Allison and Halperin 1972). Formal action channels include institutional procedures for decision making, while informal action channels can include networks or allies that political actors activate to gain bargaining advantages and make their interests prevail. The Kissinger-Carlucci dynamic in this case study invites us to consider how ambassadors can gain advantages by influencing other players outside the State Department toward their preferences and bypassing the Secretary of State to access the President.

Uncertainty and Role Change

Though scholars have a good grasp about the processes underpinning NRCs' formulation, change, and effects in relative stable relations between states in the international system, they know much less about how role conceptions between states change if one of the state actors undergoes a period of significant domestic turmoil. Domestic upheavals that result in regime transitions are periods of high uncertainty for international relations. As domestic groups vie amongst themselves for control over the state and for the creation of a new regime, the transitioning state's role enactments, and even its position in the international system, come under question. During these extraordinary moments, decision-makers in other states reevaluate their relationship with the unstable state through the elaboration of new role conceptions (Breuning 2011, 31).

Furthermore, uncertainty can also lead to confusion about what role to play toward other actors. In uncertain situations, individuals—decision-makers, role entrepreneurs—frame situations, evaluate others' role enactments, and predict outcomes based on indeterminacy. Consequently, these situations are rife with misperceptions, miscalculations, and unintended consequences (Breuning 2011; Harnisch et al. 258).

Revolutions, in particular, present the State Department with challenging situations. Given the rupture of ordinary politics, US foreign-policy elites must seek to understand the paths that the revolutionaries may pursue. This involves a painstaking process of collecting and sifting through information in order to devise strategies to protect US interests. Embassies become crucial agencies in these situations. Inside the revolutionary state, embassies play a critical part in the definition of new role conceptions: they collect and provide the State Department with information about new political actors and groups, they have direct contacts with new and deposed political actors, and they act as brokers between the transitional elites in the revolutionary state and the US government.

The secretary of state is in a position where s/he can be the interpreter of the information provided by embassies and other agencies and can strongly influence the presidency on foreign policy (Mayers 1995). This was particularly true in Kissinger's case. According to Jussi Hanhimaki, by September of 1973, Kissinger's "leadership of US foreign policy was unquestioned. He was not merely the chief adviser. Kissinger was the leading policymaker" (2004, 292). Given the high levels of uncertainty brought about by the revolution, there was a high potential for conflict within the State Department over the content and manner of the United States' role enactment toward Portugal.

As Dirk Nabers (2011) and Hanns Maull (2011) argue, decision-makers are somewhat confined by their respective NRCs, but they often also have sufficient leeway to reinterpret roles. Thus, in situations of high uncertainty, one can expect some degree of role change from US policy elites, even if that change is confined within previously existing NRCs about "ego" and "alter."

Context: The Portuguese Revolution and American Interests

By early 1974, Portugal was the last European empire to still claim ruling legitimacy over a vast colonial territory. The Portuguese regime—led since the late 1920s by António de Oliveira Salazar—was a personalistic, conservative, Catholic dictatorship. Salazar controlled the government until he became incapacitated in 1968; at that point, Marcello Caetano stepped in. In spite of its nondemocratic credentials and insistence on maintaining control of its colonies, Portugal was one of NATO's founding members and maintained strong relations with the United States. Additionally, shortly after World War II, the United States struck an agreement with the Portuguese government to use the Lajes Base in Terceira Island, Azores. Lajes had tremendous strategic value for the Americans and quickly was transformed into a primary NATO installation (Gallagher 1979).

The United States' official stance toward the Portuguese government during this period was cooperative, albeit critical of its colonialism. Correspondence between the US ambassador to Lisbon, Stuart N. Scott, and the State Department in early 1974 reflects the concern over the colonies in US-Portuguese relations:

> For years we have been telling Africa, our allies and interested Americans (especially in Congress) that our position on self-determination has been reiterated to the GOP [Government of Portugal] on appropriate occasions. In fact, those occasions have been few and far between, and in order to be heard out, the closest we have been able to get to advocacy of self-determination has been to encourage the Portuguese to make their stated multi-racial policy more of a reality and, specifically, to provide a much greater role for Africans in the administration, economy and society of the territories they inhabit. (United States 1974a)

The Portuguese Revolution unfolded in four stages (see Graham and Wheeler 1983; Bermeo 1986; Downs 1989; Wiarda 1989; Maxwell 1995; Chilcote 2010). The revolution started as a coup organized by midlevel officers in the military, known as the Armed Forces Movement (AFM; MFA in the Portuguese acronym). Nearly fifty years of dictatorship crumbled in one day, on April 25, 1974. In the days that followed, the coup evolved into a full-blown social revolution. During the first stage, between April 25 and September 28, 1974, the AFM created a provisional government and proclaimed a desire to democratize the country and give independence to the colonies. In the summer of 1974, social movements proliferated throughout Portugal. In the urban areas, the labor movement, the urban squatters' movements, and the women's and student's movements became visible political actors (Bermeo 1986; Cerezales 2003; Pinto 2008; Melo 2016). At the same time, several political parties emerged. On May 7, 1974, a mere twelve days after the coup, Ambassador Scott reported in a cable to the State Department that over ten new parties had already formed. Scott's description of the parties' ideological positions was telling: two right-wing, six center-left and left, and five far-left (United States 1974b). The revolution had quickly acquired a leftist bent. Another embassy cable on April 27, 1974 foretold the path that the revolution would later take:

> In addition to showing support for coup, demonstrators shouted far-leftist slogans, and area through which demonstrators passed was left festooned with paint-sprayed hammer-and-sickle emblems, initials of both CDE and far-left MRPP, and calls for mass demonstrations on May 1. There is thus possibility that the left will abuse new freedom. (United States 1974c)

The AFM program called for three Ds: democratization, decolonization, and development. Furthermore, the AFM invited General António de Spínola to be president. Spínola enjoyed broad support both domestically and internationally, given his very public opposition to the regime's military strategy in the colonies. In addition to the presidency, the AFM created two institutions—the Junta for National Salvation (*Junta de Salvação Nacional*, JSN) and the government. The JSN was composed of a small number of high-ranking officers in the Portuguese Armed Forces. It selected the president. The government was composed of a prime minister and cabinet members, who were in turn appointed by the president. The first provisional government was dominated by the military but included individuals from across the political spectrum. This reassured outsiders—and the US ambassador, in particular—that a democratic transition was on track.

This perception changed rapidly in September. During the summer of 1974, it became apparent that the AFM and President Spínola espoused incompatible views on decolonization and on domestic politics. The AFM advocated immediate independence to the colonies, while Spínola continued to push for a federal model. Spínola also sought to anticipate presidential elections for the fall of 1974, clearly hoping to legitimize and solidify his position in the government. The AFM opposed both goals. The president began to distance himself from the AFM and, in early September, delivered a speech calling for a "silent majority" to demonstrate in his support and in opposition to the influence of "fascists" and "far-left" influences in the government. On September 28, 1974, he led a failed countercoup attempt. As a result, he was deposed as president.

The second stage of the revolution took place between September 28 and March 11, 1975. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll (Bureau of Intelligence) issued the following report to Kissinger following Spínola's aborted coup:

> As a result of the weekend crisis, the Portuguese provisional government has clearly moved to the left; however, we still do not know enough about MFA "leftist" leaders such as Gonçalves to know how far to the left. The communists were clearly the best-organized and most effective civilian force during the crisis, and there are rumors that communist ties to the MFA have been strengthened. At the same time, offices of right-wing political parties have been occupied, and "rightist" members of the Junta have been sacked. (United States 1974d)

During this period, the provisional government took a marked turn to the left. Spínolistas were purged and replaced with AFM members. Prime-Minister Vasco Gonçalves selected a leftist cabinet, which included only civilians affiliated with, or sympathizers of, left-wing parties. The various messages between State Department bureaus, consular offices, NATO, and intelligence revealed cautious optimism tempered by uncertainty about the AFM's ideological bent. For Kissinger, however, the presence of communists in the government was concerning. In October 1974, new president Costa Gomes received assurances in a meeting with President Ford that aid was on the way. In turn, Costa Gomes reassured the presidency that Portugal continued to be committed to democracy and to NATO (Oldberg 1982, 180). It was in the middle of this stage that Secretary Kissinger made the decision to replace Ambassador Scott, appointing Frank Carlucci to the post.

On March 11, 1975, the revolution entered its most critical and radical stage. Spínola and his supporters attempted a second takeover, which also failed. The AFM used this moment as an opportunity to increase its power and legitimacy in the face of a growing threat from right-wing reactionaries. The head of the military police, General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, publicly accused the CIA and the US ambassador Carlucci of involvement in the coup. Elections for the constituent assembly, which had been scheduled for that same month, were pushed to April 25, 1975. In the meantime, the Junta was dissolved, and a revolutionary council was created in its place. The Revolutionary Council banned some "fringe" parties

with counterrevolutionary ambitions, like the Christian Democrats, and set forth an ambitious program of nationalizations. In practice, the Revolutionary Council asserted its own power as overseer of the civilian parties and upcoming Constituent Assembly. As Carlucci reported in March 1975, "thrust of current reorganization is in direction AFM/military control of institutions, whatever the wiring diagram looks like" (United States 1975a). The council's makeup and the makeup of the provisional government at that moment confirmed the perception that moderate leftists were losing ground to the far-left.

However, in the April 1975 elections, the Portuguese voted overwhelmingly for the centrist parties. The Communists received less than twenty percent of the vote, while the Socialist Party (center left) and the Social Democrats (center-right) amassed about 64 percent of the vote (CNE 2007). Thus, between April and November 1975, the country was in a situation of dual power: the government was strongly influenced by the Communists, while the Constituent Assembly was dominated by the center-left (with the support of the center-right). Meanwhile, the AFM was split into three leftist camps: radical left (supported by Gen. Saraiva de Carvalho), Communists (supported by Prime Minister Gonçalves), and moderates (represented by Gen. Melo Antunes). Communists and radicals controlled the Revolutionary Council, but they mistrusted each other. A tense struggle for power ensued throughout the summer, a period that became known as the "Hot Summer."

If, in 1974, the US government and the State Department had adopted a wait-and-see position, by 1975 the Americans were expending considerably more effort in trying to influence the outcome of the Portuguese Revolution (Gomes and de Sá 2011). During the Hot Summer, power clearly rested in the hands of three individuals—Gonçalves, Carvalho, and Costa Gomes. Moderate parties' members of the cabinet walked out of the provisional government, provoking a political crisis. Radicals and communists called on the support of social movements, especially labor and urban-squatters' commissions. The moderate parties relied on the support of the Catholic Church (especially in the north of the country) and the moderate AFM. Across the country, Communist and far-left offices were vandalized. In the meantime, in July, General Saraiva de Carvalho spent ten days touring Cuba at the side of Fidel Castro. This series of developments worried the Americans, as well as Western Europeans. It is telling that the State Department bulletins between January and June 1975 barely mention the situation in Portugal; between July and December, however, the Portuguese crisis is often present in statements by the secretary to the press.

The Hot Summer brought about an intensification of international activity at the European level to find solutions to deal with the instability in Portugal. Particularly relevant was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), held in Helsinki in the last days of July 1975. CSCE "represented the culmination of détente, bringing together, for the first time, the majority of East and West European countries, plus the two superpowers" (Fonseca 2009: 47). During the conference, several European leaders approached President Ford and Kissinger to exert pressure for a change in policy geared at aiding the moderates in Portugal. In fact, European socialists had long been trying to persuade Kissinger that the socialist leader, Mário Soares, and the moderates within the AFM could deliver Portugal to democracy and rapid decolonization (del Pero, 2009, 2011; Rodrigues 2013; Castaño 2015). Kissinger, however, remained skeptical about Soares' and Melo Antunes' leadership capacities, even after agreeing to aid the moderates in August 1975 (National Archives 1975).

The crisis came to a head on November 25, 1975, when the moderate wing of the AFM waged a successful coup against the radical and communist factions of the AFM. The Revolutionary Council and the government were purged of communists and far-leftists. Carvalho's military police were decommissioned, and he was arrested, along with other supporters. The new government and the new

Revolutionary Council were completely dominated by moderate AFM members and the centrist parties.[3] The moderates' coup put an end to the uncertainty that reigned between Portugal and the United States in 1974–75.

Horizontal Contestation: Kissinger, Scott, and Carlucci

Based on primary and secondary sources and literature, one can identify several competing national role conceptions within the State Department during the Portuguese crisis. I will focus on three roles that prevailed in 1974–75 between Kissinger and his ambassadors to Portugal. The *strong ally* role—espoused by ambassadors Scott and Carlucci—entailed a strong belief that the United States should be an unwavering and activist ally to the transitional Portuguese governments. This role minimized the presence of the Communist Party in the government, advocating that the United States should use diplomatic and economic tools to strengthen the moderates, to ensure that the new regime was democratic, and to maintain Portugal within the Western alliance. This role was also supported by international actors, such as members of NATO and the European Economic Community. Kissinger would only adopt this role very late in the revolutionary process, in the fall of 1975.

The *recalcitrant ally* role, embraced by Kissinger in the first five months of the transition, also called for keeping Portugal within the Western alliance. However, this role entailed that the United States would stand by the sidelines, waiting to see how events developed within Portugal. This role also made aid contingent upon concessions that would eliminate communist representation from the provisional governments.

Between March and August 1975, Kissinger embraced an *enemy* role. This role called for the United States and other members of the western alliance to consider Portugal "lost" to communism. Though never openly advocating for Portugal's expulsion from NATO, Kissinger was privately convinced that the Portuguese government was unsalvageable for democracy. His position was that the United States needed to turn its back on the old ally and allow it to suffer the consequences of the "cold shoulder" from the West. In this view, Portugal would become a deterrent for other NATO members entertaining the idea of including Communists in governing coalitions. The secretary was particularly worried about Italy, where the Christian Democrats were seeking to form a governing coalition with the Italian Communists.

Scott and Kissinger Disagree

In the weeks after the coup, the embassy's cables reveal that Ambassador Scott was optimistic about the change in regime. One day after the coup, Scott was already requesting that Kissinger approve the embassy's recognition of the new government:

> Present regime seems likely to be more favorable to US interests than its predecessor. We assume that it will not be long before Junta contacts foreign embassies in Lisbon seeking recognition. We feel it important that we be in position respond affirmatively with minimum delay [*sic*]. (United States 1974e)

In the following weeks, reports from various agencies would cast doubt on the cooperation between Spínola's Junta and the AFM. The consul general to Mozambique, Hendrick Van Oss, for example, suggested that every member of the Junta was supervised directly by an AFM member. Yet, Scott concluded that differences between Spínola and the AFM would resolve themselves peacefully because the two were ideologically compatible (Gomes and de Sá 2011, 13). "From all available

[3] Together, they agreed to pursue a strategy that excluded the communists from government, maintained Portugal in NATO, and advanced the country's membership into the European Economic Community.

information," the ambassador noted, "there is no single 'brains' or 'strong man' in the Armed Forces Movement nor in the Junta. Both are collegial efforts although Spínola and Costa Gomes are clearly the top two leaders of the Junta and to a large extent complement each other" (United States 1974f).

Kissinger, on the other hand, was concerned that two communists had been invited to the first provisional government, one of whom was Álvaro Cunhal, the PCP leader. Scott tried to assuage these concerns. Following a phone call with Cunhal, Scott reported to Kissinger, "Cunhal affable, intelligent, and most impressive." He also reported that Cunhal emphasized "that worries he felt existed in the US that participation in PCP in government here might interfere with closeness of US-GOP relations were unfounded" (United States 1974g). Scott also tried to convince the secretary that, (1) Kissinger should contact the new Foreign Minister, moderate Mário Soares (Socialist Party), and (2) that Kissinger should visit Portugal as soon as possible to enhance cooperation between the United States and the Portuguese governments. Kissinger rebuffed both ideas in a cable on May 21, 1974:

> When you see Soares, do not repeat do not elicit a proposal for him to see Secretary. If Soares raises the issue, you may say that the Secretary would be happy to see Soares but you should make no commitment as to timing since the Secretary's schedule in the immediate future is very tight. (National Archives 1974)

Ambassador Scott's role conception for the US government vis-à-vis the Portuguese transition involved continued friendship, which the United States should reinforce through an infusion of political and economic support. Thus, he called for role continuation, not breakage. He insisted that the United States needed to take a strong ally role in supporting the Portuguese economy, as a means to bolster the moderates. In his memoirs, Scott summarized this position:

> If the United States doubted Portugal's ability to deal with the communists, it should jump in and help—and the time was now and not after the elections. If the United States, Portugal's most powerful friend, let it be known that it was withholding support and aid for Portugal because it feared a communist takeover, that very attitude might well be a self-fulfilling prophecy, causing the very result we wanted to avoid. (cited in Gomes and de Sá 2011, 18)

Consequently, Scott tried to persuade Kissinger that the Portuguese transitional elites merited trust. Instead, Kissinger responded with distrust.

The secretary's responses to early developments in the Portuguese Revolution were, at best, lukewarm. Neither the ambassador nor the secretary called for neutrality. Given Portugal's geostrategic importance and NATO membership, neutrality was not an option for the United States. However, while Scott clearly espoused the strong ally role, Kissinger pushed for a recalcitrant ally role. At the root of their differences were essentially incompatible end goals, key differences in the ranking of US interests, and different interpretations of domestic developments in Portugal. From Scott's viewpoint in Lisbon, it was unfeasible to request that Communists be left out of the provisional governments. The Communist party was a strong actor in the transition and held considerable sway in the south of the country and within the labor movement. The party was, by all indications, not eager to align Portugal with the Soviet Union and would remain neutral.

Kissinger, however, was less interested in an approach that included dialogue with the Communists (del Pero 2010, 10). Instead, he viewed acceptance of the Communists in the Portuguese government—and consequently, in NATO—as counter to US-Soviet détente (del Pero, 2009, 2011). The principal goal of the US-Soviet agreement on détente was to stabilize bipolarity. Consequently, both Kissinger and the Soviets viewed the rise of nonaligned strong communist parties in Europe as a destabilizing factor for détente (del Pero 2010, 97). In Kissinger's words, "when you imagine what communist Governments will do inside NATO, it

doesn't make any difference whether they're controlled by Moscow or not. It will unravel NATO and the European Community into a neutralist instrument . . . to bring the communists into power in Western Europe . . . would totally reorient the map of postwar Europe."[4]

Furthermore, Kissinger, unlike his ambassador, did not believe that the moderates stood a chance to control the government. In October 1974, the secretary received foreign-minister and Socialist leader Mário Soares at the State Department. In a conversation that became quite famous and which illustrated Kissinger's misunderstanding of Portuguese domestic dynamics:

> "You are a Kerensky," Kissinger said, "I believe your sincerity, but you are naïve."
>
> To which Soares replied: "I certainly don't want to be a Kerensky."
>
> And Kissinger shot back: "Neither did Kerensky" (Huntington 1997, 3).

Five months later, Soares' party would win the elections for the Constituent Assembly. One year later, he would become the first democratically elected prime minister after the revolution.

Given the contrasting understandings between Kissinger and Scott about what type of danger the Portuguese Communists posed to US interests, it is not surprising that Kissinger was unwilling to take Scott's recommendations into account. Thus, for as long as Spínola was in power as president, Kissinger did not forcefully push for dramatic changes in US-Portugal role enactments. He adopted a recalcitrant ally role—showing displeasure that the moderates would agree to invite the Communists into the provisional government but abstaining from taking a hard position. In the aftermath of Vasco Gonçalves' appointment as prime-minister and Spínola's failed countercoup in September 1974 (and his subsequent dismissal from the presidency), Kissinger intensified the push of the recalcitrant ally role. This, in spite of Scott's advice that "the September 30 change of regime in Portugal, removing many center-rightists from power . . . may not be as drastic a switch to the left as many Portuguese who prospered under Salazar and Caetano may think. Costa Gomes has the flexibility Spínola lacked and, despite prophecies of doom, may be able to turn Portugal from government by confrontation to government by accommodation" (United States 1974h).

Kissinger's activism after September was a marked shift in tempo. Between September 1974 and March 1975, Kissinger sent a State Department team to Lisbon, headed by Alan Lukens, to formulate an independent assessment of the direction of Portuguese politics. The secretary also asked the president to halt the preparation of an economic aid package to Portugal (Gomes and de Sá 2011, 40). In the meantime, Kissinger continued to pressure NATO allies to exclude the Portuguese government. In November, Kissinger asked Ambassador Scott to read a personal message to President Costa Gomes, in which the secretary requested that Portugal voluntarily withdrew from the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (United States 1974i). The small aid package that Portugal would come to receive in late 1974—25 million dollars—was requested to Congress not by the State Department but by Senator Robert Kennedy, who had personally traveled to Portugal and made direct contacts with some of the transitional leaders (Gomes and de Sá 2011). In early November, Scott was informed that he was fired. His replacement would be Frank Carlucci, a man whom Kissinger considered a hardliner, with vast experience in the Foreign Service and in revolutionary/transitional situations.

Scott's firing came at a critical juncture in the Portuguese Revolution. The US media at the time cited differences in policy between Kissinger and the ambassador, though it seems that Kissinger never offered Scott a precise reason (Acoca 1974).

[4] "Secretary of State's Staff Meeting," January 12, 1975, and July 1, 1976, NAN, RG 59, lot file 78DH443, boxes 6 and 10, cited in del Pero (2010, 97).

A few things are clear: the failed Spínola coup, his ousting, and the provisional government's shift to the left and openness to Communists convinced Kissinger to take a more active stance in Portuguese developments. Scott was a Nixon appointee who had been in the country for only five months when the revolution struck. He was not a career diplomat. Kissinger's dismissals of his reports suggest that the secretary viewed him as a soft ambassador who was misreading the revolutionary scenario. As a political appointee of a disgraced president, Scott was weak on some of the variables that bureaucratic and role scholars associate with successful role entrepreneurs, namely institutional power and access to alternative action channels. On the other hand, Kissinger was strongest in those same variables. By many accounts, at this stage Ford and Kissinger had a relationship of trust, and the president relied on Kissinger to maintain continuity and stability in foreign policy (Noer 1993; Hanhimaki 2004; Kissinger 2007). Thus, it is not surprising that Kissinger's urging that the President replace Scott with Carlucci—a career diplomat with proven skills—was not resisted by the White House (Kissinger 1999).

Carlucci Challenges Kissinger

Carlucci arrived in Lisbon at a time when alliances within the AFM and the Junta were entering a period of flux. His first assessments of the balance of power between moderates, Communists, and radicals, however, were not very different from Ambassador Scott's. In an early assessment on January 19, 1975, Carlucci warned, "battle lines now being drawn more clearly than ever before" (United States 1975b). However, like Scott, Carlucci realized early on that the moderates—especially the PS—were becoming a stronger force that could successfully counter the Communists. Reporting on a series of demonstrations and rhetorical battles between the parties, Carlucci noted: "gloves off attack by Socialists against PCP and its allies" (United States 1975c). The ambassador's reports early on can best be described as infused with cautious optimism.

His first test arrived with the March 11 coup attempt. In the days following the coup, there was a frenzy of reports from Lisbon to Washington. Carlucci was clearly apprehensive and concerned that "the abortive coup of March 11 has significantly increased the likelihood that Portugal is moving toward overt military rule." Yet, in spite of the "bleak scenario," Carlucci still stressed that, "I do not believe the situation is irretrievable." He proceeded to delineate his strategy:

> I believe US policy at the present juncture should center on doing all we can to limit the inevitable leftward shift. This will be a difficult and gradual process. We have lost a certain amount of credibility by warnings of a communist-led coup when, in fact, the coup emanated from the far right. Charges of USG complicity are widely believed. . . . Department's reaffirmation of continuance of our aid program is most helpful, since this has been our most useful tool to date. We will need all the levers we can put our hands on in the weeks and months ahead. (United States 1975d)

Carlucci defended that the US government should continue to espouse a strong ally role, directed especially at helping bolster the moderates and undermining the Communists and other far-left influences in the AFM. In the same telegram, Carlucci also emphasized that the Socialists were the only party capable of challenging the Communists in the upcoming elections in April 1975.

Carlucci's assessments were not well received by Kissinger. Between March and April, State Department sources leaked to the American media that there was tension and disagreement between the secretary and the ambassador. On April 10, the *Washington Post* reported that Kissinger believed "Carlucci had failed to live up to his reputation as a hard-hitting diplomat" and was quoted as blurting to his staff, "Whoever sold me Carlucci as a tough guy?" (cited in Gomes and de Sá, 110). Another report, the next day, in the *Nevada Daily Mail* (1975, 4), was critical of Kissinger's hard

line toward Portugal and of the firing of ambassador Scott. The article also quoted State Department sources on Kissinger's disagreements with Carlucci: "Carlucci has argued that the United States must take a 'constructive view' toward Lisbon's leftish leaders and work with them. 'Henry,' said one source, 'is rather unhappy.'" In his memoirs, Kissinger (1999) echoed these reports:

> Ambassador Carlucci favored helping the radical government on the theory that the moderates would somehow benefit from our demonstration of goodwill. I had urged Carlucci's appointment and took his views very seriously. Still, I had initially differed with him. I did not see how moderates could be strengthened by aid for radicals.

In fact, Kissinger reacted to developments during the second stage of the Portuguese Revolution (September 1974–March 1975) by changing role conceptions toward Portugal from a recalcitrant ally to an enemy role. In a meeting with President Ford on March 27, 1975, the secretary brought up the possibility of attacking Portugal and expelling the country from NATO (Gomes and de Sá, 105–6). In the weeks following the March coup, Kissinger made overt attempts to convince European allies to ostracize Portugal from NATO.[5] These overtures met with the resistance of the British and the Germans, who supported maintaining Portugal in the Western Alliance and helping the Portuguese moderates through infusions of aid (Fonseca 2009; Castaño 2015). Between May and August, President Ford—echoing Kissinger's misgivings about Portugal—more than once publicly questioned whether NATO could have a member that was Communist. The question of attacking Portugal or expelling it from NATO was complex. First, Article Five commits all members of NATO to protect a member under attack. Second, the charter included no provisions for leaving the alliance. Therefore, Kissinger carefully used the language of ostracism and "quarantine" to press his case with the European allies (United States 1975e).

As the Hot Summer of 1975 unfolded, Kissinger came to strongly embrace what became known as the "inoculation theory" (del Pero 2009, 2011). Kissinger advocated that the silver lining in the Portuguese Communist turn and expulsion from NATO was that Portugal would serve as a warning for other European governments in the Mediterranean that might be tempted to include Communists in government (del Pero, Gomes and de Sá). The anticommunist "vaccination" of Europe and its possible repercussions were seriously discussed during a meeting in New York on September 5, 1975, which included the top foreign-policy actors from the United States, the UK, France, and Germany (FRG). James Callaghan (UK secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs) argued that Europe's "southern flank is in the worst case scenario and many countries may go communist by the end of the '70s—Spain, Portugal, Italy, and conceivably Greece and Turkey." Referring to the spread of Communism as a "virus," Callaghan also made the case that the Soviet Union might help inject the "vaccine" because it was not in their interests to produce another "Tito or Mao" (National Archives 1975). Carlucci's cables also make it clear that the Portuguese government was aware of and concerned about the vaccination theory (United States 1975f).

It was in mid-August 1975 that Kissinger first signaled a change in course toward Portugal. On August 14, 1975, Kissinger stated publicly for the first time that the United States was willing to support moderate forces in Portugal. The *New York Times* (1975a, 1) noted the importance of this statement, emphasizing that, "until now, Mr. Kissinger has been gloomy about the prospects for Portugal's averting a Communist or Communist-style dictatorship of the left. But his address indicated that he and his top aides now believed the strong show of force by the anti-Communists gave

[5] Kissinger: "I simply do not understand how our economic help and yours will produce moderation. I would be willing to help Portugal if we could get it out of NATO. Put it in the record that we have told you what is coming. We see a leftward movement in Europe and Portugal's providing a legitimization of it. The problem now is to get them out of NATO. If we could have this done, we would gladly give them assistance" (US Department of State 1975).

hope that they might yet prevail." One detail did not escape the media's attention: these statements followed Carlucci's visit to Washington and meeting with Kissinger a few days earlier. On August 17, the *New York Times* (1975b) reported that "much of the credit for this belated show of encouragement must go to the energetic United States Ambassador in Lisbon, Frank Carlucci, who made a flying trip to Washington last weekend for urgent consultations." This account conforms with Carlucci's own understanding of when Kissinger abdicated continued pursuit of his NRC.

Frank Carlucci was not amenable to Kissinger's role conceptions and was not willing to acquiesce. In early August, the ambassador had decided to make his play. After months of attempting to persuade Kissinger to change his enemy role conception, Carlucci decided to bypass Kissinger, calling on personal friends and acquaintances at various agencies to share his vision for American NRCs toward Portugal. Upon arriving in Washington, Carlucci made the rounds in Congress, at the CIA, the Department of Defense, and the State Department, making the case that the United States needed to dismiss Kissinger's enemy role and pursue a strong ally role that could bolster the moderates. The ambassador made contacts with his strongest friends and supporters: Donald Rumsfeld (then White House chief of staff), Vernon Walters (deputy director of the CIA), General Alexander Haig (supreme allied commander of Europe), and Bill Clemens (deputy secretary of defense) (Gomes and Sá 2011, 172). In short, Carlucci activated both formal and informal action channels to persuade various institutional actors that his NRC should prevail over Kissinger's.

Carlucci also met with Kissinger twice during this short trip. He described the first meeting as tense, clearly suggesting that their disagreements over policy toward Portugal were not resolved:

> I told him that his statements were pushing Portugal into the arms of the Communists. And he said, "Well, if you're so damned smart you make the statements." And I said, "I will." It was that kind of dialogue. (Ford Foundation 2009)

> The conversation was very tense. . . . After the meeting his staff told me I was in trouble. I continued to defend my point of view and went to Rumsfeld. (Gomes and de Sá, 171)

Carlucci brought this heated conversation with Kissinger to Rumsfeld's attention. Rumsfeld and Carlucci were long-time friends, having been roommates at Princeton. According to the ambassador, Rumsfeld "made no commitments and didn't say what he was going to do. But in my next meeting with Kissinger, Kissinger told me that the President had asked to see me, so I assumed that was a result of my conversation with Don Rumsfeld" (Ford Foundation 2009). During their second meeting, however, Kissinger appeared more open to Carlucci's strategy:

> Meanwhile, during the meeting, he said he was willing to try my strategy for a time to see what came of it. I answered that in that case, there was no need for me to see the President. From that moment on, Kissinger became a strong supporter of the policy I defended. (Carlucci interview in Gomes and de Sá, 171)

Thus, Carlucci never actually met with President Ford to make his case. Instead, he activated a network of friends and allies in various agencies and decision-making positions to align themselves with his own NRC and to exert pressure on Kissinger. The threat of bypassing Kissinger and accessing Ford directly created the sufficient leverage for the end of role contestation within the State Department. On the one hand, Carlucci's rounds in Congress, the Department of Defense, and the security agencies generated the potential for domestic vertical role contestation between public and foreign-policy elites and further horizontal contestation between these elites and Kissinger. On the other hand, the credible threat to activate Ford's institutional power as principal role entrepreneur in US foreign policy appears to

have ultimately resolved the role competition in Carlucci's favor. Furthermore, at the international level, Western European allies had made it overtly clear to the president that they too disagreed with Kissinger's role conceptions. Together, Carlucci's agency, his ability to activate backchannels in the administration to pressure Kissinger, and international pressure contributed to the resolution of role competition.

It is difficult to say with absolute certainty that Kissinger changed his personal views on the preferable US national role conception vis-à-vis Portugal. Yet, the fact remains that from mid-August on, Kissinger certainly changed his role enactments. Note that on August 4, prior to Carlucci's US visit, Kissinger told journalists, "the evolution in Portugal has been increasingly in the direction of a state in which political parties play a less and less significant role; in which the final decisions are made by the Armed Forces Movement," whose definitions of democracy were "different from the definitions that have been historically accepted" (US Department of State Bulletin 1975a, 183). Conversely, on November 17, the secretary claimed, "my position has been that without a systematic effort to encourage the pluralistic forces in Portugal, they would be defeated" (US Department of State Bulletin 1975b, 696). This volte-face marked the beginning of consistent national role conceptions toward Portugal within the State Department. For the first time since the coup in 1974, all individual actors were aligned under Carlucci's strategy, which would prove successful. After September 1975, the United States reassumed its strong ally role toward Portugal, approved a second aid package for the provisional government (after the November 25, 1975 coup), and strongly supported the centrist parties.

Conclusions and Avenues for Further Research

Role entrepreneurs often operate with imperfect information, which can lead to misinterpretations and misperceptions of other actors' behavior and intentionality. National role conceptions help decision makers attenuate these problems, by providing frameworks of expected behavior and generating a perception of stability in interstate relations. Uncertainty—whether it emerges from domestic instability, revolutionary processes, or major international events—often will lead to contestation over established and new NRCs (Jervis 1968; Walt 1992; Le Prestre 1997; Snyder 2001). Role contestation can take place between states and within states. In this analysis, I focused on domestic sources of role contestation within the United States, as foreign-policy elites attempted to create new NRCs for the country's relationship with revolutionary Portugal.

This study contributes to role theory is a number of ways. First, it adds to our understanding of how role entrepreneurs can shape the direction of foreign policy, by offering new NRCs and by competing to have a voice in the foreign-policy process. Previous studies have shown that role entrepreneurs are more likely to prevail if they are in leadership positions (Kaarbo 1997; Hermann 2003). In those cases, disagreements between the leadership and advisors or subordinates over NRCs can be resolved in a couple of ways: either leaders accept and incorporate competing roles into their own NRCs, or they find ways to quietly dissent (Kaarbo 1997; Hermann 2003; Cantir and Kaarbo 2016). When leaders are not open to accepting new information or varying interpretations of events, they tend to dismiss the competing NRC. Kissinger adopted such a stance toward Ambassador Scott, eventually replacing him with Carlucci, under the impression that the latter would espouse similar NRCs to his own. When Carlucci, too, confronted Kissinger with an alternative NRC, role contestation emerged once again. For months, Kissinger resisted changing his role conceptions toward a strong ally role, even in the face of new information and pressures from Western European allies. A promising avenue for future research on role theory would be to examine how different leadership and

decision-making styles impact the dynamics of role contestation and the process of NRC adoption at the state level.

Second, the analysis introduces an actor that has often been overlooked in role-theory analyses—the ambassador—as a critical agent in situations of NRC fluidity. Though scholarship on diplomatic history has often recognized ambassadors as key players in foreign policy, role theorists are yet to fully engage with that literature and to theorize how ambassadors, specifically, participate in the process of NRC adoption (Mayers 1995, 2007; Ronning and Vannucci 1987). The examples of ambassadors Scott and Carlucci suggest that an ambassador's networks within the administration, including personal relationships with decision-making elites and degree of access to the president can increase the ambassador's influence over the direction of foreign policy. Scott was not a career diplomat, lacking the personal ties, influence, and legitimacy that Carlucci had at the time of his appointment. When persuasion failed, Carlucci did not hesitate to build a coalition with other domestic elite actors that leveraged against Kissinger's strong influence on the president's foreign policy.

Moreover, the study also takes the State Department as a vital location for NRC emergence and competition. Role theorists have more commonly explored role contestation between executives and the legislature, within and between parties, or between prime ministers / presidents and cabinet members or agencies (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016).

Along these lines, there is also more room to explore the role of the president as an agent in role contestation in interaction with secretaries of state and ambassadors. Foreign policy is primarily the prerogative of presidents, and ambassadors—though reporting to the State Department—serve at the president's pleasure. In this case, President Ford does not appear to have played a direct role in resolving the NRC conflicts between Kissinger, Scott, and Carlucci. This lack of involvement may be explained by a number of conjunctural factors. First, Ford was an unelected president with little experience in foreign affairs. He relied on Kissinger to provide advice and continuity in foreign policy (Noer 1993; Hanhimaki 2004; Kissinger 2007). Second, the years 1974–75 were highly complex: Watergate, Ford's subsequent pardon of Nixon, the loss of Saigon, the impending election in 1976, and the domestic perception that US influence over global affairs was in decline, loomed heavily over Ford's White House. During the period, Noer argues that Kissinger and Ford relied on each other for political survival (783). In this context, it is understandable that Ford permitted Kissinger to pursue his NRCs toward Portugal relatively uncontested. From Kissinger's standpoint, Carlucci's activation of action channels external to the State Department and the possibility of a direct audience with the President may have threatened the relationship that Kissinger had forged with the Ford. At a time when voices critical to Kissinger's détente were making themselves heard (namely, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger), it is likely—though conjectural—that Kissinger sought to avoid being undermined by one of his ambassadors. Moving forward, scholars may find that other presidents at different junctures have taken more proactive positions in resolving NRC contestations within the State Department. A contrast between such cases and the one presented here will enrich our knowledge of the dynamics between presidents, ambassadors, and secretaries of state.

Finally, this case study offers an opportunity to build on current understandings of how minority and/or subordinate views on NRCs sometimes manage to prevail. According to Kaarbo and Cantir (2016), minority views are likely to prevail when individuals holding them have institutional power, political skill, and resourcefulness, in addition to displaying leadership and passion. While these variables are a good start, they necessitate further refinement. One fruitful avenue may be to engage the bureaucratic literature further, to explore what specific characteristics and behaviors of individuals in bureaucracies lend themselves to influence over NRCs.

Ambassador Carlucci resorted to very specific uses of political skill and resourcefulness: the activation of formal and informal action channels to persuade Kissinger to change NRCs. Future research ought to investigate how individual autonomy, small-group dynamics, organizational processes, and domestic political forces intersect with the emergence of roles, role competition, and role enactments.

References

ACOCA, MIGUEL. 1974. "Envoy to Lisbon, Fired by Kissinger, Disputes Talk of Communist Control." *Washington Post*, November 19, 1974.

ALLISON, GRAHAM T., AND MORTON H. HALPERIN. 1972. "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications." *World Politics* 24 (Spring): 40–79.

BERMEO, NANCY G. 1986. *The Revolution within the Revolution: Worker's Control in Rural Portugal*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

BREUNING, MARIJKE. 1995. "Words and Deeds: Foreign Assistance Rhetoric and Policy Behavior in the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom." *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (2): 235–54.

BREUNING, MARIJKE. 2011. "Role Theory Research in International Relations: State of the Art and Blind Spots." In *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses*, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank and Hanns W. Maull, 16–35. New York: Routledge.

BRUMMER, KLAUS, AND CAMERON G. THIES. 2014. "The Contested Selection of National Role Conceptions." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 11 (3): 1–21.

BRUMMER, KLAUS, AND CAMERON G THIES. 2016. "Active Independent or Faithful Ally? The Domestic Contestation of National Role Conceptions in Australia after World War II." In *Domestic Role Contestation, Foreign Policy, and International Relations*, edited by Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, 40–54. New York: Routledge.

CANTIR, CRISTIAN, AND JULIET KAARBO. 2012. "Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8 (1): 5–24.

Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, eds. 2016. *Domestic Role Contestation, Foreign Policy, and International Relations*. New York: Routledge.

CASTAÑO, DAVID. 2015. "'A Practical Test in Détente': International Support for the Socialist Party in the Portuguese Revolution (1974–1975)." *Cold War History* 15 (1): 1–26.

CATALINAC, AMY L. 2007. "Identity Theory and Foreign Policy: Explaining Japan's Responses to the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 US War in Iraq." *Politics and Policy* 35 (1): 58–100.

CEREZALES, DIEGO P. 2003. *O Poder Caiu na Rua: Crise de Estado e Acções Colectivas na Revolução Portuguesa 1974–1975*. Lisbon: Instituto de Ciências Sociais.

CHILCOTE, RONALD H. 2010. *The Portuguese Revolution: State and Class in the Transition to Democracy*. Plymouth, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

CNE, COMMISSÃO NACIONAL DE ELEIÇÕES. 2007. "Resultados Eleitorais, 1975." Accessed in 2015. http://eleicoes.cne.pt/raster/index.cfm?dia=25&mes=04&ano=1975&eleicao=ar.

DEL PERO, MARIO. 2005. "I Limiti della Distensione: Gli Stati Uniti e l'Implosione del Regime Portoghese." *Contemporanea* 4: 621–50.

DEL PERO, MARIO. 2009. "A European Solution for a European Crisis. The International Implications of Portugal's Revolution." *Journal of European Integration History* 15 (1): 15–34.

DEL PERO, MARIO. 2010. *The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

DEL PERO, MARIO. 2011. "'Which Chile, Allende?' Henry Kissinger and the Portuguese Revolution." *Cold War History* 11 (4): 625–57.

DOMINGUEZ, JORGE I. 1989. *To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

DOWNS, CHARLES. 1989. *Revolution at the Grassroots: Community Organizations in the Portuguese Revolution*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

FONSECA, ANA M. 2009. "The Federal Republic of Germany and the Portuguese Transition to Democracy (1974–1976)." *Journal of European Integration History* 15 (1): 35–56.

FORD FOUNDATION. 2009. "Frank Carlucci." Gerald R. Ford Oral History Project. Accessed July 15, 2015. http://geraldrfordfoundation.org/centennial/oralhistory/frank-carlucci/.

GALLAGHER, THOMAS. 1979. "Portugal's Atlantic Territories: The Separatist Challenge." *World Today* 35 (9): 353–9.

GLEIJESES, PIERO. 2002. *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959–1976*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Gomes, Bernardino, and Tiago M. de Sá. 2011. *Carlucci Versus Kissinger*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Graham, Lawrence S., and Douglas L. Wheeler, eds. 1983. *In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and its Consequences*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Hanhimaki, Jussi. 2004. *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Harnisch, Sebastian. 2011. "Role Theory: Operationalization of Key Concepts." In *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses*, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank and Hanns Maull, 7–15. New York: Routledge.

Harnisch, Sebastian, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns Maull, eds. 2011. *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Hermann, Margaret G. 2003. "Assessing Leadership Style: A Traits Analysis." In *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton*, edited by Jerrold M. Post, 178–214. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Holsti, Kalevi J. 1970. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14 (3): 233–309.

Hudson, Valerie M. 2007. *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1997. "After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave." *Journal of Democracy* 8 (4): 3–12.

Jackson, Steven F. 1995. "China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961–63." *The China Quarterly* 142: 388–422.

Janis, Irving. 1972. *Victims of Groupthink*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

Jervis, Robert. 1968. "Hypotheses on Misperception." *World Politics* 20 (3): 454–79.

Kaarbo, Juliet. 1997. "Prime Minister Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Framework for Research." *Political Psychology* 18 (3): 553–81.

Kaarbo, Juliet. 2008. "Coalition Cabinet Decision Making: Institutional and Psychological Factors." *International Studies Review* 10 (1): 57–86.

Kaarbo, Juliet, and Cristian Cantir. 2016. "Agents in Structures: Insights from Cases of Internal Role Contestation." In *Domestic Role Contestation, Foreign Policy, and International Relations*, edited by Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, 174–92. New York: Routledge.

Kissinger, Henry. 1999. *Years of Renewal*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Kissinger, Henry. 2007. "Recollections of the Public and Private Gerald Ford." *Newsweek* 149 (1): 44.

Le Prestre, Philippe G. ed. 1997. *Role Quests in the Post–Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Maull, Hanns W. 2011. "Hegemony Reconstructed? America's Role Conception and its 'Leadership' within its Core Alliances." In *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses*, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank and Hanns W. Maull, 167–93. New York: Routledge.

Maxwell, Kenneth. 1995. *The Making of Portuguese Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mayers, David. 1995. *The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mayers, David. 2007. *Dissenting Voices in America's Rise to Power*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Melo, Daniela F. 2016. "Women's Mobilization in the Portuguese Revolution: Context and Framing." *Social Movement Studies* 15 (4): 403–16.

Nabers, Dirk. 2011. "Identity and Role Change in International Relations." In *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses*, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank and Hanns W. Maull, 74–92, New York: Routledge.

National Archives. 1974. *Meeting Between FM Soares and Secretary*, May 21. EXDIS. Accessed June 4, 2015. http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=93923&dt=2474&dl=1345.

National Archives. 1975. RG 59, Records of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 12, NODIS Memcons, Folder 9. Secret; Nodis. Accessed June 4, 2015. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d73.

Nevada Daily Mail, 1975. "Kissinger's Problems in Portugal." April 11. p. 4. https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1908&dat=19750411&id=O1sfAAAAIBAJ&sjid=YdQEAAAAIBAJ&pg=1221,648579&hl=en.

New York Times, 1975a. "Kissinger Gives Lisbon Anti-Reds Strong Backing." August 15, 1975, 73.

New York Times, 1975b. "Support for Portugal . . ." August 17, 1975, 166.

Noer, Thomas J. 1993. "International Credibility and Political Survival: The Ford Administration's Intervention in Angola." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 23 (4): 771–85.

Oldberg, Ingmar. 1982. "The Portuguese Revolution of 1974–5 and US Foreign Policy." *Cooperation and Conflict* 17: 179–89.

PETERS, DIRK, AND WOLFGANG WAGNER. 2011. "Between Military Efficiency and Democratic Legitimacy: Mapping Parliamentary War Powers in Contemporary Democracies, 1989–2004." *Parliamentary Affairs* 64 (1): 175–92.

PINTO, PEDRO R. 2008. "Urban Social Movements and the Transition to Democracy in Portugal, 1974–1976." *The Historical Journal* 51 (4): 1025–46.

RODRIGUES, LUÍS N. 2013. "The United States and Portuguese Decolonization." *Portuguese Studies* 29 (2): 164–85.

RONNING, C. NEALE, AND ALBERT VANNUCCI, eds. 1987. *Ambassadors in Foreign Policy: The Influence of Individuals on US–Latin American Policy*. New York: Praeger Publishers.

SCHNEIDMAN, WITNEY W. 2004. *Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire*. New York: University Press of America.

SNYDER, ROBERT S. 2001. "The US and Third World Revolutionary States: Understanding the Breakdown in Relations." In *Revolution: International Dimensions*, edited by Mark N. Katz. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

'T HART, PAUL. 1994. *Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

US DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 1975. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976*, Vol. E-15, part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–6, Doc. 153, "Memorandum of Conversation." Accessed June 5, 2015. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d153.

US DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN. 1975a. Vol. LXXIII (1884), 4 August, 183.

US DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN. 1975b. Vol. LXXIII (1899), 17 November, 696.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC CABLES. 1974a. "US Approach to GOP Re Portugal's African Policies." Wikileaks id #1974LISBON1504_b. April 20. Available at Wikileaks/Kissinger Cables. Accessed on May 6, 2015. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974LISBON01504_b.html.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC CABLES. 1974b. "New Political Parties and Groups Form in the Metropole." Wikileaks id #1974LISBON01815_b. Available at Wikileaks/Kissinger Cables. Accessed on May 6, 2015. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974LISBON01815_b.html.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC CABLES. 1974c. "Preliminary Assessment of Portuguese Coup." Wikileaks id #1974LISBON1636_b. April 27. Available at Wikileaks/Kissinger Cables. Accessed on May 6, 2015. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974LISBON01636_b.html.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC CABLES. 1974d. "Situation in Portugal." Wikileaks id #1974STATE214840_b. 30 September. Available at Wikileaks/Kissinger Cables. Accessed on May 8, 2015. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974STATE214840_b.html.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC CABLES. 1974e. "Recognition of New Portuguese Government." Wikileaks id #1974LISBON01608_b. 26 April. Available at Wikileaks/Kissinger Cables. Accessed on May 8, 2015. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974LISBON01608_b.html.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC CABLES. 1974f. "The Armed Forces Movement: Its Role in Present Portuguese Regime." Wikileaks id #1974LISBON01873. 10 May. Available at Wikileaks/Kissinger Cables. Accessed on May 8, 2015. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974LISBON01873_b.html.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC CABLES. 1974g. "Ambassador's Call on Alvaro Cunhal." Wikileaks id #1974LISBON02372_b. 11 June. Available at Wikileaks/Kissinger Cables. Accessed on May 8, 2015. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974LISBON02372_b.html.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC CABLES. 1974h. "Assessment of Current Situation in Portugal." Wikileaks id# 1974LISBON04325. October 8. Available at Wikileaks/Kissinger Cables. Accessed on May 15, 2015. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974LISBON04325_b.html.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC CABLES. 1974i. "Meeting with President Costa Gomes." Wikileaks id #1974LISBON04870_b. 9 November. Available at Wikileaks/Kissinger Cables. Accessed on May 15, 2015. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974LISBON04870_b.html.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC CABLES. 1975a. "Council of State and Junta Abolished, Revolutionary Council Takes Over." Wikileaks id #1975LISBON01418_b. March 14. Available at Wikileaks/Kissinger Cables. Accessed on May 8, 2015. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975LISBON01418_b.html.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC CABLES. 1975b. "Portugal: Soares Sees Critical Situation." Wikileaks id #1975LISBON00304_b. 19 January. Available at Wikileaks/Kissinger Cables. Accessed on May 15, 2015. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975LISBON00304_b.html.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC CABLES. 1975c. "Socialists Hanging Tough." Wikileaks id #1975LISBON00464_b. 27 January. Available at Wikileaks/Kissinger Cables. Accessed on May 17, 2015. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975LISBON00464_b.html.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC CABLES. 1975d. "Portuguese Coup: Assessment and Implications." Accessed on May 17, 2015. Wikileaks #1975LISBON01398_b. 13 March. Available at Wikileaks/Kissinger Cables: https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975LISBON01398_b.html.

United States Diplomatic Cables. 1975e. "Portugal and NATO Classified Information." Wikileaks id #1975STATE172995_b. 15 May. Available at Wikileaks/Kissinger Cables. Accessed on May 17, 2015. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975STATE172995_b.html.

United States Diplomatic Cables. 1975f. "Pro-Communist Power Play." Accessed on May 20, 2015. Wikileaks id #1975STATE174525_b. 25 July. Available at Wikileaks/Kissinger Cables. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975STATE174525_b.html.

Valenta, Jiri. 1978. "The Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1975." *Studies in Comparative Communism* 11 (1–2): 3–33.

Walker, S. 1987. *Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Walt, Stephen M. 1992. "Revolution and War." *World Politics* 44 (3): 321–68.

Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wiarda, Howard J. 1989. *The Transition to Democracy in Spain and Portugal*. Washington, DC: AEI Press.

Wolf, Raimund. 2011. "Terrorized America? 9/11 and its Impact on US Foreign Policy." In *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses*, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank and Hanns W. Maull, 194–212. New York: Routledge.

Young, John W. 2011. "Ambassador David Bruce and 'LBJ's War': Vietnam Viewed from London, 1963–1968." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 22 (1): 81–100.