THE PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION

STATE AND CLASS IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

RONALD H. CHILCOTE

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REVOLUTION

"Portugal was once a country of 'discoverers.' Today, it is still to be discovered by social scientists. Which other country in the twentieth century experienced a bloodless revolution led by young military officers anxious to put an end to an unjust war, a revolution moreover promptly appropriated by the popular classes and leading to the consolidated democracy of today? Here is a decisive book to solve the puzzle. Ronald Chilcote has dedicated much time to the study of Portuguese society. He offers us the best work on the Carnation Revolution written in English. Very well researched, thoughtfully conceived, and elegantly written, this fine book is obligatory reading not just for those interested in knowing more about Portugal but also for all those interested in understanding the works of progressive social change in our world."

—Boaventura de Sousa Santos, University of Coimbra
and University of Wisconsin, Madison

"This is a carefully crafted, richly documented, and powerfully argued study. It will be of great interest to historians, political scientists, and other scholars interested in contemporary Portugal, the larger Lusophonic world, and broader questions of state power and decolonization. It has particular relevance for students working on Portuguese Africa."

—Allen Isaacman, University of Minnesota

"Chilcote paints a vivid picture of a state first in formation and then in crisis, of the impact of the African wars on the traditional imperial economy and upon the army fighting them, the rise of social movements, the rebirth of civil society and the emergence of socialist and democratic ideologies. Yet, at a more profound level, he analyses the forces—the state, economic groups, and classes—that, despite the revolutionary moment, maintain control and historical continuity. This also resonates with the experience of the former colonies. The book provides students of historical change with tools for a deeper analysis and understanding not only of the Lusophone world but beyond. His proposition that the state remains decisive to capitalist development is stunningly proven by the rescue of financial capitalism in the recent global crisis."

—Rosemary Galli, author of *Peoples' Spaces and State Spaces: Land and Governance in Mozambique*

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Preface: Portugal and Comparative Inquiry

ALL MY SCHOLARLY ENDEAVORS HAVE INCORPORATED comparison in some manner. My work is based in political economy and political science, but I think of my outlook as interdisciplinary. This book on Portugal draws from this orientation. The question then is how is it comparative and how do we approach comparisons? I address this, first, with a brief look at comparisons in the study of political economy and their usefulness to the social sciences, and second, by illustrating how my own work, and this book on Portugal in particular, have utilized comparisons in different ways.

Comparative inquiry in the social sciences, and particularly in the United States, has considered whether our comparisons should be based on field research that incorporates the history and culture of particular situations or on formal or abstract models in which data are manipulated and hypotheses tested. During the first half of the twentieth century comparative research focused on such themes as the formation of the nation-state, constitutions, and governmental activities in Western Europe and the United States. Investigation tended toward description and later incorporated theory and methods that sought to provide a more systematic basis for understanding. With the rise of behavioralism in the 1950s, attention focused on scientific method and value-free research. This dominant movement was challenged by the postbehavioral revolution of historicism and normative theory that accompanied dissent during the 1960s. During the 1980s and onward, the search for an approach evolved into either a refinement of the positivist approach and attention to rational choice models or the incorporation of critical theory.

My own approach combines comparative inquiry, incorporating both fieldwork and case studies, with theoretical frameworks that draw on the origins and evolution of particular historical experiences. I wish to move beyond the debates about whether inquiry is driven by area specialization or social science, formal or normal theory. I believe that both qualitative and quantitative study are useful and that subjective or objective analysis is possible. In other words, many approaches are possible, but a choice of direction may depend on circumstances and possibilities for a successful book.

I am strongly influenced by comparative historical work such as the classic synthesis *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966), in which Barrington Moore studies the transition from agrarian to modern industrial societies and identifies three paths and differing cases (bourgeois revolution in the English, French, and American examples, conservative revolution in Germany and Japan, and peasant revolution in China and Russia). In the tradition of Moore, Theda Skocpol compares the revolutionary experiences of France, Russia, and China in *States and Social Revolutions* (1979) She emphasizes that the state is central to comparative historical analysis. Charles Bettelheim in *Class Struggles in the USSR* (1976; 1978) uses a single case to demonstrate that class struggle and uneven relations of production are evident in the period from the Russian Revolution in 1917 to 1930. With attention to Europe, the French historian Fernand Braudel in *Civilization and Capitalism* (1981) outlines the origins and evolution of capitalism from the fifteenth century to the twentieth in a now-classic account that influenced Immanuel Wallerstein's *The Modern World System* (1974). Wallerstein conceptualizes an advanced core of nations in northwestern Europe, a periphery in Eastern Europe, and a semiperiphery in Mediterranean Europe, and this framework allows him to reinterpret the European experience from the breakup of feudalism through the rise of capitalist agriculture and mercantilism. These works emphasize concepts of transition, state, class, and capitalist development—all concerns in this book on Portugal.

The reader may wish to explore the enigma of comparison, debates over approach, examples of different studies, and other questions and details in my trilogy of books, beginning with *Theories of Comparative Politics* (1981 and 1994), *Theories of Comparative Political Economy* (2000), and *Comparative Inquiry in Politics and Political Economy* (2000).

Personal Examples of Comparative Study

In my view serious comparative writing emanates from work in the field, usually in situations relatively unfamiliar to the investigator. It may be an easy task to identify a theme and propose to study it, but it is altogether a different

matter to carry out field research outside one's own community and country and especially so in the case of Portuguese-speaking or Lusophone areas that once were colonies and part of the Portuguese "empire" and now are nations. My early research on Portugal was not productive because of censorship and restraints of the Salazar dictatorship. My early book *Portuguese Africa* (1967) draws not only from these experiences and mostly Portuguese colonial writings and reports on African resistance and how Portugal restrained them but from the ephemeral leaflets and writings of Africans who initiated their national liberation struggles during the early 1960s. My collection and bibliography of two thousand such documents serve as a starting point for an African perspective of its history of resistance, revolution, and liberation (see in the Aluka Digital Library the Core Readings Collection in Struggles for Freedom in Southern Africa). After independence in 1975 in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, I attempted field research based on interviews with the revolutionary leadership, but life after independence was unsettling, and my interviews ultimately appeared years later in *Amílcar Cabral's Revolutionary Theory and Practice* (1991). Cabral was also indirectly involved in the revolutionary experiences of Angola and Mozambique, but his example sets him apart from most revolutionaries in Africa and helps us to understand the successes and failures of African independence struggles before and after his tragic death.

Early on I brought scholars from Angola and Brazil together to present papers at the University of California, Los Angeles and Riverside. Their cultural and historical experiences differed, and their disciplines included anthropology, history, political science, and sociology, yet some common ground appeared in the volume of essays published as *Protest and Resistance in Angola and Brazil* (1972). My own contribution offered a classification and typology of social and political movements involved at the local level in efforts to transform society at the regional and national levels.

My fieldwork turned to Brazil and specifically to two unrelated scholarly studies. The first, entitled *The Brazilian Communist Party: Conflict and Integration, 1922–1972* (1974), looks at the origins and evolution of the party as the country evolved from agrarian society based on coffee production to urban industrialization and organized labor in the cities. Undertaken during a military dictatorship, my research delved into a few archives and uncovered previously suppressed or unavailable documents and newspapers. Interviews took place with caution and often under cover. About the same time I launched a field study of elites and ruling families in two towns in the interior of Northeast Brazil. This book, *Power and the Ruling Classes in Northeast Brazil* (1990), involved exhaustive research into community records, extensive two-to-three hour in-depth structured interviews with notable people, and survey questionnaires among students in the schools and, in particular, with sons and daughters of the elites.

How do these personal examples serve to help us understand the comparative approach? First, the early work on Portugal evolved into a historical overview and interpretation of its five African colonies. The book focused on two perspectives, Portuguese and African, and showed the stark differences between European colonizer and exploited African. It also showed the continuity of African resistance under colonialism through the independence struggles. It revealed how the unwritten history of Africans must be uncovered through innovative efforts involving revision of colonial perspective, oral testimonials, and other means. Second, the encounters of Portuguese-speaking African and Brazilian scholars permitted an exchange of views and understandings within different cultural settings but with a common focus on themes of protest and resistance. Our attempt to provide a framework for comparative study was followed with a plethora of studies and monographs on prominent cases of resistance among social and political movements, especially in Brazil, where historians had tended to ignore them. Third, the work on Brazil began with archival research and informal interviews with intellectuals in the two major cultural centers, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. In Rio I was fortunate to talk with those involved in a progressive government-sponsored institute that was attempting to identify and promulgate a national ideology of developmental nationalism, and in São Paulo I interviewed academics who also were involved in questions on nationalism and development. The perspectives of the two groups were different: the activist Rio intellectuals wanted to reform Brazil into an autonomous developed nation, while the São Paulo academic intellectuals were more interested in serious research and writing that might influence future change. Many of them had found refuge politically within the Brazilian Communist Party, about which I wrote a monograph, while another study, now in progress, will compare and contrast all of them, their ideas and thinking, and their political trajectories over the past half century. Fourth, my book on two communities in the backlands of Northeast Brazil examines questions of power structure, class relations, and the transition from backward agrarian into modernizing conditions, drawing on the prolific theoretical literature on underdevelopment and development. Comparison of the two communities at the local level provided a basis for study of communities elsewhere; it also provided analysis of power and influence at the local, regional, and national levels.

My work on Portugal draws from my earlier comparative work. I have written sporadically about the opposition under the Salazar dictatorship, the resistance to Portuguese rule in the African colonies, and the break with the past represented by the coup of April 25, 1974. The present volume thus compares periods of authoritarianism and resistance with representative and popular democracy. It emanates from an important historical moment when nearly a half century of authoritarianism disintegrated in the face of a revolu-

tion that led Portugal to abandon its African colonies and turn toward formal democracy and integration with Western Europe. This book is a synthesis, drawing from primary and secondary sources and supplemented with my own interviews, in an effort to look at theoretical ideas and their possible relevance and to explain the 1974–1975 revolution and its aftermath in Portugal. I draw on the historical past as a backdrop to understand contemporary political economy. This permits me an overview with interpretation and substance without delving in great detail into an elaborate historical analysis. The Portuguese experience may be compared to revolutionary moments and transitions elsewhere. In the middle 1970s Greece and Spain also moved from authoritarianism to democracy (see my edited volume *Transitions from Dictatorship to Democracy: Comparative Studies of Spain, Portugal, and Greece* [1990]). In Brazil the military dictatorship slowly gave way to participation and elections so that democracy emerged a decade later, followed by a similar pattern in Argentina and Chile. I also examine theories and ideas that emanate from experience outside Portugal, especially other parts of Europe, with the intent of learning their relevance to Portugal. Finally, my methods have employed detailed historical investigation, before 1974 when scholars were severely limited, in library and archival research generally restricted for all, and in interviews during a time of repression in which only moderate opposition could be expressed rarely in censored newspaper articles and infrequently in clandestine manifestos, and analysis of events infrequently circulated. After 1974 I relied on interviews with participants in the events of 1974 and 1975 and in extensive reading of the thousands of documents and writings uncovered in public libraries and private archives. These interviews were largely informal and not structured to synthesize data quantitatively. Not only did I approach each interview with some knowledge of the recipient's personal experience in the years of revolutionary euphoria but I devoted attention to the major theoretical themes of this book, such as transition, class, state, development, and democracy. As explained above, each theme emanates from important comparative studies.

Although I am concerned with historical events, movements, and crises, the reader can find more detail and background in the first (Chilcote 1987) and second volumes (Chilcote, 1998) of my research on the 1974–1975 period. I hope that this foundation will serve others in the preparation of a definitive history both of the period and the twentieth century.

Plan of the Book

The book comprises ten chapters and a conclusion. At the outset I look at the rise of capitalism and its consolidation alongside various forms of the state

during the twentieth century. The first chapter provides theoretical context and historical analysis and arguments about the rise of capitalism and an evolving bourgeois revolution in Portugal. I refer to but do not explore deeply the early historical moments, and I expect the reader to pick up the threads of argument and perspective, pursue them if desired, and use them as reference to the essential questions of this book.

Chapter 2 illustrates, compares, and contrasts five forms of the state to show that its organization and political directions may be complex and varied. I work through a century of Portuguese history in order to demonstrate connections between the past and present. For example, the struggle between an authoritarian outcome and a parliamentary system dominated by a plurality of parties is a theme evidenced in early history but is particularly conspicuous in the period after 1974. The forms of the state also are linked to the evolving capitalism within Portugal, from early mercantilism to more advanced and industrial capitalism.

Chapter 3 provides substantial details on the major economic groups that dominated the Portuguese economy prior to 1974, their demise, the absorption of their firms into the state in 1975 and 1976, and the emergence of old and new groups in the period thereafter to the end of the century. The purpose is to reveal the ties and dependence of private capital on the state and the state's sheltering of private capital in the face of any attempt to socialize the means of production.

Chapter 4 emphasizes the view that over the long run the Portuguese political economy has experienced a pattern of continuity while recognizing that events such as the overthrow of the monarchy in 1910 and the coup in April 1974 and the revolutionary aftermath represented shifts from authoritarian rule to representative democracy in the political sphere, whereas the economy in 1974, despite a momentary attempt to socialize the means of production, carried on through the hegemonic influence of the state and powerful economic groups. This is not to minimize the significance of the coup of April 25, 1974, and the ensuing revolutionary period but to affirm that ultimately Portugal was unable to realize a then widespread revolutionary vision of socialism. I argue that a rupture occurred with the coup ushering in a representative democracy but had minimal impact upon the state. Although the economy opened up to European integration, there persisted a pattern of state control and economic group influence. I try to give this a long view by carrying the story up to the end of the century.

The ensuing five chapters look at the 1974–1975 coup and the revolutionary aftermath. The origins and path of the coup itself are examined along with three defining moments. The roles of institutional forces and social classes in shaping these events are analyzed. I have strengthened these chapters by

including, mostly in footnotes and references, my extensive interviews of participants that help us in understanding details.

Chapter 5 briefly describes how the coup evolved and summarizes the key moments of the six provisional governments by examining conjunctural moments, commencing with the April 25, 1974, coup and ending with the countercoup of November 25, 1975. I refer to the observations, descriptions, and differing interpretations of participants in this period. Some of my sources emanate from particular progressive and revolutionary positions, which I find useful to the discussion. I use their interpretations as a way to introduce an array of views, not to contend with or follow their ideological line of thinking.

Chapter 6 emphasizes a focus on major institutions and their role and impact on the revolutionary events. The institutions analyzed are the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA) and its contradictions and influences; the major progressive Communist (PCP) and Socialist (PS) political parties, their origins and evolution as well as their similarities and differences ideologically and in practice and the consequences of not getting along together; and the origins and evolution of the major labor unions and their policies and action along with relations to the PCP and the PS. I feel strongly that an institutional analysis is helpful alongside a consideration of classes and other forces that I deal with in the following chapters.

Chapter 7 examines the origins and evolution of the popular and social movements prior to and after the April 25 coup. I look at neighborhood commissions, workers' commissions, popular rural movements, and popular and radical left movements. Some of the left movements emerged as splinter groups from the PCP that tended to aggregate radical elements of the opposition. Others appeared with ties to left international organizations or spontaneously as independent movements. Only a handful of them were important, but overall hundreds of revolutionary groups and parties participated in shaping the massive mobilization and dialogue that characterized the period after April 25. I delve into how they formed through alliances and splintered over ideological differences. Collectively they were conspicuous during 1974 and 1975, and the manifestation of their ideas and demands through newsletters, pamphlets, and leaflets reflected a groundswell of revolutionary sentiment and a possible vision of a transition to socialism. Many of their leaders later shifted ideologically, joining the left of center PS or the right of center Partido Social Democrática (PSD) and assuming roles of responsibility in various governments.

Chapter 8 analyzes social classes and class struggle by identifying the origins and evolution of the dominant and popular classes. First, classes are defined. Then they are positioned in terms of supporters and opponents of regimes

from 1926 until 1975. The dominant social classes, including agrarian capitalists and industrial capitalists, are described in relation to the state and to civil servants and technocrats. The popular classes, in particular the rural proletariat and the peasants as well as the urban working classes, are described, and their role in the 1974–1975 revolutionary period is examined in relation to strikes and other actions aimed at improving conditions. The analysis argues that while committed to change the popular classes were constrained by the progressive political Communist and Socialist parties and conflicted by a disparate and splintered revolutionary left.

Chapter 9 focuses on two legacies of the Portuguese experience. The first looks at the prospects for socialism inherent in earlier periods but clearly envisioned by the revolutionary participants in the 1974–1975 period and in the new constitution that emanated from this vision. The struggle for a socialist revolution is juxtaposed with the problems in the Portuguese situation, which denied it. Second, I dwell on the idea of hegemony and counterhegemony in the thinking of Antonio Gramsci as a way to reflect on the capitalist experience before and after the 1974–1975 period.

Chapter 10 provides a postscript to the revolutionary period, with attention to the effort to establish hegemony over Portuguese society during the last quarter of the twentieth century: it focuses on the disputes between the PS and the PCP, the effort of the MFA to maintain its position in the face of the political parties and a pluralistic and divisive parliamentary democracy, and the new composition of forces that took hold after November 25, 1975. This period begins with the counterrevolutionary coup of November 25, 1975, and the rolling back of reforms in the ensuing years, a consolidation of bourgeois or parliamentary democracy and a resurgence of capital both in the cities and the countryside. It is a time for the search for a new hegemonic bloc of political and economic forces in conjunction with a state that continues on with old forms and adapts to new forms, in particular casting off the remnants of socialism and legitimizing a neoliberal state in concert with domestic and foreign private capital.

I may not have dealt with or answered all of the questions in the conclusion, but I have tried to address most of them. The focus on several themes and the topical organization of the chapters results in some repetition of information in order to help the reader along. For example, the discussion in chapter 3 on state formations draws upon the resistance to the Salazar dictatorship, and later this information helps to understand the dynamics of the revolutionary period during 1974–1975, especially the tendency toward popular and direct democracy.

Acknowledgments

I HAVE HAD A CLEAR IDEA OF HOW TO BREAK UP this book into thematic chapters; I have tried to be direct and yet include some relevant detail. All this is difficult in a work that tries to cover a century of activity while not providing a definitive or detailed history. Barbara Metzger, who considerably tightened up the book with her editing, does not tolerate reiteration of points or pedagogical guidance to the reader, and I have tended to accept most of her direction in this regard. I have added a list of *siglas* or acronyms to back up their spelling in the text, and I explain and characterize each the first time it is mentioned in the text (in ensuing references, the reader can go to the appendix). I identify people the first time they are mentioned, and firms are placed in context but not necessarily with great detail, because my purpose is not to analyze them, just to show their influence or importance at particular moments. I have relied closely on position and comments of many participants and observers, yet I have tried to distinguish views from both the right and left that differ from my own critical but optimistic and progressive perspective.

Feedback from readers has suggested that I tend to jump from historical period to period and mix chronology, but my purpose has been to compare and contrast. I do so, however, after explaining the significance of each period. I have also tried to eliminate or mitigate redundancies that appear, for example, the discussion of left parties in chapters 6 and 9 or of the popular left in chapters 2 and 7. Although these could be combined, I chose to separate the discussion into pre-1974 and post-1975 activities, but I also tried to analyze the organizational and ideological evolution of the left parties after 1974 as a case study; there is a necessary slight overlap in content, but I decided to leave

most of this intact. One might question why I focus on early history, but this was essential in my discussion on the capitalist transition and the role of the state that is at the heart of some debates in Portugal about when capitalism took place, and because that was an issue even up to 1974. I needed to give some sweep of history in examination of sources that identify both early and late dates for the capitalist transition; this then provided the context for a look later at aspirations for a transition to socialism. In this effort, I wanted to relate substance to theoretical questions.

I have been asked why I emphasize patterns of continuity throughout the twentieth century rather than the 1974 break that appears to have distinguished present from past. My overview allows me to show continuity through time, but I do not wish to undermine the proposition that a significant political and economic rupture occurred during 1974 and 1975, nor do I wish to deny that there was substantial change, including the impact of integration with Europe. However, the aftermath of the revolutionary period clearly shows that regime change and a vision of socialism (manifested through a new constitution) do not ensure the radical outcomes anticipated in the 1974–1975 events and experience.

Another point, related to my focus on state and class and drawn out initially in the chapters on the state and later in chapter 8 on class, refers to propositions, set forth at the outset, that suggest that class struggle can be observed in the state as well as in production and that the political struggle for the transition to socialism requires the expansion of both direct and indirect forms of participation. In ensuing discussion I do not elaborate on these propositions but instead generally incorporate them into an analysis that at least implicitly demonstrates their validity. In my theoretical introduction I make clear that this book attempts to evolve a class theory of the state through examination of the Portuguese case. In the ensuing chapters I believe that I have worked my analysis of events around these very general propositions and demonstrated the political and economic outcomes of class struggle and the role of the state. In this process I do not ignore the role of institutional life, past or present, or the structure of the state, which gives a certain continuity as well as resistance to the potential change implied by the class struggles.

An early draft was read closely by Nancy Bermeo, Rosemary Galli, and John Hammond, whose suggestions and comments helped me in revision. A second draft benefited from a critical reading by Manuel Vilaverde Cabral, António Costa Pinto, Víctor Crespo, Mário Murteira, André Nathan, Alan Stoleroff, and Boaventura de Sousa Santos. The latter proposed a reorganization of chapters that necessitated further revision and, in my view, improved the manuscript considerably. Allen Isaacman read a more polished version. Mário Machaqueiro read carefully, corrected, and translated the whole manu-

Introduction

T HIS BOOK EMBRACES A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW of the twentieth century with a focus on the revolutionary experience of Portugal during 1974 to 1975. It intends to interpret and synthesize without being a definitive history. It relates theoretical considerations to practical experiences. It is comparative, drawing on examples elsewhere and providing for a basis for comparison. Portugal is unique in that its relatively recent revolution brought rupture to a half century of authoritarianism, challenged traditional institutions, unleashed class struggle, opened up the possibility of participatory democracy, and promised a socialist outcome. In his *Crisis of the Dictatorships* Nicos Poulantzas particularly saw promise in the Portuguese experiment. His comparative study explored transitions in Spain, Portugal, and Greece during the middle 1970s. Other examples serve for comparison. In an evolving pluralistic society, the Chilean peaceful road to socialism under Salvador Allende was disrupted by a brutal military coup in September 1973. The opening of politics and revolutionary change, for example, is explored in *Fanshen* and *Shenfan* by William Hinton in his documentary in a Chinese village after 1949; in Russia where class struggle was evident in the years ensuing from its 1917 revolution as carefully delineated in *Class Struggles in the USSR* by Charles Bettelheim; and in *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* and *Class Struggles in France, 1848–1850* by Karl Marx in his penetrating analysis of state autonomy and class struggle.

The Theoretical Framework

Four principal themes stand out in the book: (1) capitalism and state formations in twentieth-century Portugal, (2) the effort after the coup of April 25, 1974, to bring about a transition to socialism, (3) the class struggle, traditional institutions, and the new social and popular left movements that were conspicuous during the revolutionary period from 1974 to 1975, and (4) hegemony before, during, and after the revolution to the end of the century.

Given that the state and its apparatuses have come to pervade all aspects of contemporary capitalist society and that there is little consensus on theory of the state or on what constitutes a class analysis of society, I attempt a theoretical analysis of the state and its relationship to class through examination of the Portuguese case. I draw on essential ideas from the theoretical literature, generally European in influence, that may have relevance to Portugal. For example, I ask to what extent this experience has been the inevitable outcome of capitalist-class hegemony supported by the state and its ideological apparatuses (Antonio Gramsci). How are the form and function of the state determined by relations of class within the capitalist mode of production (Nicos Poulantzas)? Has the capitalist class mobilized the state as a counterforce to the capitalist crisis (Louis Althusser)? Does the state bureaucracy operate independently of the capitalist class, yet defend the interests of that class because of dependence on capitalist accumulation (Joaquin Hirsh)? Does the state serve as an arena for class conflict (Claus Offe)?

I will explore the possibility that the questions raised by these thinkers may be helpful in understanding the Portuguese experience and, conversely, that the Portuguese experience may contribute to the confirmation or revision of theories on state and class. I am particularly interested in the thought of Gramsci and Poulantzas, whose ideas and writings were popular during the revolutionary period in Portugal but whose case studies drew from experiences outside Portugal. The Gramscian analysis of the formation of the state amidst regional disparities in the north and south of Italy, for instance, is particularly relevant.

I am interested in examining the proposition that the form of the state evolves from the relations of production in capitalist society and that the state is the political expression of the class structure inherent in production. By adopting this approach I hope to avoid the economism of an analysis that concentrates on the economic base or infrastructure of society in isolation from class relations of production. While recognizing the usefulness of institutional analysis, I also want to avoid overemphasizing political concepts or focusing on the superstructural aspects of society at the expense of a materialist critique of political economy.

In spite of the omnipresence of global capitalism and attempts by governments everywhere to limit the role of the state in the economy, I believe that the state remains decisive. Martin Carnoy argues that the state "has grown increasingly important in every society, from advanced industrial to Third World primary-goods exporter, and in every aspect of society—not just politics, but in economics [production, finance, distribution], in ideology [schooling, the media], and in law enforcement [policy, military]" (1984: 3). It is clear in the thought of Marx and Engels that under capitalism the state performs many necessary functions in society, the consequences of fundamental contradictions between private and public life and the division of society into classes, using its power to mitigate class conflict. Thus public force is entrusted to the institutions of the state and to its repressive apparatuses (the army and the police) to ensure order and stability and to its ideological apparatus to influence public opinion. With these apparatuses the state can ensure the reproduction of the dominant bourgeois class structure. An essential question, however, is whether the state always functions as the coercive instrument of the ruling class or is sometimes autonomous, especially in situations where no class appears to hold power to rule through the state. Does the bourgeoisie in certain instances delegate power to the bureaucracy? Or is autonomy the rule in "exceptional" periods when no class is capable of ruling and a Bonapartist personality in power plays the classes off against each other? Does such a personality serve the economic interests of the bourgeoisie even though it does not control the state? And what about the contradictions between an autonomous state and a bourgeoisie no longer content with Bonapartist rule or a restless proletariat threatening revolt? Another perspective challenges the assumption that through intervention the state is able to ensure capitalist accumulation by facilitating the extraction of surplus from workers and asks instead to what extent the state is able to mediate the class struggle. Can the state successfully manage and implement programs and policies that represent the competing and contradictory interests of different classes? Finally, can the state serve to stimulate direct and continuous participation of people in government and society? If bourgeois and proletarian democracy are incompatible, must workers seize the state and its apparatuses, as Lenin advocated? Can workers find their place within the bourgeois state, or must they establish a parallel organization to pursue a participatory democracy?

In pursuing answers to these questions, I have limited my discussion to the identification of major propositions and assumptions, avoiding advocacy of a particular line of thinking in the belief that real historical experience may demonstrate the validity and usefulness of more than one approach depending on different conditions at different periods of time. Thus, this introductory

theoretical essay serves as a prelude to a fuller discussion of the origins and evolution of the Portuguese capitalist state.

I have already stated my preference for a class theory of the state, keeping in mind Marx's view that all history is the struggle of classes, and I find instructive the lesson he gave us in his class analysis of mid-nineteenth-century France. A class analysis must account for institutional life alongside the actions and interactions of all the classes. Within Portugal during the "hot summer" and the fall of 1975 there was clear evidence of an emerging class struggle and a rupture with the past. After 1975 there was a struggle for a new hegemony of class and institutional forces, which evolved through formal representative democracy, and a partial continuity of state apparatuses and practices.

Marx and Engels emphasized two classes under capitalism, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but they did not ignore other class forces. In *Capital* Marx referred both to the three big classes of landowners, the industrial capitalists, and the proletariat and to a wider range of classes and class fractions. My analysis of Portugal attempts to incorporate all classes and class fractions. I hope to avoid the structural limitations of class categories and relate class to the ongoing struggle of people. The dominant class of capitalist society tends to be a ruling class in possession of the major means of production and political power. As a ruling class it is an economic class that also rules politically. It dominates the economy through control over corporations and financial institutions. It need not be monolithic and may incorporate varied interests that tend to become cohesive. How the dominant class relates to a theory of the capitalist state thus becomes a central concern in this book.

I also intend to address the theme of hegemony at moments of conjuncture and class confrontation and to assess its impact on the state. This seems especially relevant in the case of Portugal, once the most backward of capitalist nations in Europe. Gramsci drew from the Italian experience, but his ideas have served comparative analysis elsewhere. He suggested that the most favorable conditions for proletarian revolution do not necessarily occur in countries where capitalism is most advanced. His emphasis on political and ideological as well as economic struggle may have relevance to the transition from dictatorship to political democracy that took place in Portugal after April 25. How the state functioned in this important moment—facilitating or inhibiting the bourgeoisie, providing concessions to subordinate classes, and building unity with the mass of population—is of particular interest.

A focus on social classes and struggle is important in this book because the plethora of studies on the 1974–1975 events place their analysis in some sort of class context. It was a time when classes were especially conspicuous in the dynamic play of forces reaching for a revolutionary outcome, but this emphasis should also account for traditional institutions as well as emerging

popular forces and social movements that were deeply involved in shaping the experience.

While examining state and class, I do not ignore institutional life. This certainly is implied in any focus on the state, but I also explicitly look at institutional forces not only in the period before April 25, 1974, but thereafter and, in particular, the role of the military, the major progressive political parties, and the emerging new social and popular movements.

I also explore the implications of the transition to socialism that was part of the rhetoric and writings of the 1974–1975 revolutionary period. Two strategies in this transition to socialism were debated. The Leninist strategy of dual power aimed at the mobilization of the working class into a parallel organization outside and counter to the capitalist state and under the leadership of a revolutionary vanguard party. Through the working class this organization would seize state power and thereafter establish its hegemony. Initially, political class struggle would have primacy over the economic class struggle in a commitment to a mass line of proletarian internationalism and the formation of workers' councils and a united or popular front of working class, poor peasantry, and petty bourgeoisie. An alternative strategy, reflecting the changing nature of the state under advanced capitalism, turned away from the strategy of dual power because the state was seen as all pervasive in social life. In this approach class struggle would not be confused with building mass opposition but also take place within the apparatuses of the state, intensifying its basic contradictions and mobilizing fractions to support the transition to socialism. Although Nicos Poulantzas seems to have accepted the strategy of dual power in his early writing, later he altered his position (1976: 179–180), arguing that struggle within the state apparatus itself was necessary to disrupt the balance of forces and bring about a transition to socialism. Given their failure in the Portuguese situation, it will be of interest to examine how deeply revolutionary forces penetrated the popular classes. The frontal assault on the state may have seemed inappropriate because of the difficulty of building a mass revolutionary party. Given the pervasive influence of parliamentarianism, representative democracy and a plurality of political parties might prevent power from degenerating into a corporative system on the right or falling under the control of an intransigent type on the left. It will be useful therefore to examine how the Portuguese bourgeoisie manipulated this democracy to its own ends.

These political outcomes are somewhat determined by what Gramsci called "hegemony" and "counterhegemony" to characterize the forms of bourgeois ideological and cultural domination in society. His conceptualization cut through mechanistic interpretations and permitted understanding of capitalism's pervasive influence in advanced society. He emphasized economic

considerations, acknowledging the importance of the mode of production in periods of institutional stability, but he also directed attention to the political sphere and referred to an "ensemble of relations" and a "historical bloc" in an effort to break away from the abstract economism and dogmatism of some progressive thinking in the early twentieth century and to focus analysis on concrete situations. "Hegemony" implied ideological manipulation and consensus that transcended the state and civil society, and Gramsci employed it to suggest that sustaining a social order over time depended not only on the organization of state power, repression, and violence but also on ideological consensus and popular support. He moved beyond an instrumental view of the state as a coercive bureaucratic apparatus imposed upon civil society a view of the state as an arena for ideological and political conflict and as a means by which the dominant class seeks popular consensus. For the dominant class to achieve hegemony, it must transform popular consciousness and ensure that ruling ideas become deeply engrained in social relations and national traditions. Intellectuals with their coherent worldviews can facilitate this transmission process and serve as a link between the state and civil society. The contrasting notion of "counterhegemony" denotes the challenge of insurgent movements in both civil society and the state.

These theoretical considerations emanate from particular experiences, usually a configurative study such as Marx's attention to France, Lenin's historical analysis of the rise of capitalism in Russia, or Gramsci's focus on Italy, but their work has served the contemporary era as a basis for comparative study elsewhere.

1

Capitalism and the Bourgeois Revolution

IN PORTUGAL, AS IN MOST OF EUROPE, profound transformations of society have occurred repeatedly since ancient times. Revolution may erupt in political and economic struggles for power and in response to charismatic or ruthless personalities motivated by greed or selfish interests with little concern for the common people. In modern times, change has accompanied the rise of capitalism and the implantation of a "bourgeois" revolution through phases of mercantilism, industrialization, and imperialism. A division of labor between rulers and the ruled has marked every phase, with the dispossessed and repressed often resisting and rebelling against domination and exploitation and manifesting a vision of an egalitarian society.

A brief exploration of the origins and consolidation of capitalism in Portugal helps in understanding the delays and advances of the bourgeois revolution, serves as a prelude and background to the revolutionary events of 1974–1975, and touches upon why and how the inclination to remain marginalized, resort to protectionism, and develop autonomously from within was eventually transcended through integration with Europe.

In early indigenous societies most people lived poorly, yet participated in decisions affecting life in the community and relations between the community and the outside world. Some communities exhibited early class distinctions based on a hierarchy of religious and political authority, with tribute paying distinguishing the peasantry from the ruling class. Under feudalism the lords appropriated the surplus through production on their lands, and there were no commodity relations. An early division of labor occurred with

the appearance of artisans in towns who produced commodities and ex-
changed them more or less freely and equally for products they immediately
needed. Another division of labor occurred with the introduction of money
and the emergence of the merchant specializing in commerce, an elemen-
tary form of capitalism in which owners of capital appropriated the surplus
produced by workers.[1] These historical moments appeared in the European
transition from feudalism to capitalism, but in Portugal, always a relatively
poor country, when and how a capitalist transition occurred has long been
in dispute.

During the Middle Ages, people clustered in the local economic domains of
feudal lords. The English called them manors, the French *seigneuries*, and the
Portuguese *senhorias*. Three ruling class fractions prospered under feudalism:
monarchies, hereditary nobility (whose income was generated independently
on the basis of fiefs), and staffs with income-producing offices held for life
such as the Catholic clergy. Most people were peasants living in individual
households, usually clustered in villages, with access to and control over some
agricultural land. Politically, the manorial system involved mutual obligations
between lords and their vassals. The vassal would swear fidelity to the lord and
would often be given a fief, usually a piece of land, in exchange for his services,
generally military.

The peasants worked their own fields and the common fields of the village.
Wage labor was uncommon, work in the lord's fields being supervised by his
representatives. The lords and the Church sustained themselves through col-
lection of feudal rents from all servant households in the form of direct labor
in the household or the fields of the lord or a portion of their production. By
the tenth and eleventh centuries some commodities had begun to circulate
through informal networks of traders, markets, and fairs, and eventually these
networks served as the foundation for emerging cities that absorbed rural
industry and trade.

These changes marked the beginning of a transformation of production
and social conditions that eventually swept away past relations and practices
in the expectation of an improvement in material conditions and a freer and
more humane society. The transition involved disruptions in the workforce.
In advanced feudalism, for example, the peasant was evicted from his land
and became a wandering wage laborer and part of the rural proletariat. Some
peasants fared well and exploited the less fortunate, while many of the rural
proletariat migrated to the cities for seasonal work. These conditions provided
the labor forces necessary for industrialization. Technological advances and
a large pool of migrating rural laborers seeking work for wages contributed
to increases in production and in the size and efficiency of farms. Thus, the
countryside provided the resources for the transition to capitalism.

Timing of the Transition

Where and when the transition took place in Portugal must be understood in the context of European history. Although the emergence of capitalism in early nineteenth-century England differed from capitalist development in France, Germany, and the United States, which occurred later in the century, a typical transition from feudalism to capitalism can be sketched as follows:

850 to 1000	Consolidation of feudalism in Europe
1000 to 1300	Feudal expansion and the rise of centralized states
1300 to 1450	Crisis and decline, peasant rebellions and warfare
1450 to 1650	Transition, exploration, world economy
1650 to 1800	Early mercantile capitalism, proletarianization of the peasantry, and industrial revolution
1800 to 2000	Monopoly capitalism and imperialism

Historians generally assume that the definitive transition within Portugal occurred during the nineteenth century, although the 1640 break with Spain and the May 28, 1926, overthrow of the First Republic—ushering in nearly a half century of authoritarian rule—are taken into account as well as the liberal revolutions of 1820 and 1910. Events since 1974 have also been viewed as decisive. Several historians, however, dwell on and debate the implications of a fourteenth-century revolution. António Borges Coelho (1981) is most insistent that a bourgeois and national revolution occurred in the cities and towns of Portugal in 1383 in a challenge to the feudalism in the region between the Douro and the Minho rivers. Urban demand for foodstuffs transformed the relations of production on some agricultural lands, and a class struggle between merchants in towns and the feudal nobility was evident. Armando de Castro (1979) provides a detailed analysis of the transition from the twelfth to the fifteenth century with attention to archival records on feudalism and the rise of mercantile capitalism. Ronald Guedes da Fonseca (1983: 19–28) asserts that Portugal produced the first bourgeois revolution with a national character in Europe, arguing that from the eleventh century on, a commercial bourgeoisie used Portugal's geographical position to promote maritime commerce because of its strategic location on the sea route between the Flemish and Italian cities. Portugal also benefited from its national unity in the early twelfth century, allowing the bourgeoisie a rapid ascent to a new class of merchants. By the fourteenth century extensive bourgeois influence in the cities confronted the political power of the feudal aristocracy and the clergy. Although the feudal bloc of nobility and clergy that held political power through the mediation of the crown did not systematically obstruct these commercial

activities, it sought to control and extract economic benefits from them. Yet
a vigorous commercial bourgeoisie grew rapidly in Lisbon and especially in
Porto. In its pursuit of autonomy and expansion, it inevitably confronted the
power and political, administrative, and fiscal privilege of the feudal classes.
In the interior cities of the Alentejo and Algarve an emerging rural bourgeoi-
sie also influenced the peasantry against the nobility. A coalition of classes led
by the commercial bourgeoisie succeeded in resisting and expelling Castilian
forces backed by the aristocracy and the clergy in what Fonseca character-
izes as a "social mercantile bourgeois revolution" at Aljubarrota in August
1385. Although history generally records this as a war between nations and a
struggle for national salvation, Fonseca sees it as "class war culminating in the
triumph of the mercantile bourgeoisie, allied to artisans, peasants, the urban
people in general, the rural bourgeoisie, and some individual personalities
who held certain positions in the state apparatus" (1983: 21). He argues that
this revolution pushed Portugal toward the golden age of navigation and dis-
covery at a time when the old dominant classes were trying to recover their
political power.

Although the old aristocratic classes were able to recover much of their
power and influence among the peasantry, especially in the interior, the com-
mercial bourgeoisie eventually persisted as a subordinate class (Fonseca, 1983:
23). Fonseca considers the changes of 1383–1385 significant in that mercantile
capitalism coexisted with feudalism. Future industrial capitalism, however,
was compromised by the social structures maintained by the nobility and
the clergy. He refers to this situation as "a conflictual alliance" in which the
mercantile bourgeoisie was able to gain small concessions and a greater role
in the state apparatus over the long run until the nineteenth century (24). The
price of its compromise in the fifteenth century was the denial of its historical
role. The dominant nobility-clergy class was able to subsist on its lucrative
trade in the colonies, much of it ultimately absorbed by England and some
of it conceded to its subordinate bourgeois class ally without concern for the
development and modernization of the country (25).

These relationships help to explain why Portugal remained an agricultural
country, its industrial capitalism long delayed. Only in the second and third
decades of the nineteenth century was the bourgeoisie able to manifest its po-
tential. By the middle of the century there was an opportunity for a bourgeois
revolution of some importance, but the representatives of the aristocracy
held on while ceding hegemony and control of the state apparatuses to the
bourgeoisie (26). The more radical sectors of the petty bourgeoisie desired a
transformation but were marginalized as the monarchy maintained itself in
power. The "liberal" bourgeoisie was weak and indecisive, but some of the
semifeudal structures were dismantled without destroying the aristocracy

itself so that thereafter a link persisted between the economic interests of the nobility and sectors of the commercial and financial bourgeoisie.

Thus the so-called bourgeois revolution gave birth to what Armando de Castro (1979) calls "bourgeois aristocracy," implying that feudal remnants survived in the framework of Portuguese capitalism. Protectionist measures favored nascent industry. There were no authentic agrarian bourgeois reforms. Sales of Church property resulted in the transfer of property to a few hundred families of the big financial bourgeoisie who were linked to the nobility. Large bourgeois *latifundios* replaced some of the feudal estates, especially to the south of the Tagus River.

A somewhat similar interpretation appears in the work of António Fonseca Ferreira (1977), who examines the evolution of capitalism from its origins in the fourteenth century to the nineteenth century. The development of the productive forces is central to his analysis: "Within the social formation the commercial fraction of capital dominates . . . tending to invest in speculative agricultural and commercial activities" (7). He argues for the need to examine the role of both the institutions organized by the apparatus of the state and that of the social classes in the development of the productive forces (9). He goes so far as to compare the revolutions of 1383–1385 and 1974: whereas earlier the peasants had allied themselves with the bourgeoisie against the feudal aristocracy, in the twentieth century workers and peasants seized factories and farms only to succumb to the central power of the bourgeoisie (12–13).

The Motive Forces of the Transition

Two general views dominate the extensive debate on the primary motives for the transition. One of these, represented by Marx and Engels and most of the contributors to the early debates, is that forces within feudalism led to the change. Among these forces were inefficiencies in the manorial system of production, the increasing monetary needs of the landowning aristocracy, and a shift from feudal rents and peasant labor on manorial land to monetary payments or remuneration in kind that produced widespread flight of the peasantry from the land. This view comes close to the interpretations of Castro and Fonseca. An alternative view is that capitalism emerged independent of feudalism and was largely attributable to the rise of merchant traders and international trade and that a system for exchange was the catalyst for the transition (Hilton et al., 1978).

Manuel Vilaverde Cabral's discussion of the development of capitalism in nineteenth-century Portugal reflects this latter understanding. He focuses on the 1703 Treaty of Methuen as establishing a form of import substitution

(1981: 15) and goes on to examine the abolition of slavery and the rise of wage labor in the south (17), the contradictions that appeared in the development of the capitalist mode of production (specifically, a spurt in large-scale industrialization, investments in machinery, and accelerated mechanization in the textile industry, especially from 1875 to 1880 [39]), the penetration of capitalism in the countryside both in the traditional agricultural area of Ribatejo and in the vineyards of the north, emigration and its impact on the development of the capitalist mode of production (41), and the consolidation of capitalist relations of production from 1870 to 1890. His analysis of the capitalist transition in Portugal (1979) focuses on class struggle, and his anthology of historical writings (1974) includes discussion of the agrarian question.

Focusing on the same period, José Capela (1979) points to the abolition of slavery and the role of the Portuguese bourgeoisie in the period after 1810. His related analysis (1975) concentrates on the mercantile capitalist bourgeoisie of Porto and its ties to the colonies from 1834 to 1900. He links the commercial bourgeoisie to its membership in the Assoçiação Comercial (founded in Porto in 1834), describes its impact during the nineteenth century, and associates it with the tradition of British commercialism. He points to the emergence of new trade organizations, such as the Centro Comercial do Porto, the Ateneu Comercial, and the Associação Comercial dos Lojistas do Porto, by the end of the century.[2]

Ramiro da Costa (1978) examines industrialization from 1850 to 1910 and dates the introduction of relations of capitalist production to the early eighteenth-century reign of Dom José I. He argues that the penetration of capitalism was partially blocked by the liberal revolution of 1820–1863, which undermined the old seigniorial class (14).[3] He identifies the movement and popular revolt of Maria da Fonte and Patuleia as significant but incapable of halting the development of the necessary conditions for implementing capitalist relations of production in the Portuguese countryside (14–15). In a similar vein, he points to the crisis of 1890–1891 as working to the advantage of the large Alentejo landowners, who succeeded in imposing a protectionist regime and consolidating its power (19).

Miriam Halpern Pereira (1978) suggests that, whereas the notion of decadence underlay past historical explanations of retarded development in Portugal, the notion of dependence has become the basis for more recent work. She shows that mercantilist imperialism affected the Portuguese economy, undermined the empire, and disarticulated the national state, leaving the Portuguese bourgeoisie dependent on Britain (18–19). Emphasizing changes in agriculture, her analysis contends with those of Castro (1979) and Cabral (1974), who stress industrialization (Cabral identifies bursts of activity in 1873–1886 and 1891–1914) and argue that external dependency did not

preclude an evolution similar to England's, the difference being the lesser intensity associated with the transition from mercantile to industrial capitalism. Vitorino Magalhães Godinho (1971) takes the very different view that the character of the old peninsular regime impeded the development of capitalism in Portugal and that the agro-export sector was essential for industrial expansion, especially after 1885, with the opening of the African colonial market. Pereira argues that the old regime was gradually destroyed by the liberal revolutions of the mid-nineteenth century. The passage from commercial to industrial capitalism was distorted and accompanied by slow industrial development. The emerging capitalism of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries was decisive in the transformation of the seigniorial structure. In the nineteenth century legal changes with regard to property brought an end to feudalism; tributes were suppressed in 1832–1834, and by 1850 the conversion of feudal property to capitalist property was complete (Pereira, 1983a: 285).

During the second half of the nineteenth century, industrialization in Portugal was blocked by Britain, which dominated the world market in industrial products and obstructed the incipient mechanization of industry in competing nations. Pereira suggests that the smothering of the revolution of Maria da Fonte by the Quadruple Alliance delayed the bourgeois revolution (1983a: 315), and Britain's intervention in 1847 ensured its dominance over the internal Portuguese market and control over the Brazilian market as well.[4] A policy of free trade rather than protectionism ensued under the liberal governments—a reflection of the weakness of the industrial relative to the commercial and agricultural bourgeoisies. For forty years Portugal had exported vast quantities of wine, fruit, cork, wood, and minerals primarily to England, which absorbed more than half of them as Portugal's principal market. Although industry suffered from this relationship, agriculture benefited, and the number of agricultural capitalists multiplied. In some regions domestic commerce suffered as Portuguese merchants favored foreign markets, and eventually the whole economy declined until agrarian and other reforms and some industrialization brought balance at the end of the century (317–339).[5]

Pereira (2001 and 2002: 132–133) argues that the new colonial system was about to become the mainstay of the Portuguese economy. She identifies a new international division of labor during the period 1870 to 1914 and examines liberal measures during a period dominated by agriculture alongside emerging industry. Technological changes were evident in the two principal branches of agriculture, maize and viticulture, in relation with chemicals and flour milling in industry. She argues that there should have been a dynamic relationship between agriculture and industry with the colonial system becoming decisive not only as a consumer market but as a source for accumulation of capital. The new colonial system would become essential to a

Portuguese economy that had failed to live up to its potential. Liberalism may have undermined the old order, and it contributed to agriculture alongside some emerging industry, yet whereas Portugal in 1800 had been one of the three richest countries in Europe, by 1913 it was one of the three or four poorest.

Fonseca (1983: 28–29), describing the Portuguese social formation from the second half of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, points to "the slow evolution of an archaic capitalism, semiparasitic, dependent, with limited industrial dynamism, existing largely on colonial exploitation . . . an aristocratic bourgeoisie in political power, almost always governing on despotism . . . an ideological superstructure favorable to the most backward clericalism and the cult of an obscure ruralism, a state apparatus run by corrupt and routine bureaucracy, all a legacy of the past." Jaime Reis (1984) attributes Portuguese underdevelopment to the devastation caused by the Napoleonic invasions, the instability created by the nineteenth-century civil wars, low tariffs, a small internal market based on a backward agrarian economy, a weak and divided bourgeoisie, a scarcity of capital, and deficiencies in education. Castro (1974: 67) points to the strangling of the economy in the period 1910 to 1970 caused by

> the profound agrarian crisis (weakness of market, population flight, sharpening regional disequilibrium, low level of economic technology, incapacity of self-sustaining production, entrenchment of traditional interests that retard the modernizing of capitalist relations of production in the countryside); the small internal consumption market, a reflection not only of the agricultural crisis but of the low level of work in relation to capital and income; the decline in industrial growth; increase in inflation; low level of industrial technology; increase in emigration; regional disequilibrium; protectionist policies; low human social development and poor training of the workforce.

Despite these problems, capitalism had unquestionably altered the character of the rural socio-economy. At the same time, integration into the global world through technology and direct investments by large firms had promoted a capitalism of consumption, stimulated a modest growth in commercial banking, and promoted the extension of markets, especially to Europe.

Labor and Class Struggle

The transformation of the peasant farmer into a free wage laborer accompanied the transformation of money into capital and established an accumulation process. In his useful *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations* (1857–1858)

Marx argues that the worker had to be separated from the land—that free wage labor and its exchange against money were preconditions for capitalism. Most traditional Marxists see the struggle between classes as decisive in this process. In his informative *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899) Lenin identifies conditions such as competition and land concentration as impacting class relations in such a way that a rural petty bourgeoisie, a rural proletariat, and even a tenuous middle class replaced the Russian peasantry. This dissolution of the peasantry was accompanied by a migration from agricultural areas to more densely populated areas and an increase in usurer capital in the countryside.

Rejecting the idea that the slow development of the productive forces was attributable to the primitive mechanization of agriculture, the inadequate use of fertilizers, and the general backwardness of agriculture, Ramiro da Costa (1978: 19) suggests that the development of a Portuguese internal market undermined feudal property by establishing the conditions for bourgeois production and commercial bourgeois domination of the artisan industry (21). After 1890, colonial exploitation and emigration to Brazil sustained commerce and industry and to some extent reinvigorated the bourgeoisie (29). The new liberal bourgeoisie, however, "subordinated its development to its dependence" and relied on "trade and colonial exploitation, the ownership and exploitation of land . . . the oppression of the working classes, and the lack of a domestic industrial base" (Kayman, 1986: 3).

The liberal First Republic of 1910–1926 marked a definitive turn against the monarchy, the old aristocracy, and the conservative Church, but it was a period of political instability. During the republic, Castro says, the development of the capitalist forces of production undermined commercial capital tied to imports. He points to early industrial development and the expansion of bank capital and describes the strikes in 1911 in the Setúbal canning industry and the rupture between the republic and the workers' movement (1978: 53).

An additional stimulus for the economy was the colonial market that supplanted the foreign market: "The expansion in Africa permitted a great accumulation of capital. . . . The underemployment, the unemployment, the impoverishment of small farmers continued to characterize the structure of the Portuguese economy" (Pereira, 1983b: 321). Capela (1977) documents how Portugal introduced capitalism into the colonies, especially Mozambique.

The period from 1926 to 1961 has been described by Costa as reflecting the autonomous development of a backward bourgeoisie because no fraction held hegemony. It was a period associated with fascism under dictatorial rule but supported by "an alliance between the big industrial bourgeoisie and the big rural bourgeoisie . . . [and] behind them . . . the diverse sectors of the medium and petty bourgeoisie" (1978: 65). Formally, fascism was based on three

pillars: the National Labor Statute, which suppressed independent unions but created fascist ones, the Law of Industrial Conditioning, and the Colonial Act. With the nationalization of foreign capital, investment diminished from 1925 to 1945. Some of these holdings, for example, in transport and communications, were later given to national capital. The world depression also led Salazar to impose tariff barriers and limits on expansion, and this led to an alliance between the industrial bourgeoisie and large landowners up to 1940. From that date on, industrial development and financial capital diminished the weight of agriculture and placed the latifundists and their political representatives in a subordinate position. From 1945 on, the failure to introduce intensive capitalist exploitation in the countryside and the maintenance of low salaries for the rural working class undermined the industrial bourgeoisie and impeded the development of an industrial workforce.

Drawing on the dominance-dependence theme of Pereira, Mário Murteira (1979: 124) emphasizes "the incapacity of the Portuguese social formation to internalize in its process of growth the consequences of the imperial relationship that it always maintains on the external level." Until 1974 the Portuguese structural crisis was the result of exogenous mechanisms such as the expansion of exports, the stimulation of industrialization by outside investment, emigration, and so on. Additionally, the maintenance of the political-ideological structure under Marcelo Caetano ensured the old order and precluded any major transformation. Consequently, many tensions appeared in 1974 and 1975 with a new political force seeking to establish a new economic system and a new model of accumulation that would necessitate a break with international capitalism (132). The failure to effect any major change was due largely to weakness in the political sector (134).[6]

Thus, the delay of capitalism in Portugal appears to have been the consequence of a floundering liberal bourgeoisie made up mainly of under-capitalized small- and medium-scale commerce and industry with some concentration in urban areas but insufficient political power to bring about full industrial capitalism. Its inability to involve the agricultural and financial elements of the old aristocracy in modernizing the economy made the capitalist transformation shaky and uneven and doomed the liberal experiments of the nineteenth and early twentieth century to failure.[7]

Notes

1. In his framework for the study of central issues in economic history, Douglass C. North (1981) focuses on two economic revolutions: the first occurring ten thousand years ago and involving the transition from hunting and gathering to settled agriculture, the herding and breeding of animals, and the cultivation of plants for food, in

which "the results of a developed ability to increase the resource base amounted to a fundamental economic revolution" (73); and the second revolving around industrialization and recent technological advances that "created an elastic supply curve of new knowledge which builds economic growth into the system" (171).

2. The Porto bourgeoisie remained dominant in its rivalry, conflict, and interaction with the commercial bourgeoisie of Lisbon—see Maria de Lurdes Lima dos Santos (1983) on the behavior and customs of the bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century.

3. Gallagher (1983: 12, 14) emphasizes the influence of liberalism in confronting feudal remnants and facilitating Portugal's path to capitalist development, explaining that "freemasonry, introduced by foreign merchants, spread among a small section of the middle class at the beginning of the nineteenth century . . . radical ideas continued to make headway. . . . Between 1820 and 1851, years of political strife in Portugal, liberalism was never totally eclipsed as a viable force . . . for much of the nineteenth century, the military was a relatively liberal force."

4. Kayman argues that the alliance between the landed bourgeoisie and the British allowed the bourgeoisie to remain strong enough to impede any deep transformation of landownership and use, especially among the small number of very large holdings in the south. The commercialization of agriculture and the surpluses it generated thus did not become the basis for industrialization but instead served financial capital. The penetration of capitalist relations of production in the countryside resulted in the separation of the worker from his means of production—the proletarianization of the rural population. The peasantry did not benefit from the undermining of feudal ownership or from alternative industrial activities that could absorb a surplus of labor: proletarianization left it "impoverished, more dependent on local feudal power (as hirelings or seasonal workers) and subject to cyclical or chronic unemployment and emigration" (Kayman, 1986: 2).

5. For an analysis of Portuguese backwardness in the 1860–1913 period, see Reis (1984). For an interesting and useful understanding of the notion of liberal bourgeois property in the juridical and legislative history of Portugal, see Hespanha (1980).

6. For a useful analysis of monopolies and finance capital in the Caetano period, see Santos (1977b). See also Amaro (1982) for detail on capitalist penetration in Portugal. Cabral (1976a) elaborates on the transition to capitalism in the nineteenth century. On precapitalism and capitalism in the countryside between the two wars, see Medeiros (1976). On the articulation of modes of production, with reference to historical and contemporary writers, see Sideri (1970) and João Martins Pereira (1974: 168–185). In contrast to these critical assessments, Baklanof (1979) offers a fairly optimistic appraisal of the old regime, especially economic changes in 1960–1973, "an extended period of accelerated economic growth and structural change" (799).

7. Kayman (1986: 9) suggests that "the developing class was not yet strong enough to maintain political stability or industrial discipline. . . . The capital accumulated in commercial and speculative activities had built a large financial base at the cost of industrial capitalization and had given the banks a highly selective power. . . . As the financial base increased, so too did the rhythm of concentration." Complementing this analysis are Melo's (1978) brief overview with data and discussion of the economy before and after April 25, Pereira's (1976) classic work on the economy, and Morais

and Volante's (1986) chronology of facts, laws, plans, and events relating to the Portuguese economy. Rodrigues (1977a) gives details on foreign investment in Portugal in 1974, while Rosa (1974) reflects on economic and financial dependency, foreign debt, and the poor economic situation before the coup. Pereira (1975) examines Portuguese dependency in all its ramifications: technological, commercial, financial, political, and "civilizational." Fonseca (1983) also examines the Portuguese socioeconomic formation and general characteristics of dependency on the eve of the April 1974 coup. Rolo (1977) fills in scholarly detail about technology in the capitalist era and the nature of Portugal's dependency.

PART I

STATE FORMS, ENTERPRISE, AND CONTINUITY IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF CAPITALISM

SINCE ITS ORIGIN MANY CENTURIES AGO, the state has been dominant in Portuguese society, and similar to most states in the modern world it has been linked to capitalist development—initially through mercantilism under monarchical and republican rule, later through private financial and industrial investment closely associated with the fascist corporate model, and ultimately through the integration with Western Europe of the bourgeois democratic form that evolved after the collapse of socialist aspirations during 1974 and 1975. This state has tended to be decisive in the polity through its administration of government agencies, in law through its control of the military and the police, in the economy through its regulation of production, finance, and distribution, and in ideology through its influence in education and the mass media. The following three chapters review the origins and evolution of the Portuguese state and its formations and apparatuses and examine the major economic groups and state enterprises. Despite changes, the structure of the state has remained remarkably constant as different regimes have appeared and disappeared through history.

2

Origins and Evolution of the State

T̲H̲E̲ ̲S̲T̲A̲T̲E̲ ̲M̲A̲Y̲ ̲B̲E̲ ̲C̲H̲A̲R̲A̲C̲T̲E̲R̲I̲Z̲E̲D̲ as bringing together the political, economic, social, and cultural processes and relations of society. It regulates and mediates society's interests. It may be relatively autonomous with regard to economic relations (but social classes may be structured outside the state in the capitalist mode of production), dominant, however, through its ideological and repressive apparatuses. Here the state performs its class role as the site in which various competitive fractions (financial, industrial, commercial, agrarian, and mining) of the capitalist class are unified or coalesced through hegemony. A number of state formations are evident. In the authoritarian or exceptional form, rule tends to be autocratic, with formal competition absent and participation limited to the dominant classes and the privileged or favored groups. This form was evident during the Portuguese monarchy from its inception in the twelfth century until its demise in 1910 and during the dictatorship from 1926 until 1974. In the parliamentary or bourgeois form of the state, formal competition enhances the possibility of state autonomy, and the state implements policy formulated within recognized rules, procedures, and institutional bargaining. Outside the state, in civil society, parliamentary and political party politics may extend hegemony over the inherently antagonistic hostile working class. There may also be meaningful informal and direct participation in the shaping of policy by groups and individuals outside the parliamentary system. The parliamentary form of the state appeared during the republican periods from 1910 to 1926 and from 1974 to the present. Through the state, especially in capitalist and industrial societies, social classes may be organized collectively so that the interests of particular classes are

undermined while the bourgeoisie and its allies are mobilized around national interests. Similarly, the state and its leaders may encourage the disunity of dominant classes so that individual capitalists or capitalist interests do not prevail. Coherent state policy is possible when the needs, interests, and conflicts of the dominant class fractions are mitigated.[1] Further, in times of economic crisis the state may mediate social pacts between labor and bourgeois interests within parliament and political parties to ensure economic and political stability and enhance mutual interests.

During the twentieth century, Portugal witnessed a variety of historical struggles, including the fall of the Coburg-Bragança monarchy in 1910, the volatile First Republic from 1910 to 1926, a stable dictatorship known as the New State under António Salazar and then Marcelo Caetano from 1926 to 1974, a revolutionary upheaval in 1974 and 1975, and the ensuing Second Republic. The following analysis examines these struggles and their impact on the formation and evolution of state.[2]

Five political forms of the Portuguese state can be identified (table 2.1). With the exception of the democratic socialist formation, envisaged and anticipated by a wide range of interests active during 1974 and 1975 and projected in the 1976 constitution, all these forms appeared throughout Portuguese history. Each form was associated with the evolution of capitalism in Portugal, but capitalism itself advanced from a mercantile form during the monarchy and republican eras, lasting well into the twentieth century through a commercial, financial, and industrial form in combination with state capital under the fascist corporate state. It was especially in the 1950s and 1960s that socialized sectors in industry and banking mixed with international and domestic private capital under the progressive authoritarian state.

TABLE 2.1
Formations of State

Political	Economic
Monarchical	Mercantile Capitalist
Republican	Mercantile Capitalist
Fascist Corporate	Commercial, Financial, and Industrial Capitalist in Conjunction with State Capital
Progressive Authoritarian	Socialized Sectors in Domestic Industry and Banking Mixed with International and Domestic Private Capital in Commerce, Industry, and Finance
Bourgeois Democratic	Trend toward Deprivatization of State Enterprise, Concessions for International Capital, Stimulation of New Economic Groups of Mixed Foreign and Domestic Capital

During the revolutionary period of 1974 and 1975 there was an inclination toward deprivatization of state enterprise. There have been concessions for international capital and the promotion of new economic groups of foreign and domestic capital under the bourgeois democratic state, especially since the late 1980s.

The Monarchical State

The Portuguese monarchical state appeared in an absolute form in the late fourteenth century and in a liberal form in the nineteenth century. From absolutism evolved a corporate structure that was assimilated into later forms of the state. Monarchism also accompanied early commercial activities, but the weakness of mercantile capital reflected the fortunes of the absolute monarchy, which leaned on the administrative capabilities of the Church and generally depended on the support of the nobility. Bourgeois interests and mercantile capitalism achieved prominence toward the end of the monarchical period.

Several traditions that carried over from the monarchical experience bear heavily on Portugal's present struggle for prominence in the modern world: the inadequacies of the state formation and backwardness in the economy that delayed capitalist development, an attempt to impose a corporate structure upon society, and the rise and fall of a bourgeoisie whose liberal traditions failed to confront the crown and the feudal order.

National unification early in the twelfth century, the consolidation of the crown, and the explorations and conquests of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries may have contributed to Portugal's uniqueness (Stanislawski, 1959), but this early experience also reflected shortcomings in the state and produced centuries of backwardness and stagnation. From the reign of João I (1385–1433), when an absolute monarchy prevailed, to the eighteenth century when the Cortes, or parliamentary body, failed to convene and the Twenty-Four Corporations of Lisbon and Porto (entities representing different sectors of society) were undermined, political space was severely limited. The nobility was divided into three segments: a traditional one rooted in the countryside, another with interests in maritime affairs (through administrative positions in the government and private commerce), and a "new" one of intellectuals and merchants. The clergy was divided into various orders, the Jesuits being particularly wealthy, powerful, and influential; the wealth of the "conventional" clergy, however, was based on its large estates and its prestige among the popular classes. The commercial bourgeoisie was active in the large cities, especially Porto, but subject to strict controls of the monarchy.

The absolute power of the state led eventually to popular demonstrations in Porto in 1757 (Silva, 1988: especially 21–25). During the early nineteenth century Portugal was organized into a hereditary constitutional monarchy, with executive power resting in the king and his ministers, legislative power in a unicameral Cortes, and judicial power in the courts. This arrangement was "liberal" in spirit, with the Cortes elected every two years by direct vote with limited suffrage, but it alienated the nobility and clergy by failing to give them representation. A new constitutional charter in April 1826 shifted power to the executive and the king by dividing the Cortes into an upper house of peers and clergy appointed by the king and a lower house of deputies elected every four years, with the king holding veto power over all legislation. Absolutists revolted, annulled the constitution, and repressed the liberal cause. The six-year interim pitted absolutists (whose power stemmed from the landed gentry and some of the peasantry, particularly in the north) against moderates (tied to the upper bourgeoisie in the towns) and liberals and radicals (supported by the industrial bourgeoisie and merchants). Liberals emerged victorious in May 1834 and were persuasive four years later in the writing of a third constitution that represented a compromise by establishing sovereignty in the nation, abolishing the upper house of peers and substituting a house of senators, and retaining a house of deputies elected directly through a narrow franchise. In contrast to the 1822 constitution, the upper chamber gave power to notables, including the nobility, through the senate. Parliamentary experience throughout the century was marked by the ineptness of both moderate and radical governments, even though various amendments and democratic reforms were introduced that ensured direct elections of the lower house and limitations on the upper house.[3]

One prominent historian has viewed the early state as a weakly organized superstructure under the monarchy generally dependent on the administrative efficiency of the Church and its alliance with the nobility. A mere façade, the crown was absorbed in its own splendor and prosperity and little interested in the political involvement and economic development of its people. The Cortes stopped functioning at the end of the seventeenth century, and the bourgeoisie was unable to leave its mark on culture and the state. The changes during the eighteenth century led to the revolution of 1820, the independence of Brazil, a struggle for survival for the ancien régime, and the triumph of liberalism. However, the absence of a strong bourgeoisie and quarrels between the monarchy and the military left Portugal with a sociopolitical formation lacking industrial and agricultural modernization (Godinho, 1985).

The rise and fall of the bourgeoisie were linked to the fortunes of the absolute monarchy. The monarchy was weak in power and organization, dependent on the clergy and the nobility, and particularly vulnerable to the early

manifestations of liberalism. Liberalism traced its efforts to organize, reform, and innovate to Prime Minister Pombal (1750–1777), to the influence of the French revolution and the liberal ideas introduced into Portugal after the Napoleonic invasions, and to changes in the political apparatus of the state thereafter pressured by the bourgeoisie. Republican and liberal ideals had originally infiltrated into Portugal through two Masonic lodges established in 1733 by foreign immigrants. By the end of the eighteenth century, the membership of these lodges included Portuguese merchants, industrialists, professionals, civil servants, and even clergy. The Masons became involved in progressive and liberal causes, participating in an abortive conspiracy in 1817 and a successful revolution three years later and finally seeing a consolidation of their influence in 1834. They were also influential in the formation of the First Republic in 1910.[4]

The Republican State

In parliamentary politics the strength of institutional forces usually gravitates to the center, and despite the initial appearance of a shift leftward the First Republic was no exception. Forty-five governments, including one military dictatorship, fluctuated between left and right political forces during this period. Along with parliamentary republicanism came the rise of the petty bourgeoisie, whose political agenda was opposed to the excesses of the wealthy landowners and industrial monopolies while providing welfare reform for the working class and agrarian reform for the peasantry.

During October 1910 the armed forces overthrew the Bragança dynasty and the Coburg-Bragança monarchy. This was a critical juncture in Portuguese history because a substantial foreign debt had accrued and the monarchy's subservience to the British crown had alienated both the petty bourgeoisie and segments of the bourgeoisie itself. The Partido Republicano Português (Portuguese Republican Party—PRP), founded a generation earlier, was a center-left party that combined contradictory interests, including petty-bourgeois radicals and some former monarchists.

With the monarchy deposed, the struggle turned against the Church and the dominant classes. In 1910 all religious orders were expelled, religious property passed to the state, a divorce law was decreed, and religious holidays were suppressed, although during the last years of the republic a compromise permitted religious orders to return and Catholics to be represented in parliament. The interests of the dominant classes were tied to land, and republicans struggled to bring about agrarian reform. Liberal bourgeois elements advocated technical assistance and credits to farmers, while socialists

and workers called for property confiscation and redistribution, especially of the large unproductive estates in the south. The industrial bourgeoisie, whose interests were largely in the textiles of the north, expanded with the establishment of industrial complexes under the Silva and Sommer families, respectively in Barreiro on the southern bank of the Tagus and in Maceira in the district of Leiria. These industries provided for home consumption, for internal trade was dependent on agricultural exports—principally wine and cork along with sardines. The Portuguese economy, however, continued to be heavily dependent on Europe, a relationship ensured after the 1703 Methuen Treaty with England and reinforced by the British, French, German, and Belgian investments that controlled a large part of industrial, trade, banking, and transport activities.[5]

While the republic's zeal for reform was aimed at remnants of the monarchy, the Church, and the ruling classes, republican ideals, socialist in thrust, were lost in the mainstream politics of bourgeois compromise. Party maneuvering, splintering, and ideological bickering obscured appeals to the masses of workers and peasants. Somewhat isolated from bourgeois politics were several groupings on the left that represented workers' interests in generally ineffectual ways. The Partido Socialista Português (Portuguese Socialist Party—PSP) was isolated and insignificant. The Seara Nova group, established in 1921, was more effective in presenting a coherent ideology that combined a defense of national interests with an attack on the ruling classes and bourgeois party politics and combined republican slogans with democratic socialism and pacifism. Seara Nova leaders participated in governments in 1923 and 1925.[6] An anarchist movement also evolved around the struggles and organization of workers; under the republic, the right to strike was proclaimed after a wave of strikes, initiated in late 1910, swept the country. Finally, the Partido Comunista Português (Portuguese Communist Party—PCP) was founded in 1921, having evolved from the União Maximalista Portuguesa of 1919.[7] Closely aligned with the Soviet Union, it eventually established itself as a viable opposition force.

In this era of instability the left aggressively pursued its demands for radical reform. Agrarian reform, taxation of the wealthy, social welfare, and nationalization were high on the parliamentary agenda. Toward the end of the First Republic the parliament discussed a decree nationalizing monopolies such as the Companhia dos Tabacos (tobacco), the Companhia Portuguesa dos Caminhos de Ferro (railroads), and the Companhia União Fabril (textiles). At the same time the working class was organized, although its ranks were divided between socialist and anarcho-syndicalist tendencies. In 1913 a national workers' union, the União Operária Nacional, was founded, and in 1919 it was expanded, under anarchist control, into the Confederação Geral do Trabalho (General Confederation of Labor—CGT) with 120,000 members.

The number of strikes during the First Republic totaled 518 in contrast to 91 during the last decade of the monarchy and 65 during the period from 1860 to the end of the century. This labor agitation, combined with leftist pressure for reform, was indicative of a movement toward socialism in the face of conservative forces that were preparing to come to power.

In sum, economic problems coupled with political fragmentation accounted for most of the instability of the First Republic. Mainstream republicanism prevailed under the apparent unity of the PRP, but by 1926 five political currents were active (figure 2.1). From left to right these included the Partido Radical (Radical Party—PR), formed in October 1921; the Partido Republicano Esquerdista Democrático (Democratic Left Party—PRED), founded in 1925; the PRP; the Acção Republicana (Republican Action), a splinter group established in 1923; the Partido Republicana Nacionalista (Republican Nationalist Party—PRN), which came into existence in 1923; and the União Liberal Republicana (Republican Liberal Union—ULR), an offshoot of the PRN in 1926 (Marques, 1972, vol. 2: 161–163, 174).

Republicanism turned against the dominant classes and institutions of the monarchy: liberal, socialist, and anarchist ideals permeated the period of instability, in which the petty bourgeoisie, workers, and peasants contended with the agrarian, commercial, and industrial bourgeoisie. The structures of the republican state were intended to create an arena for pluralistic discourse through a multitude of political parties and other interests of various ideological tendencies. The Portuguese economy, retarded and inefficient, remained largely dependent on foreign capital, however, and despite the aura of political radicalism at home, republican ideals were generally undermined by conciliation and moderation with the bourgeoisie (for further background, see Schartzman, 1989).

The Fascist Corporate State

Authoritarianism has been the rule rather than the exception in Portuguese politics. It was evident in the monarchy prior to 1910 and prevailed throughout the period of the dictatorship from 1926 to 1974, and its legacy underlay the revolutionary fervor of 1974 and 1975. Authoritarianism embedded itself in the apparatuses of the state—in the administrative machinery designed to ensure order and stability and in the implementation of policies in the interests of the dominant classes, in particular the large landowners and the financial, industrial, and commercial bourgeoisie. Eventually a split in the dominant classes brought about the collapse of corporate fascism while it ensured the continuity of the capitalist expansion that had characterized the period prior to the coup of April 25, 1974.

LEFT

Anarchists and
Anarcho-Syndicalists

Portuguese Socialist
Party (PSP) (1875)

União Maximalista
Portuguesa (1919)

Portuguese
Communist
Party (PCP) (1921)

Seara Nova (1921)

CENTER*

Partido Republicano Português
Portuguese Republican Party

Radical Party (PR)
(1921)

Republican Action
(1923)

Nationalist Party (PRN)
(1923)

Democratic Left Party (PRED)
(1925)

Liberal Union (ULR)
(1926)

RIGHT

CADC (1912)

Centro Católica
Português (1917)

Integralismo Lusitano
(1914)

Causa Monárquica
(1914)

Acção Realista
Portuguesa (1923)

Partido Legitimista
(Miguelistas)

União dos Interesses
Económicos (1925)

Figure 2.1. Political Parties and Groupings, First Republic
* Other center parties were active, including the Evolutionists or Partido Republicano Evolucionista (PRE) and Unionist or União Republicana (UR), which united with the liberal Partido Republicano Liberal (PRL) in 1919 and ultimately with the nationalist Partido Republicano Nacionalista (PRN) in 1923. From the Evolutionists was formed the Centrist Party or Partido Centrista (PC) in 1917. The PC joined with the Decembrists in December 1917 to found the Partido Nacional Republicano and later the Partido Presidencialista (PR).

The coup of May 28, 1926, did not immediately signify a swing to the right, since most army officers favored a democratic republic within a framework of order and authority, with a program aimed at currency stability, the elimination of corruption and inefficiency in the bureaucracy, reforms in justice and the armed forces, and an end to nationalization of private firms. Their intervention followed in the tradition of military involvement in politics marked by the eighteen revolts that took place between 1910 and 1926 (Payne, 1973, vol. 2: 571–572).

Under the First Republic political and economic conditions had developed that favored a rightist takeover. Voter apathy was apparent; that less than half the electorate actually participated in elections was an indication of substantial support among monarchist sympathizers. Parliamentary distrust, personal animosities, and petty polemics had resulted in the fall of many cabinets. Lax party discipline created instability even when a majority vote in parliament should have been ensured. Disillusionment with republicanism and fear of socialism had led to intellectual interest in fascism and authoritarian rule. Further, a considerable reduction in purchasing power and the threat of increased taxation were sources of public dissatisfaction.

If fascism seems not to have been an objective of the coup, there were indications as to the outcome well before Salazar's entry into government in June 1926, the granting to him of full veto power over finances in 1928, his rise to the premiership in 1932, his promulgation of the "corporate" constitution a year later, and the institutionalization of the Portuguese New State. The origins of Portuguese fascism can be traced to the ideology of the right under the republic.

In December 1917 Major Sidónio Pais led a successful coup and established a military dictatorship that lasted only until his assassination a year later. The coup was partly a response to disastrous losses experienced by the Portuguese armed forces in France and Africa toward the end of World War I. Beyond these losses war brought food shortages, inflation, and reduction of purchasing power. Pais, who called his repressive regime the "new republic," was influenced by the *integralism* that was in vogue among students and junior officers. Inspired by traditional and extremist tendencies emanating from France's Action Française, the integralist movement in Portugal had been founded by António Sardinha. Integralists supported Pais and attempted to move his regime in an authoritarian corporatist direction. A demagogue and manipulator of the masses, Sidónio Pais represented an early influence in Portuguese fascism. Hermínio Martins notes that "the corporatist experiment evolved by Sidónio with integralist advice and cooperation preceded those of fascist Italy or Primo de Rivera, which are sometimes regarded as prototypes of the corporative republic defined by the Portuguese Constitution

of 1933" (1970: 309). Gallagher compares Pais to Napoleon III: "Like the French emperor, Sidónio . . . had a republican past and had participated in a major anti-royalist revolution before succeeding to power. Like him, Sidónio can be characterized as a modern political dictator somewhat ahead of his time" (Gallagher, 1983: 26–27).

Integralism was also linked to monarchism. Integralismo Lusitano, founded in 1914 as a party of the monarchy, opposed republican ideology and subscribed to the philosophy of Charles Maurras. It was also nationalist and corporatist, and its ideology was articulated by law school graduates of the University of Coimbra through its publications. Causa Monárquica, a royalist party favored by the deposed King Manuel, was widely supported until 1923 when extreme rightists formed an integralist splinter group, Acção Realista Portuguesa.[8] The conservative Legitimist Party supported the monarchist claim of Prince Miguel, whose son Duarte Nuno later became the Miguelista aspirant to the throne.

Additionally, the ideological underpinnings of the authoritarian state were linked to the Centro Académico da Democracia Cristã (Academic Center for Christian Democracy—CADC), a student group founded in 1901 at the University of Coimbra and revived under the republic as a means of consolidating Catholic interests in politics; António de Oliveira Salazar was one of its leaders. The Centro Católico Português, founded in Braga in 1917, was also influential; associated with the Centro were the important shapers of the regime: Salazar, Teotónio Pereira, and Marcelo Caetano along with the Church hierarchy represented by Cardinal Manuel Cerejeira, Mendes dos Santos, Castro Meireles, and others. Manuel Braga da Cruz examines the conditioning of the Salazarist "historic bloc" and characterizes the New State as a corporate phase in which Christian Democracy, unable to launch its own dominant movement, allied itself with the dictatorship (1980a: 376). Since Salazarism was "a fascism without a fascist movement" (Lucena, 1976b, vol. 1: 98), Cruz (1980a: 382) concludes that ideologically it owed as much to the Catholic movement and Christian Democracy as it did to integralism.[9]

The polarization of bourgeois and proletarian class interests reinforced the drive toward fascism. In defense of their class interests, large landowners, merchants, industrialists, and financiers assembled in the União dos Interesses Económicos, founded in 1925. Several of the integralist leaders were members of distinguished landowning families in the Alentejo. As the dictatorship evolved, however, many clusters of integralists constituted its leadership and supporters: integralists such as Caetano and Pereira assumed administrative and ministerial roles in building the corporatist structure of the New State, integralist-fascists favored Nazi Germany during World War II, and national syndicalists favored a charismatic leadership, mass movement, and armed

militia. The Blue Shirts advocated violence, and some of them continued to serve the regime as journalists after their movement terminated in 1934, while others, including their leader, Rolão Preto, joined the opposition. The opposition also included an integralist old guard that favored restoration of the monarchy and neo-integralists, the intellectual wing of the monarchist opposition (see Martins, 1970: 310–312).

Theoretically, the New State was to unify diverse social classes into a corporate whole organized horizontally rather than vertically in order to ensure the harmony of the divergent interests of employer and worker, but in practice, institutions and the people representing them were aligned with the bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the proletariat, on the other. This polarization of politics along class lines reflected not so much institutional loyalties as class values and preferences. The state was systematically structured to ensure order, discipline, and authority over the political economy.[10] The corporate nature of the polity was shaped by the constitution and the National Labor Statute of 1933, legislation aimed at concentrating authority in the executive and abolishing parties and class unions in an attempt to deny any conception of class struggle in Portuguese society. Theoretically, control was decentralized among many organizations, but in practice it was exercised from the top (figure 2.2).

The prime minister was theoretically subject to appointment and dismissal by a popularly elected president, but in fact the president served only in a ceremonial capacity. The prime minister was the real center of power. He was simultaneously president of the Council of Ministers or cabinet, a member of the Council of State (a consultative body to the president that met only once, when Salazar was unable to continue in 1968), and chairman of the Corporative Council, the highest-level coordinating agency of the corporate system.[11] Integrated with the national administrative structure were lower levels of government: municipalities (*conselhos*), districts, and provinces and, for the municipalities of Lisbon and Porto, wards (*bairros*) and parishes (*freguesias*).

The legislature was not an equal and separate branch but subservient to the executive. It consisted of a National Assembly and a Chamber of Corporations. The National Assembly ratified legislation drawn up by the executive. Its members were elected by popular vote under a limited franchise; all were associated with the single party, the União Nacional, and Salazar himself usually selected the slate of candidates. The União Nacional functioned to broadly propagate the corporative ideology.

The Chamber of Corporations was organized into twenty-four sections, each representing a major social or economic activity. Theoretically, all political and economic activity was associated with the Chamber in some way, but in actuality not much happened. At the highest level, the first corporations

Political and Social

Council of State · Council of Ministers · Corporative Council

National Assembly · Corporative Chamber

União Nacional · Unitary Organizations

National Foundation for Joy at Work · Secondary Organizations

Society for the Defense of the Family · Primary Organizations

Work of the Mothers for National Education

24 Corporations — Institutes / Federations

Unions

Casas de Povo, Grêmios, Syndicates, Casas dos Pescadores

Economic

Organization of Economic Coordination

Regulatory Commissions (Imports)

National Juntas (Exports)

Repressive

Army, Navy, Air Force

Legião Portuguesa

PIDE

Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR)

Polícia de Segurança Pública (PSP)

Guarda Fiscal

Polícia Judiciária

Mocidade Portuguesa

Major Bases of Support

Institutions { Bureaucracy · Armed Forces · Church }

Classes { Large Landowners · Big Industrial Bourgeoisie · Financial Bourgeoisie }

Figure 2.2. Structures of the New State

were not formed until the late 1950s. At the intermediate or secondary level, national or regional federations or unions were included that combined unions and guilds having common interests. The primary elements included unions of employees, guilds made up of individual employers or firms, guilds of farmers, and associations of fishermen and their employees. The family, of course, was considered as the basic unit of the corporative hierarchy.

The social apparatuses of the state included a number of "collaborative" agencies such as the Fundação Nacional para a Alegria no Trabalho (National Foundation for Joy at Work), which was to serve the social and recreational needs of the lower classes. The Sociedade para a Defesa da Família (Society for the Defense of the Family) was a charitable organization run by wives of government officials, while the Obra das Mães pela Educação Nacional (Mothers' Work for National Education) directed its efforts toward the preservation of the family and the school.

The repressive apparatuses of the state included the secret police (modeled on the Gestapo), the Guarda Nacional Republicana (for control of rural disturbances), the Polícia de Segurança (for breaking up demonstrations), the Guarda Fiscal (fiscal police), and the Polícia Judiciária (judicial police). Additionally, two paramilitary organizations were formed in 1936. The Mocidade Portuguesa, a compulsory youth organization, encompassed the school population, subjecting it to political loyalty tests and socialization to the values and principles of the regime. Modeled as a paramilitary group along the lines of its German and Italian counterparts, the Mocidade wore green shirts and used the fascist salute and terminology. After the outbreak of civil war in Spain, the Legião Portuguesa was set up as a paramilitary body of green-shirted patriotic volunteers and supporters of the regime in the struggle against communism.

A principal objective of the New State was to institutionalize collaboration between capital and labor. A harmony of class interests was to take the place of class conflict. In reality, however, labor suffered and capital clearly benefited. Under Salazar and Caetano, the state structures allowed for a consolidation of the military, the Church, and the dominant classes in defense of the regime. Military dissidence in the form of small rebellions was evident after 1926, but generally authority and discipline, austerity, and stability characterized the period. The signing of a concordat in 1940 reconciled differences between the Church and the state. Large landowners and wealthy bourgeois families constituted the dominant class support. After World War II these families began to concentrate their capital through intermarriage, investment in banks, and ties with foreign interests.

The period 1926 to 1974 was economically exceedingly stable, which partially accounts for the inattention of journalists and scholars to Portuguese politics at the time. It was an era of oppression; dissent and opposition, however,

were evident at all times on a variety of levels. The moderate opposition manifested its concerns during electoral campaigns that were tolerated by the regime for the sake of its democratic façade. Divisions were not uncommon within the institutions that supported the regime. There were strikes and agitation within the labor and student movements. Finally, the regime was confronted by a series of spontaneous, short-lived, and inevitably abortive revolts and the threat of armed struggle. A glimpse at this dissent and opposition is helpful for understanding the political forces that contributed to the demise of the New State and the radical changes of 1974 (Martins, 1969).

Electoral Opposition

A few weeks before elections orchestrated by the regime, the opposition was permitted to campaign. The candidates of the União Nacional were unopposed in 1934, 1938, and 1942, as was President Oscar Carmona in 1928, 1935, and 1942. Among the popular fronts established during the 1935–1937 period were the Frente Popular Portuguesa, the Frente Popular Antifascista, and the Liga Contra a Guerra e Contra o Fascismo (Manta, 1976). A moderate opposition emerged in February 1943 with the formation of the Movimento de Unidade Nacional Antifascista (National Antifacist Unity Movement—MUNAF) by António Sérgio, Bento de Jesús Caraça, José Magalhães Godinho, Rui Luís Gomes, Fernando Piteira Santos, and José Gregório, who presented a platform for a provisional government. Their movement evolved into the Movimento de Unidade Democrático (Democratic Unity Movement—MUD), dominated by the clandestine PCP, which sponsored candidates for the 1945 Assembly elections. The MUD Central Committee was arrested in 1947, and by 1949 a split had developed between the PCP and the liberal republican antifascist current that resulted in the leftist Movimento Nacional Democrático (National Democratic Movement—MND) and the rival moderate União Democrática Portuguesa.

The MUD endorsed Norton de Matos for president in 1949, but its strategy was to withdraw on the eve of the election. The Matos campaign unexpectedly denounced the regime, called for democracy, and unified communists, socialists, moderates, democrats, and republicans, whose past infighting had hampered the opposition. The 1958 presidential campaign of General Humberto Delgado was also distinguished for its bringing together some of the military, independent Catholics, dissident monarchists, liberals, old republicans, and even the left (once it dropped its own candidate, Arlindo Vicente) and earned nearly a fourth of the votes (Delgado, 1962).

An African uprising in Angola early in 1961, however, awakened both the center and the left to the importance of effecting a change at home and in the

colonies. Within Portugal, the generally weak and disorganized opposition organized into the Directório Democrata Social. Protests and demonstrations by workers and students became more frequent. In Algiers, Portuguese exiles founded a popular front that combined elements of center and left into the Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (Patriotic National Liberation Front—FPLN), a coalition representing the PCP (clearly the best-organized movement), the Movimento de Acção Revolucionária (a noncommunist left movement established as an outgrowth of student unrest), and the Movimento de Resistência Republicana (consisting of liberals and republicans). The FPLN elected Delgado as its president but later split with him. He then formed a rival group that he headed until his mysterious assassination by the secret police on February 13, 1965 (Romero-Robledo and Novais, [1974], and Sertório, 1978).

With Salazar's incapacitation in 1968, the regime faced a succession crisis. Alternatives included restoration of the monarchy, return to military rule, continuity, or a new course toward limited liberalism. Caetano pursued the latter alternative with the support of monarchist officers. An integralist and drafter of the Constitution of 1933, Caetano had served Salazar as minister of colonies and later became rector of the University of Lisbon. Despite his characterization as a liberal, he remained a corporatist.[12] Trapped between the growing influence of the left and the constraints of Salazarist forces, he would not allow the formation of opposition parties in 1969 but did permit political committees and a somewhat open campaign; the official party garnered 88 percent of the vote.[13]

The regime would not tolerate elections as a device for mobilizing the population. Illiterates (nearly a third of the population in 1960) and women (until 1968, unless they proved they were heads of families and paid a minimum estate tax) were disenfranchised. Elections did serve, however, as a pretext for reorganizing cabinets and recruiting new talent and helped to neutralize ultraright elements (extremist fascists during the 1930s and dissident monarchists) and divert the opposition from clandestine activities. Additionally, the preelection campaigns made the opposition appear less important than it really was, and the intellectuals and professionals who dominated these campaigns often resorted to abstract ideological discourse that led to divisions and schisms. Schmitter argues that noncompetitive and unimportant elections functioned "to articulate a dominant coalition between segments of a divided political elite and conflicting fractions of the superordinate economic class; and to disarticulate any potential rival coalition between elements of a dispersed political counterelite and components of subordinate economic classes" (1978: 136).[14]

Caetano implemented changes in 1971 relating to the constitution, corporatism, the right to work, and social security. Lucena (1976b, vol. 2: 54) argues

that the expansion of freedoms was implemented in a paternalistic manner that permitted the persistence of injustice. As to the division of powers, there was no liberalization; given the state of siege and the colonial wars, Caetano wanted an executive as strong as his predecessor's.

What did change was economic growth, in particular the movement toward integration with Europe. At the intermediary level, there was a reformulation of the corporative organs that allowed a certain autonomy without breaking with tradition. The state feared "patronal spontaneity" (101) and did not extend to the guilds all the measures applied to the unions. Caetano did not touch the Chamber of Corporations, and the dominant classes continued to depend on the state (151). In short, there was an appearance of shifting from fascism to political pluralism without losing sight of the corporate principle that collaboration of classes should be fundamental to state and society (185). Continuity was the essence of the Caetano period. The state was strengthened at all levels. The "renovation" involved modernization, liberalization, and integration: modernization was a reflection of economic progress in general and some of the reforms (186); liberalization was a means and not an end (187), and the opening was timid; integration was ambiguous because the restructuring of primary organs was a contradiction (189).

Divisions within Institutions Supporting the Regime

Conservative and liberal tendencies appeared in the army and other services that challenged the status quo. During the late Salazar period General Fernando dos Santos Costa, a monarchist, Catholic, and ultraconservative, represented one direction and General Júlio Botelho Moniz another, although the "liberals" were more truly represented by such opposition candidates as General Norton de Matos, a former governor of Angola and war minister who ran for president in 1949, Marshal Francisco Higino Craveiro Lopes, a former president (1951–1958), and presidential candidates Admiral Quintão Meireles in 1951 and General Humberto Delgado in 1958.

Throughout the years of the Salazar regime, Cardinal Cerejeira, a close friend of Salazar and fellow member of the old Centro Católico, led a conservative Catholic majority; many cabinet ministers were recruited from the Centro and the CADC. In 1958, however, the bishop of Porto, António Ferreira Gomes, joined the opposition in criticizing labor conditions in Portugal and influenced many Catholics to mobilize against the regime. After 1958, dissenting Catholic priests and laymen worked through the Acção Católica and two of its youth branches, the Juventude Universitária Católica (Catholic University Youth—JUC) and the Juventude Operária Católica (Catholic Workers' Youth—JOC). One of these priests, Abel Varzim, was conspicu-

ously active in the Liga Operária Católica (Catholic Workers' League—LOC). By 1962 a progressive movement had emerged from the ranks of the Catholic youth. Demands for university reforms were extended to protests against the regime itself, and in the 1965 electoral campaign Catholics, many of them sons of prominent figures in the regime, signed petitions favoring reforms at home and autonomy in the colonies. This activity foreshadowed the emergence of Christian Democratic and socialist movements in the struggle against the regime (see Cerqueira, 1967 and 1973b, for useful analysis of the Church and the dictatorship).

A small group of wealthy entrepreneurs had benefited from key concessions, but even this group became disenchanted with the restrictive national economy and pressured the regime to expand markets and seek economic integration with Europe. Monarchist supporters within the military, Church, and dominant classes were frustrated by their inability to restore power to Dom Duarte Nuno, whose conservative Miguelista line and claim to the throne had been recognized by some monarchists after the death of Dom Manuel II in 1932. Causa Monárquica, directed by General José Esquivel, a staunch supporter and close friend of Santos Costa, also supported him. Contending with Nuno was the Manuelista claimant, Princess Maria Pia de Saxe-Coburg, duchess of Bragança, and independent monarchists in the opposition, including the faction led by Jacinto Ferreira.

Military Intervention and Resistance

Attempted coups, barracks revolts, naval mutinies, and uprisings had long punctuated the lengthy history of military involvement in civil society. Two weeks after the rebellion in Braga on May 28, 1926, its leader, General Manuel de Oliveira Gomes da Costa, was himself dislodged and deported to the Azores. On July 9 General Sinel de Cordes staged a coup, named himself finance minister, and elevated General Óscar Carmona to power. In 1928, with the economy in disarray, Carmona became president, and Salazar was installed as finance minister under a government formed by Colonel Vicente de Freitas, who later denounced the União Nacional as a totalitarian party and severed ties with the regime. A year earlier there had been an abortive revolt organized by Captain César de Almeida and naval Lieutenant Commander Agatão Lança in Porto and Lisbon. Almeida and other deposed leaders later established the Paris League for the Overthrow of the Dictatorship. On July 20, 1928, a former war minister, Colonel José Mascarenhas, led uprisings in Lisbon, Setúbal, and elsewhere. In April 1931 there was an uprising of deported politicians in Madeira, the Azores, and one in Guinea, directed against the metropolitan wheat monopoly established under Salazar; and on August 26,

1931, another revolt broke out in Lisbon. Workers reacted against new labor organization with a partly successful general strike in 1934. In the same year the Blue Shirts, a fascist group, plotted against Salazar because of his "non-revolutionary" direction. A year later police uncovered a monarchist military plan for an uprising at the Penha de França barracks. In 1936 the crews of three ships mutinied in Lisbon harbor, apparently in sympathy with the Spanish Republic. Salazar immediately declared himself minister of war and minister of foreign affairs in addition to prime minister and finance minister. In July 1937 there was an anarchist attempt on his life. The Revolt of Mealhada, named after the village where it occurred, was a national movement under several officers, including one general, but the abortive uprising of October 10, 1946, involved only one leader, Captain Fernando Queiroga. Another coup attempt failed in the Azores on April 10, 1947, but its participation included the air force technician Hermínio da Palma Inácio, who later became head of the urban guerrilla Liga da União e Acção Revolucionária (League of Revolutionary Union and Action—LUAR) (Figueiredo, 1975; Raby, 1988: 28–29). The government cracked down, forcing dissident officers into retirement and dismissing some professors from university posts. A celebrated trial of the Junta Militar de Libertação Nacional followed in spring 1948. Among the defendants were João Soares, father of the socialist leader Mário Soares. In August 1958 thirty noncommissioned officers conspired on behalf of Defense Minister Fernando dos Santos Costa. On March 11–12, 1959, a plot involving seven junior officers and several political currents, including progressive Catholics, was uncovered. In January 1961 Henrique Galvão (see 1961 and 1976 [1965]), a former colonial officer and dissident deputy, seized the luxury liner *Santa Maria* under the banner of the Directório Revolucionário Ibérico de Libertação (Iberian Revolutionary Directorate for Liberation—DRIL). In February Africans staged an uprising in Luanda, and a month later Bakongo partisans launched a massive revolt throughout northern Angola. On April 13, 1961, Defense Minister Botelho Moniz was dismissed from his post after he and other military leaders had demanded Salazar's resignation. In December the Portuguese possessions (Goa) in India fell. On January 1, 1962, Captain João Varela Gomes (1980b) and army officers along with Catholic dissident leader Manuel Serra and other militants attacked the Beja army barracks.[15]

Left Opposition

Organized resistance was also conspicuous. Foremost were the clandestine activities of the PCP. Communists associated themselves with united fronts such as the MUNAF, the MUD, and the FPLN. Within the MUNAF the PCP promoted a strategy of insurrection through strikes and popular demonstrations alongside armed groups of workers aimed at neutralizing the armed

forces. Republicans within these fronts advocated a military uprising and overthrow of the regime and restoration of the First Republic. The MUNAF organized Grupos Anti-Fascistas de Combate that obtained arms and initiated contacts within the army, thereby contributing to "a situation of almost constant military conspiracy from 1943 to 1947" (Raby, 1988: 20–21).

The PCP usually supported labor agitation and occasionally resorted to terrorism, although this was generally carried out by fringe groups such as the LUAR—which under Palma Inácio robbed a bank in Figueira da Foz in 1967 and stormed the town of Covilhã in 1968. Well organized into cells, the PCP remained relatively intact over the years. Its clandestine apparatus was nearly destroyed in late 1948 when most of the party leadership was arrested and imprisoned (Raby, 1988: 108–109); Cunhal was held until his spectacular escape from Peniche prison on January 3, 1960 (Cunhal, 1975a: 133–137).

Essential questions confronted the left at the end of the decade of the 1950s, among them whether to pursue an alliance of classes to oppose the dictatorship and whether to support the theses of the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956. In an era in which the Sino-Soviet and Albanian-Soviet splits divided the international communist movement, as early as March 1961 within the PCP Central Committee a leading young militant, Francisco Martins Rodrigues (1975), criticized the abandonment of a worker-peasant alliance in favor of unity with the liberal bourgeoisie. He objected to PCP adherence to the Soviet position favoring "peaceful coexistence" and "peaceful transition to socialism." After his departure in December 1963 and formal expulsion in January 1964, Rodrigues joined João Pulido Valente and Rui d'Espiney in carrying their Marxist-Leninist line to the formation of a new movement outside the PCP, the Frente de Acção Popular (Popular Action Front—FAP). Advocating armed struggle, the movement initiated its first attack in November 1965, against a police station. Adopting a thesis of the PCP in 1954, the FAP also called for a popular democratic revolution as a means of destroying the financial and landowning bourgeoisie.

The need to reconstitute a communist party became the basis of another organization, the Comité Marxista-Leninista Português (Portuguese Marxist-Leninist Committee—CM-LP), founded in Paris in April 1964 and active in Portugal by about June 1965. Much of its leadership was imprisoned by the secret police in the ensuing months, resulting in a period of inactivity. In January 1967 the CM-LP held its first conference in Paris, where a majority favored reconstituting the Communist Party and opposing a Guevarist line of guerrilla struggle. The Guevarist line reappeared at the second conference in November 1968, although Guevara had died fighting in Bolivia a year earlier and the *foco* theory that he and the French journalist Régis Debray had advocated had been discredited; elements supporting this position were

encouraged by the May 1968 movement in France but soon abandoned the party. Thereafter, a number of movements advocating the Marxist-Leninist line appeared.

Two tendencies characterized the October 1969 electoral campaign: the coalescing of the opposition into a popular front and armed struggle by some movements. The collaboration of communists with radical and moderate elements of the opposition within the CDE provoked radical leftists to challenge the PCP with the formation of many new organizations. First, the Accão Revolucionária Comunista (Communist Revolutionary Action—ARCO) evolved in Porto as a movement of armed struggle, influenced by the example of Carlos Marighella and the urban armed movements of Brazil, but was not involved in any actions and was quickly dispersed by the police. Second, the student-based Unidade Revolucionária (Marxista-Leninista) (Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Unity—UR [M-L]), the Organização Comunista Marxista-Leninista Portuguesa (Portuguese Marxist-Leninist Communist Organization—OCM-LP), founded clandestinely in Porto in 1970 with origins in the O Comunista group and O Grito do Povo of Porto, and a host of other splinter organizations assumed a position around the Marxist-Leninist line of reconstituting a communist party. Third, the Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado (Reorganizing Movement of the Party of the Proletariat—MRPP) also pursued a Marxist-Leninist line, having emerged from the radical student movements in Lisbon (see chapter 7 for details and organizational structure).

Trotskyist currents in Portugal were influenced by developments in France in 1968, the active student movement in Portugal during 1969, and the efforts to reconstitute the Fourth International. The Portuguese groups that emerged after 1969 were the Comité de Ligação dos Militantes Revolucionários Portugueses (Committee Linking Revolutionary Portuguese Militants—CLMRP), following the French Lambertist line in 1970, and the Liga para a Construção do Partido Revolucionário (League for the Construction of a Revolutionary Party—LCPR), following the English Healyist line in 1973, while the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (Internationalist Communist League—LCI) appeared at the end of 1973, having evolved from the Grupo de Acção Comunista in the School of Medicine of the University of Lisbon.

Ultimately, three main armed movements emerged from the divisions in the PCP in the early 1960s. The LUAR had developed from the movement around Humberto Delgado after his electoral campaign in 1958, the seizure of the *Santa Maria*, the hijacking of a TAP flight in 1961, and the abortive attack on the Beja barracks. It saw itself as breaking with the reformism of the radical petty-bourgeois opposition and argued that new conditions, including the crisis of capitalism and the colonial wars, were favorable for formation of

a revolutionary army to bring down the dictatorship. Applying the insurrectional *foco* thesis of Régis Debray and the experience of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in the guerrilla struggle in Latin America, the LUAR turned to acts of violence to break with the PCP traditional line of mass struggle and to push for a popular struggle of armed self-defense. In September 1967 it attacked the army barracks in Evora. In August a year later, it attempted to occupy the town of Covilhã and establish "a liberated zone," but its command was surprised by the police and arrested. Thereafter, it altered its "individualist" position and advocated a global revolutionary strategy, connecting the mass struggle with the armed struggle. From the time of the escape from prison of Inácio until 1973, LUAR carried out a series of bank robberies within Portugal, France, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg, but, as was acknowledged in self-criticism at its First Congress in August 1975, it suffered from internal disorganization and arrests. Whatever its fame, the LUAR "always displayed an extremely fragile organic structure, permeable to infiltration by the political police. . . . It paid dearly for its 'spontaneity' and 'individualism' in conditions of clandestine struggle" (Martins and Loureiro, 1980, 2: 19). On October 26, 1970, a second group, Acção Revolucionária Armada (Armed Revolutionary Action—ARA), attacked the ship *Cunene* at the Alcântara docks in Lisbon, and in November it partly destroyed a training center of the security police, a munitions depot destined for Africa, and the cultural center of the American embassy. The ARA represented an attempt by the PCP to shift to a revolutionary strategy, in part as a response to criticism of its policies and in part as a reflection of demands for action from the party rank and file. In contrast to the LUAR, however, its actions were apparently carefully planned and launched with the approval of the party hierarchy at a time when the regime faced its greatest crisis. Finally, the revolutionary brigades represented a break with the PCP through the schism that occurred in September 1970 within the FPLN, headquartered in Algiers. Eventually, the brigades evolved into a political party, the Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias (Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades—PRP-BR), led by Carlos Antunes and Isabel do Carmo. The brigades advocated violent struggle and socialist revolution in contrast to the PCP's reformism and pursuit of national democratic revolution objectives. Various armed actions were carried out from late 1971 until 1973, including the destruction of some NATO installations in Portugal.[16]

In general, the movements before 1974 were split between armed revolution and the reconstitution of a communist party, although all of them except the ARA opposed the policies of the PCP. The armed-struggle position eventually influenced the younger elements of the PCP that supported the ARA in the early 1970s. There were also tactical differences among the many far-left

currents, but frequently they were distinguishable more in terms of personalist questions than of ideological issues. After April 25 these movements, attempting to adapt to the new conditions, helped to raise consciousness and stimulate the revolutionary fervor that followed in the wake of the coup.

Labor and Student Agitation

A labor movement also contributed to the resistance. Anarchist, socialist, and communist efforts to organize and politicize the working classes met with varying degrees of success during the First Republic and the early years of the New State but subsided somewhat after the general strike of 1934. A wave of strikes in Lisbon and other industrial areas took place during October and November 1942, July and August 1943, May 1944, and April 1947 (Raby, 1988: 70–90). Strikes occurred over wage demands among rural workers in the Alentejo and Ribatejo in 1947–1949 and in 1952–1953 by fishermen in Matosinhos, near Porto, demanding a day of rest (124–128). After 1957, strikes and demonstrations were commonplace; by 1960 workers were openly defying the regime, and by May 1962 Alentejo farmworkers had initiated a series of strikes over wages and working conditions (139–144). Strikes and mass protests also accompanied the presidential campaign in May and June 1958.

After Salazar's death, the Caetano regime loosened the reins on the unions and allowed labor to select its leaders without government approval. Elections were tolerated, and an opposition in the ranks of labor, generally controlled by the PCP, became conspicuous.[17] Protests, slowdowns, and strikes were common, and arbitration commissions tended to favor labor demands for wage increases. However, two decrees in 1970 ensured official control of union activities after metallurgists were denied independent union bargaining power and a rally in the soccer stadium. The Communist Intersindical, originally founded in 1938 and clandestine for most of its existence, remained underground as a parallel organization to the official unions. Forty-four major strikes occurred between December 1973 and April 1974. At the same time inflation soared, unemployment increased, and hundreds of thousands of Portuguese workers emigrated to other parts of Europe.

Passage of the law regulating student associations provoked student protest in 1956 and an open meeting in Lisbon in March 1958, while a Catholic-sponsored meeting between students and labor representatives in July 1959 was followed by a series of student demonstrations. In November 1960 Coimbra students protested the price of cinema tickets; student disturbances in Lisbon during March were followed two months later by further action in

Coimbra; police harassed a national student conference in Coimbra in March 1962 and intervened a few weeks later in student celebrations in Lisbon. These events sparked the emergence of a radical student movement and the formation of hundreds of clandestine political organizations, most of which were labeled "ultraleft" by the PCP (see Chilcote, 1993). Raby (1988: 136) aptly characterizes the situation as follows:

> These were the sons and daughters of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, sectors which in the main had traditionally supported the regime. While they had specific demands concerning academic freedom, the right to control their own organizations . . . the movement was characterised by typical student spontaneity and anarchy and was therefore unpredictable and difficult to negotiate with.

The organized resistance of the communists and other groups, together with the defeat of international fascism in 1945, the massive electoral opposition in 1949 and 1958, and the colonial wars beginning in the early 1960s, raised expectations that the regime was about to fall. This illusion of the imminent defeat of the regime interfered with long-range strategies of resistance. The opposition tended to favor passive resistance over open conflict.

The military and security forces provided the main support for the regime, but internal dissension fomented by the devastating wars in the colonies and consciousness among young officers that the nation was due for a change ultimately toppled the regime. No longer could it count on the traditional and monolithic support of military, religious, and bureaucratic forces. The ostracized and dissatisfied intelligentsia, political opposition, and urban and rural labor seeking changes in the conditions of everyday life were to find a new ally in the young military officers.

Authoritarianism and corporatism were premised on the legacy of political life under the monarchy. The apparatuses of the fascist corporate state provided the administrative machinery that would ensure order, discipline, efficiency, and stability. The state's policies aimed to serve the interests of the agrarian, commercial, financial, and industrial bourgeoisie, and in large measure they did so. The corporate structure helped mitigate conflict and harmonize diverse interests, especially those of capital and labor. Political pressure brought reforms in 1971, but the executive remained intact and the corporate apparatus unchanged. Caetano sought to reshape fascism into a political pluralism while pursuing class collaboration and continuity in state apparatuses. The burden of the colonial wars and the push for modernization and integration with Europe, however, demonstrated that change was inevitable.

The Progressive Authoritarian State

On April 25, 1974, the military put an end to nearly a half century of dicta-
torship. While the change of regime did not ensure a radical transformation
of the state, there were many important changes in the following eighteen
months. Under progressive leadership the state retained most of its former
structure as consensus emerged on the necessity for a transition to socialism.
The essential issue revolved around the question of whether to shape state au-
thority in a gradual progressive direction or move rapidly toward democratic
socialism through the direct participation of the popular classes.

The origins of the April 25, 1974, coup date to the March 12, 1959, plot
and arrest of leaders of the Movimento Militar Independente, a movement of
clandestine cells organized with the approval of President Humberto Delgado
and the tacit support of former President Craveiro Lopes, who had not been
endorsed for reelection by Salazar and whose support for Salazar was tenuous.
Organized in Lisbon, this movement was headed by Major Pastor Fernandes
and Captains Almeida Santos and Vasco da Costa Santos along with other
officers, including Vasco Gonçalves, who later emerged as a dominant leader
of the Movimento das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement—MFA),
which engineered the April 1974 coup (Bandeira, 1975b: 25). Varela Gomes,
who had led the abortive Beja revolt, later headed the Fifth Division under the
military governments of 1974 and 1975. Manuel Serra, a radical Catholic or-
ganizer, was also involved.[18] Among the causes of discontent were the control
over the military exercised by the secret police and other security forces (who,
for example, screened applicants to the military academies). Young military
officers were resentful of low wages and lost esteem.

Midway through 1973 some captains and majors petitioned the govern-
ment to resolve pay grievances and working conditions. They were upset
over a decree of July 13, 1973, that permitted conscripts with high school
or college education to receive officer training in an accelerated program at
a military academy. During the month of October captains and majors met
in Evora to discuss major political issues and seek a political rather than a
military solution to the colonial wars in Africa. The loss of life, the suffering
of the wounded, and defeat in battle indicated that Portuguese commitments
abroad were excessive. Additionally, these officers had come in contact with
the ideals of the liberation movements and their criticisms of colonialism and
imperialism. They recognized that those who benefited from the war were the
same financial groups that exploited the people in the metropolis.

One in eight of the middle-level professional officers constituted the MFA,
with its strength primarily among the military corps in Guinea and Mozam-
bique and its organization into cells, with each person maintaining contact

with four others. On December 1, 1973, the MFA enlarged its coordinating committee, itself divided into a military committee to organize a coup and a political committee to formulate a plan for the period after the coup. On January 30, 1974, the MFA condemned the Caetano government as being responsible for the ills of the nation and called for the democratization of Portugal and independence for the colonies. During February General António de Spínola's celebrated book on these questions was published, and a month later he and Francisco da Costa Gomes were dismissed from their posts as deputy chief and chief of staff, respectively. On March 16 the Fifth Infantry Regiment at Caldas da Rainha revolted and marched on Lisbon, demanding the reinstatement of the generals. On April 4 the MFA planned its coup and three weeks later, although disagreeing with his solutions, ushered the popular Spínola into power.[19]

Portugal appeared headed in several possible directions. While the collapse of the dictatorship was accompanied by political and economic disorder, sentiment for strong fascist rule under the traditional right evaporated in the euphoria of revolutionary developments. At the same time, during 1974 and 1975, reactionary and moderate forces openly and clandestinely mobilized their counterrevolution. The communists and their line of "popular" democracy in alliance with progressive segments of the military were influential during the first eighteen months. Ascendant with the bank nationalizations of March 1975 and the following "hot summer" were the popular elements in the countryside and urban areas that anticipated the triumph of "popular power" in pursuit of a dictatorship of the proletariat and a full transition to socialism. After the April 1975 elections for the Constituent Assembly, however, the political parties were able to push for a parliamentary system premised on democratic socialism and pluralism. The Socialists emerged victorious in the April 1976 elections and under their leader, Mário Soares, were tolerant of a neocapitalist political regime and liberal in their acceptance of state planning while permitting private property—a perspective that was to prevail thereafter in all the constitutional governments.

Progressive forces within the military dominated the six provisional governments from April 1974 to November 1975. Military authority at the top served to mediate among the various political and economic groups vying for influence during this period. The old state structures remained largely intact, despite changes in agency names and some personnel. A struggle between advocates of strong authority at the top and those who favored decentralization and pluralism at the grass roots was ultimately resolved in the direction of a parliamentary and multiparty system with the promulgation of the 1976 constitution.

Underlying the emergence of the progressive military as a monolithic force in politics during 1974 and 1975 was the dispersion of various blocs within the MFA military apparatus (figure 2.3).

Immediately after the April 25 coup, the Junta de Salvação Nacional (Junta of National Salvation—JSN), made up of officers from the military services, was formed, and a Council of State made up of Junta members, seven MFA representatives, and seven civilians was organized. These official bodies complemented similar units, including the command apparatus of the army, the navy, and the air force, the MFA, the MFA Coordinating Committee, and the Comando Operacional do Continente (Continental Operational Command—COPCON). Later the official state administrative apparatus incorporated the president and prime minister and his cabinet, while the political sphere

Figure 2.3.   The Progressive Authoritarian State, 1974–1975
Source: Adapted from *Expresso* (December 21, 1974)

included the Assembly of the Republic and major political parties. Parallel military political structures included a top level with the Conselho da Revolução (Revolutionary Council) of the MFA, which included the members of the Junta, the military ministers, the COPCON commander, and the seven members of the Program Coordinating Committee (officially twenty persons, later expanded to twenty-eight; see Rezola, 2006 and 2007, for detail and increase in number). A secondary level was made up of the MFA Assembly of Delegates (200, later expanded to 240) of the three armed forces, which met monthly; more than half its members represented the army. At a tertiary level, the three armed forces were organized hierarchically into military regions, each with its own council.

The MFA structure proved unable to assimilate the lower levels of the military as spontaneous and autonomous barracks committees sprang up and began to operate independently. Committees for political education, sports activities, external affairs, and welfare were established. These committees were paralleled by workers' and tenants' committees. The propaganda wing of the military, known as the Fifth Division, was active in "cultural dynamization" campaigns that brought it into contact with the masses, but its activities were curtailed in August 1975.

The political parties clustered into four groupings from the extreme left to the extreme right (table 2.2). On the far left, electoral parties included the Frente Socialista Popular (Popular Socialist Front—FSP), formed on January 9, 1975, under the direction of Manuel Serra and militants of the Movimento Socialista Popular (Popular Socialist Movement—MSP) who had broken with the PS and social democracy. The Movimento de Esquerda Socialista (Left Socialist Movement—MES), founded in 1970 by young intellectuals, was critical of three trends in the post-1974 period: military authoritarianism in the service of finance capital, utopian social democratic reformism, and left authoritarian military reformism. It favored a class struggle by the urban and rural semiproletariat and proletariat, the poor peasantry, students and intellectuals working on behalf of the oppressed, elements of the petty bourgeoisie, and soldiers and sailors. The União Democrática Popular (Popular Democratic Union—UDP) was made up of several Marxist-Leninist organizations with the aim of overcoming bourgeois democracy on behalf of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Frente Eleitoral de Comunistas (Marxistas-Leninistas) (Marxist-Leninist Communist Electoral Front—FEC [M-L]) was established about December 1974 as a Maoist successor to the OCM-LP. The Partido de Unidade Popular (Popular Unity Party—PUP) was also founded in December 1974. The LCI was affiliated with the Trotskyist Fourth International. The MRPP began in September 1970 as a Maoist Marxist-Leninist party. The Aliança Operária-Camponesa (Worker-Peasant Alliance—AOC),

TABLE 2.2
Political Movements and Parties

	Clandestine Movements of the Left, 1964 to 1974			
Trotskyist	*Armed Struggle*	*Marxist-Leninist*	*Communist*	*Socialist*
CLMRP	LUAR	FAP	PCP	PS
LCPR	ARA	CM-LP	CDE	CEUD
LCI	BRs	Vanguarda Vermelha		
	ARCO	CCR (M-L)		
	UR (M-L)	CN-L de P		
	OCM (L-P)			
	MRPP			

	Political Parties in the Aftermath of the April 25, 1974 Coup		
Far Left	*Left*	*Center-Right*	*Far Right*
FSP, MES	PCP, PS	PPD (PSD)	FDU
FEC (M-L)	MDP/CDE	CDS	MEP
PUP, LC		PPM	PL
MRPP, AOC			MDP
PCP (M-L), PRT, MLP			
LUAR, ARA, PRP-BR			

founded in late 1974, opposed capitalist imperialism. The Partido Comunista de Portugal (Marxista-Leninista) (Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Portugal—PCP [M-L]) was close to the PUP in its Maoist line. The Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (Revolutionary Worker's Party—PRT) was Trotskyist in orientation. Among other leftist groupings were the anarchist Movimento Libertário Português (Portuguese Liberation Party—MLP); the LUAR and the ARA, both active in sabotage operations during Salazar days; and the PRP-BR.

The mainstream of the left parties was made up of the PCP and the PS. Both parties had suffered factionalism, the FAP and other splinter groups breaking off from the PCP after 1964 and the MSP and other elements splitting from the PS. The PCP had been especially effective in forging united fronts such as the MUNAF, the MUD, and the CDE, while the Movimento Democrático Português (Portuguese Democratic Movement—MDP or MDP/CDE) was also close to the PCP. The PS had evolved from its predecessor, Acção Socialista Portuguesa (Portuguese Socialist Action—ASP), founded by Mário Soares in 1964.

Courting a centrist image but recognized as well to the right were the Partido do Centro Democrático Social (Social Democratic Center Party—CDS), the Partido de Democracia Cristã (Christian Democratic Party—PDC), the Partido Popular Democrático (Democratic Popular Party—PPD), and the Partido Popular Monárquico (Popular Monarchist Party—PPM). Founded

in May 1974 by Francisco Sá Carneiro, Magalhães Mota, and Francisco Balsemão, the PPD called for socialism along social democratic lines. Its ranks also included small and medium-sized landowners in the north, students, and liberal professional people. The CDS, founded in June 1974 as a centrist party and led by Diogo Freitas de Amaral, favored a revitalized economy within a capitalist framework. The PPM, established on May 29, 1974, as an amalgam of several monarchist currents, advocated a democratic monarchy. The PDC, founded in the middle of 1974, followed Christian Democracy.

On the right and extreme right were small groupings representative of traditional and big capital interests but not influential with the electorate: the Frente Democrática Unida (United Democratic Front—FDU), a coalition of the Movimento Federalista Português (Portuguese Federalist Movement—MFP), the Partido Liberal (Liberal Party—PL), the Partido Trabalhista Democrático Português (Portuguese Democratic Labor Party—PTDP), and the Movimento Popular Português (Portuguese Popular Movement—MPP).

The political parties alongside the unions, workers' commissions, neighborhood committees, and other popular organizations expressed their demands in open and direct ways. Their activities appeared to mitigate the dominance of the military and later this became a reality, but initially the state was really organized under the dominance of the MFA and the military institutions (figure 2.4).

The Bourgeois Democratic State

From the earliest days of the revolution various constituencies advocated the structuring of state power along pluralistic lines. Pluralism signified a democratic solution to a half century of dictatorship and was to ensure participation by all political groups. Undermining the dominance of the military, it would ensure that no single party would establish hegemony over the political economy and that discredited rightist groups would have an opportunity to dialogue in the political arena. Portugal veered toward democratic socialism as a myriad of parties, groups, and interests struggled for recognition.

With the promulgation of the new constitutional order, parliamentary democracy was to be the institutional form through which a democratic transition and a socialist outcome would be implemented. The 1976 constitution explicitly placed "sovereignty" in a president directly elected by the voters, the Revolutionary Council, the Assembly of the Republic, the government, and the courts. An MFA alliance with the people was to "guarantee the democratic conquests and the revolutionary process." The administrative apparatus functioned through the government and the various ministries. The armed

Figure 2.4.   Military and Political Institutions under the 1976 Constitution
Source: Adapted from Domingos (1980: 150)

forces and various police forces constituted the repressive apparatus, which was necessary not only for maintaining order but for implementing states of siege or emergency if called upon to do so by the president in consultation with the Revolutionary Council. The legislature consisted of the Assembly of the Republic, elected according to proportional representation, and the ideological apparatus was organized around state control of television, radio, and many national newspapers.

The political parties were to play an essential role in the transition to socialism, mobilizing and raising the consciousness of the masses. At the same time, they were to support the political program and practice of the MFA as a national liberation movement seeking national independence through the construction of a socialist society. The MFA (1975) explicitly defined the pluralist route to socialism:

> Pluralism means the free expression and discussion of opinion as well as experiences in the construction of the new society, in an open and permanent dialogue with all the Portuguese people. Socialist pluralism comprehends the coexistence in theory and practice of various forms and conceptions of the construction of socialist society. . . . Party pluralism . . . implies the recognition of various political parties and currents of opinion, even if they do not necessarily defend

socialist options. At the same time, it admits an opposition whose criticism can be beneficial and constructive, provided its actions do not oppose the construction of socialist society by democratic means.

The principal parties in this experiment are identifiable in table 2.3, which provides numbers and percentages of votes for the April 1975 and April 1976 elections. Legislative elections in 1969 and 1973 had allowed some incipient parties to operate in the form of electoral committees. Two parties important in the post–April 25 period dated their political activity to their founding, the PCP in 1921 and the PS in 1973. Together the two parties polled about half the vote in 1975 and 1976, but ideological differences kept them from forming any effective coalition. The MFA insisted that the combined vote of the PCP, the PS, and the splinter left groups indicated popular acceptance of the country's revolutionary course toward socialism. The PS's Soares, however, mindful of the military control over government, argued only that the strength of his party combined with that of the centrist PPD ensured a balance between "democratic forces," on the one hand, and totalitarian forces, on the other.

TABLE 2.3
Electoral Results, 1975 and 1976

(Total and percentage votes and number of seats for each party)

Party	Elections to Constituent Assembly (April 1975)			Elections to Assembly of the Republic (April 1976)		
	Votes	*%*	*Seats*	*Votes*	*%*	*Seats*
PS	2,145,392	37.87	115	1,887,180	34.97	107
PPD	1,474,575	26.38	80	1,296,432	24.03	73
PCP	709,636	12.53	32	785,620	14.56	40
CDS	433,153	7.65	16	858,873	15.91	42
MDP	233,362	4.12	5	—	—	—
FSP	66,161	1.17	—	41,954	0.78	—
MES	57,682	1.02	—	31,065	0.58	—
UDP	44,546	0.79	1	91,383	1.69	1
FEC (M-L)	32,508	0.57	—	—	—	—
PPM	31,809	0.56	—	28,163	0.52	—
PUP	12,934	0.23	—	—	—	—
LCI	10,732	0.18	—	16,235	0.30	—
MRPP	—	—	—	36,327	0.67	—
PDC	—	—	—	28,226	0.52	—
AOC	—	—	—	15,671	0.29	—
PCP (M-L)	—	—	—	15,801	0.29	—
PRT	—	—	—	5,182	0.10	—

Twelve parties participated in the elections of April 1975. Two-thirds of them were Marxist and Leninist in orientation, two were social democratic, one rightist, and one monarchist. Seven parties (but not the UDP, LCI, MES, PUP, and FEC [M-L]) had signed a pact that assured the MFA of power in the ensuing three years. The substantial vote for the PS and the PPD indicated a moderate and parliamentary direction in contrast to the dominant and disproportionate position of the PCP and the Movimento Democrático Português (Portuguese Democratic Movement—MDP) in the government. The 1976 elections reaffirmed this consolidation of moderate party politics under a PS-PPD coalition and ensured the CDS representation (see Chilcote, 1993, and Abreu, 1975a and 1975b).

The constitutional framework in 1976 balanced military power with political power. The constitutional governments and the political parties in parliament, however, gradually assumed more and more influence, and in 1982 the constitution was revised to eliminate the Revolutionary Council and reduce the authority of the military.

The discussion thus far has suggested a dualistic characterization of the Portuguese state: first, an authoritarian state in which rule was autocratic, formal competition was absent or limited, and participation was restricted to the dominant classes or privileged groups and second, a parliamentary and bourgeois state in which formal competition permits a degree of state autonomy and policy is formulated within recognized rules and procedures. The authoritarian (exceptional) state, represented in the absolutism of early monarchism and the liberalism of later nineteenth-century monarchism as well as in the corporate fascism of the Salazar dictatorship, depended on the support of the Church, the armed forces, and the dominant classes, including the nobility early on and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie later. The parliamentary and bourgeois state, associated politically with formal democracy and economically with welfare reforms for the popular classes and constraints on the dominant classes, appeared during republican rule.

The dualistic character of the Portuguese state implies radically different experiences over time. The various political forms are generally associated with particular regimes and ideologies, but the structure of the Portuguese state has remained relatively constant, as regimes have changed. On a political level, bureaucratic authority and centralization have prevailed. Economically, the Portuguese state has been linked to an evolving capitalist development with emphasis on building infrastructure and facilitating finance capital, initially to encourage national enterprise but later to permit foreign capital to penetrate the economy. Thus, the centralized capitalist state has always exercised a decisive role in the administration of public policy and the regulation

of production and distribution. It has also tended to mobilize the bourgeoisie and its allies around national interests; it has balanced the diverse interests of dominant class fractions and opposing groups and institutional forces and even found ways to undermine and dissipate class conflict.

Notes

1. Part of the conception is drawn from Carnoy (1984) and Jessop (1983), who provide syntheses of various theoretical approaches to the state. This conception of the state approximates that of Abraham (1986: 1–3) in his provocative but controversial analysis of state and classes during the German Weimar Republic. In his useful historical synthesis Bresser Pereira (2004: 16–19) identifies the following state forms: absolutist, liberal, liberal democratic, social democratic, social liberal, and republican. He uses these forms not to depict stages of political development but as a simple way to show governance through time in different European cases. In an era of conservative and neoliberal skepticism and the downsizing of many state functions, he argues that reform of administration and management can be carried out not as a way to dismantle the state but to strengthen it. My formulation identifies state forms as they evolved through different regimes and conspicuous periods of Portuguese history.

2. Fernando Rosas (2004a) offers an overview of the twentieth century in terms of three fundamental cycles in the political trajectory of the country: the end of the liberal-oligarchic system (1890–1926), authoritarianism (1926–1974), and the cycle of democracy (1974–1976). He agrees with Boaventura de Sousa Santos that the 1974–1975 revolution opened a path of modernization but that in reality Portugal is a country modernizing belatedly and with inherent difficulties as it confronts "the logic of hegemonic globalization" (160). The political literature on contemporary Portugal before 1974 is sparse. Some of it is incorporated into general histories of the country, the most important in English being works by Marques (1972) and Payne (1973). Wheeler (1978) provides a useful contribution to an understanding of the First Republic. Writings on the New State either apologetically embrace the Salazar dictatorship or criticize the regime from liberal republican and left perspectives, but Wiarda (1977) attempts to view the regime in an objective light, and Graham (1975) and Schmitter (1975) analyze its institutions and policies. There is a dearth of literature on the opposition to the dictatorship, the most useful works being Fryer and Pinheiro (1961) and Figueiredo (1975). One reason for this is the lack of information during nearly half a century of cultural repression and censorship. Another is lack of interest among scholars unwilling or unable to risk empirical studies or to publish in-depth criticism that might later force them into exile. The literature tends to emphasize institutional forces and to overlook class interrelationships, tensions, and struggles. Since 1974 a plethora of works has appeared, most of which are fully annotated and described in the more than two thousand books, pamphlets, and articles in my bibliography on the period (Chilcote, 1987).

3. The invasions of the Napoleonic armies and the flight of the crown to Brazil allowed liberalism to infiltrate Portugal from France and England, where opponents of absolutism had been forced into exile. Liberalism was spread through Masonic lodges, especially in Porto, where in August 1820, military units revolted. This led to a provisional government and the election of a constituent Cortes made up mainly of merchants, bureaucrats, and professionals who favored liberal institutions but opted for a compromise and the restoration of the monarchy in the 1822 constitution. A succession crisis was provoked by absolutists and by the claim of Miguel, youngest son of King João VI. The king's death in 1826 brought Pedro, the oldest son, back from Brazil, where he had been emperor; Pedro abdicated in favor of his daughter, Maria, and granted the constitutional charter of April 1826. Absolutists disputed this outcome, however, and in February 1828 Miguel, then in exile for his role in the abortive uprising of April 1824, returned to Portugal to be proclaimed king by supporters; Miguel abolished the constitutional charter and dissolved the house of deputies. A six-year war ensued until liberal forces were able to return to power in May 1834. The 1838 constitution was amended at various times, subject to differences between moderates (Regeneradores), radicals (Históricos), and progressives (Progressistas). Politics also involved a hierarchical network of relationships between local notables known as *caciques* and their followers, who benefited from transactions of goods and services and even jobs and concessions in exchange for votes. See Opello (1978a) for additional details and a useful historical summary of Portuguese constitutional history.

4. The Masonic movement included radical petty-bourgeois intellectuals, students, some military officers, and others who, influenced by the utopian socialism of Fourier, in 1875 founded the Portuguese Socialist Party, elements of which joined in the establishment of the Partido Republicano Português (Portuguese Republican Party—PRP). The Masons also included prominent members of the high bourgeoisie. Half the ministers of the 1910–1913 provisional government were Masons, as were Presidents Bernardino Machado, Sidónio Pais, and António José de Almeida. The role of the Masons in the First Republic is discussed in Marques (1975). Although some of the officers who participated in the overthrow of the republic in May 1926 were Masons, other Masons were involved in the revolt of February 1927 against the military dictatorship. Subsequently, the masons became a major force in the resistance to the gradual consolidation of the New State until a decree of January 1935 prohibited Portuguese from participating in secret societies.

5. André Gunder Frank used this example to explain the impact of dependency: "The treaties of the seventeenth century, and especially the Treaty of Methuen in 1703, brought on the destruction of Portugal's textile industries, the takeover by Great Britain of its foreign and even domestic trade . . ." (1967: 155). By 1990 the textile industry accounted for the employment of 28 percent of the Portuguese industrial force and nearly a third of the country's exports, yet on the eve of the full integration of Portugal into the European Economic Community (EEC), the Portuguese textile industry continued in crisis, with several thousand unemployed workers and a large number of factories filing for bankruptcy (*Anglo-Portuguese News*, October 11, 1990).

6. A useful analysis of the Seara Nova movement is in Moser (1965). With its monthly magazine and publishing house, it outlasted the regime and provided a cultural form of resistance that helped mobilize the opposition.

7. The PCP has published many of its clandestine documents (issued before 1974) as well as official documents. Some of the writing of its secretary-general, Alvaro Cunhal, has appeared in English (Cunhal, 1975a). Raby (1988) provides the most systematic and detailed analysis of the PCP and the opposition in general. Pereira (1981) delves into the formative period of the party, and also offers a critique (1988) of the more recent period of party dissidence. His biography of Alvaro Cunhal (1999, 2001, and 2005) contributes to a history of the PCP. Cerqueira (1973a) describes the PCP during clandestinity.

8. Remnants of the royal line were evident to present days. Dom Duarte Pio de Bragança reviews his impressions of life in Portugal since his return in 1975 and refers to Causa Monárquica as an ideology behind the restoration of the monarchy. See *Diário de Notícias* (March 5, 2004), 12–17. Sousa-Cardoso (2005) reports on the Causa Real and the demise of the PPM party that formed in 1974 with the active support of monarchists who had worked in the opposition clandestinely during the Salazar-Caetano years. He refers to a constituency of twelve thousand voters and to opinion polls showing some 20 percent of Portuguese who prefer a monarchist alternative.

9. Cruz (1980a and 1980b) suggests three phases in the development of Christian Democracy in Portugal: first, from the establishment of the Sociedade Católica in 1843 to 1894, a period of antiliberal Catholicism and interest in the formation of a Catholic political party; second, from 1898 to the establishment of the First Republic, antisocialist Catholic syndicalism and the development of academic centers; and third, intervention and organized political expression, culminating in 1917 with the Centro Católico Português, which was later transformed into Acção Católica, with various press organs. Cruz (1982) provides the best analysis of the origins of integralism before and during the Salazar period. He describes Lusitanian integralism as traditional, conservative, and counterrevolutionary, integrating a traditional nationalism, a monarchist nationalism, and other forms that became the basis for integralism under Salazar. For an analysis of how Salazar consolidated his power in the 1926–1932 period, see Gallagher (1981). For early manifestations of fascism, see the brief article and chronology of strikes and political agitation during 1910–1919 by Almeida, Machado, and Cabral (1979). Cabral (1976b) imaginatively reviews recent books on the period, including the work of Campinos (1975), Lucena (1976b), Medeiros (1976), and others.

10. For details of the corporate structure, see Lucena (1976b), Wiarda (1977), Graham (1975), and Schmitter (1975). Schmitter and Wiarda participated in debates among North American political scientists who turned to corporatism as an explanation for authoritarianism in Portugal, Brazil, and other parts of Latin America. Wiarda (1978: 417) sums up the dialogue:

A new body of writings has appeared which uses corporatist concepts and frameworks, as distinct from liberal and/or Marxian models, to examine patterns of interest

representation, public policy-making, and political culture in a variety of countries. . . . We are learning that corporatism is not exclusively to be identified with Right and authoritarian regimes but may also take left-socialist or syndicalist directions, additionally that corporatism may be present in advanced industrial societies as well as developing ones.

Other examples of this literature include Wiarda (1978 and 1979) and Schmitter (1974). Lucena analyzes various forms of corporatism: economic or integral, pure or subordinated, and associative or state (1976b: 165). He argues that Portuguese corporativism, organized through compromise, was open to everything and that while its framers did not want the state to intrude upon society, in practice the two were fused. Corporatism aimed to mitigate struggle and seek the collaboration of classes and groups within classes (Lucena, 1976a: 169). In addition to his studies of the Salazar and Caetano period, there is his book on the 1976 constitution (1978).

11. Campinos refers to the New State as a presidential regime dominated by Salazar, with executive power in the office of prime minister exercised through a hierarchical set of controls institutionalized through a single complex staff organization known as the Presidency of the Council of Ministers: "A distinct ministry or supraministry, it contained a core group of reliable officials, civilian and military—personally accountable to Salazar—charged with the responsibility of reporting on, controlling, and regulating various aspects of Portuguese life" (Graham, 1983: 224). Raby (1988) breaks the history of Portuguese fascism into six stages: 1926–1931 (the initial armed resistance and adjustment by the opposition to clandestinity as the regime consolidates); 1931–1941 (division, retreat, and dislocation, a period of increased repression along with the rise of fascism); 1941–1949 (antifascist unity and rise of a resistance movement, including the reorganization of the PCP, which spearheads the opposition); 1949–1957 (division and retreat during the Cold War and the recovery of the regime after the war and the postwar crisis); 1957–1962 (rise of the opposition and new tendencies, including military populism, Catholic leftism, and civilian-military insurrection); and 1962–1974 (restructuring of the opposition during the period of colonial wars). Cruz (1988) subdivides Salazarism into periods of dictatorship (1926–1933), building of the New State (1933–1945), diversification of the regime (1945–1961), hardship (1961–1968), and obstructed liberalization (1968–1974). Other useful retrospective works on the Salazar period include essays by Silva et al. (1989) and Colóquio sobre o Estado Novo (1987). Georgel (1985a and 1985b) discusses political and economic institutions as well as the police and the military. Pinto et al. (1982) contains essays on fascism in Portugal, including an interesting chart on the evolution of the regime, relevant models, and successes and failures.

12. Wiarda provides balance to some of the exaggerated analysis by foreign observers of liberalization: "Concentration on the supposed liberalizing or democratizing tendencies (and reversals) of the Caetano era represents more wishful thinking and downright imagination on the part of outside journalists and reporters than it does the actual realities of Caetano's policies and government. For Caetano's intentions were never to democratize or liberalize Portugal, and it is inappropriate to fault him for failing to do what he never intended to do" (1977: 256).

13. The opposition had met at Aveiro on May 15–17, 1969. Its papers and policy position (see Congresso da Oposição Democrática, 3rd, 1973) reveal the variety of perspectives that surfaced in the electoral campaign: old republicans and moderates in the Acção Democrata-Social (Social Democratic Action—ADS); moderate Catholics, liberals, and moderate socialists in the Commissão Eleitoral de Unidade Democrática (Electoral Commission of Democratic Unity—CEUD); and radical Catholics, left socialists, and communists in the Commissão Democrática Eleitoral (Democratic Electoral Commission—CDE). After the November elections Caetano changed the name of the União Nacional to the Aliança Nacional Popular. Several reformist candidates had been elected on the official slate, notably Francisco Pinto Balsemão and Francisco de Sá Carneiro, and they pushed for liberal legislation. For a brief period "liberal" technocrats joined the cabinet (João Salgueiro in planning, Rogério Martins in industry, and Xavier Pintado in commerce), and the momentum toward liberalization concentrated in the Sociedade para o Estudo do Desenvolvimento Económico e Social (Society for the Study of Economic and Social Development—SEDES), which was to become a moderate force upon which General António de Spínola depended when he came to power in 1974. See Blume (1975b) for a description of the institutions under Caetano. For details on the 1969 elections, the opposition, and the Caetano government, see Sánchez-Gijón (1970). See Martins (1969) and Hugh Kay (1970: 329) for a review of the opposition from the 1950s and Lucena (1967) for observations on the opposition in exile.

14. Schmitter (1978) and Bandeira (1975a) provide the most useful and comprehensive treatments of elections during the New State period from 1933 to 1974. They report the following rates of participation in legislative elections: 1934 (5.3 percent), 1938 (8.6 percent), 1942 (8.5 percent), 1945 (7.1 percent), 1949 (11.4 percent), 1953 (11.5 percent), 1957 (11.6 percent), 1961 (12.0 percent), 1965 (13.1 percent), 1969 (11.6 percent), and 1973 (15.4 percent).

15. Raby (1988: 212–213) suggests that Beja was an important armed action because it involved new military and civilian participants, including some communist militants defying the directives of their party, and that if it had occurred a few months later in coordination with mass labor strikes and student and faculty demonstrations in Lisbon, Coimbra, and Porto, its outcome might have been different.

16. For memoirs of Portuguese exiles in Paris in May 1968 and their influence on extreme left politics, see Raimundo (1988). On the student "revolt" of 1969, see Coelho (1988), which includes a chronology of important events from 1968 to 1972. There were the 1969 elections with CDE and CEUD (see Rabaça, 1989). See also Pinheiro (1979), based on essays originally published in *O Diabo*, where she describes her experience in Algiers, especially from 1962 to 1966. Her article on this experience (1965) covers the role of Piteira Santos, Tito de Morais, FPLN, JAPPA, MAR, PCP, Delgado, and so on. For correspondence of Humberto Delgado with Manuel Sertório, see Sertório (1978): the introduction gives a detailed view of the exiled opposition and Delgado's relationship to it, including the PCP. See also Romero-Robledo and Novais [1974?] for documentation and detail on the assassination of Delgado.

17. Cunhal (1975b: 13–19) recounts the activity of the PCP from its Fifth Congress in 1957 until the Sixth in 1975. He divides this period into four phases: (l) from the

Fifth Congress until July 1958, when there were some large opposition rallies, legislative and presidential elections, and a strike of sixty thousand workers; (2) from July 1958 to February 1961, marked by strikes among cod fishermen (twenty-seven days), fishermen of Matosinhos (seventy days), and miners at Aljustrel (thirty-three hours) and a March 1959 protest and imprisonments; (3) from February 1961 to May 1962, including the Angolan insurrection of February 4, 1962, a fourteen-day strike at Peniche, and massive demonstrations of a hundred thousand students on May 1, 1962, and two hundred thousand rural workers on May 8; and (4) May 1962 to 1974, with various strikes and May Day demonstrations each year.

18. Raby (1988: 202–204) provides further details, based on interviews with Serra and others, and suggests that this movement was significant because it was not connected to old republicans of the opposition "establishment."

19. For Spínola's inauguration speech and the MFA program, see Movimento das Forças Armadas (1974). The two major works, including significant documents, on the origins and evolution of the MFA are Rodrigues, Borges, and Cardoso (1975) and Almeida (1977). In addition, see a narrative of three days of revolutionary coup by Rodrigues (1974), early impressions of the coup by Banazol (1974), insightful impressions on his experience in Guinea-Bissau by Lourenço (1974), the useful chronology by Santos, Cruzeiro, and Coimbra (1997), and the analysis by Rezola (2007). Alves (1975) presents readable and interesting overview.

3

Economic Groups, Public Enterprises, and Multinationals: Links to the State

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MANY MAJOR ECONOMIC GROUPS DOMINATED the Portuguese economy under the New State. At the same time, the state fostered a number of national industries, some of them in conjunction with national and international capital. Monopolistic and oligopolistic groups influenced policy, and the state in turn shielded Portuguese industry.[1] Although this relationship was radically changed after April 1974 and, in particular, by the nationalization of large enterprises in March 1975, powerful economic groups, some old and some new, emerged in the aftermath of the revolutionary period. Stimulated by Portugal's ties with Europe, most of them were closely aligned with international capital.

The postwar period from 1946 to 1974 was decisive for the monopolization of capitalism in Portugal. Monopoly groups had been established in the 1920s, when some small and medium-sized firms had begun to concentrate capital in certain sectors of the economy (Fonseca, 1983: 29). Each group was a commercial-financial industrial cluster of companies under the direction of a leading capitalist, a family, or a conglomeration of capitalist and family interests. Some, like the Companhia União Fabril, had grown rapidly through exploitation of vegetable oils from the colonies. During the 1950s these groups expanded by incorporating corporate and bank capital. At the same time, the Salazar regime limited foreign investment, in the view of one observer not in defense of "an authentic nationalism" but with the intent "of preserving its economic and political influence in the most archaic sectors of the bourgeoisie and impeding the appearance of a concentrated proletariat" (Fonseca, 1983: 29).[2]

During the Salazar years economic policies emphasized stability, insulating the economy from external forces, and keeping structural change to a minimum. Relying on national resources and minimizing external dependency, the "inward-oriented corporatist economy" was kept in isolation from the outside (Baer and Leite, 1992: 20). State regulation, minimal public ownership, and a monopolistic private sector characterized this economy: "The system stifled competition, misallocated resources, strengthened existing monopolies, encouraged favouritism, and discouraged foreign investment" (Corkill, 1999: 15). Pressures for change during the 1960s, including the colonial wars in Africa and integration with Europe, culminated with the coup of April 25, 1974, and the ensuing revolutionary period turned the economy upside down, with instability, nationalization of monopolies, and a widespread demand for a socialist economy. With the collapse of the empire and especially the colonies in Africa, Portugal was faced with the choice between integration into Europe or finding its own path. This problem was not really worked out until the first constitutional governments under Mário Soares.

Within the limits of its dependence on capitalism, Portugal moved slowly in the direction of an opening toward Europe as one means of meeting the increasing commercial and technological needs of the monopoly groups while allowing some modernization of its backward capitalism. Foreign capital would also serve to bolster and prolong the Portuguese colonial wars and possibly stimulate exploitation of untapped natural resources in Africa. Initially, Portugal joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and by 1963 international capital had begun to have an impact, a process interrupted by the revolutionary events of 1974 and 1975 but restored thereafter with formal affiliation with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986. The Caetano years represented a further effort at liberalization of the economy and a partial modification of state apparatuses. This implementation of a "technocratic fascism" reflected the interests of the more dynamic sector of the bourgeoisie (Fonseca, 1983: 32).

Through nationalization of the banking system in 1975 these interests were generally assimilated into an expanding state. Although the old groups were unable fully to recover their influence, by 1990, under increasingly conservative governments, state enterprises were being liquidated or sold to private interests, and new groups in the private sector were becoming prominent in the economy. The composition of these groups reveals the structure of the Portuguese dominant classes, combining financial, industrial, commercial, and sometimes landowning interests.

Santos (1977a) suggests four phases: 1926–1928 to 1944–1945, corporativist ruralism; 1945–1946 to 1958–1959, industrialization and opening to the

exterior; 1960 to 1967–1968, national economic contradiction and European integration; and 1968–1969 to April 1974, regenerating technocracy. He points to two periods of concentration, one in 1939–1959 and another in 1968–1973 (81). He argues that with Caetano's rise to power the industrial bourgeoisie and technocracy considered the moment opportune for transcending the colonial question by opening the economy to foreign, particularly European, capital and modernization. These classes rapidly expanded and consolidated monopoly control over the economy through ownership of key firms, holding companies, and banks. Small firms began to disappear in the face of monopoly and multinational capital. Technocrats began to play a decisive role in the political apparatus and the large monopoly groups. Conditions at the time included political isolation from the outside world, the conflict between integrating the colonies into the national economy and reorganizing the economy in conjunction with European integration, a tendency to rely on existing but obsolete industry and a low level of technological innovation, permanently stagnant agricultural production based on a traditional policy of subsidy, a corrupt state apparatus, substantial emigrant labor, monetary instability due to the colonial wars, and a crisis in trade only offset by a positive balance of trade with the colonies (1977a: 70–71).

By the end of 1973 seven large traditional groups constituted the monopolistic nucleus in Portugal: Companhia União Fabril, Espírito Santo, Champalimaud, Português do Atlântico, Borges & Irmão, Nacional Ultramarino, and Fonseca & Burnay (Martins, 1973). The first four of these groups dominated because of the convergence of their control of large industry and leading position in commercial banking (Ribeiro, Fernandes, and Ramos, 1987). Interspersed among them and other groups were fourteen powerful families: Melo, Espírito Santo, Champalimaud, Quina, Mendes de Almeida, Queirós Pereira, Figueiredo, Feteira, Bordalho Vinhas, Albano de Magalhães, Domingos Barreiro, Pinto de Magalhães, and Brandão Miranda. A secondary level, dependent on this nucleus but benefiting from the speculative Caetano period, was made up of some thirty families with interests in real estate, tourism, insurance, and some industrial projects; conspicuous in this bloc were the Silveira Machado, Abecassis, Lagos, Cocco, Medeiros de Almeida, Pinto Basto, Sebastião Alves, and Manuel Bulhosa families. The following discussion focuses on the more salient features of the seven dominant groups, drawing on the description by Martins (1973).

The Grupo Companhia União Fabril aggregated more than one hundred integrated firms and more than one-tenth of the capital in Portugal. It had started more than a century ago as a soap factory in Lisbon and then expanded its activities throughout Portugal and the African colonies, with interests in chemicals, textiles, shipping, naval construction, and other industries. It

controlled three banks and the largest insurance company, Império-Sagres-Universal. The Melo family was tied to it through the Banco Totta e Açores and the Calheiros Lopes family through another bank, Sociedade Agrícola do Arneiro Grande. The industrialists Alves Diniz and Manuel Gonçalves were also heavily involved. By 1973 it was identified in *Fortune's* list of the three hundred largest firms in the world (*Revista Expresso*, September 29, 1973).

The Grupo Espírito Santo, comprising some twenty firms, had interests in banking, insurance, petroleum, paper, cement, tires, and communications. Its influence extended through the largest commercial bank, the Banco Espírito Santo e Comercial de Lisboa, and the second-largest insurance firm, Tranquilidade. Descendants of the Carlos Pereira family also participated in the group along with North American, Belgian, and other foreign interests. The group had substantial agricultural interests in the colonies.[3]

The Grupo Champalimaud, under the leadership of the industrialist António Champalimaud, was involved in cement, steel, insurance, and paper. It consisted of twelve large industrial firms, including the national steel company, a bank (Pinto e Sotto Mayor), and the third-largest insurance conglomerate, Confiança-Mundial-Continental de Resseguros. Other families involved included the Pinto e Sotto Mayor family; the Count of Caria, administrator of the family bank; the Duke of Palmela, a large landowner in the Setúbal peninsula; Silveira Machado, with two automobile firms; Mário Vinhas, with beer factories; and the Viscount of Botelho, head of a family in the Azores with shipping interests.

The Grupo Banco Português do Atlântico, with seventy firms including three banks, an insurance company, and several investment houses, exercised influence through the Banco Português do Atlântico, third largest in Portugal. In this group were several family conglomerates, including Feteira-Bordalho (glass manufacturing), Brandão Miranda (industry-banking), Manuel Vinhas (industry-banking), Albano de Magalhães (textile manufacturing), and Domingos Barreiro (merchandising).

The Grupo Borges & Irmão, with forty firms, was active in banks, insurance, textiles, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, construction materials, fishing, tourism, hotels, tire manufacturing, pharmaceutical products, and newspapers. The banker-industrialist Miguel Quina, son-in-law of the Count of Covilhã, whom he succeeded as head of the group, was the major figure in this group, which had substantial interests in the north, especially in Porto.

The Grupo Banco Nacional Ultramarino was a large financial trust with interests in insurance (Fidelidade), mining, transport, and tourism and controlled numerous companies in the African colonies.

The Grupo Fonseca & Burnay, with interests in banking, railroads, and overseas exploration, was formed through the fusion of the banking interests

of the Sousa and Figueiredo families together with Belgian capital. It was integrated with international capital through ITT.

   A secondary level of groups, many dominated by family capital, included the Grupo Banco Intercontinental Português, led by Jorge de Brito and involved in road construction, banks, insurance, and shipping; the Grupo Pinto de Magalhães, headed by the prominent capitalists Alfredo Pinto de Magalhães and José Costa Oliveira; the Grupo SACOR, the state oil monopoly, partly owned by the Grupo Espírito Santo and the Grupo Português do Atlântico; the Grupo do Conde de Caria of the Mendes de Almeida family; the Grupo do Banco da Agricultura, representing the interests of large landowners; and the Grupo ITT. [4]

   Espírito Santo, Burnay, and, after 1968–1969, the Companhia União Fabril were closely linked to foreign capital. The Banco Nacional Ultramarino, Espírito Santo, and Champalimaud were oriented toward colonial exploitation. The Companhia União Fabril and Borges & Irmão were protected economically within Portugal (table 3.1).[5]

State Enterprise and the Economic Groups

Since the 1930s the state had been associated with private national and international industrial capital, particularly in the field of energy, with the objective of achieving self-sufficiency (Ribeiro, Fernandes, and Ramos, 1987: 946).

TABLE 3.1
Economic Group Control in the Portuguese Economy, 1973

Activity	Degree of Control	Groups
Iron Ore	50%	Champalimaud
Ferro-Manganese	100%	CUF
Steel Manufacture	Partial Monopoly	Champalimaud
Shipbuilding	80%	CUF
Chemicals	65%	CUF, SACOR, Espírito Santo
Cement	77%	Champalimaud, Others
Paper	80%	CUF
Vegetable Oils	40%	BPA, Espírito Santo
Beer	Oligopoly	All Major Groups
Commercial Banking	90%	All Major Groups
Insurance	60%	All Major Groups
Maritime Transport	60%	CUF
Auto Sales	Partial Oligopoly	Champalimaud, Fonseca & Burnay, Espírito Santo

Sources: Santos (1977a, 1977b), Fonseca (1983: 43), and Martins (1973)

It envisaged joint ventures with private capital to build infrastructure and heavy industry.[6]

On March 11, 1975, a counterrevolutionary coup served as a catalyst and pretext for the nationalization of the interests of the economic groups. Three days later their powerful financial base disappeared with the nationalization of the banks, and on the following day there was a takeover of thirty-two insurance firms. During April the energy and oil interests, the steel monopoly, and rail, sea, and air transportation services fell under the control of the state, followed by cellulose and tobacco in May, urban transportation in June and July, mining and chemicals in August, textiles in September, holding companies in October, radio and television in December, and several newspapers in early 1976. The nationalizations continued until July 29, 1976, by which time there were 244 firms under state control. [7]

The state moved quickly to reorganize its assets. The Banco de Portugal now exercised nearly absolute control (98 percent) over commercial banking in the country (sixteen banks and two banking houses) and integrated these entities into ten state banks (Borges & Irmão, Espírito Santo e Comercial de Lisboa, Fonseca & Burnay, Micaelense, National Ultramarino, Pinto e Sotto Mayor, Português do Atlântico, Totta & Açores, Crédito Predial Português, and União de Bancos Portugueses). The state also reorganized its insurance firms, with control over three-fourths of all insurance premiums, into six groups (Comércio e Indústria, Bonança, União e Ultramarina; Douro, Mutual, Ourique, Argus e Tagus, Mundial-Confiança e Pátria; Fidelidade, MSA, Seguradora Industrial e Atlas; Império e Alentejo; Tranquilidade, Garantia Funchalense; and A Nacional). Electric energy was consolidated under a public entity, Electricidade de Portugal, and the four nationalized oil firms, including two refineries, were brought together into Petróleos de Portugal. The state organized the paper industry into the Empresa de Celulose e Papel de Portugal and controlled the largest iron-and-steel enterprise, Siderurgia Nacional. By the end of the 1970s there were fifty-six "public enterprises" under the state (table 3.2).[8]

TABLE 3.2
State Enterprises, 1980

Administração-Geral do Açúcar e do Álcool EP (AGA)
Aeroportos e Navegação Aérea (ANA)
Agência Noticiosa Portuguesa EP (ANOP)
Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses EP
Central de Cervejas EP (CENTRALCER)
Cimentos de Portugal EP (CIMPOR)
Companhia das Lezírias EP (CL)
Companhia de Seguros de Crédito EP (COSEC)

Companhia de Seguros Império EP
Companhia de Seguros Mundial-Confiança EP
Companhia Nacional de Navegação EP
Companhia Nacional de Petroquímica EP (CNP)
Companhia Portuguesa de Transportes Marítimos EP (CTM)
Correios e Telecomunicações de Portugal (CTT)
Dragagens de Portugal EP (DRAGAPOR)
Electricidade de Portugal EP (EDP)
Empresa de Celulose e Papel de Portugal EP (PORTUCEL)
Empresa de Electricidade de Madeira EP
Empresa de Petroquímica e Gás EP (EPG)
Empresa Financeira de Gestão e Desenvolvimento EP (FINANGESTE)
Empresa Industrial de Tabacos EP (TABAQUEIRA)
Empresa Nacional de Turismo EP (ENATUR)
Empresa Nacional de Urânio EP (ENU)
Empresa Pública das Águas de Lisboa EP (EPAL)
Empresa Pública de Parques Industriais
Empresa Pública de Urbanização de Lisboa EP (EPUL)
Empresa Pública do Abastecimento de Cereais (EPAC)
Empresa Pública do Cachão
Empresa Pública do Saneamento Básico da Região de Lisboa
Empresa Pública dos Jornais Notícias e Capital (EPNC)
Empresa Pública dos Jornais Século e Popular (EPSP)
Estaleiros Navais de Viana do Castelo EP
Fábrica de Extracção, Refinação Óleos Vegetais e de Rações EP (FORE)
Fábrica Escola Irmãos Stephens EP
Ferrominas EP
Grupo Segurador MSA EP
Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda
Instituto de Participações do Estado EP (IPE)
Metropolitano de Lisboa EP
Navegação de Portugal EP
Petróleos de Portugal EP (PETROGAL)
Petroquímica e Fibras Sintéticas EP (PETROFIBRAS)
Química de Portugal EP (QUIMIGAL)
Radiodifusão Portuguesa EP (RDP)
Radiotelevisão Portuguesa EP (RTP)
Rodoviária Nacional EP (RN)
Saneamento Básico da Região da Madeira (SABAM)
SETENAVE EP
Siderurgia Nacional EP
SOCARMAR EP
Sociedade Mineira de Santiago EP
Telefones de Lisboa e Porto (TLP)
Transportes Aéreos Portugueses EP (TAP)
Transportes do Tejo EP (TRANSTEJO)
União Cervejeira EP (UNICER)
União de Bancos Portugueses

The state sector was economically powerful although disordered, disarticulated, and lacking direction and a rational government policy that would give it dynamism and facilitate the reconstruction of the national economy. One commentator suggested that some industries in the state sector were monopolistic without benefiting from a monopoly's advantage (Ferreira, 1979: 23). This situation may have changed with the return to power of a technocratically oriented government under Aníbal Cavaco Silva and its determination to liquidate inefficient and unnecessary state enterprise or return it to private ownership. By 1989 real growth was up 5.4 percent, investment was 7.5 percent, and unemployment was reduced to 5.4 percent, the lowest in the EEC. Together with increases in personal income and domestic consumption, these advances were reflected in optimism about the economy, particularly among domestic and foreign investors in the private sector, but there was also marked growth in sales among public enterprises, in some cases above 50 percent, along with sharp increases in productivity. Roughly a third of the top fifty enterprises in Portugal were public, and many of them had experienced rough times because of poor investment and low productivity in part attributable to decisions under private management prior to nationalization but also to stagnancy under the state (*Revista Expresso*, July 8, 1989: 185). Electricidade de Portugal (EDP), for example, suffered from both excessive debt and personnel; QUIMIGAL had invested in oil exploration that had not yielded new resources, the CP needed to renovate its antiquated rolling stock, and Siderurgia Nacional was modernizing its facilities.

By 1990 the Portuguese banking system included nine public banks, four private commercial banks, and eleven foreign banks along with three public and two private credit institutions. In 1989 Banco Totta e Açores (BTA) became the first of the state banks to be denationalized, while the shares of the Banco Português do Atlântico (BPA), the largest commercial bank, were to be offered to private investors, followed by those of the Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor (BPSM) and Banco Espírito Santo e Commercial de Lisboa (BESCL). By 1990 two of the large public insurance companies, Aliança Seguradora and Companhia de Seguros Tranquilidade, had been privatized.[9]

The New Economic Groups

The predominance of the state in the economy was not a deterrent to a "rebirth" of the private economic groups (Azevedo et al., 1989). Among the seven big groups whose holdings had been taken over by the state nationalizations fifteen years earlier, only the Grupo Espírito Santo, under the leadership of Ricardo Espírito Santo, was conspicuous in the new configuration of eco-

nomic groups that exercised substantial influence on the Portuguese economy by 1990. It had concentrated its reorganization abroad through two holding companies, Espírito Santo Financial Holding in Luxembourg and Espírito Santo Resources in the Bahamas. Through joint capital ventures in France, Italy, Spain, and elsewhere, its strategy was to promote a web of international activities while extending its tentacles throughout the Portuguese economy. Its assets in Portugal included financial institutions, the Banco International de Crédito and Espírito Santo Sociedade de Investimentos, and insurance enterprises, the Companhia de Seguros Inter-Atlântico and Companhia de Seguros Tranquilidade. The latter, reacquired in October 1990 through the reprivatization process initiated by the Cavaco government, was active with assets in agroindustry, industry, tourism, real estate, food services, and other service areas. It anticipated reacquiring its former bank, the BESCL, once the state opened up the bank to reprivatization.

In the aftermath of the revolutionary process of March 1975, when large-scale nationalization had occurred, the state in 1976 created the Investimento e Participações Empresariais (IPE) as a public holding company designed to integrate assets dispersed among some thirteen hundred firms not directly belonging to the state. In 1982 the IPE was designated an autonomous rather than a state enterprise, a mere formality because the state maintained complete control. This legal change permitted more flexibility in the IPE's operations, including new investment with political implications (see analysis by Maria Manuel Stocker, in *Público*, November 5, 1990, on questionable transactions between IPE and Sociedade de Construções Severo de Carvalho). As the largest group in the Portuguese economy, with participation in one hundred firms, IPE accounted for 6 percent of Portuguese exports; its activities included agricultural industry, fishing, lumber, paper, cork, mining, textiles, glass, ceramic, cement, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, automobiles, shipping, electronics, telecommunications, maritime transport, construction, insurance, and finance. António Sousa Gomes and a team of young entrepreneurs presided over its operations. Gomes envisaged the IPE as "a state instrument of political economy in the promotion of productive investment and modernization of the Portuguese economy in cooperation with private enterprise" (Azevedo et al., 1989: 8R). However, in November 1990 its future was in doubt because of a government decision to allow the participation of private capital, in particular the three old banks, BPA, BESCL, and BTA, in units under the control of IPE, and the organization into a new state entity of the most profitable, namely, the Marconi, Secil, and Brisa (*Revista Expresso*, October 13, 1990, and *Diário de Notícias*, November 13, 1990).[10]

Additionally, the Cavaco government attempted to refine and reorganize state involvement in the economy through two "new financial groups"

organized through the state entities, the Caixa Geral de Depósitos and the Banco de Fomento Nacional. The former group decentralized its activities through the Banco Nacional Ultramarino and the Fidelidade-Grupo Segurador, while the latter group worked through Cosec and the Banco Borges & Irmão (Azevedo et al., 1989: 15R).

Among the newly emerging private groups were the Grupo Sonae, headed by Belmiro de Azevedo, a conglomerate of sixty firms including the remnants of the old Grupo Pinto Magalhães, with interests including lumber and wood products, agroindustry, biotechnology, distribution, fast food, communication services, and tourism; the Grupo Jerónimo Martins, presided over by Alexandre Soares dos Santos, with control over the supermarket chains of thirty-one Pingo Doce and fifteen Pão de Açúcar stores; the Grupo Amorim, led by Américo Amorim, with sixteen firms and control over more than half the world's cork supply, an enterprise based on a tradition established by his grandfather but now diversified into other lines within and outside Portugal; the Grupo Vicaima, led by Alvaro da Costa Leite, with twenty-five firms in lumber and wood products and construction, and a portfolio that included financial participation in nine private national banks and a presence in foreign markets; the Grupo Entreposto, under António Dias da Cunha, maintaining interests in commerce, industry, and services in Portugal, Mozambique, Spain, and Brazil; the Grupo RAR, named after its first venture, Refinarias de Acúcar (founded in 1942), and headed by Macedo Silva, with majority interest in fourteen firms concentrating on foodstuffs (sugar, chocolate, wines), distribution, finance, and services; the Grupo Interfina, a young group fostered by Jorge Ferro Ribeiro with interests in finance, textiles, insurance, tourism, and construction; and the Grupo Colep, under Illídio Pinho, with a primary interest in the packaging of foodstuffs (for further details, see Azevedo et al., 1989).

The Multinationals

By the end of 1973 some 270 firms were controlled by or integrated with multinational capital (Martins, 1976). Their growth and influence in the Portuguese economy was due to policies of the Caetano regime aimed at attracting foreign capital (by offering minimal fiscal and customs controls, incentives, credit, expatriation of capital), and the low cost of labor. Some 150 of these firms were branches of large foreign enterprises (the rest being integrated with national capital through internal banking credits). Their activities were primarily in exploitation of mineral resources or import substitution activities, for example, Beralt Tin (wolframite), Standard Eléctrica e Plessey Automática

(electrical materials and telecommunications), Lever (detergents), Nestle (food products), Ford, General Motors, Fiat, and Renault (automobile assembly), and Secil (cement). A second group of some ninety-five firms, including Timex, Grundig Electrónica, Central Data, Philips, General Instruments, and Siemens, aimed at manufacturing for markets abroad and depended on cheap Portuguese labor. A third group of fourteen multinationals imported their products for distribution within Portugal, including pharmaceutical and chemical firms such as Shell, Bayer, and Merck. A fourth group of some twenty firms, including Leon Levy and Costain, was involved in real estate and tourism. These groups exercised substantial control over some economic activities within Portugal (see Martins, 1976, and table 3.3).

The Caetano regime had hoped that the opening to foreign investment would be accompanied by technology, capital, and modernization of the Portuguese economy. The multinationals were also encouraged to invest, exploit natural resources, and "colonize" major sectors of the colonial economy. The dominant economic groups within Portugal also envisaged integration of their capital with that of major foreign corporations as a means of moving toward economic integration with Europe. In her assessment of the multinationals, however, Martins demonstrates that the presence of the multinationals was not accompanied by any substantial investment of capital or significant transfer of technology. Furthermore, their activities in the Portuguese economy were not incorporated into development plans. Indeed, decisions were based on multinational interests, impeding any balanced development of the national economy: "The multinationals did not contribute to a real

TABLE 3.3

Multinational Control over Economic Activity within Portugal, 1973

Economic Activity	Degree of Control	Multinationals
Synthetic Fibers	100%	Mitsui & Others
Gas	100%	Air Liquide
Electronics	75%	ITT, Philips, Others
Paints & Varnish	75%	Hoechst, Others
Auto Assembly	75%	Ford, General Motors, Others
Drugs	75%	All Large Firms
Soap & Toothpaste	50%	Lever, Colgate
Detergents	50%	Lever
Clothing	50%	Some 80 Firms
Cellulose	50%	Bill, E-Pulg Mil
Cement	33%	Secil

Source: Santos, (1977a: 78), Fonseca, (1983: 43), Martins (1976)

development of our country but led us toward dependency and further separated Portugal from the rest of Europe" (1976: 62).[11]

To summarize, under Caetano the old monopolies began to form joint enterprises with foreign firms, in line with the process of multinationalization that was occurring elsewhere in the world. In a search for profits outside Portugal and its colonies, they located some of their holdings in Brazil, Europe, and the United States. With the 1975 nationalizations some conglomerates were able to continue operations abroad (e.g., Champalimaud in Brazil, Quina in France, and Espírito Santo in Brazil, England, and the United States). Those that remained in Portugal declined, while those abroad tended to recover. The new groups emerged after 1976 tended to align themselves with foreign capital, and consequently their nationalist aspirations were largely subverted by their compromises abroad. At another level, Portuguese enterprise had flourished through ties with the state, and after the nationalizations public capital gradually gained control over the private means of production. With privatization, however, this control gradually shifted to foreign enterprise, and the domestic bourgeoisie found its participation limited as the government released funds for investment.[12]

Notes

1. Medeiros (1978) argues that capitalism was given new impetus with the consolidation of the Salazar regime. Bruneau (1984: 19–21) suggests that no particular class controlled Salazar even though the bourgeoisie clearly benefited from his rule: "In the pattern of patrimonial rule, updated in this conservative and authoritarian regime of personal control, Salazar ruled alone." Salazar was free of clientelism and compromises and exercised power on a personalist basis. Caetano, in contrast, did not rule effectively and lacked control of the regime; in his memoirs he complained of lack of power and party backing, the uncooperative attitude of the liberals, and the passivity of the capitalists.

2. This attention to building an isolated economy tying Portugal to the colonies with attention to fractions of the bourgeoisie may be helped by reference to a special issue of the journal *Análise Social* based on papers presented at a conference in April 1991, including three historical analyses by Nuno Gonçalo Monteiro, Ana Mouta Faria, and Luís Espinha da Silveira and studies on agrarian and local elites by Maria Filomena Mônica and others and on political and intellectual elites by Rui Ramos, Maria de Lourdes Lima dos Santos, Manuel Braga da Cruz, and others (see Instituto de Ciências Sociais, 1992).

3. See Carvalho, Antunes, and Ferreira (1975) for an exposé on the Banco Espírito Santo, a collective effort of the Comisões de Delegados Sindicais do Banco Espírito Santo e Comercial de Lisboa.

4. See ITT (1978), a report on details of ITT operations in Portugal and its Shera-ton hotels during the Salazar period, workers' occupation of the hotel in 1974, and the problems in the post–April 25 period. This PCP-published book on foreign capital and its penetration and impact in Portugal cites Rolo (1977) as an example of dependence on outside technology in the communications industry. The ITT group in Portugal was made up of Standard Eléctrica SARL, ITT Semicondutores, Rabor-Construções Eléctricas SARL, Hotéis Sheraton de Portugal SARL, Oliva Comercial SARL, Oliva-Indústrias Metalúrgicas SARL, and Imprimarte-Publicações e Artes-Gráficas SARL (23). Each of these firms was reviewed and analyzed at a time when ITT was seeking expansion of its facilities, about 1977.

5. Mónica (1987) provides helpful background with some relevance to the traditional families in her detailed, scholarly analysis of capitalists and industrialists in the formative period of 1870–1914. She delves into family prominence, family links, key figures, and their impact on the economy. She has also published (1990) sixteen interviews with prominent capitalists. The first organization representing industrial interests was the Associação Industrial Portuguesa, founded in 1849 in Porto; the Associação Promotora de Indústria Fabril, founded in 1860, was the predecessor of the Associação Industrial Portuguesa (Schmitter, 1975: 13). Santos (1977a and 1977b) gives detail on the monopolies in the 1968–1973 period. For an interview with Champalimaud, see Camões (1989). See also the analysis by Sammis (1988) and Nataf and Sammis (1990).

6. Patricio's book (1989) on the industrial petrochemical complex SINES, on the Atlantic coast south of Lisbon, reveals the conflict between state-sponsored industrialization and socioeconomic life at the local level. The consequences included expropriation of both small and large parcels of land and the uprooting of families subsisting on the land, impact on the environment that interfered with the local fishing industry, and waste outflows. The dominant political force in the area, the local PCP, adopted positions of policy and practice that contrasted with those of the national party, which officially opposed the industrial project and favored labor-intensive small and medium-sized industry and traditional agricultural and fishing activities. The local PCP became not only responsible and efficient but open to dealing with people's needs and effective in leading or joining with resistance activities to protest the negative consequences of industrialization in the area (see also Patricio, 1990). Wemans (1986) focuses on the Cavaco government's plans to close SINES and on other state enterprises. (See also "Os 'dossiers' secretos de Sines," *O Jornal* 699 [1988].) Of the two state petrochemical plants at SINES, the CNP was privatized with Finnish capital, and PETROGAL was placed on the market.

7. Martins and Rosa's (1979) work on the public sector reveals the web of relationships among private and public firms, focusing on public enterprise in each major sector of the economy. Their information is particularly useful in understanding the strength of the monopoly groups prior to nationalization, the links among them, and how the state reorganized them after takeover. Pinho (1976) is helpful on this question. Camacho (1987) assesses the implications of privatization of the public sector, while Pacheco (1988a, 1988b, and 1988c) examines state and other enterprises and relations with workers, strikes, salary adjustments, and so on.

8. Ferreira (1976b: 4–5) argues that in the early years of the revolutionary period economic dependence was consolidated through financial dependence, and the open-door policy accelerated the country toward bankruptcy.

9. For details on the bank sector see Bastardo and Gomes (1990). On banking in the early 1980s, see *Revista Expresso Suplemento* 457 (August 1, 1981), 1S–20S. The nationalized banks continued under state control throughout the decade, as the Cavaco government strategy was to permit the formation of new private banks. The first of this "new generation" of private banks was the Banco Comercial Português (*Sabado*, August 5, 1989, 132–133). In late 1990 the old Mello group, under José Manuel de Mello, revealed its strategy of expanding into corporate finance by purchasing a majority share of the Sociedade Financeira Portuguesa, once the government opened its shares for privatization (*Revista Expresso*, November 3, 1990). See *Diário de Notícias* Supplement "Empresas," March 1992, for details on the rapidly expanding financial structure of the Portuguese economy. In early April 1992 Portugal agreed to link its escudo currency to the monetary system of the EEC, another indication of the importance attributed by the government to the financial sector.

10. On the new economic groups, see Azevedo et al. (1989), Bastardo and Gomes (1990), and Silva and Soares (1989). The privatization process was slowed by judicial proceedings and discrepancies between government and arbitration commission values in determining indemnification for the firms nationalized fifteen years earlier; for details, see *O Independente,* October 4, 1990. Miguel Quina discussed the nationalization of his property and showed me documents on the 1988 settlement of his claim in the form of bonds that would mature in twenty-eight years and leave him little once inflation had been taken into account; he planned to appeal this judgment to the Supreme Court, seeking remuneration in the form of shares in the old companies as they were privatized (interview, Miguel Gentil Quina, Lisbon, November 2, 1990). For an analysis by his son including attention to the nationalizations of 1975, the process of privatization, and the influx of foreign capital in Portugal, see Quina (1990). As an example of this process, in late 1990 the government announced its intention to privatize 60 to 70 percent of the capital of the Siderurgia Nacional without limiting foreign participation and without recognizing any rights of the former owner, António Champalimaud (*Expresso*, November 3, 1990).

11. Rolo (1976) emphasizes the mechanism of dependency through multinational corporate activity in general, with attention to Portugal and its legislation on foreign capital investment, which he dissects in detail. Rolo, Nabais, and Gonçalves (1984) examine 2,543 contracts related to the transfer of international technology to Portugal. A leader of one of the old groups commented that the 1975 nationalizations were aimed at socializing the private means of production without touching foreign capital and that reprivatization under the Cavaco government was leading to foreign control of the domestic economy (interview, Miguel Gentil Quina, Lisbon, November 2, 1990).

12. In his work on Portuguese telecommunications, carried out through the Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Brazilian political scientist Jawdat Abu el Haj (Internet Messages to Chilcote, June 22 and August 19, 2008) observes that one of the new groups (Sonae) evolved out of the 1974–1975 revolution. Belmiro Azevedo was from a small

farmer's family and influenced by his godfather, a PCP militant. He was a protegé of Pinto de Magalhães, himself a self-made man. During the revolution, he retained the control of Sonae and invested in supermarkets and shopping centers. He attempted to gain control of Totta but failed because of a boycott by bankers and government officials. Later he tried to take over Portugal Telecom but failed because Espírito Santo blocked financing in Portugal. His defeat signaled the decline of the new bourgeoisie and the rise of the older finance sector.

These groups seem to be blocked from politics and unable to influence economic policies because they pertain to the new bourgeoisie, which is competitive and typical of the initial phases of capitalist development. The old recovering bourgeoisie is basically financial and with important presence in the state because of the pressure on Portugal to internationalize and compete in the European Union. This geopolitical position thus determines in the last instance the options of Portugal to support its old classes, now modernized and well connected by international bankers. Thus, the new national bourgeoisie is based largely on finance capital.

4

Continuity of the State
in the Political Economy

O{N THE EVE OF THE FALL OF THE C{AETANO REGIME}}, there was speculation about Portugal's destiny. Among the various scenarios (see, e.g., SEDES, 1974), one combined the characteristics of commercial capitalism with strong Portuguese traditions, envisioning a resurgence of the precapitalist model of the past and of the dominant classes made up of large landowners and an upper urban bourgeoisie. Continuity of the corporate state would guarantee the security of private property and ensure harmony between businessmen and workers under the supervision of the state. Another scenario projected a model of industrial capitalism in the image of Europe, to be realized through private initiative in conjunction with the state, maintaining the privileged structure of private enterprise intact and fulfilling a modicum of social needs alongside a market economy. Yet another followed a socialist direction: the state would coordinate planning and control of certain sectors of the economy, guaranteeing an equitable distribution of resources to meet the needs of the people and allowing workers to participate in the decisions over their production. After the coup of April 25, Portugal tried to move away from the first of these alternatives and toward the last of them, but once the revolutionary period had subsided and the state had reasserted its hegemony over society, consensus began to build in the direction of developing along the path of European industrial capitalism while tolerating a strong managerial role for the state.

It is apparent from the above discussion of the different historical forms of the Portuguese state that structural change over time has been more apparent than real and that the patterns of state centralization and dominant authority,

perceptions of corporatism and pluralism in civil society, and the idea that mass mobilization would legitimize the political order persist. We have seen how the state and its role in society are linked to capitalist development and that economic groups with ties to the state appear through different historical periods, whether their interests are based on domestic or foreign or on private or public capital. The overthrow of the monarchy in 1910 and the coup and revolutionary events of 1974–1975 clearly represented momentary ruptures and possibilities for a radically different society. Yet, throughout the twentieth century, continuity rather than deep structural change has characterized the evolution of the political economy in Portugal.

Continuity in Portuguese politics is evident in several ways. First, there is a tendency for the government to centralize the activities of the state. Barreto (1984a) argues that all governments since 1974, whatever their political views, have promoted centralization, following in the tradition that includes the legacy of monarchy and empire, the predominance of the Catholic religion, the Napoleonic administrative tradition of the state and its reproduction, the imperative of defense, the concentration of the political class in Lisbon, and the tendency of the central power to dominate municipal government.[1] Graham suggests that although state authority was rationalized in the nineteenth century and expanded through political and administrative reforms modeled on the Napoleonic tradition, this had "little effect on the concentration of power in the hands of a relatively small number of individuals or on prevailing norms governing bureaucratic behavior" (1975: 13). The reforms were superimposed on the bureaucratic organization of a century earlier under Pombal, but they led to the institutionalization of "a regime of administered politics" that functioned effectively under Salazar (14):

> Behind the façade of corporatism, the internal policy process—the decisions in economics, in politics, and in social policy which came to give the Salazar regime its distinctive character—was clearly the preserve of the civilian and military bureaucratic elite, men who were strategically located in the Ministry of the President of the Council of Ministers, in the Council of Ministers, and in the central ministerial organizations themselves, of which Finance, Interior, Army, and Colonial Affairs were the key institutions.

Over the years an "administrative state" evolved as the regime shifted from personal to bureaucratic rule so that a "definite hierarchy of authority developed" (29).

Since 1974 the evidence for this centralizing tendency has been apparent in the growth of the public enterprise sector and the increase in public administration. A study of people filling political positions in the parliament and government since 1976 showed a concentration of 847 persons in 1,608

positions over a number of years, leading Santos (1986: 177) to conclude that "the political class reproduces itself by means of a relatively closed system . . . which may result in a dangerous distancing of the citizens from the democratic process." He provides data to show the doubling of public employees and the central administration.

Many writers have also emphasized juridical and structural continuity. For example, Leal argues that a rupture in the functioning of the state did not accompany the April 25 coup: "The State functions as it had earlier" (1982: 928). Although the revolution attempted to substitute one political system for another and to elaborate a new constitution with new political organizations and a new political class, "the juridical continuity of the state was not in question." He sees the 1976 constitution as representing a compromise between the ideals of political democracy and the hope or promise of socialism, with the Revolutionary Council presiding over this compromise as the institutional legacy of the revolutionary process. Barroso (1984: 458, 461) demonstrates that the institutionalization of the political process tended to undermine and control the proliferation of interests that affected the system in the revolutionary period: "The emerging democratic regime, after an initial explosion, was able to limit [participation] through institutionalization," and "the state demonstrated an exceptional capacity for adaptation and resistance to the polarizing social and political movements."[2]

The fall of the regime on April 25 did not imply the general collapse of the state. The institutional process of reconstruction was relatively slow, and the administrative process carried on. Santos refers to a fragmented state within which there were ruptures and continuities: "There are people running the state who did not participate in it before the coup, and there are continuities within the very institutions that brought about the ruptures" (interview, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Coimbra, July 22, 1988). He argues (1984) that since about 1969 the social movement of urban workers, the salaried petty bourgeoisie of the large and middle-sized cities, and the rural workers of the Alentejo kept the crisis of hegemony from being resolved definitively in favor of the industrial-financial bourgeoisie. In anticipation of such a resolution, this fraction of the bourgeoisie supported the coup. Thereafter its plans were represented in a series of conjunctural crises in which it lost its opportunity to take power. Once the March 11 coup had been stifled, "the state became the platform for multiple social and political struggles . . . the crisis of the state was transformed into a crisis of class struggle . . . the crisis of the state was transformed into a revolutionary crisis that lasted until November 25, 1975" (Santos, 1984: 18). In place of dual power, the revolutionary crisis produced a "dual state": on the one hand, maintaining structures, practices, and traditional administrative ideologies and, on the other, experiencing institutional

changes that gave it a new and decisive role in the accumulation process and the overall direction of the economy (22).

In a different context, Lucena (1988) speaks of "the legacy of two revolutions" while also emphasizing continuity in a comparison of the constitutional frameworks of the New State and the Second Republic. Whereas the 1933 constitution was based on corporatism and leaned toward traditional values of God, country, and family, the 1976 constitution referred to the socialist transition and the values of freedom, equality, and participation. The first "revolution" had led to stability and authoritarianism with attention to the destiny of the nation and its colonial empire. The second "revolution" had brought instability and "popular power" through the nationalization of monopolies and occupations of factories, farms, and housing and the dismantling of the colonial empire. Despite these differences, the two constitutions were similar in their emphasis on legitimacy and on organs (respectively the Chamber of Corporations and the Revolutionary Council) to implement their programs, both constitutions spoke to rights and liberties despite differing practices, both failed to include a coherent socioeconomic model, and both provided for state intervention in social and economic affairs (509–511). Lucena points to the slow pace of the dismantling of the state's corporate structure after April 25, 1974. Although the Chamber of Corporations and the corporations themselves were immediately abolished, organs at the primary and intermediate levels were neither completely eliminated nor radically reformed. Labor union structure dating to 1970, for example, served as the basis for the central labor confederation that evolved after 1974. The Casas do Povo or social centers in rural areas during the Caetano period tended not to be abolished; indeed new ones were established. Likewise, the Grêmios de Lavoura or farmers' guilds that had served to channel relations between farmers and the state and contributed to the formation of cooperatives during the Caetano epoch continued after April 25, when it was sometimes difficult to distinguish between cooperativism and corporatism. The process of dissolving corporatism in the countryside commenced in September, but peasant seizures of land and the establishment of new organizations among movements of peasants frightened the PCP, which looked for stability in the traditional organizational structure, and this resulted in "a system much more 'integrated' than Salazarism but one that would be fundamentally supported within the Salazar framework, roughly and brutally accelerating the tendencies of state capitalism that had been manifested in the depths of the deposed regime" (Lucena, 1988: 513; for his more exhaustive analysis of the guilds, see 1984a). In the period after 1976 the political system evolved in open and flexible ways that had not existed in the Salazar period, but the extinction of the traditional corporatism remained problematic. Many of the old institutions,

formally terminated, continued to function and to adapt to the new political experience. Lucena argues that an "Estado Concertado" or "adaptive state" evolved after 1976. First, there was a tendency to depend upon the old corporative structures as a defense against the challenge of new political forms. Second, authoritarian corporatism was reformulated by the left, particularly the PCP. Third, it is not inconceivable that the Caetano regime, drawing upon the "demo-liberal" tradition of the 1933 constitution, could have used its "renovation in continuity" as a means of transcending authoritarian corporatism to reach a democratic pluralism similar to what Portugal was experiencing in the decade of the 1980s. Fourth, the passing of the "revolutionary wave" made possible integration with Europe and movement toward (bourgeois) democracy and neocorporatism within a tradition of corporate state organisms (Lucena, 1988: 547–555).[3]

Although the 1976 constitution evolved as a radical document oriented to Marxism and reflective of the revolutionary manifestations of 1974 and 1975, its text also emphasized non-Marxist elements, with attention to institutions, political democracy, and pluralism. Jorge Miranda (1976: 175–176) points to Marxist influences in the text, for example, in the collective appropriation of the principal means of production and planning of economic development (article 50), the role of workers' commissions in moving the revolutionary process toward the construction of democratic power for workers (article 55), the state's role in restructuring education and transcending its traditional role in conserving the social division of labor (article 74), the treatment of property in "the transition to socialism" (articles 89 and 90), and the treatment of rural property and the elimination of latifundistas (article 98).

The constitution was subjected to revisions in 1982 and 1989 that reflected the evolving bourgeois-democratic state. In 1982 the formal balance of powers was changed to make the system more parliamentary and less presidential. The Revolutionary Council was abolished and replaced by the Council of State, which included the heads of parties and had to be consulted before the president could dismiss a government or dissolve the Assembly. The pocket veto was abolished, and a normal veto could be overturned by a simple majority of the Assembly. The president appointed military commanders nominated by the government. The revision also removed some socialistic terms.[4] Despite these changes, Miranda (1986) stresses the durability of the constitution, which he attributes to its recognition of Western pluralist democracy as an option and to the stability provided by the "dual" presidency (the president first alongside the Revolutionary Council and later the Council of State). He argues that the 1982 constitutional revisions not only eliminated tensions by purging revolutionary remnants but also established a substitute for the Revolutionary Council without disrupting the political system. The

Revolutionary Council had to be consulted on the dissolution of the parliament and the declaration of war or of a state of siege. All the parties except the PCP desired change in order to weaken the executive (for contrasting analyses, see Antunes, 1982, and, for the pros and cons of the Revolutionary Council, Alves, 1983, and Moreira, 1982). Further changes in 1989 included the elimination of revolutionary language, specifically in article 1, which referred to the transformation of the republic "into a classless society," article 2, which stated that as a state Portugal envisaged "a socialist transition," and article 83, which asserted that "all the nationalizations after April 25, 1974, are irreversible conquests of the working classes."[5]

Continuity is also apparent in the persistence of traditional forces of Portuguese society. Aguiar (1985: 17) notes the contradiction between the need to modernize practices such as patrimonialism, bureaucratic power dependent on state authority, and networks of clientelism at all levels of decision making. An assessment of political life after 1974 must account for these traditions and, if we are to believe Lucena, must not ignore the influences of the prior period. Lucena (1976b) offers a series of interesting hypotheses about the institutional structure of the state under corporatism. Among its essential elements were a "dictatorship of a single party and corporative system of social organization" and a nationalism corresponding to "an alliance, to a bloc of all the bourgeoisie, but under the shield of the strong state" (98). He argues that it was possible for the regime to put aside fascism without breaking with corporatism—passing from a fascist corporatism to a nonfascist corporatism under Caetano (99) and possibly thereafter. Corporatism takes two forms: an integral form, embracing diverse economic, cultural, moral, and administrative activities, and a limited form that attends to the economy and the generation of discipline in producers and workers (100). Corporatism promotes collaboration of classes in the sense that it must develop harmony among them, mitigate conflicts, and resolve the dilemma between freedom and authority. Thus it ensures collaboration among workers and mediates the diverse fractions of the bourgeoisie, seeking to consolidate a political balance among them. Capitalism needs social stability and the support of a strong state to advance, and these conditions are achievable through the bourgeois compromises of the national corporative alliance of the past or the social pact of the present (101). However, corporatism is not just any collaboration of classes. It is fundamental to the society and the state, but it need not be formally incorporated into governments or constitutions, nor must its institutions function as envisaged in official programs, since in Portugal corporate institutions took a long time to appear and existed on paper much of the time. Portuguese corporatism is not very associative and is tied to the state (102). It can impose comprehensive interclass solutions without necessarily following

any institutional process (103). Fascism may be corporatist, but corporatism is not obliged to be fascist (103). Modern capitalism tends toward corporatism or neocorporatism (106). Salazarism sheltered a small capitalist order and was repressive (111), but the changes under Caetano were substantial and resulted in a shift from one form of corporatism to another: "from a fascist, despotic, state corporative form to a 'European' neocorporatism, democratically oriented"(1982: 902).[6]

Schmitter (1975) calls attention to the historical origin of medieval corporatism in the guilds of urban centers dating to the founding of the Aviz dynasty in 1384. Wiarda (1979: 93) defines the Portuguese corporatist state as based on

> the reciprocity of a patron-client system. . . . Society consisted of functionally diverse, hierarchically ordered corporate groups. . . . The nobility, the Church, and the fighting knights stood near the apex, directly below the crown, in this vertically segmented hierarchically ordered scheme. They constituted the higher-order "corporations"; their function was to govern, to harmonize the human social order with a higher responsibility. . . . The king (or later, prime minister or president) remained unfettered by a coequal parliament or judiciary.

Since the eighteenth century Portugal has been split between this corporatist Catholic traditional-patrimonial conception and a liberal-rational urban-middle-class secular conception, with the result that no single regime has been able to govern wholly in the name of one or the other. However, corporatism is "one of the most oppressively monopolistic of state capitalist systems" (Wiarda, 1979: 100). Schmitter (1975: 8–9) suggests a dichotomy between traditional authoritarian and pluralistic conceptions while identifying four schools of corporate thought: a social Christian, ethically traditionalist one; an authoritarian, bureaucratic nationalist and secular modernizing form; a radical parliamentary, bourgeois solidarity tradition; and a leftist, socialist, syndicalist line.

The idea of a strong corporate or socialist state was associated with the illusion of a mass movement at the base. Lucena's characterization of the Portuguese state as fascism without a fascist movement exemplifies this paradox during the Salazar period, while the widespread demonstrations in favor of socialism during the 1974–1975 revolutionary interlude might be characterized as socialism without a socialist movement. In the former case, Raby (1988: 4) differs with Lucena on the role of the fascist party or movement in mobilizing and controlling through the corporate state apparatus of paramilitary and youth brigades, unions, and professional associations: "It is this dual function of fascist mass organisations—both mobilising and regimenting the masses—which is crucial to an understanding of the Portuguese case." In the

latter case, it was clear from the collapse of the revolutionary movement after November 25, 1975, that the popular classes had not yet become a movement capable of sustaining the revolution and implementing a socialist transition.

Continuity in the economy has been demonstrated in the regressive character of Portuguese development both during the dictatorship and in the revolutionary period after 1974. In the first instance, Schmitter suggests, Salazar provided the basis for a capitalist economic system in the absence of a vigorous and autonomous national capitalist class. The consequence was "development without change; participation without freedom; capitalism without capitalists" (1975: 7–8). The implementation of authoritarian rule, he believes, permitted the dictatorship to achieve stability and growth of "this 'delayed-dependent' mode of economic production"(1979: 26).[7] Delayed capitalist development, he argues, leads to problems of dependence and financial instability that affect the state and its policies. The bourgeoisie may be weak and unable to control the process of capitalist accumulation, and therefore the state must step into the breach and repress the threat of the popular classes. He applies this analysis to the crisis in banking in 1924–1925 and the need for state intervention that led to the military coup of 1926 and modification of banking regulations in the 1926–1930 period. He notes the impact of political differences on different fractions of various classes, including the tensions between the financial and industrial bourgeoisies and between the privately employed and public service workers (29). He notes that in Portugal the "exceptional" form of bourgeois domination was the rule—that is, the political authority of the bureaucratic apparatus of the state was dominant: "This form of conservative-bureaucratic authoritarian rule emerged in conjunction with a rise of financial accumulation at a very early stage of capitalist development"(40). In the second instance, Santos (1980: 159; 1990: 29–35) argues, radical actions after March 1975 affected neither the class basis nor the class nature of state power, although together with working-class mobilization and popular initiative they produced a revolutionary crisis through paralysis of the state apparatus and conflict within the armed forces: "The same process that suspended or neutralized the bourgeois power simultaneously impeded the power of the proletariat. This was less a situation of dual power than one of dual powerlessness . . . a situation which favored bourgeois power in November 1975."

Throughout the twentieth century the autonomy of the state has been conditioned by the ways in which the economy has become dependent on state activity. The ruling bourgeoisie maintained its position in the face of other class interests and institutional forces that from time to time challenged the dominance of the state and the hegemony of the bourgeoisie but failed in these efforts because of compromise or internal splintering. Under the

monarchy this link between the state and the bourgeoisie was facilitated by an initial effort to provide legislative power to the Cortes in the 1822 constitution and to disenfranchise the powerful clergy and nobility while recognizing the primacy of the monarchy. Under the First and Second Republics, permitting policymaking in parliament mitigated executive power. The 1933 constitution under Salazar provided for an exceptional state and personalist rule that tended to favor capitalist interests while thwarting rapid modernization. Central planning was a particular preoccupation of the regime, which promoted successive development plans (1953–1958; 1959–1964; 1965–1967; and 1968–1973) designed to establish an infrastructure for industry and ensure the emergence of powerful capitalist groups in industry and finance. Here too a pattern of continuity was evident in the organization of the economy around the interests of these groups in coordination with the state, the assimilation of these interests into the state through nationalizations in 1975, and the emergence of new groups through the efforts of the Cavaco government to privatize state enterprise under the guidance and tight regulation of the state.

The corporate state was modeled on the fascist one to ensure order and stability for an emerging capitalism and the dominant classes—landowners and the commercial, financial, and industrial bourgeoisie. An elaborate political apparatus of government ministries and bureaucratic agencies was amalgamated into this state, and a repressive apparatus of military and security forces provided for its continuity and the consolidation of capitalism. Fascism and capitalism were closely linked and inseparable throughout the Salazar and Caetano regimes, despite claims distinguishing them ideologically. Under Salazar, dominant-class support was concentrated in the large landowners and wealthy families. After World War II these families concentrated their capital in banks, and some of them associated with foreign interests to form influential financial groups. Once the hegemony of the New State was challenged by rebellion in the colonies and abortive revolts at home, divisions appeared within the dominant classes and the institutions that supported the regime. Dissent and political opposition together with uncertainty in the economy contributed to the fall of the Caetano regime.

After April 1974 the progressive authoritarian state undermined the foundations of the dominant classes, but capitalism persisted, generally supported by the military reformers, while the popular classes pressed in the direction of a democratic socialist state. The military reformers attempted to establish their own hegemony over Portuguese affairs but found themselves divided into competing power groups, beset by contrasting ideological tendencies, and split among several strong and prominent leaders. Progressive military elements desired to bring about the transition to socialism, but their own

lack of solidarity—and, perhaps, lack of commitment to this end—permitted a return to a constitutional and parliamentary democracy. Manuel Braga da Cruz believes that President Ramalho Eanes was the last remnant of a tradition in which the military revolutionary tradition was legitimized and that the revolutionary process was blocked by democratic institutionalization (the two pacts favoring political parties and the electoral process of March 1975 and February 15, 1976). Although he sees lines of continuity persisting between the pre- and post- periods of the April 25 coup, he also notes revolutionary ruptures, for example, the break with the old economic groups. He sees continuity in the old economic groups and their power to influence corporatism in the past and present periods and in the emergence of new powerful economic groups after 1976 (interview, Lisbon, July 28, 1989).

Political parties, mostly on the left, proliferated, and there was difficulty in establishing and maintaining government as the politics of the Second Republic began to resemble those of the First. Hope for some transition to socialism rested with the socialists and communists, but here the prospects were dim. The moderate inclinations of the socialists were evident in their push for social democracy and their rightist leadership. They tolerated democratization under the leadership of the domestic bourgeoisie, leaning toward the PPD rather than allying themselves with the PCP. Their traditional opposition to communism forced them to join with centrist forces behind a façade of democratization. While it clearly represented the interests of the domestic bourgeoisie, it did not attempt to represent the comprador or international bourgeoisie or the large landowners. This position of the PS conflicted with the desire of its centrist allies to roll back land reform and other progressive measures. Consequently, a break with these forces brought about the fall of the first two constitutional governments under the socialist leader Mário Soares. For their part, the communists tended to combine democratization with the transition to socialism, and this, according to Poulantzas (1976: 147), led to vacillation between strategies.

This political dilemma must be viewed in the light of the serious problems of the Portuguese economy. Because of the wars in Africa, for example, there were large deficits in the nation's balance of payments. By late 1973 inflation had soared, and hundreds of thousands of workers had emigrated to other parts of Europe. The revolt and the ensuing reforms were accompanied by new problems. The tourist industry collapsed along with the construction boom it had generated. The threat of and later the actual expropriation of large estates south of the Tagus River brought cutbacks in grain production. The small farmers of the north resisted government price controls. The undercapitalized textile industry faced chronic problems as a result of the loss of access to cheap raw materials from the former colonies, where it had enjoyed

protected markets. Thousands of embittered colonists returned to Portugal, adding their numbers to the employment crisis.

While there would probably have been no immediate return to the New State, the political and economic crisis permitted moderate military forces to gain the upper hand on behalf of the bourgeoisie. Land reform remained a central issue for the government, which began to hand back to owners land taken illegally in the fervor of the revolutionary months. At the same time, the government promoted a shift toward a "free" economy and placed fiscal and monetary controls on the economy in an attempt to stem inflation and cut the balance-of-payments deficit. As the moderate military and the bourgeoisie achieved control, it was clear that the revolution had not progressed sufficiently to allow a transition to socialism.

Notes

1. The 1976 constitution refers to autonomy and decentralization, prompting Opello (1978a) to exaggerate the importance of these ideals at the municipal level. In fact, centralizing tendencies prevailed, and municipalities continued to languish.

2. Schmitter (1975: 62) is premature in reporting the dissolution of corporatism ("It collapsed almost without resistance along with the other pillars of Portuguese authoritarian rule. . . . Since April 1974 it has been replaced by a veritable 'beehive' of autonomous, voluntaristic, competitive, overlapping, non-hierarchic associational activity. Portugal has suddenly become one of the most pluralistic polities in existence"). In contrast, Wiarda (1979: 114) emphasizes continuity in the state: "The Portuguese state is still largely the administrative and technocratic state that it was before, heavily bureaucratic, still carefully regulated and controlled, with elaborate legal-administrative procedures left over from the old regime, still organized from the top down and governed by decree-law."

3. A similar emphasis on "two revolutions" is found in Barreto (1988). Reiterating his thesis of continuity, Lucena also speaks of "three revolutions" after the April 25 coup. Decolonization, which changed the shape of the state from an imperialist to a non-imperialist one, was an enormous historical revolution. A second revolution, real but not irreversible, was the state's absorption of a large part of civil society and destruction of the capitalist framework and the large groups in "a real revolutionary process." This revolution was also a "false" one because the direction of the revolutionary movement did not pertain to any of the important classes: "It was from outside in a pure Leninist way, of course. If that revolution had not been stopped, supposing that it was not stopped by the 25th of November, a very strong state socialism or state capitalism would have been installed. . . . State capitalism and state socialism essentially do not differ." The third revolution occurred on November 25, 1975, fourteen days after the last Portuguese soldier returned from Angola, "when there was no longer any reason for most Portuguese officers to be on the side of the revolution" (interview,

Manuel Lucena, Lisbon, July 27, 1987). For a contrasting perspective, see the argument by Cunhal (1977: 36) that a democratic and national revolution would destroy the fascist state and install a democratic regime, end the power of the monopolies and promote general economic development, carry out an agrarian reform and give land to those who wanted to work, raise the standard of living of all workers, democratize instruction and culture, liberate Portugal from imperialism, grant independence to the colonies, and pursue peace and friendship with all peoples.

4. Bruneau (1984: 138) notes that Acção Democrática was the largest coalition but needed the support of the PS for revision. "Thus a great deal of negotiation took place which was not restricted to the Assembly, but carried over to the parties, state apparatus, military, and the media. Revision was ultimately accomplished due to the support of Mário Soares and the Socialist Party" in the vote of August 1982. Soares had promised President Ramalho Eanes in 1980 that he would not support revision. The PCP voted against the alterations, and the MDP abstained.

5. See Sousa (1987: 30R–33R). Details of the constitutional changes in 1989 are in Assembleia da República (1989). The replacement language in article 1 reads: "In the construction of a free, just, and solitary society"; article 2 refers to the state as based on "popular sovereignty, pluralism, and democratic political organization with the objective of economic, social, and cultural democracy and the deepening of participatory democracy." Matos (1983) gives the most detailed analysis of presidential elections and the role and functions of the presidency. See Gaspar (1990) for a scholarly analysis of the 1976 constitution, influences on its formation, and modifications implemented later. See also Domingos (1980).

6. Lucena (1979: 48) accepts the premise that the "Social State" took the place of the "New State" with emphasis on authority, nationalism, and the organic collaboration of classes as the foundation of the state but that the Caetano regime was not necessarily fascist. Lucena (1984b) comments on interpretations of the Salazar regime, includes a review and assessment of Schmitter's work, and shows the similarities with his own work. He distinguishes corporatism from nationalism in the work of Stanley Payne and faults Wiarda for inattention to economic questions and other matters. He also critically reviews (1977a) the conception of fascism in the stimulating work of Eduardo Lourenço.

7. Sertório characterizes the Portuguese socioeconomic formation in terms of dependency marked by external trade in which exports are insufficiently diversified, being agricultural for the most part, direct foreign investment penetrates domestic industry for export, and imperialism dominates credit. In monopoly capitalism of the state, monopolies coexist with small and artisanal enterprise, there is a tendency toward integration with Europe, dependency upon foreign imperialism persists, and a classical imperialist pattern continues in Africa. Portuguese neocolonialism is evident in the weakness of the Portuguese state, the dependence of most domestic monopolies on foreign monopolies, the weakness of the bourgeoisie, the radicalization of national liberation movements in Africa without much affecting the development of the colonies, and the pursuit of cheap labor by foreign monopolies (1973: 33–35).

PART II

CLASS AND MOVEMENT IN THE STRUGGLE FOR A SOCIALIST TRANSITION AND POPULAR DEMOCRACY

THE STRUGGLE FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY and a transition to socialism is apparent in the programs and activities of social classes and popular movements during the eighteen months following the coup of April 25, 1974. The chapters that follow describe the historical context of the coup, the events leading up to it, and the institutional fragmentation that ensured its success and then go on to examine several important conjunctural moments that were decisive in the ensuing revolutionary period. Against this background they analyze institutional conflict and the MFA, the role of other institutional forces such as the major political parties, the labor unions, and the Church, the configuration of new popular and social movements in this dramatic process, and the class struggle that shaped these revolutionary moments.

Some of the questions explored are why revolutionary groups were willing to demonstrate and in some instances to carry their struggle to the barricades but were not prepared to govern. Although its leadership, albeit divided, was competent and disciplined, the popular movement collapsed. The following chapters also consider why the revolutionary commitment to change soon became meaningless to many who felt left out of the process of transformation. This process was complex and unwieldy, even where the commitment to change was apparent. Was it that in the face of uncertainty people began to retreat from the heat of battle and the ideal of socialism? Did their impatience and alienation degenerate into complacency or deference to control from the top, leaving their socialist aspirations to succumb to bourgeois forms such as the capitalist market and parliamentarism? What happened to popular or

participatory democracy with the erosion of the commitment to a socialist transition?

In the light of the Portuguese case, I reconsider propositions in Marxist thought as suggested by Carnoy (1984: 9): that class struggle can be observed in the state as well as in production and that the political struggle for the transition to socialism requires the expansion of both direct and indirect forms of participation. Recent Marxist literature draws these ideas not only from the thought of Antonio Gramsci but also from Eurocommunism's challenge to the sectarian Stalinist and Marxist-Leninist parties, the assault on structuralism, and the pursuit of a new left that transcends the traditional communist and socialist parties (see Chilcote, 1990, for a review of these trends). All these tendencies were evident in the Portuguese experience, and the ensuing discussion will allude to them.

I also examine whether the breakup of the strong authoritarian state (fascist or socialist) might open up the system to elections and new parties while leaving the state administration and repressive apparatuses intact. The collapse of right and left authoritarian governments throughout Europe led to a tendency to open the market. In the short run this may improve the distribution of consumer goods, but might not the ensuing disorder lead to a reassessment, calling for state control and regulation? Once revolution has been abandoned, will incremental change alone prevail?

5

The April 25 Coup

Grândola, vila morena
Terra da fraternidade
O Povo é quem mais ordena
Dentro de ti ó cidade

—José Alfonso

THE APRIL 25 COUP NOT ONLY BROUGHT down Europe's oldest ruling dicta-
torship but also set out on a course toward a socialist transition. This
process unleashed a host of social and political forces. All the world turned
to this small nation of ten million inhabitants in the expectation that a deep
revolution was in the making and that Portugal would demonstrate its capac-
ity to transform itself from a relatively backward nation to a participatory
democracy able to cope with popular social needs and build an economic
infrastructure.

The events leading up to the coup of April 25, 1974, have been analyzed and
documented in considerable detail elsewhere (for a detailed monthly chronol-
ogy see Afonso, 1995).[1] For our purposes, the essential moments included the
reactions of officers who had returned from the colonial war in Guinea-Bis-
sau and expressed their displeasure at resolutions the government planned
to introduce at a meeting of junior and middle-level officers in a Congress
of Combatants at Porto in June 1973. Denied the opportunity of attending
the meeting, more than four hundred of these officers distributed a petition
stating that they would consider any motions passed at the congress invalid.
On September 9, 1973, 140 junior officers met at Evora to protest a law

permitting conscripted officers to attend the military academy briefly and then enter the ranks of professional officers, with their previous years of service counting toward their seniority.[2]

This movement of dissenters had evolved in Portugal but spread to the colonies. In October 1973 one of its leaders, Major Melo Antunes, was elected a deputy to parliament by the opposition CDS. On October 6, eight hundred officers submitted undated letters of resignation in opposition to government policies relating to their careers. On October 12 the government withdrew the decrees. At a November 24 meeting in São Pedro do Estoril, Lieutenant Colonel Luís Banazól called for a coup, and at a clandestine meeting of officers on December l at Obidós a majority favored limiting the movement to professional issues rather than becoming involved in a coup or forcing the government to call new elections.

On December 5 Banazól and Major Vasco Gonçalves argued again for a takeover. About that time there was an abortive revolt by right-wing generals. On February 25 the movement met to discuss the draft of a program drawn up by Melo Antunes, and on March 4 and 5 in Cascais, 110 officers met to support it. They agreed to collaborate with Generals Francisco da Costa Gomes and António de Spínola, respectively general chief of staff and vice general chief of staff. The appearance of Spínola's best-selling *Portugal e o futuro* had provoked a breach between the general staff and the government in late February. When the Caetano government abruptly dismissed these generals, the movement considered staging a revolt on March 11 in league with Spínola; this idea was rejected as premature but was unilaterally implemented by an infantry regiment from the town of Caldas da Rainha, just north of Lisbon. On March 16 the regiment moved ahead with a march on Lisbon but was stopped en route. Realizing that a coup was inevitable, at Oieiras Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho drew up a plan of operations on March 24 to be implemented between April 20 and 29. When Captain Vasco Lourenço, a founding member of the MFA, was transferred (deported) to the Azores, Carvalho assumed command of MFA operations and planned and led the coup of April 25. It began about 11:40 P.M. on April 24 with the playing on a Lisbon radio station of the banned ballad "Grândola, Vila Morena" by the exiled leftist and popular singer José Afonso.[3] Four hours later downtown Lisbon was occupied. In all only six men died, five of them shot by agents of the secret police when hundreds of persons demonstrated outside their headquarters.[4]

The Duality of the Coup

The roots of the coup are not difficult to identify. A principal problem was the rupture of Portuguese ties with the Third World and the collapse of the coun-

try's historical tradition of empire and colonies, especially in Africa. The old imperial network was geographically vast but had primarily benefited a small cluster of family monopolies in the metropolis. In Asia, early in 1961, India had swallowed up the small enclave of Goa. During the early 1960s national liberation struggles had appeared in the African colonies, first in Angola, then in Portuguese Guinea, and later in Mozambique. Poor in material and human resources, the Salazar regime soon found itself overextended, unable to cope with guerrilla warfare and facing pressures at home. Uncertain as to its objectives in Africa and confronted by formidable revolutionaries, Portugal soon found itself bogged down by unpopular wars, poorly paid and disenchanted soldiers in the outlying colonies, a population at home demoralized by the casualties, and highly politicized university students drafted as junior officers into the armed forces. The Portuguese people tired of the unending conflict and began to recognize the ruinous policies and actions of their dictatorial government. The wars disrupted traditional trade patterns between the metropolis and the colonies. In particular, they interfered with the extraction of raw materials from the colonies, in large measure stifling the efforts of foreign enterprise to which concessions had been granted either outright or in the form of joint ventures. Although certain industries certainly benefited from military contracts, the interruption of trade was harmful to most sectors, especially those dependent on the cheap raw materials or guaranteed markets that the colonies provided. The loss of trade and the expense of the colonial war undercut both the budget and the balance of payments—areas that the Salazar and Caetano regimes had successfully handled. In addition, conscription to ensure adequate forces in the colonies and emigration as a result of draft dodging and unemployment made labor scarce and intensified demands for wage increases. Constraints on state funds undercut government protection and subsidies for agriculture and deterred any impulse in the direction of agrarian reform. The wars also contributed to inflationary pressures.

The response of the large economic groups and the technocrats to the erosion of the traditional economy was to modernize. They pushed for an "open" export-led economy compatible with the world capitalist market (Kayman, 1986: 48):

> The multinational-related monopolies led the call for modernisation: the reconversion of the industrial base to higher levels of technology, capital and manufacture. . . . The economy would be released from its long-term crisis through the reorganisation and streamlining of the state apparatus, an enlargement of the financial system, and a restructuring of the capital markets to attract more foreign investment.

The Portuguese economy, drained by the colonial wars, susceptible to international recessions, and largely dependent on commerce, was unresponsive

to increasing demand for domestic consumption. With the abandonment of protectionism and the internationalization of the economy, the economic groups and the technocrats no longer needed to have the Finance Ministry control the economy on their behalf; they were strong enough to control the economy themselves through a monopoly market. In fact, as events later revealed, not only were these groups devastated by the nationalizations of March 1975 but after the November counterrevolution the economy gradually evolved toward a new dependence on the Finance Ministry, especially during the Cavaco government after 1985.

Beyond this explanation for the fall of the regime, other aspects must also be considered. The capitalist state and the ruling bourgeoisie, dominant in the economy and shielded by traditional institutional forces that had given the regime stability for nearly half a century, were no longer able to maintain their historical bloc because of fragmentation and the challenge of other classes and forces.

During the Salazar dictatorship institutional conflict was minimal, and class struggle was controlled by the repressive apparatuses of the state. During the Caetano transition period, although the liberalization measures were superficial and the state structures were maintained intact, there was division within the institutions that had traditionally supported the regime, the military and to some extent the Church, as a response to economic and social conditions and in recognition of the need for political change. Dissension within the ruling bourgeoisie undermined the regime, in particular in the financial and industrial circles that were pushing for integration with Europe and were frustrated over the colonial wars and the failure of policy in Africa. At the same time, the labor movement was growing in strength, independent of the corporate state, while strikes and demonstrations reflected increasing instability.

It has been argued that it was continuity in the Portuguese experience and not a mass revolutionary movement that brought about the April 25 coup: "The collapse of the New State, like that of the monarchy in 1910 and the First Republic in 1926, was not the result of a mass-based, revolutionary movement but purely the work of a military conspiracy which effortlessly overturned a regime that was powerless to defend itself" (Gallagher, 1983: 65).[5] Having outlived the dictatorship in its moderate opposition, *Seara Nova* (April–May 1988) editorializes that in the Portuguese popular struggle the antifascist experience had been a suffering but mitigating process and although the resistance never lost its "moral authority," it did not emerge as a force of social vanguard.

Even one of the conspirators, Pedro Pezarat Correia, wonders whether it was a coup or a revolution but ultimately characterizes it as a coup of a pe-

culiar kind in that the MFA had produced a progressive program and transformed the military into a revolutionary force aimed at democracy, decolonization, and development: "It was a group of military men who, initially with socioprofessional motivation, evolved with concerns of a political nature, organized themselves clandestinely, defined their objectives, prepared a political program, and planned and carried out an act that brought down the regime on April 25, 1974" (1994: 35). He emphasizes the inevitability of the coup and argues that it was internal contradictions that weakened the dynamic revolutionary process and opened the way for a counterrevolutionary one (25). He characterizes the coup as a "military *golpe de estado* of progressive content" and rejects any characterization of it as a military regime that would reinforce its authority, restrict freedoms, and proclaim a conservative authoritarian course. He suggests that the MFA sought only a provisional government and a power structure not limited exclusively to the military but that its political and social content were oriented to freedoms for the people (42). The revolution failed to evolve correctly, he says, because of a power struggle within the MFA and the countercoup of November 25, 1975. Although clauses of the constitution incorporated the revolutionary thrust and even accepted the premise of an eventual transition to socialism, all of the ensuing governments sought to roll back the revolutionary accomplishments, with the result that today most traces of the revolution have disappeared (interview in Ferreira and Marshall, 1986: 77).

Carvalho offers a somewhat similar perspective, arguing that only the military could bring down fascism and that there were two currents within the military, one under the moderate Spínola and the other under the more radical political committee of the MFA (Medina, 1988: 57). Carvalho, a prominent officer in the Portuguese army who had become sympathetic to the decolonization process, pushed it along quickly. He opposed the PCP support of Spínola's proposal that the liberation movements become political parties involved in an electoral process to consider self-determination for the colonies. The PCP desired that decolonization be accommodated by the liberation movements in the colonies so as to keep the Portuguese revolution strong (interview, Luís Moita, Lisbon, May 28, 1986). Moita referred to Rosa Coutinho as "the red admiral." He was not a member of the PCP, as widely believed at the time, but his views were close to those of the PCP. Victor Crespo, another important naval officer in the coup, felt that the military influenced the PCP more than the PCP influenced the military and that the PCP role initially was positive but eventually appeared negative through the media that it controlled (interview, Lisbon, July 25, 1989). Cunhal, the PCP leader (1975b: 46), suggests that the revolution had been spawned not in the party but within the army: "It wasn't a coup. We Communists said so at once. It was a movement

of democratic forces within the army with meetings of four hundred officers at a time discussing ways and means of changing the regime." Vasco Lourenço asserts that neither the PS nor the PCP was influential in the coup and that the PCP and the MFA never worked formally together: "The conspiracy evolved within the army" (interview, Linda Velha, July 25, 1988).

José Manuel Tengarrinha differs in his view that April 25 was a military coup completely identified with the left opposition and that the heights of power were in the hands of the petty bourgeoisie and a class struggle was evident (interview, São João do Estoril, November 13, 1990). Early reports exaggerate the revolutionary nature of the coup and its aftermath, but the politicization and the pressures of the popular movement that occurred after so many years of passivity cannot be explained away. Boaventura de Sousa Santos argues that there was a profound crisis and revolutionary crisis but is uncertain it was a true revolution (interview, Coimbra, July 22, 1988). As Phil Mailer, an Irish anarchist and participant observer in the events, puts it, "People could see their misery and their problems in a historical setting . . . the climax of a week of hectic, fast-moving events. Working people have left an indelible mark on the situation. The call is for socialism and masses of ordinary people have been involved in making it" (1977: 61). In contrast, Gallagher (1983: 80) argues that

> the period of exception was not a revolution in the true sense but a struggle among military elite factions over the nature of the new regime. As in the past, spontaneous demand making was contained, frustrated, and otherwise coopted by the various provisional governments, the communists, who saw them as a threat to their power, and the bureaucratic apparatus of the state . . . these changes were not the result of the actions of a broadly based revolutionary movement.

Similarly, Graham (1993) argues that civil-military relations and the capacity of the state to initiate change were essential in the transition from authoritarian rule.

Francisco Louçã suggests alternatively that "the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary crises must be understood in terms of a duality of power" (interview, Lisbon, November 19, 1990). The coup of April 25, 1974, was due to the fragmentation of the supportive institutions of the dictatorship, especially the military and Church, and of the bourgeoisie itself, as well as differences between colonial-oriented state interests and technocrats emanating from the failure of the colonial war and domestic problems in the economy. At the same time, the coup was a reflection of a crisis of legitimacy and hegemony; the old political system had failed to assimilate new social and political interests, and the industrial-financial and the landed bourgeoisie were unable to find a political direction that would guide the subordinated forces. The No-

vember 25 countercoup eventually resolved the legitimacy crisis, but the crisis of hegemony continued well into the 1980s (Santos, 1984: 45–46).

Duality may also be seen in the pursuit of democracy before and after the coup. Kayman argues that the contemporary experience draws from the past efforts to implement democracy in Portugal: "What was implied was the continuing presence of the nineteenth century in the present crisis" (1986: x). Part of this crisis was attributable, he believes, to the coexistence of two economies, one based on free-market capitalism and the other on precapitalism in which exchange was private and personalized, and to regional differences, between the coastal urban centers and the rest of the country.

Silva (1982: 1182), examining moments of crisis in Portuguese history, identifies their causes and the agents of their solutions and points to the existing political system as the cause of the crisis that precipitated the April 25 action. The intervention of Sidônio Pais during the Old Republic was associated with his demagogy, whereas the array of diverse political parties and their instability during the republic led to the coup of Gomes da Costa in 1926, and the abortive coup of Botelho Moniz reflected not only a challenge to the Salazar regime but its intransigency (table 5.1).

Conjunctural Moments

The coup set the stage for a revolutionary struggle between progressive and reactionary forces. Progressive forces were victorious on April 25, September 28, and March 11 in response to right-wing maneuvers in each case. The countercoup of November 25 was another decisive moment, favoring a moderate course and ultimately leading to a reorganization of conservative forces.

September 28, 1974

With the April 25 coup General Spínola was named interim president, and he immediately appointed many of his supporters to seats in the Council of State, including the seven members of the Junta da Salvação Nacional

TABLE 5.1
Moments of Crisis in Portuguese History

Crisis	Cause	Agent
Sidônio Pais	Demagogy and Tyranny	Republic and Revolution
Gomes da Costa	Politicians and Parties	Portuguese Army
Botelho Moniz	Government Political Action	Portuguese Army
25 April	Existing Political System	MFA

(Junta of National Salvation—JSN) and seven members of the Coordinating Committee of the MFA. The aftermath of the coup was marked by a series of important events culminating in a bungled attempt by Spínola to maneuver himself into power through a massive uprising of the "silent majority," planned for September 28, and his resignation from the presidency on September 30. The events included the April 25 dismissal of Caetano's government, parliament, secret police, youth movement, and political party, the April 26 promulgation of the MFA program and amnesty for political crimes against the former regime, and the May Day demonstrations by hundreds of thousands of workers and followers of the revolution.

The tensions and fissures that had appeared prior to the coup did not evaporate with the change in regimes. The crisis of the first provisional government (May 15 to July 10, 1974), that of the independent liberal democrat Adelino da Palma Carlos as prime minister and the former liberal opposition deputy and PPD leader Francisco Sá Carneiro as deputy prime minister, reflected the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary tendencies. This government included representation of various parties from right to left (PPD, PS, and PCP, two seats each, CDE and SEDES, one seat each, and seven MFA officers). Despite the inclusion of socialist and communist ministers and secretaries of state, it signified a compromise weighted toward the center-right. Its program stressed measures to combat inflation, reform banking, assist small and medium-sized business, implement a minimum wage, advocate a political rather than a military solution to the colonial wars, intensify relations with the EEC, and establish diplomatic relations with all countries (see *A Capital*, May 15, 1974). A representative of the PCP led the Labor Ministry, and one of its first measures, in response to labor unrest, was the implementation of a national minimum wage.

The splintering of the left diffused the common opposition to fascism that had united the population prior to the coup. The communists pushed for a national democratic revolution as a prelude to socialism, while extreme left groupings called for socialism immediately. Cunhal (1975b) articulates the communist path:

> In this country it is impossible to form a popular front without the army. The Socialists' great mistake lies in not having understood such a simple truth, in having estranged themselves from the army despite all the votes obtained. Even now, they can't manage to grasp this fact. They refuse to acknowledge that we are engaged in a revolution together with the army, a revolution started and led by the army.

As the left became more conspicuous, Spínola moved against the communists in an unsuccessful attempt to declare a state of emergency on June 13. The

move served to unite the left against counterrevolutionary tendencies, but as these leftist sectors began to find political expression the contradictions concealed in their apparent unity began to manifest themselves in a series of crises and counterrevolutionary moments.

Spínola, always the opportunist, sought to control the revolution during its first phase. Caetano had insisted on surrendering to a general, in this case Spínola at the Carmo barracks: "The MFA had always recognized Costa Gomes and Spínola as important figureheads, but it was effectively Caetano who, forcing their hand, chose the latter as the 'leader' of the Movement, as precisely the guarantee that power would not fall from a military still dominated by its hierarchy into the hands of a popular mass uprising" (Kayman, 1986: 70).

The tensions between right and left may have been responsible for MFA caution, moderation, and even indecision. Preoccupation with a possible resurgence of the right undoubtedly permitted Caetano to surrender to Spínola, thereby ensuring him leadership of the movement in its first phase. This concern also allowed power to be turned over to the JSN, whose members included not only Spínola but Costa Gomes and the right-wing Silvino Silvério Marques of the army, a popular but conservative dissident, Carlos Galvão de Melo of the air force, and Pinheiro de Azevedo, a moderate from the navy. In addition, it fostered the formation of a number of extreme rightist and reactionary parties whose objective was to undermine the process of democratization and decolonization.[6] The most important party of the center-right was the PPD, organized on May 6 by former liberal opposition members of the 1969 parliament.

The new government explicitly declared itself committed to a capitalist economy and to continuity: "It sought continuity with the previous regime, mediated by the technocratic modernisation proposals and a greater measure of 'social justice'" (Kayman, 1986: 77). Despite the overthrow of the old regime and the dissolution of its fascist political structures and policies, the MFA set forth a modest program. It provided the foundation for a transition to socialism without referring to socialism itself. However, while it guaranteed public order, in practice it sometimes resorted to repression: "The MFA, in its revolutionary role in a country irreducibly polarized by fascism, was to find itself continually caught between, and partially defined by, the mutually exclusive imperatives of not provoking the right and defending the interests of the working-classes" (74).

A somewhat different view was that the program, "not being of communist inspiration, . . . brought forward a certain Marxist language and was for the PCP, principally, but also for a faction of the armed forces that was responsible for its publication, an instrument of revolutionary advance" (E.

Lourenço, 1979: 189). António Pita (1994) notes that in spite of repression and censorship, Marxism did influence twentieth-century intellectual thinking, generally through the positions of the PCP on important issues and the party's compromise with the opposition to the dictatorship in the face of the apparent contradiction between Marxist thought and the prevailing positivist currents. He identifies "a naturalist conception of Marxism" corresponding with the second reorganization of the PCP in 1940–1941 and the "positivist conception of Marxism" in the strategy of the popular front, observing that Marxism was influential in the renovation of republicanism and political democracy as well as in the transformation of the Portuguese intellectual conscience.

Pressure from labor, in particular, and a series of demonstrations served to split the Spinolistas from the MFA executive committee, which objected to Spínola's demand for authority to declare a state of siege to crush labor unrest. The PPD accused the PCP of responsibility for the strikes, and the communists objected to the government's open commitment to capitalism. The MFA response (July 12) was to form the COPCON, centered in Lisbon, with the responsibility for maintaining civil order, mediating disputes between the MFA and popular movements, and carrying out the goals of the MFA program. Under the command of Carvalho, COPCON represented a power base for the radical wing of the MFA (Kayman, 1986: 88):

> The idea itself was basically a containment strategy: if the PCP and Intersindical could not control the work force, perhaps the leftwing of the MFA could. But in fact what began as a contingent intermediary, in due course was to become a radical driving-force in the revolution to such an extent that eventually its destruction became a central issue in the countercoup of 25 November 1975.

Given the failure of the first government and Spínola's conservative inclinations, when he moved again to appoint a military moderate as prime minister the MFA insisted on the appointment of one of its senior officers, Colonel Vasco Gonçalves, as prime minister and other MFA officers to various cabinet posts. The second provisional government faced two immense problems: confronting a deteriorating economic situation, both in the urban industrial centers and in the rural agricultural zones, and resolving the problem of the colonies.

Unrest in the countryside involved the mobilization of farmworkers and landowners. In May 1974 the Associação Livre de Agricultores (Free Association of Farmers—ALA) was formed in Beja with the intent of protecting the interests of small, medium-sized, and large landowners. Despite its desire to project a democratic image, it was generally thought of as a clone of the farmers' guilds under Salazar, but it was also viewed by the revolutionary government as a legitimate representative of farming employers. Agreements signed

in Beja during June guaranteed a forty-four-hour week, minimum salaries, and other concessions. When landowners did not respect these agreements, there were threats of a general strike. An August 16 law aimed at curtailing strikes was tacitly approved by both the PS and the PCP, which were seeking some means of controlling the protesting workers: "The second provisional government was still concerned to reassure business and to impose a sophisticated system of industrial order . . . [and] although the Gonçalves government was to the left of Palma Carlos' administration, it was still responding much more to the threat of reaction than to the reality of the working-classes" (Kayman, 1986: 92–93).

Unrest in the industrial sector involved hundreds of labor disturbances, including the contentious Lisnave strike and demands for new management and negotiation of a collective agreement and resistance to the limitations of the new strike law. Also conspicuous was militancy of the TAP airlines workforce, which had been infiltrated by the PCP before 1974 and by the MES and the PRP after the coup. Discontent with management and failure to reach a collective agreement had resulted in a strike on August 26, provoked by a MES-supported faction led by engineers and maintenance men demanding a forty-hour working week. Both the PCP and the MFA criticized the strike, and in the early morning of August 28 COPCON units of military police and paratroopers occupied the Lisbon airport and declared martial law (for details see Mailer, 1977: 108–114).

The colonial question was controversial and divisive. The attempt by Spínola to circumvent negotiations for the independence of the colonies by forming a federation or commonwealth of provincial territories ran counter to the MFA insistence on independence. Guinea-Bissau was the first of the colonies to be formally granted independence, and Spínola, in a speech to the nation on September 10, acknowledged that this step was the culmination of a decade of African liberation struggle; in fact, it was a recognition that Africans had not only thwarted the general's efforts to defeat them but effectively ended nearly five hundred years of empire and colonialism. An agreement in early September on the independence of Mozambique provoked white settlers there to launch a series of raids in the capital and massacres in the bush. Independence for Angola was more complex, involving support by popular and left movements for the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement of Liberation of Angola–MPLA) and sympathy on the right for the moderate liberation movements, the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Liberation Front of Angola—FNLA) and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola—UNITA). On September 14, Spínola met with representatives of the moderate movements on the island of Sal, Cape Verde. A provisional

Angolan government, including all three groups, was formed, but unity soon dissolved into a civil war, with the United States backing the moderate movements against the MPLA. Eventually, the MPLA came to power, but the counterrevolutionary support of the Reagan and Bush administrations carried the dissidence well into the 1990s (Stockwell quoted by Mailer, 1977: 375).[7]

In his speech of September 10, Spínola called for mobilization against those planning to impose a leftist dictatorship: "The silent majority of the Portuguese people have to awaken and defend themselves from extremist totalitarianisms." He was supported by ultra-right-wing groups and parties and initially by the CDS and the PPD. Leaflets and posters appeared announcing a massive demonstration on September 28. The plan involved pressuring the government to accept an emergency state of siege and uprisings in Angola and Mozambique. The left demanded that the demonstration be banned: the PCP warned of a right-wing coup; the Fifth Division alerted the military, and barricades were erected around Lisbon. Carvalho and Prime Minister Gonçalves were called to the presidential palace and held there throughout the 28th, prompting the MFA Coordinating Committee to cancel the demonstration and demand that Spínola back off and resign.

On September 30 Spínola fled the country. He had underestimated popular support and the strength of the MFA, and his direct attack on the Gonçalves government and the MFA had revived a unity on the left that had been deteriorating throughout the summer. Obsessed with personal power, Spínola had been at the center of a conspiracy or, in the words of an MFA investigative report, "a complex reactionary maneuver against the progressive evolution of the Portuguese people" (Movimento das Forças Armadas, 1975a: 82).

Cultural repression and censorship had prevailed throughout the years of the dictatorship, and in the aftermath of the coup, artists and writers intervened with denunciations of the past and support for revolutionary change. On June 10 they organized a festival that was to be carried on national television. The theatrical group Comuna, whose message was critical of fascism and the longtime supporter of the regime, Cardinal Cerejeira, organized one of the events. The live broadcast was abruptly halted a few minutes before midnight by a PS-affiliated major in charge of communications, and this resulted in the occupation of the station by television workers. Another friend of Salazar, Coulouse Gulbenkian, had given a good share of his fortune to the establishment of a foundation that exerted substantial influence on culture in Portugal. The Gulbenkian buildings were occupied in July by workers, including MES militants, demanding a purge of those who had collaborated with fascism; the occupation occurred on the anniversary of the death of Gulbenkian, and the MES went so far as to lay a wreath on his grave. Both incidents reflected contradictions in the thinking of the left, its timidity, and its lack of creativity (Mailer, 1977: 99–101).

Events demonstrated the need for the society to beware of the reactionary forces that had long ruled the country and remain firm in its commitment to the revolutionary process: "September 28 provided a great lesson—so great that everyone was about to lose. Neither the people nor the MFA wanted it. . . . But the crisis came to us to say that the Revolution could not be soft, could not be fragile or hesitant" (Freitas and Cruz, n.d: 182). Despite its setback and the resolve of revolutionary forces, the right's ties to Spínola were extensive, and the general seems to have persisted in his ambition to return to power even in exile (Wallraff, 1976: 28). The fundamental dilemma for the MFA was whether to retreat and allow the bourgeoisie to resume power, or take over large areas of government and the social order and try to cope with the problems. These choices assumed either the "neutral" form desired by the political parties or the classical "Bonapartist" form characteristic of the military in times of social stress. For the time being, the course of the MFA was largely determined by the fast-moving events and, in particular, the precipitous actions of rightist forces (Mailer, 1977: 106):

> The whole notion of a "neutral" MFA, above the class struggle, was either demagogy or illusion. Given the international context a socialist revolution would prove difficult without tremendous internal and external opposition. But a viable bourgeois democracy was not on the cards, at least for the present. The armed forces remained in power, policing the contradictions they had unleashed and leaving the question of social revolution . . . unanswered.

March 11, 1975

The September resignation of Spínola had consolidated power for the MFA. Costa Gomes immediately took his place as president, while Vasco Gonçalves as prime minister formed a third provisional government, including five new military appointments. The MFA consolidated itself, first identifying its "socialist tendency" (November 5), then restructuring itself (December 6) into a General Assembly of two hundred delegates and a Supreme Council of the Movement made up of the president and the remaining six members of the Junta, the five military ministers, the commander of COPCON, and seven members of the MFA Coordinating Committee, and finally voting for the principle of *unicidade* (a central labor organization) (January 28) and endorsing the economic plan of Melo Antunes (February 8). The economic plan consisted of some seventy short-term measures that envisioned a socialism as follows: "It excludes the social-democratic control of the management of capitalism . . . but it does not exclude a pluralistic society . . . [and] the class struggle now under way must take into account the alternative role which the middle classes can now play" (*Diário Popular*, February 28, 1975). This

prompted one observer to comment, "All the government could dish up was a mixture of small-scale nationalizations and a vague . . . 'revolutionary' recipe for maintaining capitalism" (Mailer, 1977: 153).

These measures confronted and marginalized the counterrevolutionary movement, which nevertheless did not waver in its resolve. On March 10 Spínola attempted to engineer a countercoup from the Tancos air force base north of Lisbon, but the anticipated military support did not materialize, and he fled into exile. Immediately, the MFA nationalized the banks and insurance companies under the fourth provisional government, which came to power on March 26 and was also led by Vasco Gonçalves. It proclaimed (April 4) the irrevocable "socialist character" of the revolution and asserted that the Portuguese path to a "transition to socialism" would be achieved through an alliance between the MFA and the people. A pluralist party system would also be implemented once the parties had signed a pact (April 11) permitting their participation in elections (April 25), with the elected parliament limited to the drafting of a new constitution. The elections reflected a desire for stability and a respite from the turbulence of discussion, organizing, and participation in everyday affairs: "It was the personal price one paid to escape the demand for permanent self-mobilization, a demand dictated by the state of permanent stalemate in the political and social arena outside. It was a new pattern of bourgeois recuperation" (Mailer, 1977: 13).

This mix of state control over the economy and a democratization of the party system led to further confrontation and ideological struggle. The Socialists emerged victorious in the elections (April 25, 1975), for instance, but workers took over their newspaper, *República* (May 19). The MFA split over the June debate to draft a program of political action as moderates linked with the Socialists opposed the Gonçalves government and the MFA leadership. The government also had to contend with popular movements that were seizing lands, factories, and homes. After considerable debate, the government eventually passed an agrarian reform law (July 29) as a way of rationalizing the vast occupation of land in the Alentejo farmlands. Yet a fifth provisional government was formed under Gonçalves on August 8 just as MFA moderates published a "Document of the Nine" criticizing the government for its support of the popular movements, while through the COPCON, leftists issued another document (August 13) demanding that the government adopt more radical measures. Eventually, Gonçalves was defeated by a coalition of moderates and leftists in the final MFA Assembly (September 5–9). (For a full report of the causes and consequences of the counterrevolutionary coup of March 11, 1975, see Movimento das Forças Armadas, 1975b.)

November 25, 1975

Moderates took control of the sixth provisional government under the premiership of Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo (September 19) and dominated the Revolutionary Council, setting the stage for the countercoup of November 25.

On November 25 Ramalho Eanes consolidated power in a moderate wing of the military that ultimately would undermine and end the control of the MFA, lead to his becoming president, and bring Mário Soares and his Socialist Party to power under the new constitution.

The countercoup was the culmination of a period of near-anarchy and failure of the sixth provisional government to control the media, the military, and the labor movement. In a comprehensive account of these events, Mailer describes this confusion with insights on how the revolutionary turmoil came to an abrupt end. First, the means of communication, dispersed among different political interests under public or private control,[8] were manipulated by the left in the belief that whosoever controlled the media controlled the thought of people. The left tended to exaggerate the exploits of the revolution. Rádio Clube Português, the best of the radio stations, was unable to "resist the onslaught of the leftist groups. It created a mythology, propagated it, and then began to believe in it. . . . It boosted super-revolutionary personalities. And when the bubble burst all concerned were surprised to discover that little of this existed. . . . No wonder that certain papers like *Expresso* began talking of the 'Lisbon Commune'" (Mailer, 1977: 305).

The revolution occurred at an economically inopportune time. Oil prices were rising, and the international economy was deteriorating. Portuguese exports, especially textiles, were declining. Fewer jobs were available abroad, constraining emigration and placing pressure on the domestic economy to provide more jobs. This and the return of refugees from the colonies, many with limited skills, presented the government with insurmountable problems. In a candid and useful report, U.S. Senator Claiborne Pell (1976) reflects on the economic situation in 1974 and 1975. Among the economic issues were a rise in wages, decline in productive capacity and job opportunities, the exodus of the ruling families and their professional managers in the nationalized firms, leaving a management void, a drop in the gross national product in 1975, unemployment at 12–15 percent of the labor force, and a trade deficit accompanied by declining demand for Portuguese exports.

On September 29 Prime Minister Pinheiro de Azevedo ordered the military occupation of all radio stations. Initially COPCON refused to take over the Rádio Clube Português, which had allowed disabled servicemen to broadcast their complaints about low pensions; then a Lisbon regiment with rifles carrying leftist revolutionary Frente de Unidade Revolucionário (FUR) stickers

occupied the station for a few hours and withdrew. Rádio Renascença was initially occupied by its workers and later came under "colonization" by political groups such as the UDP. The PRP persuaded Carvalho to lead a march to the station, where he ordered the troops to withdraw, permitting broadcasts to carry on.

The military was splintered among many factions, and the government could not depend on its support: the Group of Nine dominated the MFA Council and controlled army units at Cascais, Mafra, and Estremoz; the COPCON under Carvalho counted on the support of the left and workers and controlled units around Lisbon; the Gonçalvistas, with strength in the ministries and the media, supported the COPCON against the Group of Nine; and right-wing officers outside the MFA controlled some units in Lisbon and were mostly dispersed in the north. This fragmentation led hundreds of radical soldiers and lower officers to form the Soldados Unidos Vencerão (SUV). An initial meeting on August 21 in a forest between Porto and Braga was followed by the group's first communiqué on September 8 and a demonstration of 120,000 persons in Lisbon on September 26. The government effort to gain control rested with the establishment on September 27 of Groups for Military Intervention or Agrupamento Militar de Intervenção (AMI) and a strategy set forth in a secret document that was labeled "the Colonels' plan" and leaked by *O Século* at the end of September.

Terrorism and anarchy permeated the major moments leading up to the countercoup of November 25: the uncovering of explosives and the bombing of the Municipal Council in Porto (September 16), a strike of rural workers in the Alentejo (September 17), the burning of the Spanish embassy in Lisbon in protest of the execution of five political prisoners in Spain (September 27), the forcible occupation of six hundred thousand hectares of farms in the Alentejo (October–November), the warning by the PS of a leftist coup (October 1), demonstrations at the Lisbon Municipal Council (October 13), a COPCON warning of a rightist coup (October 25), the occupation of the daily *O Século* by MRPP workers in opposition to the PCP workers' committee (October 31), the occupation of the Ministry of Social Communications (November 7), a PS-PPD demonstration in Terreiro do Paço (November 9), a strike of construction workers and a march of thirty thousand at the São Bento government building (November 13), a Porto demonstration led by the PS, the PPD, and the CDS and the burning of an Intersindical office (November 14), a PCP rally (November 15), communist-influenced demonstrations in the Lisbon industrial belt (November 16), a warning of a right-wing coup in the daily *O Século* (November 18), a "strike" by the sixth provisional government and its threat to move to Porto in the face of right- and left-wing opposition (November 21), the denunciation of Carvalho and Costa Gomes by the PS and Mário Soares (November 23), and the continued occupation

of the Tancos base by paratroopers and supporters (November 24). On November 25, with rumors of a right-wing coup, commandos took positions at Belém, and Ramalho Eanes announced that he was taking over all military operations. Captain Clemente read manifestos from the metalworkers' union calling for a general strike and condemning the state of emergency. Workers erected barricades and offered resistance but were disbanded by the commandos, who also took over television transmitters. A state of siege was declared, and all mobilizations were disbanded. Despite resistance in Setúbal and the strike efforts of workers at the Lisnave shipyards, the countercoup succeeded and the Group of Nine took over, allegedly to prevent a left-wing coup. Vasco Lourenço replaced the deposed Carvalho.[9]

A Retrospective Interpretation of the 1974–1975 Conjunctures

An array of the views expressed by journalists, scholars, and intellectuals, many of them foreigners (see Mesquita and Rebelo, 1994), contributes to an understanding of how the revolution was subverted. The explanation lies in contradictions underlying the drive toward revolution, especially the difficulties of transcending tradition, differences within the revolutionary movement, and the obstacles confronting any socialist transition.

Traditional Influences

Portugal's half century of dictatorial rule was not obliterated by the April coup. Elements of the previous regime, its policies and practices, together with the continuing influence of the ruling classes and their conservative institutions and the persistence of capitalism as it adapted to the new conditions, were conspicuous in the ensuing revolutionary period.

The internationalization of great conglomerates in the late period of the dictatorship represented "a disintegration of the old alliance between landowners and the financial and industrial interests" (Maxwell, 1974: 19). A fundamental difference was over whether Portugal should remain in Africa or turn toward Europe. Caetano came to power favoring the Europeanists in the debate, but his initiative in recruiting young, pro-European technocrats (João Salgueira, Rogério Martins, Xavier Pintado, Manuel Belchior, Carlos Horta, and others) was countered by pressure from conservative forces under President Américo Tomás and the former foreign minister, Franco Nogueira. By 1972 all the technocrats had been fired or forced out of government; most of them were expressing their views through the liberal opposition, and after 1974 they were associating with moderate and center-right parties.

Historically, the Portuguese bourgeoisie was weak and dependent upon the state: "Since the Revolution of 1820 the dominant class in Portugal never had the strength to govern in a parliamentary system because the liberal revolution was not accompanied by a technical and industrial revolution that solidified its power. The dominant class was always weak so that the military were periodically called to assume political responsibilities" (Rodrigues, Borges, and Cardoso, 1979: 13–14). Under Salazar, however, the military was given a subordinate role, and the dictatorship evolved under civilian rather than military control, necessitating repression of democratic resistance within the armed forces. The April 25 coup liberated not only the Portuguese people but also the progressive elements within the Portuguese armed forces. The MFA thought of itself as the engine of the revolution and as the liberation movement of the Portuguese people. Thus the mobilization of the campaigns of cultural dynamization and the MFA–People's Alliance were aimed at strengthening the popular struggle in the face of the contradictory interests of the political parties and bourgeois interests.

Young and progressive officers led the MFA, and tensions and differences were immediately evident between them and the senior officer corps. The officers of the MFA desired democracy, decolonization, and development. Democracy involved their participation in politics, counter to military tradition, respect for authority, and constraints limiting political activity. Once independence for the colonies was recognized, the institutionalization of the MFA became an issue of contention. The development question related to whether to build the forces of production through capitalist means or by a rapid transition to socialism.

No doubt the end to the colonial wars would have been difficult without a domestic revolution in the metropolis as Manuel Vilaverde Cabral argues in a pragmatic reassessment of his earlier progressive views (1983b: 133). The radical alterations of the 1974–1975 period were similar to those pursued in 1958 and 1962 but broader in scope. With the isolation of Spínola and implementation of the radical decolonization, an urban popular movement was necessary for the consolidation of democracy. Nevertheless, Cabral points out, the actions of the PCP and the extreme left at times put democracy at risk and provoked the extreme right into action. The election of Eanes as president and the center-right government in 1980 served to mitigate the aspirations of the extreme right and the extreme left. These events, he suggests, were largely spontaneous; the military did not manipulate the popular left, and it is not clear that it was modernist and conservative forces that brought the revolutionary period to an end.

Class struggle in Portugal has not always been conspicuous, but it was clearly evident after April 25. The image projected during the dictatorship was

of a passive, humble people respectful of order and desiring stability, an ideological myth that Eduardo Lourenço (1976 and 1978) analyzes and exposes as an illusionary expression of dreams and realities of "a fascism that never really existed." The political and social turmoil of the revolutionary period revealed a different image, as described by progressive economist Mário Murteira, who served as a minister in several of the provisional governments during 1974 and 1975: "Each one of the six provisional governments . . . was characterized by a certain relation of internal forces . . . and . . . by a certain relation with the ongoing social process. Apparently these are but two aspects of the same thing or perhaps a superstructural expression of the conjuncture of class struggle in Portugal that constantly intensified until November 1975" (1976: 37). He recounted the essential moments of this struggle as follows:

1. From May to July 1974, the Palma Carlos plan, which envisioned giving powers to Spínola with the support of Sá Carneiro (a move that would have brought the immediate dissolution of the MFA and altered the process of decolonization and internal democratization).
2. From July 1974 to March 1975, a period of decisive decolonization that exposed Spínola for his contradictory practices and marginalized the right-wing military with the substitution of Costa Gomes for Spínola after September 28 but represented a delay in reforms and support for preferences earlier defended by Spínola, Sá Carneiro, and others, specifically, a rationalization of the economy aimed at attracting the investment needed for reconversion and guaranteeing the development of key productive and export sectors.
3. From March to September 1975, implementation of anticapitalist measures and reform of the political structure and emergence of dissident factions and lack of conciliation.
4. The balancing of Pinheiro de Azevedo as prime minister with Vasco Gonçalves as chief of staff of the armed forces, which was intended to ensure continuity but in fact led to the collapse of the revolutionary movement.

Recognition of this political maneuvering and the importance of class struggle must not, however, be allowed to obscure the role of the agricultural workers in the Alentejo and Ribatejo, where agrarian reform was effective, the industrial workers of the great industrial belts around Lisbon, Setúbal, and (to some extent) Porto, and the radicalized soldiers, sailors, and officers. Missing from this alliance were large sectors of the urban petty bourgeoisie and small and medium-sized farmers of the north and center of the country. Paul Fauvet (1978: 110) suggests that the PCP strategy was problematic in its failure

to acknowledge the possibility of a middle road between advancing toward socialism and reverting to an authoritarian state and in its conviction that there could be no stable bourgeois democracy. Essentially, he argues, Nicos Poulantzas was correct in saying that what was lost on November 25 was not an immediate advance to socialism but the leadership of the popular masses over the process of democratization. However, his view that the revolutionary process itself was not really threatened overlooks the ensuing rollback of revolutionary reforms.

Differences within the Revolutionary Movement

It is curious how committed participants eventually came to divide the revolutionary movement. In theory, for example, Vasco Lourenço and Otelo de Carvalho largely agreed on the need for participatory democracy. Vasco asserted: "I believe people should be able to participate more directly in the political life of the country. This could take the form of workers' committees in factories, neighborhood committees, and a wider role for local government" (Ferreira and Marshall, 1986: 137). Speaking of how he became disillusioned with the colonial struggle, Vasco spoke of his personal experience alongside a Guinean recruit who turned out to be an informant for the African revolutionary forces. The fact that this person risked his life and died in battle against his comrades convinced Lourenço that this was not his war to fight and those who fought for freedom held higher values than his (interview, Linda Velha, July 25, 1988). Likewise, Otelo exclaimed:

> I believe in direct democracy. I defend base socialism, and I consider that only socialism can bring dignity, happiness, and well being to the workers and place economic and political power in the hands of their direct representatives. Marxism may be relevant to Portugal, but we do not have to import ready-made regimes. . . . We should harness the spontaneity and creativity of the masses, which gives them the ability to solve their own problems. I saw, during the Portuguese revolution, the power of this creativity in the streets and the towns and the fields. (quoted in Ferreira and Marshall, 1986: 121)

Debate over the shaping of the political system and positioning of ideology eventually produced dissension within the MFA. The events of September 28 called for consolidation, resulting in the creation of the Council of Twenty in October and later the Assembly of the MFA. Differences first appeared in December when the MFA faced two alternatives: serving as the Constituent Assembly or entering into an agreement with the political parties prior to elections. The former idea gained strength in January 1975 and the latter in February (see *A Luta*, February 28, 1976). The March 11 events precipitated a

further MFA institutional response and some consensus in the establishment of the Revolutionary Council following the extinction of the JSN and the Council of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces. Division within the MFA again appeared with the April 25, 1975, elections as its political wing, the Fifth Division, unsuccessfully called upon the voters to cast blank ballots.

Demonstrations on May 1 also revealed serious differences between the PCP and the PS, especially over the issue of whether a single labor organization should prevail. The principal rupture was the document issued on July 8 by the Group of Nine, the officers representing the moderate MFA current led by Vasco Lourenço. The approval of guidelines for an Aliança Povo-MFA, supported by the Gonçalvista current and a military tied to COPCON, was another point of contention. Officials in the north took exception to it, and their opposition spread to other regions as the MDLP, the Comité de Defesa da Liberdade (Committee for the Defense of Liberty—CDL), the ELP, and other ultraright groups emerged with plans for conspiracy and actions during the hot summer of 1975.

Within the MFA radical elements sought to raise consciousness and mobilize the popular sector against a resurgence of the right. A memoir by Ramiro Correia (1984), a naval lieutenant and physician, illustrates this with a documented account of the activities of the Fifth Division, which was established by decree on August 29, 1974, and closed down on August 27 a year later. His analysis of the Fifth Division as "a revolutionary laboratory" recounts how this movement first became active in June 1974 as a coordinating committee of seven officers under then Colonel Vasco Gonçalves. José Maria Paulo Varela Gomes, the renowned leader of the Beja revolt against Salazar early in 1962, was especially active in July–October 1974 until another officer, Robin de Andrade, assumed his role and then Ramiro Correia took over on June 20, 1975. One document, signed by Varela Gomes, describes the organization as elaborating and diffusing MFA plans and objectives to representative civil and military groups, keeping the military command informed, disseminating information, formulating doctrine, organizing debates, and so on. Another explains the events of March 11 and links Soares with Spínola. Others describe the Fifth Division's cultural dynamization campaigns and set forth action proposals for political-military actions.[10]

The failure of the Tancos uprising on September 3–5 signified the defeat of the Gonçalvista current, leading to the withdrawal of Vasco Gonçalves as chief of the armed forces. The void was quickly filled by movements on the far left, including the SUV and the Acção Revolucionária das Praças do Exército (ARPE); within the navy, the Comissão Dinamizadora do Associativismo das Praças (CDAP); within the air force, the Comité de Vigilância Revolucionária da Força Aérea (CVRFA); and among noncommissioned officers, the Milicianos

Unidos Vencerão (MUV). As a counterforce to these radical groups, the Group of Nine launched its own unofficial organization, the Frente Militar Unida (United Military Front—FMU) (see Rodrigues, Borges, and Cardoso, 1979: 121).

In a pessimistic and conservative assessment of all these moments, Douglas Porch shows how the Spínola group had succumbed to the pressures of the MFA Coordinating Committee and its efforts to impose a socialist government (1977: 128). He blames the problems of the March 11 intervention on the "disastrous" cultural dynamization program (188–189):

> Cultural dynamization was one of the great touchstones of the entire process which began on 25 April. . . . It served to prepare and organize by bringing the people into contact with the MFA and thereby with its own idea of the revolution [but in the end there were] grave insults to the values—moral, traditional and cultural— . . . which led naturally to the rejection of the men of the MFA.

Porch attributes the resistance to the revolution to divisions between socialists and communists, between north and south, and between Lisbon and the rest of the country. He criticizes the communists for attempting to unravel the army chain of command and for encouraging an escalation of violence in the summer of 1975. He links dissension to the activities of Carvalho and COPCON and their pursuit of popular power. Most units did not participate in these activities and defied COPCON directives. Moderate officers organized against the leftward march of the revolution, turning for political backing to the PS, the PPD, and even the CDS. The Gonçalves government controlled most of the press, but opposition was manifested in the daily *A Luta*, made up of remnants of the occupied *República*, *Jornal de Notícias* in Porto, and the new *Jornal Novo*, along with weeklies such as *Revista Expresso*, *O Jornal,* and others (191–221). Porch concludes that the November 25 events were a reflection of the military's political failure (236–237):

> The skepticism of most officers at the sight of their colleagues taking government positions grew with the realization that many were bent on imposing a totalitarian regime on the country. The result inevitably was a call for a return to the barracks. Even politicized officers were forced to admit that politics should be kept separate from command. Portugal's experience with a military-led revolution proved once again that soldiers make poor tutors for democracy.

Obstacles to the Socialist Transition

In their resistance to the radicalization of the revolution, the Group of Nine counted on Mário Soares to continue the revolution: "They did not bring

about the 25 November in order to end the Revolution" (Rodrigues, Borges, and Cardoso, 1979: 16). What they wanted was an alternative to "Socialism Now," which they considered unviable. The followers of Melo Antunes in this moment looked to social democracy as a more gradual approach to the goal of socialism. After November 25, the Group of Nine believed that it had created the conditions for socialism, overlooking the impact of class struggle on any transition. In December popular forces supported Vasco Lourenço and the Região Militar de Lisboa (RML) that he commanded, and by February Lourenço was recommending support for the popular mass organizations. Thereafter, his command represented only a remnant of the revolutionary process, manifested in mobilizations in December 1977 and January and March 1978. Differences with General Rocha Vieira, the army chief of staff, who felt that Vasco had made the RML an island within the army, led to his resignation and "the effective end" of the April leadership. He was the last of the "captains-general of April" to exercise a political-military role, and his departure "constituted a visible sign of the incapacity of the general to adapt to the revolutionary process" (212). Underlying this turn of events was a desire for a stable order: "All the drama of the Portuguese revolution is found in this progressive end to the socialist project in the face of the need to safeguard the democratic order in the bourgeois sense of the term," for the revolution evolved "so quickly and apparently improvised, if not disorderly, that it was not easy to determine those responsible for the failure of what had been for many Portuguese and also for many foreigners an exemplary revolution" (E. Lourenço, 1979: 189–190). Melo Antunes summed up: "This experience could have been much richer if there had not been so many errors, deviations, incompetence in understanding that April 25 was a great historical opportunity. There was no global capacity for determining a strategy of structural transformation of the Portuguese society" (interview in Avilez and Ochôa, 1982: 10R).

The path to socialism confronted issues of struggle on the left: centralized command versus local participatory democracy, authoritarianism versus pluralism, discipline versus spontaneity. The MFA's consolidation of power conflicted with pressures to open up the system, and its effort to transform itself into a political movement was unacceptable to the emerging popular forces (Bourdillat, 1981).

The opposition of the major monopolies to a socialist path was undermined first by decolonization and second by their nationalization after March 11. The nationalized companies included Jorge de Melo's Companhia União Fabril, an aggregate of 186 firms with a monopoly of the tobacco market but diversified into chemicals, shipbuilding, and other industries and linked to the Banco Totta Aliança and international interests with ties to capital in southern

Africa; Miguel Quiná's group of at least sixty companies and, with large interests in southern Africa, three banks (Borges & Irmão, Banco Crédito e Industrial, Banco do Alentejo), and petroleum in Angola; the Espírito Santo family and group, whose chief administrator, Franco Nogueiro, had served Salazar as foreign minister, with its Banco Espírito Santo e Comercial, agricultural holdings in Africa, and petroleum in Angola; and the Champalimaud empire, with the Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor, cement and steel monopolies, and cattle raising in Angola. The absorption of these interests into the state was not necessarily viewed as a setback for capitalism, as João Bernardo points out: "This process is the creation of capitalists of the state presently dominant in the mass political institutions that correspond to the new economic structure born with March 11. . . . The state appears as the financier of the production of those same firms of which it is to be the purchaser" (1975: 1–2). Under Salazar, agriculture was dominant in the economy through an alliance of large politically dominant landowners with the ascendant industrialists and bankers, who were subordinate to them politically. Toward the end of the Salazar period the large landowners were politically defeated, but their alliance persisted, and they could depend on the repressive forces to protect their interests. The large industrial and financial groups developed agrarian property in the colonies so that by the April 25 coup there was a complete separation between them and the landowners in the metropolis. The mechanization of the agricultural sector and other reforms that the industrialists pursued under Caetano were unsuccessful because agricultural interests could resist change through the repressive apparatus. Thus, after the coup, industrialists supported agrarian reform, and until March 11 agrarian reform appeared as a means of increasing the internal market for productive industrial machinery and reducing the imports of foodstuffs. Thereafter, the agrarian reform became important in the policy of controlling prices and salaries as well as absorbing unemployment.

The revolutionary government confronted the popular classes with another barrier to the socialist path. After April 25, in the view of Bernardo, it repeatedly opposed strikes through a reorganization of the state apparatus that consolidated the power of state technocrats and capitalists and repressed and integrated workers under state control. He felt that the workers were completely disorganized and the left parties were cautious about increasing salaries, thus limiting their recruitment and organization. This vacuum was filled, however, by a proliferation of autonomous organizations of the proletariat, including workers' commissions.

For the state bourgeoisie it was essential not to have a party that would organize the working class or permit the transformation of any existing party for this purpose. Thus the dominant class could not mobilize the proletariat

under the banner of the PS or the PPD because the existing economic struc-
ture and the militarization of production made it necessary for the army to
administer the economy: "The army is the model of state capitalism. . . . The
great weight of miliciano [conscripted June 10] officers within the army, with
its extension to the colonial war, makes it the armed body of technocratic
ideology. . . . These milicianos were the direct ideological inspiration and the
immediate social base of the MFA" (Bernardo, 1975: 24). In sum, the reor-
ganization of the state and the organization of the proletariat as a purely civil
apparatus proved impossible because (1) the capitalism of the state found
the best model for its institutions in the army, (2) the militarization of the
economy and relations of work gave the army the primary role in administer-
ing the economy, (3) civil organizations had been systematically eliminated
under Salazar and Caetano, (4) the army had discovered in its colonial experi-
ence a political-social organization distinct from that of the Salazar-Caetano
regime, and (5) the multitude of conscripted junior officers gave the MFA an
ideological strength and integrated the young technocrats with the military
professionals into a solid and durable force after April 25. The reorganization
of the apparatus of the state with the army as its base began with September 28
and was consolidated by March 11. The principal problem for the dominant
class in 1975 was therefore not the reorganization of the state apparatus but
the incorporation of the proletarian class (25).

The MFA needed to incorporate the working class ideologically and repres-
sively. Bernardo outlines two models for this strategy in the aftermath of the
March 11 events. The first of these was the implementation of the authoritar-
ian and ultrahierarchical internal structure of the PCP and the military. This
was to include the PS without its current leadership and the FSP, the MES,
and the MDP/CDE. The second was the ideological incorporation of the
masses into the established parties. The former was representative of Vasco
Gonçalves and the PCP (undermined by the Group of Nine initiatives) and
the latter of the Carvalho–LUAR-PRP line (also representing an opportunity
for the dominant class to recover the autonomous organizations created by
the initiative of the proletarian class). He envisions the possibility of a combi-
nation of the two models representing the pressures of one group or the other
within the MFA (Bernardo, 1975: 27).

The events of the summer of 1975 undermined both these currents and the
possibility of a socialist outcome. The eventual supplanting of the MFA by a
parliamentary system tipped the balance of power to the political parties and
placed constraints on the state while allowing its consolidation. The regimes
after November 25 set limits on the nationalization process and reorganized
public enterprises in a typically bureaucratic and centralizing fashion. The
major task for the bourgeoisie in its recovery of its enterprises, however, was

to block the formation of a new and extensive "caste" of public servants, many of whom were recruited from the old private sector and from the armed forces. Rather than a struggle of socialist construction against private capitalist recovery, the struggle became one between state capitalism and a mixed economy: "Those responsible for the deposed Salazar and Caetano regime could never resolve one problem: that of the large size of the state, the tendency to control and absorb everything in the modernizing process alongside capitalism that had long since ceased to be 'liberal'" (Lucena, 1977b: 574). For example, after November 25 agrarian reform was moderated so as to permit an agrarian capitalism dependent on the state through the discretionary powers of the Ministry of Agriculture. Thus, the implications of the countercoup involved not only thwarting the pressures of popular forces on the left and the working class but ensuring continuity in the state over Portuguese society: "The main repercussion of November 25 was a strengthening of the state apparatus, allowing it a more coherent and united approach to control and planning. . . . More specifically, it required firmer control over the workers' organizations and over the Army" (Mailer, 1977: 343).

In a useful interpretative analysis of state crisis and popular mobilization during the 1974–1975 period, Diego Palacios Cerezales understands the political process as "revolution" or "turbulent transition" in a period of popular mobilization not only in the countryside but within the state, resulting in a state crisis (2003: 25). He argues that the coup brought about a significant rupture in the coordination and hierarchy of state organizations, even though its goal was to establish a new institutional integration (55). Although substantial rupture, disruption, and mobilization was evident during the April 25, 1974, to November 25, 1975, period, the crisis within the state endured until the revision of the constitution and the dismantling of the Revolutionary Council (177).

Notes

1. Sources of documents on the April 25 coup and its aftermath include the archives of Jose Pacheco Pereira in Porto (later moved to Marmeleira), the Centro de Documentação 25 de Abril in Coimbra, and three hundred meters of Revolutionary Council documents that had been hidden from scholars at the Fort of São Julio da Barra in Oeiras, the official residence of the Minister of Defense (see Vegar, 1995). Most documents, however, are in the Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo.

2. Otelo Sarvaia de Carvalho indicated that twenty-four dissident officers clandestinely met in Bissau and issued a protest, eventually signed by fifty-five persons. Another 136 signed a petition in Evora on September 9 (interview, Oieiras, July 28, 1989).

3. Aniceto Afonso (in Medina, 1988) says that the signal was the reading of the verse.

4. My account of the coup and subsequent conjunctural moments during 1974 and 1975, which is not intended to represent a definitive history, is drawn largely from Medina (1988), a synthesis of primary documents, firsthand accounts, and memoirs. Among other fundamental Portuguese sources are Almeida (1977), Carvalho (1977), Clemente (1976), Cunhal (1976), Costa Gomes (1979), Gomes (1980a), Pereira (1976), Rodrigues, Borges, and Cardozo (1975 and 1976), and Spínola (1978). Useful foreign contributions include Ferreira and Marshall (1986), Kayman (1986), Mailer (1977), and Reeve (1976). Despite the usefulness of these sources, they do reflect personal perspectives. There is a need for an exhaustive history of the period.

5. The historian Kenneth Maxwell minimizes the significance of the revolution: "It was startling in psychological power, yet limited in its ability to reorder society; significant enough in its impact to transform the context of social and political discourse and the institutional context within which political power is exercised but, once over, hard for many outsiders to take seriously" (1995: 1). A useful summary of the coup details is in Medina (1988: 7–57).

6. The commission charged with investigating the events of September 28 identified the following parties: the Partido do Progresso (Progress Party—PP) and the Movimento Federalista Português (MFP), founded by Fernando Pacheco de Amorim; the Comité Nacionalista de Acção Revolucionário (Nationalist Revolutionary Action Committee—CNAR); Movimento de Acção Portuguesea (Portuguese Action Movement—MAP), an integralist rightist splinter group led by the Coimbra professor Guilherme Braga da Cruz; the PNP, led by Artur Alberto da Silva; the MPP, established in May 1974 with the intent of forming a common front of rightist parties under the FDU and the Frente Social Democrata (Social Democratic Front—FSD); and the PL, born of a split in the Convergência Monárquica and led by José Harry de Almeida Araújo (see Movimento das Forças Armadas, 1975a). After the abortive conspiracy of September 28, the PP was banned, most of its leaders arrested, and its offices closed, and other right-wing parties ceased activity.

7. See Gleijeses (2002) for an extraordinary analysis based on archival research and covering the role of Cuba and other nations in the evolving independence struggles and liberation of former Portuguese colonies, in particular Angola and Guinea-Bissau.

8. After March 11 most of the media fell under the control of the government, since the nationalization of the holdings of the large family groups included their newspapers, magazines, and radio stations. The morning dailies, *Diário de Notícias* and *O Século*, were under the control of the PCP, but the former paper reflected official government positions; the afternoon dailies represented an array of ideological positions: *Jornal Novo* (independent social democrat), *A Luta* (right-wing socialist), *República* (UDP and PRP), *A Capital* (supportive of the PS), *Diário Popular* (left of center), and *Diário de Lisboa* (MDP and CDE), and the weeklies included *Expresso* (independent), *O Jornal* (PS), and *O Tempo* (CDS). The radio stations were distributed as follows: Emissora Nacional (government), Rádio Clube Português (privately

owned), Rádio Renascença (Catholic Church until taken over by workers but with one transmitter in Porto controlled by conservative Catholic elements), and a federation of small privately owned stations. Progressive Catholic groups such as Acção Católica and Cristãos para o Socialism (CPS) supported workers at Rádio Renasçença by affirming a desire to participate in the class struggle within Church circles (Matos, 2001: 119).

9. Carlos Fabião claimed that there were two coups planned for November 25: one from the left under the leadership of the Group of Nine and supported by the PS and another from the right under the leadership of Sá Carneiro and Pires Veloso, representing interests from the north of the country. He asserted that U.S. Ambassador Carlucci supported the southern group because, unlike Henry Kissinger, he believed that only a center-left government could bring stability (Ferreira and Marshall, 1986: 102; for the U.S. role, see also Sick, 1991; Sá, 2004; and Gomes and Sá, 2008). Melo Antunes revealed that Eanes participated in the meetings of the Group of Nine, and he also affirmed that November 25 was "a tactical success" that had impeded the revolutionary process but that the real responsibility fell to "the sectarianism of the PCP and the adventurism of the far left" (Ferreira and Marshall, 1986: 166). Rosa Coutinho, in analyzing the failure of the revolution, attributed its failure to the PS, which did not join the PCP in supporting it: "The revolution was supported only by the PCP and the MFA on one side and the PS on the other. The PS won by breaking the MFA through the Group of Nine" (Ferreira and Marshall, 1986: 171). For details of these events, see Rodrigues, Borges, and Cardoso (1979: 139–154) and Silva Tavares et al. (2001); the chronology in 25 de Novembro (1976); the official report in Simões (1976); the memoir of Pinheiro de Azevedo (1979); Reeve (1976) for an anarchist condemnation of left-wing and communist conceptions of power; Gil (1976) for support of the moderate course that ensued; and Clemente (1976) and Gomes (1980a) for left perspectives.

10. Varela Gomes's family had associated with the military, his father serving as an admiral in India and he having spent time in Mozambique. He was renowned for his participating in the opposition in the 1961 elections and for his role in the Beja revolt a year later. He was briefly imprisoned in May 1974 by officers close to Spínola, but MFA people came to his rescue, and he was allowed to reenter the military as a colonel once an amnesty was granted to those who had been forced out by the Salazar regime. He claimed to have had a major role in the events of March 11, and although he was a leader in the Fifth Division, he did not get along with Otelo nor did he ever join the PCP. He fled Portugal after the November 25 countercoup (interview, Lisbon, July 24, 1989).

6

Institutional Conflict and the MFA

SOME OF THE MAJOR BOOKS ON THE 1974 coup stress an institutional approach to the study of the political economy of Portugal. Ferreira points to the involvement of many institutions in the political process and suggests that "in the formation of a political regime the institutional discourse was more determinant and important than the class struggle" (1983: 88; see also Aguiar, 1983, and Bruneau, 1984). Given the dominance of the MFA, the political parties, for instance, served as the means for mediating the intervention of people in the revolutionary process. At the time of the coup, Portugal was a country without intermediate organizations, and the parties became agents for the concrete expression of particular interests. Thus, a democratic model was possible only through a pact between the political parties and the armed forces, "structurally resolving an important Portuguese political question" and preventing the triumph of the PCP or the radical tendencies within the MFA (89). In effect, two pacts between the MFA and the political parties constituted the essential elements of the transformation of the revolution into a democratic bourgeois state (211). Ferreira argues that, although the class struggle that precipitated crisis after crisis in the aftermath of the April 25 coup was significant, the role of institutions in this process proved to be as decisive as it had been in producing the coup itself (1983: 211).[1]

Whereas after September 28 the major political parties (PCP, PS, PPD) associated with the government insisted that the MFA was indispensable to the revolutionary process, the legislation of November 7, 1974, gave the parties "monopoly access to political activity" while the MFA was "institutionalizing its intervention in the political scene" through various organs and ministries

in the government. In this way the military had to adapt to the independence of the colonies by reorganizing itself at home (Carrilho, 1994: 49–50, 114).

The institutionalization of the MFA was a means not only of enhancing the political process but also of reforming the army itself. For example, the Comissão Dinamizadora Central (Central Mobilizing Committee—CODICE) was an effort to raise consciousness in the military as well as among the Portuguese people. The Plataforma de Acordo Constitucional, signed on April 11, 1975, otherwise known as the Pacto-MFA-Partidos, is characterized by Carrilho as "the institutionalization of the MFA [that] permitted an extra-electoral space of influence" (54). A second such pact, signed on February 26, 1976, allowed the president to be elected directly rather than through an electoral college. The victors of November 25 assumed, however, that a high military figure would preside as president (92), an assumption that proved correct in the election of Eanes, who in February 1985 also formed a new but short-lived party, the Partido Renovador Democrático (Democratic Reform Party—PRD), with the support of political elements within the armed forces (109).

In a visit to his earlier thesis that through "liberalization" the Caetano regime had passed from a fascist to a nonfascist corporatism, Lucena emphasizes that the institutionalization of corporatism takes into account the shift from a collaboration of classes and social groups influenced and strictly controlled by public powers to a system of voluntary consent and an ever more distant state. He views this shift as a qualitative change from capitalism to a mixed economy, with an interlude in early 1975 when private capital was passing completely to the state. No hegemonic class or social group emerged in this period, however. Both the bourgeoisie and the new bureaucratic technocracy needed a lengthy period for recovery, while the unity of the working classes was tenuous in the face of economic instability and the need to defend their particular interests. The problem of restructuring the Portuguese productive system revolved around the choice between a mixed economy and a revolutionary path of intervention and nationalization on the road to state capitalism (Lucena, 1977b: 578–580).

Other institutions link the contemporary transition to the past. Manuel Braga da Cruz (1999) traces its origins to the late nineteenth century with the rise of a socialist party, a democratic republican center, and a social Catholic movement that set in motion the drama of the downfall of the monarchy and the rise of fascism and a conservative Church under Salazar. Associating the transition with the recent rise of a "new fascism," António Costa Pinto (1998a) turned to the legacy of the New State and efforts to revitalize fascism late in the regime, for example, by the young intellectuals around the journal *Tempo Presente*, founded in 1959, or the university youth movements such as

Movimento Jovem Portugal, Frente dos Estudantes Nacionalistas, and Frente Nacional Revolucionária, and, finally, the rise of reactionary parties after April 25 such as the Partido do Progresso, the Partido Liberal, and the Movimento Nacionalista Português or the Movimento Democratico para a Liberatação de Portugal, founded by General Spínola after fleeing from Portugal, and the Exercito de Libertação de Portugal (ELP).

Other historical links to the past include Luís Farinha (1998), who analyzes the effort to dislodge the Estado Novo from 1926 to 1940, while Alvaro Cunhal (1999b: 91–98) identifies four major fronts during the resistance to the Portuguese dictatorship thereafter. The first involved the struggles of the working class in strikes of 1942, 1943, and 1944. The second front comprised the democratic opposition to the regime, culminating in the Congress of Aveiro on April 4–8, 1973, led by intellectuals such as writers, artists, professors, doctors, and jurists. Students formed the third front and manifested mass protest against the regime.[2] The fourth front evolved through the colonial wars and discontent in the military.

Cunhal also lends support to my suggestion that fascism under Salazar and Caetano was fundamentally in the direction of capitalism, taking issue with those historians and economists who see Salazar as perpetuating a rural-based and backward economy: "The development of capitalism under Marcelo Caetano was not a correction but a logical continuation of capitalist development under Salazar" (1999b: 34). The democratic program presented by the opposition Acção Democrático-Social in January 1961, he argues, was simply a reform effort promoted by the liberal bourgeoisie (50). Industrial development legislation in April 1972 ensured the intervention and direct support of the monopolistic groups dominating the national economy (36).

Cunhal also devotes attention to the counterrevolutionary tendencies since 1974, identifying the important moments along the path to a countercoup. First, he outlines details of the abortive coup under the government of Palma Carlos as Spínola sought to impose new controls on the left, especially the PCP from July 8 to July 10, 1974, on the basis of evidence appearing in the memoirs of Spínola and Soares (1999b: 136–138). He elaborates on the plans of Spínola and his conservative forces in the events leading up to September 28 and March 11. Describing the decisive countercoup of November 25, he implicates Soares in the alignment of conservative forces against the PCP (1999b: 218).[3]

Another link is suggested by Fernando Rosas who views Marcelismo as the belated expression of a reformist current in the New State that had emerged after World War II and came to power in 1968 (1999: 10). This current was ultimately unable to overcome the demands of the colonial wars that initially had saved the Salazar regime in 1961: "This liberalizing political elite . . . never

escaped the cultural cauldron that had largely dominated the oligarchy of the New State" (27).

The MFA

Fragmentation

In large measure the coup was an outcome of a gradual erosion of the hegemonic bloc formed by the traditional institutions that had supported the dictatorship. The stability that characterized the period from 1926 to 1974 was interrupted only by occasional abortive revolts and the modest dissent of the political opposition during brief electoral campaigns. Within the armed forces conservative and liberal tendencies manifested sentiments in favor of restoration of the monarchy (on the right) and in the direction of representative democracy, an open economy, and autonomy for the colonies (on the left). Although a conservative Catholic majority was influential within the government, liberal Catholic dissent appeared from time to time to rally support for labor and university reforms. The sons of prominent figures in the regime joined the opposition with petitions for reforms at home and in the colonies, and small Christian Democratic and socialist movements appeared. Even some of the wealthy entrepreneurs who had benefited from key concessions became disenchanted with the restrictive national economy and pressured the regime to expand markets and seek economic integration with Europe. The government attempted to adjust to these changing conditions. Confronted by the growing influence of the moderate and left opposition and the constraints of the Salazarista forces, Caetano introduced token "liberalization" measures.

At the time of the coup the economy consisted of semifeudal (precapitalist) activity, especially in the north, where tenant farmers paid some of their rent in the form of labor power or as agricultural produce; capital owned by private individuals or companies; monopolies of firms or banks controlled or owned by the hundred most powerful families; and state-owned enterprises involved in extraction of raw materials, energy, and transportation (Mailer, 1977: 269). Initially, all these sectors were enmeshed in the events surrounding the coup. With dissent pervasive and sympathy for profound change widespread, one journalist observed: "The country is having an ideological heyday. Young aristocrats are talking about a dictatorship of the proletariat, communist workers are talking about cooperating with industrialists, and peasants are talking about the right to fancy vacations in Estoril" (Kramer, 1974: 103). In the beginning the mood was socialist and revolutionary, but the ensuing months of turmoil revealed past complicity with the dictatorship:

"The truth is that there is virtually no way to purge Portugal of everybody who cooperated with the Fascists, because in one way or another the great majority of the people did" (104). Emerging from this background was the MFA, which both reflected past contradictions and divisions and represented hope for an evolving new political system.

Unity and Disunity

Historical divisions within the military have not been uncommon. Comparing the revolutions of 1820, 1910, and 1974, Correia notes "a cleavage between a powerful minority leadership and an anonymous majority, marginalized from decisions, excluded from participating, ignored in the distribution of privileges." The majority has always been positioned to respond when called upon in a crisis but otherwise relegated to a secondary role (1994: 251):

> It was these people who participated in the Revolution of 1820 by helping the bourgeoisie take power that marginalized the people. Then in 1910 the people participated in the overthrow of the monarchy in order to strengthen the power that the bourgeoisie had retained since 1820. And in 1974 the people collaborated in the defeat of fascism as a means of helping the Marcelistas return to power and consolidating of the privileges of those who had always held them.

I have argued that the military, as an institution threatened with the possibility of civil war, closed ranks, purged radical elements, and sought political stability. Once stability was ensured, the ongoing capitalist transformation could continue and even accelerate, and the Portuguese army as a traditional institution was preserved.[4] What was different was their adoption of a bourgeois parliamentary form.[5]

The historical mission of the MFA was to guarantee conditions that would permit a peaceful and pluralist transition to democracy. An early goal was the eventual achievement of socialism, although divergent perspectives evolved on the question of which path should prevail in a transition from capitalism to socialism.[6] For a majority, including most socialists and communists, the transition was to be conditioned on the establishment of a multiparty political system and parliament. For a minority, including most of the popular left and revolutionary groupings, it was to depend on a variety of radical measures that would transcend any bourgeoisification of politics. Despite the support for rationalization of the economic system and ongoing capitalist accumulation, these contrasting perspectives undermined fractions of the bourgeoisie, preventing it from assuming political hegemony.[7]

During 1974 and 1975 the military appeared hegemonic in Portuguese politics, but events after the April 25 coup revealed a deep schism in its ranks.

Within the MFA, forces around Vasco Gonçalves appeared to favor authoritarian, bureaucratic socialist, antidemocratic rule. The COPCON seemed to aggregate idealistic proponents of direct and popular democracy. The Group of Nine sought to represent a sensible moderate revolutionary course. These divergent groups thus blurred any single picture of the MFA intervention as a consequence of its autonomous role in mediating conflicts between the popular revolutionary groups and the political parties.[8]

Lourenço argues that the Group of Nine represented a means of transcending the polarization between the authoritarian, antidemocratic, and bureaucratic socialism represented by the forces around Gonçalves's honesty and the idealistic direct and popular democracy represented by COPCON and forces of the extreme left. He emphasizes that whereas Gonçalves's honesty and revolutionary commitment could not be questioned, his personality and role served to promote division and counterrevolution (1976: 153).

A more alarming perspective appears in a commentary by the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci: "The MFA, until lately compact and united, has started to reveal all its fractures. . . . It is carved up into as many different factions as there are generals, colonels, and captains. . . . The army no longer exists, you might say. Even the state no longer exists. . . . Every politician has his own man in the army" (1975: 23).

The fracturing within the MFA as the leading political force was a conspicuous problem that the creation of the Council of Twenty in October and the formation of the Assembly of the MFA did not resolve. The schisms within the armed forces prior to the November 25 countercoup were a reflection of strong charismatic personalities and leadership, ideological divisions in the ranks, contrasting social class origins and affiliation within the officer corps, and a dispersion of power within the MFA.

Personalities. Portuguese history is replete with examples of strong charismatic personalities, including that of King Sebastião, who invaded Morocco in the seventeenth century, Dom Miguel, a pretender to the throne who attempted to wrest the crown from his sister, Maria, in the early nineteenth century, João Franco, who served briefly as dictator from 1907 to 1908, and Sidônio Pais, who ruled briefly during the First Republic. As Salazar built up his own centralized personal autocracy, opposition appeared within his own power structure under the conspicuous military figures of Admiral Manuel Quintão Meireles, Captain Henrique Galvão (1895–1970), General Humberto da Silva Delgado (1906–1965), Colonel and later General Francisco da Costa Gomes (1914–2002), General Júlio Botelho Moniz (1900–1970), Marshal Oscar Carmona (1869–1951), and Marshal Higinio Craveiro Lopes (1894–1964) (Gallagher, 1983: 88).

Parallel to the strong charismatic figures and the weak political parties, a strong populist tendency emanating from these authoritarian manifestations pervades Portuguese politics. Raby sees this populism as a product of the petty bourgeoisie in a situation in which hegemonic crisis results in the "mobilizing of a mass coalition against the dominant class bloc." For example, the movement led by Humberto Delgado during the 1958 elections and the rise of the MFA in April 1974 were populist (Raby, 1988: 63–64):

> Both exhibited many of the features commonly associated with populism: ideological vagueness, loose structure, a heterogeneous mass following, charismatic leadership. Both were multi-class, anti-status quo movements led by petite bourgeois elements; both tended to radicalize under pressure, and both tended to outflank or overwhelm existing parties or organizations of the left.

The major military contenders for power, more or less ordered in relation to their militancy, were Spínola, Costa Gomes, Vasco Gonçalves, and Otelo de Carvalho.[9] Spínola was a charismatic war hero before April 1974. Restrained, autocratic, disciplined, and authoritarian, he was one of Portugal's most highly decorated generals. Elitist in style, with his monocle, white gloves, and whip in hand, and considered a moderate reformer because of his two controversial books, *Por uma portugalidad renovada* and *Portugal e o futuro*, Spínola had also been a volunteer in Franco's Spain, an observer with the German army during World War II, and a director of the Portuguese steel monopoly. Ambitious and desirous of leading the nation, he had been dismissed from his post as commander of forces in Guinea-Bissau in 1973, as deputy chief of the general staff in March 1974, and as president in September 1974. During the first provisional government, he favored a policy of self-determination without independence for the colonies, and this position led to a rift with the MFA. Through Prime Minister Palma Carlos, Spínola attempted to expand his popular base, but this was resisted by the MFA. During the second provisional government he moved more in a personalist direction, ultimately losing both the MFA's and the electorate's support as he reflected the bourgeoisie's preoccupation with communism, protection for friends in high finance, and decolonization. Ousted from office, he attempted to seize power in the abortive March coup and then fled into exile.

Costa Gomes, nicknamed "The Cork" for his ability to stay afloat in the whirlpool of Portuguese politics, was a moderate and conciliator who had served as chief of the general staff until his abrupt dismissal by Caetano on March 15, 1974. He succeeded Spínola as president and also served as chief of the general staff in 1975. In this capacity he was the senior officer in age, professional service, and experience.

Vasco Gonçalves, a middle-aged army engineer with an interest in philosophy, had collaborated with the opposition, including the PCP, for many years prior to the revolution. He was an organizer of the MFA and served as prime minister from 1974 to 1975. Nationalist and procommunist, he was often described by the press as a Marxist with a missionary goal and abundant energy who was probably a communist in all but name.[10]

Carvalho was a noncommunist radical and charismatic leader. A chief organizer of the April coup, he later became head of national security. He was a sympathizer of the PRP-BR and favored its conception of workers' councils in factories. He advocated that the MFA become a national liberation movement and desired to establish a popular base of revolutionary councils among workers, soldiers, and sailors. He preferred a proletarian dictatorship to pluralist socialism. As Portugal drifted toward constitutional parliamentary government, Carvalho gradually was marginalized until later in a celebrated trial he was convicted of plotting to overthrow the government.

Other figures prominent in 1974–1976 included Admiral Alva Rosa Coutinho, who supported nonaligned Third World socialism and a pluralist road to socialism with the nationalization of some enterprises; Major Melo Antunes, who succeeded Mário Soares as foreign minister in 1975 and was a leader of the Group of Nine and favored a pluralist path to socialism; and recently named general Carlos Fabião, who had been Spínola's leading commander in Guinea-Bissau but did not follow in the footsteps of his superior. The four personalities mentioned above also represented major ideological lines of thinking.

Ideologies. At the time of the coup three ideological divisions were conspicuous among the officers. On the left were those who advocated an end to the wars and immediate independence for the colonies. Their spokesmen were Gonçalves and Carvalho. In the center were supporters of Spínola, who desired an end to the wars but shared a belief in the need to continue the Portuguese presence in Africa. On the right were ultraconservative elements such as retired senior officers, industrialists, landowners, and politicians under the Caetano government, who were represented by former president Tomás and Mozambique commander Arriaga, a racist opposed to African rule and an advocate of continuing the colonial wars.

Within the military, the left socialist and the center Spinolista lines were dominant. The radicalism of officers was attributable to their experience in Guinea-Bissau, where Spínola had employed psychosocial methods in opposing the African guerrillas and encouraging the formation of a black bourgeoisie linked with colonial interests. He also purged the ranks of incompetent officers and sided with younger officers. In addition, there were similarities between the MFA program and the proposals of the Aveiro Congress of April

1973, the program of the PS of May 1973, and the political program of the CDE during the October 1973 electoral campaign, in which many military officers had participated.

Prior to the events of March 11, 1975, the MFA embraced four major tendencies: a moderate current, consisting of Spínola sympathizers and officers close to the PS such as Fabião, which favored "democratization" and pluralism; a "Third World" current balanced between the PCP and the PS and grouped around Majors Melo Antunes and Vítor Alves[11]; a hard-line current close to the disciplined and pro-Soviet PCP and clustered around Vasco Gonçalves; and a populist revolutionary current with Carvalho as a figurehead. With the departure of the socialists from the government in July, the Vasco Gonçalves current emerged dominant, although pressure within the MFA was sufficient to reduce his position of prime minister to part of a troika arrangement with Costa Gomes as president and Carvalho as head of COPCON. In late 1975 and 1976 all three of these personalities faded from the political scene as the Second Republic experimented with parliamentary democracy and the military turned to technocratic rather than political approaches.

Class and privilege. Whatever the desire of the MFA to place itself above all classes, different classes were distinguishable within the ranks of the military. The Portuguese press referred to various ideological lines in separating out the class interests. Spínola signified an orientation favoring modern or European capitalist interests under strong rule similar to Gaullism in France, while Gonçalves represented a left military current favoring popular power. These contrasting tendencies reflected changes in the social composition of the officer ranks since the turn of the century.

Traditionally, a wealthy family had prepared at least one of its sons for a military career. The sons of the old agrarian aristocracy and the industrial bourgeoisie attended the Colegio Militar and later the Escola do Exército. In 1959 the Escola was renamed the Acadêmia Militar, signifying an expansion of recruitment beyond the ruling bourgeoisie, whose sons were now turning to other professions. This expansion was possible through provision of tuition and salaries by the government, and officers began to come from the petty and middle bourgeoisie in small cities and in the African colonies and sometimes from working-class families (who, however, could rarely afford to send their sons to the Colegio Militar). Many of the captains and majors who participated in the April 25 coup were from these middle bourgeois and working-class strata, while their superiors—the generals and admirals—had been trained in the elitist Colegio and were integrated into the monopoly capitalist structure. Under Salazar and Caetano the politically reliable older officers had been promoted to these high ranks, and their stature also assured them of positions on the boards of private and state enterprises. Below them

but above the captains and majors was a staff of officers relieved of combat duty but responsible for the administration of military affairs. Elitist and segregated, known for corruption and disregard of their responsibilities, they were resented particularly by officers at the junior and middle ranks—the captains and majors in their thirties and forties who had graduated from the Acadêmia Militar. Their numbers were diminishing, as was attested by Otelo de Carvalho, who recounted (interview, Oeieras, July 28, 1989) that when he left the military academy in 1959 there were thirty-one cadets and when he was teaching there in 1973, there were only five. Hence the need for *milicianos* who had been conscripted from civilian life and placed in special training programs at a time when supplementary personnel were needed. These junior officers had attended high school or the university during the early 1960s and associated with leftist student organizations at that time. Maria Carrilho (1994) and Kenneth Maxwell (1995) point out that more and more cadets of rural and provincial origins were being admitted to the Acadêmia Militar. However, Pedro Pezarat Correia (1994) is critical of the tendency of both domestic and foreign observers to attribute the changes in the military's outlook, which led to the coup and revolution, to the officers' class origins. He points out that the origins of proponents and opponents of the revolutionary option within the military were similarly diverse and argues that it was the raising of consciousness among middle and junior officers that made the difference (112). This consciousness was internalized through the opposition of Delgado and externalized abroad through the colonial wars. Correia considers the participation of milicianos to have been limited, though positive, in the coup itself but more extensive in the ensuing revolutionary process and especially significant in the colonies (142).[12]

Below the professional officers and *milicianos* were the sergeants, soldiers, and sailors recruited from the lower classes. Sergeants had revolted against the monarchy in January 1891 and had participated in the Caldas da Rainha uprising on March 16, 1974. An autonomous organization of sergeants had formed before the April coup. Sailors had supported a mutiny of several ships during 1936, some of them having joined the PCP, and they too were involved in the 1974 events. These groups had been radicalized by their experiences in the colonial wars. Thousands of men had deserted during the first thirteen years of war. Dissatisfaction increased when military service was extended to five years and the maximum draft age was raised to forty-five years.

Thus class differences clearly divided the ranks of the military services. The senior higher officers were sharply distinguishable from the junior and middle-ranking officers not only in class origins but also in class interests. The older officers dedicated themselves to colonial exploitation at the service of the large domestic capitalist groups and international imperialism, while

the younger officers perceived contradictions between their bourgeois allegiances and the big capital interests. Additionally, they articulated differences between national and international capital. Their class consciousness probably accounted for their opposition to imperialism and capitalism and their advocacy of socialism.

Dispersion of power. As the MFA assumed hegemony, it faced obstacles and uncertainty. Pasquino (1977) notes that there was no serious effort to move the revolution through a transition to socialism, and he attributes this to the strategy of some leftist parties (especially the PS) that favored parliamentary democracy. Although the state was dominated by the military apparatus and the movement toward socialism was stifled by parliamentary maneuvers, the military apparatus was weakened by internal competition among various power blocs.[13]

One fundamental discrepancy was the conflict between the MFA and the armed forces over democracy, decolonization, and development versus continuity with past practices. For example, Costa Gomes, head of the Council of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, issued a directive stating that participation in outside political meetings was permitted only with the knowledge of a commanding officer and only if uniforms were not worn and that military personnel could not be members of parties or political organizations (48–49). If this directive had been enforced, the MFA would probably have disappeared altogether (Rodrigues, Borges, and Cardoso, 1979: 48–49). Acceptance of the MFA may be attributable to the cultural emphasis on passivity, apathy, and conformity criticized by the anthropologist José Cutileiro (1977). An alternative perspective suggests that the role of political parties was decisive (Bruneau, 1984).

The Progressive Political Parties

Not since the republican period of the early twentieth century had political parties been involved in shaping the political economy of Portugal. At that time the proliferation of parties brought instability and eventually succumbed to a military coup in 1926, followed by a half-century dictatorship of Salazar and Caetano. Although the MFA dominated in the eighteen months following the April 25, 1974, coup, two formerly clandestine political parties, the PCP and the PS, emerged as major players in its aftermath, and eventually a parliamentary system evolved to mold and moderate what some believed to be a counterrevolutionary course. In addition to the PCP and the PS, two other parties were especially active as the parliament became prominent and the MFA fell into decline. The PPD, a center-right party founded in 1974

by Francisco Sá Carneiro, Francisco Pinto Balsemão, and Joaquim Magalhães, who had constituted the National Assembly's "liberal wing" under the Caetano regime, identified itself with social democracy and in 1976 changed its name to the Partido Social Democrata (Social Democratic Party—PSD). To the right of the PSD, the CDS, founded by Freitas do Amaral and others, also emerged in 1974.

The PCP

The PCP was decisively involved in the revolutionary period, when it was generally seen as a mitigating influence rather than as the radical revolutionary group it had been perceived to be during its lifetime of clandestinity prior to the coup. Founded March 6, 1921, the PCP survived the military coup of May 28, 1926, whereas all of the major parties, including the PS, disappeared. As members of the only organized opposition party during the Salazar regime, its militants suffered repression and imprisonment.

Clandestinity clearly contributed to the functioning of the PCP as a closed party, and it may be suggested that an ideologically orthodox and closed party tends to lose strength when innovations are introduced in the society at large. In a less-developed society such as Portugal, the subculture created and maintained by a closed party such as the PCP was essential for maintaining the allegiance of its supporters. According to Rato, the PCP "maximized" its efforts "to realize profound changes in the relations of power" (1988: 57). The coup and ensuing revolutionary process, however, may have caught the party by surprise, for although it dominated some social and economic sectors it was not strong enough to assume total control of the state apparatus (59). It did retain considerable influence in the political institutions because of its role in shaping the Portuguese constitution (60). It did not control the groups to its left with which it competed, and therefore after 1974 it sought a strategy of alliances through such organizations as the Frente Eleitoral Povo Unido (United Peoples Electoral Front—FEPU), the Aliança Povo Unido (United Peoples Alliance—APU), the MDP, and the Coligação Democrática Unitária (Unitary Democratic Coalition—CDU).[14]

Throughout its evolution, the PCP adhered to its Marxist legacy and as a consequence was often characterized as orthodox, sectarian, or rigid. In a serious look at Marxism in twentieth century thought with a more sympathetic focus on PCP positions and compromises with the opposition to the dictatorship and the contradiction with prevailing positivist currents, António Pedro Pita points to "a naturalist conception of Marxism" corresponding with the second reorganization of the PCP in 1940–1941 and a "positivist conception of Marxism" in the strategy of popular front. He

suggests that with the 1974 coup Marxism was influential in the renovation of republicanism and political democracy as well as in the transformation of the Portuguese intellectual conscience.

The recurrent party crises appear to have depended less on adherence to an outmoded strategy premised on the possibility of a democratic and national revolution than on changes in the Soviet Union. Dissension within the party became evident after the death of Josef Stalin in 1953. Differences between the Soviet Union and China and later the reforms of perestroika were to alter relations between the communist parties of the two countries and provoke debate within the PCP among dissidents who demanded open dialogue and assessment of past policy and errors. Reflecting on this dissidence, Francisco Martins Rodrigues charges the PCP with dissociating itself from the proletarian vanguard and perpetuating bureaucracy in its organization. He attributes this "centralism" to the influential reformist petty bourgeoisie within the party, dating it to the Seventh International in the 1930s. He identifies several phases in the party's evolution: an opportunist phase from 1935 to 1940, with emphasis on the popular front involving republicanism, nationalism, and pacifism; a second phase from 1941 to 1949, led by Alvaro Cunhal, with emphasis on influencing the working class as a means of building a bourgeois democratic opposition; and an ensuing third phase in which the party sought to fuse the interests of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie in the direction of revisionism. This centrist line represented a maturing of the petty bourgeois policy of the PCP (1985: 189–191).

The features that Rodrigues criticizes can be linked to changing conditions in Portugal and the colonies: the Angolan insurrection of 1961 and the initiation of colonial wars against the Portuguese presence, the rise of the labor movement, the rejection of liberal ideology by students and the petty bourgeoisie, and the emergence of a revolutionary opposition distinct from the more passive reformist one. He notes the convergence of three movements in the challenge to the dictatorship—the revolutionary movement of the proletariat, the democratic national movement, and the national liberation movement in the colonies—and warns against underestimating the latter. Reviewing the activity of the Portuguese opposition since 1941, he points out that the workers' and national democratic movements emerged in 1945 with legal and illegal economic actions by committees and unions, and hunger marches. The next few years saw an intensification of economic struggle with demonstrations and strikes. He suggests that the January 1, 1962, Beja revolt, an important armed action against the dictatorship, "because of a lack of proletarian and revolutionary direction fell under the control of bourgeois revolutionaries and developed into a weak coup attempt." He criticizes PCP

militants for overlooking the fact that the opposition was moving in a revolutionary direction (Campos, 1974: 36).

Historically, the party embraced the working and intermediate professional classes, representing, in particular, workers, public employees, professionals, merchants, and students. Salaried rural workers were associated with the party only in the Alentejo, while peasant smallholders were apparently of little importance to the party and the urban workers affiliated with it were concentrated in Lisbon, Setúbal, Almada, and Porto (Marques, 1977). During the 1930s the party had evolved from a small sectarian fringe group to become influential over a growing working class located in the Lisbon-Setúbal industrial zone, and by 1945 it had secured a second power base among the landless rural workers in the Alentejo.

This base served to bolster a weak political opposition both within and outside Portugal. The fragility of the internal intellectual opposition was due to repression by the regime and co-optation of liberal elements and technocrats in the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, serious protests appeared in the late 1950s. Cunhal (1975c) traces this activity from the PCP's Fifth Congress in 1957 until the Sixth Congress in 1965, dividing this period into phases. The first, from the 1957 congress to July 1958, involved large opposition rallies to the November 1957 elections for the National Assembly and the 1958 presidential elections. The second phase, from July 1958 to February 1961, witnessed strikes by fishermen at Matosinhos and miners at Aljustel. The third phase, from February 1961 to May 1962, included the Angolan insurrection of February 4, 1962, a fourteen-day strike at Peniche, the November 1961 National Assembly elections, and massive rallies involving a hundred thousand students on May 1, 1962, and two hundred rural workers on May 8.

The PCP also participated in the exiled opposition in Algiers, which aggregated several movements in the FPLN (see Cunhal, 1975c: 133–175; Pinheiro, 1979; and Dimas, 1986), including the Resistência Republicana Socialista (Socialist Republican Resistance—RRS), led by Tito de Morais, and the Movimento de Acção Revolucionária, led by Lopes Cardoso and Ramos da Costa and others who were later involved in founding the PS.

The PCP courted Humberto Delgado, the unsuccessful opposition presidential candidate in 1958, and Cunhal praised another conservative general, Galvão de Melo. Serving later in the government under Spínola and involved in many other events in which conservative and moderates joined with communists, initially Cunhal and the PCP were able to win respect for their participation in bourgeois democracy (J. F. Antunes, 1980: 13).

Disciplined and organized, the PCP, alongside the MFA, was able to fill the vacuum established after the 1974 coup. Cunhal became a minister, and members of its rank and file in the labor movement assumed charge of state

agencies, including the press, radio, and television. The party's economic perspective was decisive in its strategy and led to political mistakes (see Gomes and Bruneau, n.d.). One observer, however, has noted that during the tumultuous events of March 1975 "PCP activists and ordinary members were in the forefront of the wave of expropriations" of banks, monopolies, and insurance companies: "Without the party's effective control of the infrastructure of local government . . . it is doubtful if this assault on economic power could have been carried through so quickly and with such apparent ease" (Gallagher, 1986: 53). It was evident that the party membership also increased during the revolutionary and especially during the electoral times, from 14,593 to close to 100,000 by March 11, 1975, 115,000 at the time of its Eighth Congress in 1976, 164,700 at its Ninth Congress in 1979, and 200,753 at its Tenth Congress in 1983 (Cunhal, 1985: 175).

Through its affiliate the MDP, the PCP was influential in municipal government. Patricio illustrates this point by showing that the party was able to dominate local politics in the town of Sines and balance industrialization and the steel factory there with the interests and activities of the fishing community: "Local officials were willing to use the status of the town hall together with popular mobilization and party organization to engage in political action. In Sines the participation of the communists at the local level of political power has been largely determined by the popular and social movement in the process of resistance to 'modernization'" (1990: 60).

The PCP was influential during the revolutionary period because of the continuity of its program and policy. The program of its Sixth Congress in 1965, for example, emphasized four traditional party concerns: (1) the degree of capitalist development as "monopoly capitalism of the state" with two contradictions (a high level of development of the relations of capitalist production and concentration and centralization of capital, on the one hand, and the backwardness of the means of production, on the other); (2) the nature of the class of political power, defined as the power of monopolies (associated with imperialism) and latifundistas over other classes; (3) the form of political domination of governing classes, especially the fascist dictatorship and its repression and terror; and (4) the national and colonial question and the submission of Portugal to imperialism and the resulting national dependence. The program concluded that "the present stage of the revolution is a democratic and national revolution" with the objectives of destroying the fascist state and installing a democratic regime, ending the power of the monopolies and promoting general economic development, implementing agrarian reform and giving land to those who would work it, raising the standard of living of the working classes, democratizing education and culture, freeing Portugal from imperialism, recognizing the right of the people of the

Portuguese colonies to immediate independence, and following a policy of peace and friendship with all peoples. Analyzing these objectives in the light of the events of 1974–1975, Cunhal emphasizes that "in the period of revolutionary flux, almost all these fundamental objectives defined in the Program of the PCP were attained" (32) and that the ensuing four party congresses reaffirmed these ideas that had come to be accepted nearly a decade before the 1974 coup (1985: 30–33).

The collapse of the Soviet Communist Party and the breakup of the Soviet Union brought changes for the PCP. Ideological lines were clearly evident within the party, in particular between the orthodox and renovation factions, reflecting the shift away from Stalinism in favor of bourgeois democracy. Francisco Rodrigues (1991) identifies the principal factions as the *coerência* of Cunhal, aligned with Moscow, a second faction that distanced itself and shifted to the right (*reformismo comunista*), and another faction, *os refundadores*, that sought to rejuvenate the party, casting off its communist language and situating it in favor of democratic socialism to the left of the PS, opposing both reformism and orthodoxy.

Social Democracy and the PS

Although its legacy of socialism dated to the nineteenth century,[15] the PS evolved belatedly, emerging as a serious contender for power just before the 1974 coup. The PS included various factions, with a weak link to the labor movement and even a minority of intellectuals committed to a socialist revolution, but its principal leadership in 1974 and thereafter preferred a social democracy associated with representative bourgeois parliamentarism.[15] Thus, ideological debates and differences over strategy tended not to interfere with the party objective of winning control over the government and the state. This path to power involved opposition to the PCP and the popular left, a rollback of reforms, and opportunism.

A fundamental difference between the PS and the PCP lay in the former's advocacy of social democracy and pluralism in contrast to the PCP's traditional vanguardist Leninism. Fearful of succumbing to communist cooptation and dominance, the PS sought alliances with the center-right. As the role of the MFA and the PCP diminished and confidence was placed in elections, the political parties, and the parliamentary system, the PS suffered from internal dissension and the loss of some of its left factions. Its conciliatory and reformist maneuvering was evident in the early socialist governments, which rolled back agrarian reform, favored some restoration of power to large capitalists, and sponsored legislation undermining the advances by the working classes after April 25 (see Rosa, 1978).

Providing insight into PS factionalism, António Reis (1988) identifies a dialectic between the democratic parliamentary project and the MFA military project and between the Soares current, which desired institutionalization of the parliamentary regime, and the Eanes current, which divided the democratic left and sought to marginalize the PS. He sees the PS of the revolutionary period as initially weak but of increasing importance and as representing various and diverse currents: those who followed the liberal republican and liberal traditions of the First Republic, those who valued liberty and social justice as reflected in left socialist opposition to the dictatorship during the 1940s, 1960s, and 1970s, those influenced by French Marxist theory of the 1960s, those pursuing a Leninism cleansed of Stalinist imperfections, and those aligned with a Trotskyist position against Stalinism.

Eventually these differing perspectives could not be contained within a single party, and various militants defected. Many radical socialists joined the MES, and others grouped around the PRD. The root of the dissension was party reformism and opportunism. When critics outside the party such as Cunhal characterized its behavior as negative petty-bourgeois radicalism that undermined the revolutionary process, dissident socialists echoed their criticism. João Cilia (1976), who left in January 1975, condemns the PS for its opportunism and failure to become part of the revolutionary process, attributing the problems of the revolution to a PCP that advocated "socialization of the productive forces, a rigid orthodoxy and efficient organization, but never establishing itself hegemonically in the revolutionary force" and a "liberal petty bourgeoisie, carrying the legacy of the republican tradition . . . without a Marxist formation and labor base, organizing itself in semilegal and paralegal struggle, in a permanent attempt to dialogue with power" (22). He criticizes Soares for not condemning the former authoritarian regime from the perspective of class or a socialism expressed as a proletarian tendency (23). He points to the historical function of the PS as "the conciliation of classes by means of an established mechanism (the vote, institutional integration, and reproduction of the dominant ideology) applied in an established instance of bourgeois institutions" and posing as the "workers' political party with a bourgeois direction" (90). These observations are confirmed by Mateus (1996).

The views of Mário Soares provide insight into the character of the PS. Shortly after the 1974 coup he described himself as a Marxist with a preference for social democracy as the path to socialism: "I'm a Marxist, not a dogmatic one, but still a Marxist. As such I've always believed men were instruments or interpreters of history, that great historical movements were uninfluenced by the characters involved" (Fallaci, 1975: 24, 26). In another interview he elaborated: "One cannot explain everything through 'recipes'

of class struggle. I consider myself Marxist, and I do not question Marxist social analysis, but it is not sufficient to explain everything" (Soares and Pouchin, 1976: 99). He even favorably recalled Cunhal's having taught in his father's college: "I admired him still more later, during his trial: his behavior was magnificent, proud and courageous . . . he didn't really speak to defend himself, what he did was conduct a trial in condemnation of the Salazar regime. A masterly attack, it impressed me greatly" (Fallaci, 1975: 26). In an interview with *Newsweek* (May 13, 1974), he asserted that the PS was a great democratic party of humanists and willing to collaborate with the PCP in the transition from dictatorship to democracy but that it would maintain an image of a democratic party and not favor a dictatorship of the proletariat. Later, he reiterated that "the PS believes that profound changes are necessary in Portuguese society, in the economic plan, politics, and culture, but it favors a path to socialism that must pass through political democracy. . . . The truth is that the Socialists are not anticommunists and always defend Communists and back them when persecuted" (1975: 272).

Relations between Soares and Cunhal and their parties were tenuous, however. Soares believed that in its desire to dominate politics the PCP interfered with representative practice. In January 1975 there was a serious rupture between the PS and the PCP over the question of a single labor movement. Soares explained that the PCP revealed its hegemonic intentions over this question. He noted that whereas the MDP/CDE had once been a coalition of socialists and communists, it had become a dependency of the PCP and the socialists had abandoned it. Although his fellow socialist, António Lopes Cardoso, disagreed with him, Soares also insisted that it was the PCP, and not the workers' commission that was behind the seizure of the daily *República.* Only the PCP, he believed, had the means to accomplish such a takeover. Asked if there might be civil war he responded: "Well, there is a great risk. I've been saying so for six months and now even the Communist press agrees. Civil war . . . We're trying our utmost to avoid it. I believe there is some chance we may be able to" (Fallaci, 1975: 26). Asked for his impressions of other revolutionaries, Soares responded bluntly that Melo Antunes was not an army man but a politician: "At most, an intellectual army man. He has a great political flair, he's the most intelligent of the lot; and he is morally strong too" (27). Costa Gomes, he said, was an engineer with a colonel's rank rather than a proper army man and had little following: "He has had a lot of human experience in the army; he knows how to deal with soldiers. . . . He has made a lot of concessions to the Communists, and he's still doing so. . . . The only sure thing about Costa Gomes is that he appears obsessed by the idea of an armed confrontation and that he wants to avoid it" (27). He considered Carvalho "a democrat and a revolutionary. Maybe he is influenced by the extreme left, but

he isn't being used by anyone. It's true that he changes opinions rather often and voices somewhat original ideas" (28).

By the end of 1975 the balance of power had clearly shifted to the socialists. Reviewing the role of the PS under his leadership, Soares blamed the PCP and Vasco Gonçalves for consistently drawing a line between a Leninist position favoring a single party and revolutionary vanguard and his own party's advocacy of a democratic and pluralist road: "The PS does not seek ministerial posts or hegemonic positions of any kind. It wants only to overcome the present crisis and save the Revolution" (1979: 24). Later he warned that the attempt at an alliance between the PCP and the parties of the extreme left made any negotiation of a left policy with the PS particularly difficult. He believed that the events of November 25, 1975, represented "the rebirth of a country that had been condemned to anarchy, as a preparatory phase that would necessarily precede a communist-military dictatorship" (75). It was a historical turning point: "The revolutionary conquests—namely, the nationalization and the agrarian reform—have to be consolidated, with a timely correction of abuses" (81).

The Labor Unions

The labor movement first took shape in 1872 with the formation of the Fraternidade Proletária, but it did not expand and develop institutionally until the fall of the monarchy—first through a wave of strikes in 1910–1911 and then through the formation of a trade union confederation in 1913, an abortive general strike on November 18, 1918, and the founding of the CGT at the Second National Labor Congress in September 1919. A Fourth Congress, held in 1925, included the participation of communists and anarcho-syndicalists. Labor under Salazar after 1926 was tightly controlled by the New State, but there were outbreaks of dissent, with communists usually being associated with the disturbances. Under Caetano, labor was able to organize more broadly.

The Confederação Geral de Trabalhadores Portugueses (General Confederation of Portuguese Workers—CGTP), known as the Intersindical, was an elected interunion commission formed on October 1, 1970. Based largely on metalworkers, bankers, retail clerks, and wool products unions, it grew to forty-one unions in the first four months (see Pinto and Moura, 1972). On April 30, 1975, it was given power over the union movement as a consequence of laws approved by the MFA Revolutionary Council. The first trade union congress took place in the summer of 1975. In mid-1977 an all-union congress was boycotted by the PS, although some socialists (Kalidas, Barreto, and

Santana e Costa) attended and the latter two were elected to the secretariat. The communists overwhelmingly influenced the Intersindical. Dissenting unions favoring the PS and the PSD left the coalition in 1979 to form the União Geral de Trabalhadores (General Workers Union—UGT) early in 1979. Its program stressed three goals: reorganization of the union movement, a shift in macroeconomic policy, and democratic stabilization and union democracy. The former socialist leader Francisco Salgado Zenha advocated democracy in the unions and opposed the establishment of a single central. In his view it was impossible to build a democratic state out of the ruins of the fascist state: "There exist many centers of power, a certain confusion in the functioning of administrative mechanisms and the recognition that it is time to set aside the revolution in order to build the democratic state" (1976: 289).

No matter how one analyzes institutional tendencies in the Portuguese interlude of 1974–1975, it is helpful to recognize various perspectives that likely emanated from the policies and practices of the traditional institutions. In a historical conjuncture of turmoil, potential change, and challenge to the fabric of society, however, the future of the Portuguese revolution had to be weighed against both internal conditions and external influences. For example, various ideas drawn from the experiences of Europe and the Third World resonated among the views evident within the left, in particular the PS and the PCP. The principal positions were as follows:

1. A nationalist-military and anti-imperialist revolution, inspired by the popular democracy, with remote ties to the Soviet experience, and supported by the PCP and Gonçalvismo. This view emanated from the Russian Revolution and developments in Eastern Europe after World War II.
2. A "basist" formulation, drawn from the colonial experience, linked to COPCON and supported by extreme left groups.
3. Third Worldism, influenced by anti-imperialism and the goal of socialism and national independence, a view inspired by the thinking of Melo Antunes and former MES militants with regard to the liberation movements in the Third World and especially the colonial wars in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique.
4. Socialism based on a pluralist and representative democracy advocated by a military vanguard as the autonomous carrier of the socialist project of national independence.
5. A democratic-presidential revolution under the economic control of the big bourgeoisie, exemplified by Spinolista military nationalism.

6. A democratic-parliamentary revolution through political parties legitimized by popular vote, allowing a left majority to evolve while marginalizing the large economic groups.

This summary reveals the influence of events, personalities, ideologies, and legacies on institutional preferences for continuity or change. Lucena's attention, mentioned earlier, to the institutionalization of corporatism under fascism and the revolutionary period suggests that the state and public powers were important in a shift from what he envisaged as capitalism to a mixed economy. The popular and social movements were conspicuous in their demands for participation and direct democracy. A class struggle was under way. The grip of the monopolistic bourgeoisie had been shattered, but the fate of a new bourgeoisie was uncertain. The bureaucratic technocracy was being reformulated. The unity of the working classes was being undermined by the conflict over centralism versus autonomy. Thus, no hegemonic class or social and popular group was able to ascend to power in the 1974–1975 period. In such uncertainty, it was apparent that the structural apparatus of the state and government remained largely intact under the MFA and that the opening to party politics would be conditioned by differences between the PCP and the PS and by the need of the PS to align itself with the center mainstream to ensure power at the legislative and executive levels.

Notes

1. North (1981) presents a general theory of institutional change and a framework for the study of central issues in economic history. In his theory of the state Ralph Miliband (1969) emphasized a structural approach with attention to political institutions and noted that critics rightly identify other divisions in society, for example, on gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion, but that the critics also tend to overlook divisions often related to class location. Ferreira (2001) focuses on 1974–1982 as a period of "formidable institutional struggle" in which social classes intervene politically. He refers to "a military elite" trained in higher military institutions and capable of strategically resolving national problems. It had an important role in facilitating the transition to a democratic-constitutional regime, and it preserved the military as an institution facing national crises (18). In a discussion of the Conselho da Revolução after 1976 he concludes that it did not use its institutional power to build a core of high-rank officers supportive of its objectives nor did it impede the promotion of officers opposed to it (27).

2. Gabriela Lourenço, Jorge Costa, and Paulo Pena (2001) concentrate on the student opposition to the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship.

3. See also the various retrospective essays by participants and observers of the November 25, 1975, events in Tavares et al. (2001).

4. Carrilho (1994) has argued that military intervention is a constant in Portuguese history and that the coup of April 25 was not only a politically strategic move to resolve the colonial wars but also consistent with the mission and socioprofessional standard of the armed forces. The interventions of May 28, 1926, and April 25, 1974, were both carried out in the national and military institutional interest, but the former imposed constraints while the latter expanded freedom in an authoritarian style (38–39).

5. A comparison can be drawn between the experience in Portugal and that in Chile during the Allende period of 1970–1973, when the armed forces were threatened with a deep split and imminent civil war. The Chilean armed forces, however, engineered a repressive coup, and the preservation of the military as an institution was accompanied by the abandonment of a bourgeois democratic parliamentary system.

6. For emphasis on socialist pluralism in the political action plan of the MFA, adopted June 21, 1975, see MFA (1975).

7. According to one observer, "The mechanism of capitalist accumulation has not been put in question by the measures that have been carried out or those that have been projected. . . . The MFA in the last analysis is defending the fundamental interests of the bourgeoisie, even though its decisions may strike at sections of the bourgeoisie and often prevent the bourgeoisie from exercising its political hegemony directly" (quoted in Maitan, 1975).

8. An analysis in *Revista Expresso* (February 15, 1975: 17) identified three alternatives within the MFA: (1) "dominant intervention," implying absolute control, (2) "moderate intervention," a democratic alternative in accord with the MFA with a parliament, and (3) dissolution (which was not seriously supported at this time).

9. Fields (1976) reveals biographical details of MFA leaders and looks carefully at the MFA role and evolution of thinking and action. She contrasts the styles of Spínola and Otelo de Carvalho to show their different perspectives and need to work together early in the revolutionary process.

10. Davies (1975) describes Vasco Gonçalves as "a member of a well-to-do family who had for years collaborated secretly with the Communists. . . . Some call him a mystic, others a 'sly fox.' He is well to the left of the Marxist center, and passionately nationalistic" (41).

11. Vítor Alves was aligned with Vasco Lourenço and Otelo de Carvalho at the time of the coup. He felt that Melo Antunes was the most adept politically with a sense of history and integrity but not prepared to assume the presidency. He believed that there was no radical change within the state itself despite radical events associated with the April 25 coup. He distinguished between base democracy up to 1976 and the formal democracy through political parties implemented in 1977 and 1978. He believed that the revolution was democratic and not socialist and expressed disappointment that the two democracies were unable to reconcile. The revolution failed because of the inability to change ultraconservative attitudes shaped through the years of the dictatorship and the fact that the new government turned to technocrats while repressing the popular classes that had supported the revolution (interview, Lisbon, August 1, 1989).

12. Oliveira (1993), who traces his political trajectory to student participation influenced by the PCP during the involvement of Humberto Delgado in the opposition and his days as a law student in Coimbra, was one of those to enroll in the officers' course for *milicianos*. I interviewed three prominent participants who also became *milicianos*. Active in the student movement in 1960, Manuel Alegre thereafter became a *miliciano* army officer in December 1961 at a time when he spoke out against colonialism. In 1962 he participated in a military uprising in Angola for which he was imprisoned. After his return to Portugal, he became involved in the student movement, then fled to France and later to Algiers, where he joined the FPLN, initially as a communist. He broke with the party about 1968, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, but he did join with Piteira Santos in defending a line that there should be a front inclusive of the communists. He was not involved in the planning of the coup and returned to Portugal on May 2, 1974, and considered the ensuing experience to be a popular revolution without political direction or a well-defined ideology (interview, Lisbon, July 27, 1989). Manuel Lucena was one of a handful of intellectuals involved with the MFA because of his activity in the opposition. As a *miliciano* he had fled to Rome to avoid fighting in the colonial wars but returned after the coup and was reinstated and from March to November 1974 was close to the MFA. He claimed that the PCP supported the MFA but was fearful that the MFA would evolve independently and influence some communists like Martins Correia, with whom he worked closely in the MFA (interview, Lisbon, July 27, 1987). Like Manuel Alegre, António Barreto participated in student demonstrations and later was called into military service. He joined the PCP in 1963. His early Maoism and later sympathy for a Fidelista position brought him into conflict with the PCP. He trained in guerrilla warfare in Havana in 1966–1967. He believed that the April 25 coup was truly a revolution because it broke with the old structures of the previous political economy. He also believed that the counterrevolution was accompanied by some positive consequences, including a democratic state, democratic institutions, and democratic procedures, and that it eventually stopped a communist and left revolutionary force from coming to power. He also believed that technocrats had seized power as demonstrated by the fact that none of those who opposed the regime prior to 1974 were in positions of importance (interview, Lisbon, August 1, 1989).

13. According to Maria Carrilho (1994), during the New State era no candidate for the military academy was admitted without screening by the security police. The coup of April 25 eliminated this power link (*O Jornal,* January 17, 1986). A contrasting interpretation (Civicus, 1978) suggests that the police forces were a creation of the armed forces, which organized, recruited, and structured them. This view focuses on the military or paramilitary role of the Polícia de Segurança Pública (Public Security Police—PSP), the Guarda Nacional Republicana (Republican National Guard—GNR), and the Guarda Fiscal (Fiscal Guard—GF) and seeks to understand the role of the armed forces in intervention into the internal order in the context of a fascist regime. This argument assumes that these police groups "have a structure that constitutes a natural extension of the armed forces" (8). The GNR, for example, had 10,000 men, of whom 300 were army officers. The GF had 6,500 men commanded by 130 officers, including a general and 6 colonels. The PSP had 12,000 men and 100 officers,

including a general. Thus the police constituted about 28,000 men, or 1 for every 311 inhabitants, a figure far higher than that for other EEC nations; Portugal was in fact the only EEC country in which the police forces were under the control of the armed forces. A further comparison between the regimes before and after April 25 suggests that the revolts of May 28, 1926, and April 25, 1974, both emerged from within the military establishment (Saraiva, 1980: 5). Continuity in the role of the military throughout the twentieth century is inferred in the allusion to the abortive and bloody revolt of February 1927 as "a sort of abortive first 25 April" (Antunes, 1980: 14).

14. On "frontism" in party past history and policy, see Fernando Guerreiro (1975) and Raby (1988).

15. See Monica (1985) for details on the socialist movement from 1875 to 1934, including the Partido Socialista (1875), Partido dos Operários Socialistas de Portugal (1878), and Partido Socialista Português (1895)

16. Moura (1977) describes the bourgeois project of the PS. Mateus (1996) provides an exposé of the PS and, in particular, of its leader, Mário Soares, including details of his clandestine links to domestic and foreign business, ties to the Reagan administration, and workings with the CIA.

7

The New Popular and Social Movements

HAVING EXAMINED THE EXTRAORDINARY political changes affecting southern Europe in the middle 1970s, Nicos Poulantzas observed that the capitalist state monopolizes the organization of time and space in networks of domination and power. Manuel Castells suggests that this state monopoly over power is challenged today not only by global flows of capital, goods, services, technology, communication, and information but also by autonomous entities that impose a decentralization of power that brings citizens closer to government but distances them from the nation-state (1997, vol. 2: 243). Although a focus on group identity may obscure possible ties and extensions to broader constituencies and issues of the society at large, it is empowering in practice and opens up inquiry about resistance that might otherwise be overlooked in favor of a concern with institutions or class. New social and popular movements appeared in 1974 and 1975 to fill the vacuum in politics left by the demise of the old fascist regime. Expressing resistance to domination and the pursuit of empowerment, they served as an alternative to traditional institutions. They were concerned with political rights and social justice and with opening the way to a democratic space in civil society in which conflicting demands are discussed openly rather than behind closed doors. Their survival was linked to their autonomy and influence in the face of the MFA and later of the parliamentary system.[1]

This chapter examines the proposition whether the breakup of the strong authoritarian state (fascist or socialist) may affect the political sphere not only by opening up the system to elections and new parties while the state administration and repressive apparatuses continue intact but also by creating the

possibility of popular participation and direct forms of democracy. The new social and popular movements evolved in the cities with takeovers of firms and invasions of unoccupied houses and apartments and in the countryside around localized conflicts over land and massive infrastructural projects. Their existence and autonomy were usually dependent on the chaos of the postcoup period, the inattention of government to control and regulation, and the dissension over policy and the path to development. In such moments collectives, cooperatives, and self-help projects may be taken seriously once constraints have been removed. Reformist governments, however, no longer encourage self-management activities in the cities and countryside to substantiate their egalitarian or democratic ideals but view them with favor only if they are inexpensive and do not threaten private property. Successful popular movements are therefore likely to be independent of the state apparatus and untainted by official patronage.

Perspectives of the Popular Left

The left has traditionally manifested solidarity around issues of equality, distribution, and social justice in contrast to the right's defense of economic efficiency and private property. A popular left perspective might see the socialist leader Mário Soares as straddling these positions and thus representing a false alternative to the right. In 1976, Lopes Cardoso and other socialist dissidents formed the União da Esquerda para a Democracia Socialista (Left Union for a Socialist Democracy—UEDS) in an attempt to create an authentic socialist alternative to the PS under Soares's leadership, but eight years later it dissolved as the left pragmatically moved toward Soares in support of his bid for the presidency. Debate within the left also revolved around the PS, with some favoring direct adherence to the PS, others defending a process of fusion within the PS of dissident elements to the left of the party, and still others insisting on the autonomy of those leftist elements. Cunhal calls the popular left merely an "expression of petty bourgeois radicalism" that had played "a very negative role in the revolutionary process" (1976: 170). Leftism, he argues, was incapable of analyzing concrete situations, and he identified the principal enemy not as the reactionary forces but as the leftist enemies of reaction, whose divisive activities facilitated the unification of the right. Critical of this position, José Freire Antunes argues that Cunhal had not come to Portugal to make a revolution, even though the people were eager for change. The popular movement, he claims, suffered from the pressure of the political parties, especially the PCP and the PS, which confronted "spontaneous" movements they could not control and resisted "the logic of the revolutionary movement

that would have substituted for the state apparatus" (interview, Lisbon, November 19, 1989).

Francisco Louçã identifies the state as having been decisive in the chaotic period in which the popular left movements were active. "The crisis was profound and provoked more by the state than by the popular movements. . . . The momentum of the crisis of the state was more severe than that of the organization of social autonomy." He argues that the state should have made room for popular empowerment. He also advocates a "basism" involving not only organization and bureaucracy but also procedures allowing equal access to all members of the popular left movement. Solidarity must lead to political mobilization and a coherent and feasible political program. In this way the popular left could serve as an alternative to traditional populism, which has failed to create sustainable channels of political pressures or sustainable bureaucratic apparatuses. Radical political activity should be aimed at a well-informed range of scaled political interventions (interview, Lisbon, November 19, 1990):

> My argument here has been concerned not with the content of the basic-needs policy but with the modes of organization that would be needed to make it sustainable. This means improving the performance of the state bureaucracy through pressure from below but also taking measures to prevent that pressure from merely adding to the existing clientelism, whether it be personalistic . . . or mediated by ideological party loyalties. . . . More democracy means not more elections or elected bodies, but more open avenues for channeling pressures from civil society.

The struggle over these years was first to bring down the fascist regime and second to build a socialist society. In his book on the workers' and neighborhood movements that appeared after April 1974, John L. Hammond identifies two models leading to socialism. In one, the revolutionary party serves as a command structure or vanguard through which the participation of people filters in response to central decisions. In the other, popular power opposes central power and seeks an expansion of democracy and an assault on the capitalist state in order to bring about a transition to socialism. Control of production comes about through the workers' struggle to shape the production process: "The exploited must—and can—create power by organizing collectively to assert their demands and challenge the dominant classes" (1988: 20). Although this alternative rarely occurs in revolutionary situations, the Portuguese case "stands as a major late twentieth-century example in which ordinary people, workers and neighbors, seized control of their circumstances and demonstrated both the aspiration and the power to rule their own lives" (29).[2]

Neighborhood Commissions

The neighborhood-based urban movements throughout Europe and the United States appeared with the rapid growth of cities and their inability to resolve problems of housing and social services. Castells (1979) has documented many struggles aimed at ensuring collective consumption and democratic administration of services. At the local level neighborhood groups may serve as examples of self-management and often participate in political movements seeking an expansion of democracy.[3]

Drawing on interviews during 1972 and 1973 with the presidents of half the *juntas de freguesias* (official "neighborhoods") in Lisbon, Blume traces this local institution's roots to the fifth century and argues that it "offers, at the neighborhood level, a political and administrative entity which has made government more convenient, humane and, to a point, responsive" (1975a: 249). He shows that the neighborhood acts as a political broker and conduit in people's dealings with higher levels of government. The *concelho* or council has been a symbol of municipal autonomy and a regional reality since the time of Dom Dinis (Fernandes, 1982), but in 1974 it served as coordination for the urban neighborhood organization known as the *commissão de moradores* (residents' commission).[4]

After April 25, residents' commissions aimed primarily at coping with the housing shortage. In some situations the government helped slum dwellers to build new houses. In others, neighborhood organizations occupied empty houses and apartments in the major cities and let needy families settle in them. Many neighborhood organizations assumed authority to govern their localities and provided a sense of community and neighborliness for urban dwellers. They also facilitated direct democracy: "The neighborhood offers an arena for mobilization of a much broader range of people than does the work place; this potential for universal participation makes neighborhood organizations a better model for direct democracy. . . . The clearest articulation of the popular power model in Portugal came from the neighborhood commissions" (Hammond, 1988: 23).

The beginnings of the popular neighborhood movement date to just after the coup. On April 29, 1974, slum dwellers occupied an abandoned public housing project at Monsanto on the western fringe of Lisbon. Built for single persons or elderly couples, its two- and three-bedroom apartments had remained empty since completion years earlier. Within two weeks some fifteen hundred public housing units had been occupied in Lisbon. Occupations also occurred in Porto, Setúbal, and other cities (D'Arthuys and Gros, 1976). On May 11 the junta banned further occupations but implied that it would respect those already filled by destitute families. About this time the MDP was

active in creating democratic consultative commissions at the neighborhood level. In June the government established the Serviço Ambulatório de Apoio Local (Mobile Service for Local Assistance—SAAL) to facilitate self-help projects for slum dwellers. Initially, it was thought of as a way of co-opting the neighborhood commissions, but by 1975 it was cooperating in the building of new housing. According to Oliveira and Marconi (1978: 163),

> The participation of neighbors in all phases of protest has put them in direct contact with problems related to expropriations, mechanisms of financing, boycotts of local entities, carrying out a global project, and construction. . . . The difficulties, contradictions, demystification of technology, contact with capitalist circuits of production, constituted . . . a real growth of class consciousness.

At the same time the neighborhood associations were engaged in a process of purging the old governing councils and choosing new officers. The PCP effectively used its organization to help with these changes, and the MRPP had been instrumental in the occupations. During July the Grupo de Acção Popular Socialista (Socialist Popular Action Group—GAPS) was involved in organizing residents' commissions in the cities. Neighborhood agitation occurred during three periods (Vítor Matias Ferreira, 1975): from the April 25 coup to September 1974, with the first occupations in Monsanto; from October 1974 to April 1975, with the establishment of the SAAL in more than two dozen slum neighborhoods in Lisbon; and from April 1975 to April 1976 (see Movimento de Moradores, 1979).

Charles Downs argues that, as a balance of forces between social classes, the political conjuncture was a crucial element in the formation and action of the urban social movements in Portugal. Essential to the political conjuncture was the way in which both popular classes and the state responded to the popular movements (1989: 2). The residents' commissions were one of the fundamental urban movements during the revolutionary period. As Downs describes them (1989: 4–33), they appeared in all types of neighborhoods: popular neighborhoods consisting of manual workers, interclass neighborhoods with a mix of manual workers and white-collar professionals, and elite neighborhoods of professionals and businessmen. Many of them formed alliances with workers' commissions. They advocated autonomy, unity, and nonpartisanship in an effort to distance themselves from state and political parties.

The urban movement, with the residents' commissions often in the lead, involved itself in grassroots activity and was a stimulus to class struggle in which the principal classes were a small bourgeois class minority and a larger popular class minority. In Setúbal, for example, tens of thousands of people participated in demonstrations, thousands in neighborhood assemblies, and

hundreds of others in specific projects. These organizations established the conditions for providing services to most residents and improving conditions for tens of thousands, and "all this was seen as part of the basis for a new, more democratic system of popular power" (1989: 67).

The residents' commission was a base organization of the urban social movement and the movement of popular power. It did not function everywhere in the city, and it was more effective in neighborhoods where problems were more immediate, there was a relatively homogeneous class, and common life was conspicuous. Its political importance rested in its struggle for direct control. Its conditions were determined by the struggle of the urban movement. Its two principal thrusts were protest and the promotion of qualitative change by confronting the mechanisms of capitalist exploitation. Thus, the residents' commissions contributed to a change in urban structure among social groups that confront the system of urban power, bringing about improvements in social services, legitimizing the occupations, lowering and controlling rents, and building social works.

Downs et al. (1978) argue that in Setúbal there were links among urban movements at the level of urban consumption and at the level of production. Out of this emerged a popular movement to contend with the capitalist system. Their analysis focused on contradictions: the relation between various classes that comprise the social base of the movement; the union of movements linked to the sphere of production and movements linked to the sphere of consumption, which gives rise to the material basis of a global protest; the relation between political parties in the movement and, in particular, the role of sectarian parties in impeding the left from uniting the popular masses in a common political project; the relation between rulers and bases; and the ambiguous role of the state, especially at the local level (60–61).

As to whether these movements were spontaneous or manipulated, Downs argues that in Setúbal they were an outcome of the political conjuncture, the social base of the movements, and the objective problems of the population. Thus, their origins were both conjunctural and structural. Further, ties to political parties were rather minimal and conditioned more by party adaptation to the political orientation of each residents' commission than by party intervention in the commission's activities (1989: 67). Downs classifies the commissions in terms of three political orientations—radical, reformist, and self-help—and considers about half of them radical because of their participation in mass urban struggles. Each movement developed according to its own dynamic and was neither manipulated nor spontaneous. Several types of neighborhood organizations are suggested by Vítor Matias Ferreira (1982: 27), including an extreme type in the metropolitan area of Lisbon in which urban struggles and occupations surpass any official effort to solve the prob-

lem; an intermediate type in Porto and Setúbal, where the movements sought an institutional model through the SAAL while pressuring for the resolution of problems; and a type found in Evora and Lagos, where there were differences between official and informal means of solving problems.

The popular urban movements were effective in improving services and conditions of much of the population during 1974 and 1975, but after the events of November 25, 1975, there were few isolated occupations of housing units, and the urban struggle began to decline in the face of greater bureaucratic obstacles (see Vieira and Oliveira, 1976, for an overview). Downs sees the emergence of urban social movements as corresponding to shifts in class relations in the society as a whole. Once a conjuncture is favorable to the popular classes, movements of large numbers of people will appear. Their success may depend on their willingness to confront and resolve problems and on the degree of repression or receptivity of the state: "The degree of popular participation they exhibit, their evolution, relations with other organizations, possible actions and effects, and eventual end, all depend largely on changes in the political relations of forces between classes in the society as a whole" (113). He judges the Portuguese grassroots movements to have been important for revolutionary change, direct democracy, and the improvement of living conditions at the local level: "Massive and sometimes disruptive movements are part of the process of regime transition, part of the class struggles without which there will be no transition, with an important role to play in mass participation, representation, and problem resolution on the one hand and government reform on the other" (136).

Workers' Commissions

With the 1974 coup the Intersindical emerged from clandestinity to declare itself Portugal's new trade federation, and it was the official sponsor of the May Day rallies. The PCP not only supported the MFA and the new government but assumed leadership of labor, accepting the Labor Ministry but also hoping to use its labor influence to prevent work stoppages and excessive labor demands. In response to this moderation, workers in factory after factory expressed their demands and grievances to management, seeking wage increases and fringe benefits and insisting that authoritarian supervisors be dismissed. They also organized into workers' commissions. In the early months after the coup a wave of strikes spread throughout Portugal. The provisional government responded in May with a package of economic measures. The essence of this confrontation is described by Hammond: "Workers did not believe they were making revolution—they were merely raising legitimate and normal

grievances. But their experiences in the early months after the coup already exhibited the latent tension between centralism and popular power as models of revolutionary practice" (1988: 83).

After September 28, 1974, the workers' commissions consolidated their power. Informal demands to participate in decision making turned into formal demands for sharing power in the management of many factories. The commissions organized activities for workers, including publication of newsletters and sponsorship of literacy classes and political discussion groups. They mobilized workers to rally in support of causes pushed by the Intersindical and the far left. They were not always successful in achieving higher wages and preventing layoffs, and they often faced divisions in their ranks, sometimes exacerbated by different party loyalties or different jobs or statuses. The radical leftist and most militant of workers, many of them younger workers who had served in the colonial wars, were associated with new plants in the Lisbon and Setúbal area. In contrast, the PCP was particularly influential in the larger and older factories, where commissions sought formal arrangements in sharing power. Hammond helps with this distinction by contrasting the older workers influenced by the PCP at the old Lisnave shipyards on the Lisbon side of the Tagus River with the younger and more radical workers at the newer facilities on the south bank (Hammond, 1988: 104).

Workers enthusiastically supported the nationalization of monopoly firms on March 14, 1975. Hammond suggests that although the MFA and the PCP could claim they had seized control of the economy, workers really took charge at the point of production: "The centralist model could be implemented only because the workers carrying it out at the base were practicing popular power, even if they did not explicitly acknowledge it. The workers and workers' commissions were the foot soldiers of the battle against capitalism" (1988: 147). However, the large size of the nationalized firms precluded direct worker participation, and therefore the commissions served to facilitate communication with management and provide some input into decisions.

Hammond contrasts centralist and popular-power conceptions of revolution. In the former "the power of concentrated capital had to be confronted with equally concentrated political power, not only formally by expropriating, but also in substance by reorganizing the firms to facilitate collective direction of the economy" (1988: 153). Both government restructuring and worker pressure led to the reorganization of the oil and fertilizer industries along these lines, for example, but workers' autonomous actions were limited by bureaucratic and state constraints. As was the case with the urban movements, workers involved in the popular and radical left movements were able to participate more in decisions in the workplace and in management. Describing the hundreds of thousands of workers who were drawn into the struggles, Mailer points to the unexpected opposition of their own organiza-

tions, "manipulated by so-called vanguards or leaders who were not of their class and who understood little of why they were struggling. Even the groups who paid lip-service to a critique of state capitalism, for their denunciations proved to be denunciations of particular sets of bureaucrats, not critiques of the system per se" (1977: 354).

Some observers have emphasized the spontaneity of an autonomous socialist experience. For instance, Manuel Rodrigues (1975: 122) focuses on the spontaneity of the workers' movement and its actions after April 25. Self-determination is largely dependent on a separation of the workers' movement from the political parties and a distinction between party and class interests. In explaining workers' response to union control and manipulation, Mailer (1977: 132) describes how they moved toward autonomy:

> The immediate response of the workers to the need for autonomous organiza-tion was the General Assembly or "plenário." All those employed in a given enterprise would get together to discuss their situation. The plenário would usually elect a Workers' Committee or an ad-hoc commission, which would be entrusted with the task of drawing up a list of demands. In the organizational vacuum that had followed the April 25 coup, a couple thousand of these com-mittees had organized to defend workers' interests. They pressed for economic demands and even, at times, for a restructuring of industrial life, and they showed an extreme distrust of the unions and in many cases, of the new institu-tions created by the MFA.

The committees also had to cope with the political, sometimes sectarian ten-dencies of the parties and their preferences with regard to issues of age, sex, status, and unemployment, work out self-management where owners had fled their factories, establish liaison when different committees represented the many entities of an economic group, and purge management of fascist sympathizers (133–144). As Mailer puts it (145),

> Here in a nutshell were all the problems of capital spontaneously felt by the workers. The questions were profound, dealing with value, surplus value and wage labour. . . . The capitalist mode of production never altered. The new management were the committees. And although international capital was un-cooperative in terms of sales, credits and raw materials . . . enterprises continued to function.

Popular Rural Movements

After the April 25 coup, farmworkers in the Alentejo mobilized rapidly, seizing local governments and establishing rural unions. In the northern

villages farmers tended not to hire many workers, and the response was slower because of lack of experience in organizing. The organizing experience and networks of the PCP allowed it to moderate the rapid mobilization in the Alentejo, and it did not face the competition from the far left that it experienced in the factories. The first union contract was signed June 10 in Beja and provided wage increases, a reduction of working hours, vacation pay, and transportation to work. Worker demands throughout the summer were ignored by most landowners, but by October the association of landowners in Beja signed a contract with the district union that offered a small wage increase, set up a committee to evaluate the potential of uncultivated lands, and established quotas of farmworkers to work them. Similar conditions were established in Evora and Portalegre. Many landowners boycotted these provisions, considering them as undermining their property rights. In November the government began requiring landowners to rent out their unfarmed lands. Those who refused faced occupation, generally by tenant farmers and tractor owners. During the winter of 1975 the rural unions pushed for agrarian reform. A conference on February 9 was organized by the PCP, which now was urging a radicalization of the revolution in the countryside (Hammond, 1988: 117).

The desire for work led many farmworkers to take over farms, just as workers were taking over factories in the cities. This especially occurred where the PCP and unions were weak. Few occupations occurred before the approval of an expropriations law in July 1975.[5] The PCP pushed for expropriation thereafter and tolerated occupations, especially in the Alentejo. In some cases the government appointed an administrator of an occupied estate, but most occupied properties were run by their workers. A total of 450 farms and 1.16 million acres were occupied (Hammond, 1988: 179). In southern districts, the government organized eight agrarian reform centers with the responsibility for expropriations and overseeing workers on expropriated farms, which were not divided up but run as cooperatives governed by elected committees of workers.[6] The aim of the cooperatives was not profit or increases in productivity but the provision of the greatest number of jobs. Still, acreage increased by 20 percent over the previous year, and the grain harvest in 1976 exceeded that of earlier years.

Bermeo reminds us that the occupation movement was not initiated by the PCP, which simply "followed the landless onto the land" and while it was involved did not play "a vanguard role" (1986: 59). Hammond (1988: 184–185) emphasizes, however, that the PCP politically dominated the occupation movement, which eventually evolved by imposing a hierarchical organization and destroying the latifundio system. Although the PCP preferred the formation of state collective farms, state inaction persuaded the occupiers

to set up cooperatives. The occupiers were generally landless seasonal ten-
ant farmers (*seareiros*) and long-term tenant farmers (*rendeiros*). Bermeo
traces three phases of occupation: a first phase beginning in September 1974,
when frustrated landless tenant farmers announced that they would occupy
all "underutilized properties" and "do away with the large landowners," and
continuing with the occupation of a farm called Monte de Outeiro in Beja on
December 4; a second phase marked by structural changes in the agricultural
sector under the fourth provisional government after March 1975, with oc-
cupations led by jobless rural day workers; and a third phase under the fifth
and sixth provisional governments after August 1975, when the pace of oc-
cupations accelerated under the leadership of both rural jobless workers and
permanent workers (1986: 78–79).

Despite these advances, governments after 1976 implemented policies fa-
voring private enterprise and limiting the state. Most farms in which the state
intervened were returned to their former owners in 1977 and 1978. The PS
and PPD governments revised the agrarian reform law, allowing many former
owners to take back property expropriated under the previous legislation.
In general, however, the old oligarchy and monopoly groups had been seri-
ously weakened, and economic policies after 1976 "served the interests of the
modernizing nonmonopoly bourgeiosie, both its technocratic and its small
or medium-sized capitalist segment," with which "the moderate officers who
took control after November 25 were by origin and current position most
closely identified" (Hammond, 1988: 251).

Bermeo focuses on the transformation of the agricultural workforce during
the revolutionary period. Farmworkers in the south, she points out, "rebelled
with a high degree of autonomy, and their rebellion led, not to trade unionist
demands, but to extensive land seizures and to the emergence of the largest
network of worker-run farms in Western Europe" (1986: 8). She documents
how the worker-controlled farms increased production and how worker-
managers were "radicalized" by their experience. Cooperative members
concentrated on defense of their farms, but they also were more likely than
other farmers to participate in elections, parties, campaigns, and demonstra-
tions (216). Among the preconditions for radicalization of farmworkers in the
Alentejo well before the revolution, she identifies such aspects as land tenure
(78 percent of farm units were larger than one hundred hectares), secularity
and lack of interest in organized religion, which enhanced class conscious-
ness, the radicalizing military experience of the younger farmworkers, and
the potential for politicalization among rural workers who had emigrated
and later returned home in search of work (21–33). She argues that the social
structure of the latifundia lands in the Alentejo provided a basis for the radi-
calization of the rural proletariat and the new organizations and new roles for

traditional organizations allowed the radicalization to manifest itself: "The radical behavior embodied in the land seizures was not the result of a single party's master plan, but, rather, the result of a complex series of structural changes associated with the political phase of the revolution" (37).

In contrast to the traditional corporatist and class organizations—the associations of landowners or farmers' guilds and the workers' associations—were the peasant leagues and farmworker unions that burst forth with the revolution. These organizations formed alongside the political parties and were relatively autonomous, although both the PCP and the PS were involved—the PCP seeking an alliance between poor peasants and unionized workers. On the employer side, the Associação Livre de Agricultores (Free Association of Farmers—ALA) was established with the aim of defending privately owned farms but not the old regime.

In an assessment of the experience in rural areas, Bermeo argues that the men and women of the Alentejo seized land because they believed that their subsistence was threatened and that the state, weakened by crisis, would not oppose them. She also disputes that the era of peasant revolts was drawing to a close: "The struggle for workers' control in Portugal suggests that this may not be so. The actions of the landless laborers of the Alentejo and the maturation of rural proletariats elsewhere suggest not the decline of rural revolt but rather the potential for more rural proletarian struggle" (1986: 222).

Popular and Radical Left Movements

Prior to 1974 a semblance of a popular left had emerged in opposition to the regime, and the occasional confrontation of this left with the fascist regime represented a foundation for the emergence of popular movements before and after the coup. These movements were often small, diverse in outlook, and appearing as organized groups or parties with programs and objectives. Sometimes they were associated with urban and rural social movements, but generally they functioned on their own or in alliances with competing groups that shared similar goals. Correia (1990: 69–75), one of the major military figures in the uprising of April 25, identifies as possible forerunners of the uprising of April 25 the abortive strike and revolt at Marinha Grande in 1934; the September 8, 1936, sailors' revolt led by Manuel Guedes and the Organização Revolucionária da Armada, which since 1934 had had ties with the PCP (see Barata Júnior, 1995); an assault on the Banco de Portugal in Figueira da Foz, led by the metallurgical worker Angelo Maria Fernandes Cardoso, on May 17, 1937 (Gaspar, 1997a); and the abortive revolt of April 10, 1947, led by Hermínio da Palma Inácio, who organized the LUAR (Cabrita, 1995).

The March 24, 1962, student revolt at the University of Coimbra was led by many who later participated in the revolutionary left (Cabrita, 1995). In the 1960s Stella Piteira Santos promoted the FPLN in Algiers on the opposition radio Voz da Libertade (Cairres, 1999), and the activities of Portuguese exiles, including Manuel Alegre in Paris, provided a basis for popular movements during the 1970s (Carvalho, 1997). Highlights of the 1970s included a demonstration of forty thousand in Porto on April 15, 1972, against the rising cost of living, the ongoing colonial wars, and the reactionary government; the May 16 occupation of their university institutes by engineering and economics students; the May 24 and 26 student demonstrations against the government (Caiado, 1990); the FPLN bombing of army trucks on July 11 and two bombings of radio communication centers on September 26; and the March 16, 1974, revolt at Caldas da Rainha (Gaspar, 1997b; Lourenço, 1997). After April 25, counterrevolutionary activity was evident in the Exército de Libertação de Portugal (Portuguese Liberation Army—ELP) and the Movimento Democrático de Libertação de Portugal (Portuguese Democratic Liberation Movement—MDLP), which during 1975 and 1976 were implicated in robberies, bombings, and assassinations (Pereira and Amaral, 1990).

After the April 25 coup there was a massive outburst of mobilization and dialogue, especially at the grassroots and mass level. Hundreds of revolutionary groups and parties appeared to promote a leftist path toward revolution and socialism. These groups were prominent for their actions and rhetoric, for their prolific newsletters and leaflets, and for raising important social and political issues.

How did the popular and radical left evolve within the military? The role of the military changed with the advent of the cultural dynamization campaign, in which officers and enlisted men attempted to ensure "that the bourgeois democracy was not too bourgeois" and carry their program to a million and a half workers, shopkeepers, and peasants (Bermeo, 1986: 39). The formation of COPCON ensured not only order but also the possibility of workers' control in urban and rural areas, and Carvalho, its head, was committed to revolutionary and political action and linked to popular left groups. Also involved were the Assembleias de Delegados de Unidade (Assemblies of Delegates of Unity—ADUs), which were created from above in 1974 as structures for rank-and-file participation. Their concerns, however, never extended beyond the barracks, as the influence of MFA officers was substantial. The Fifth Division, deeply penetrated by the PCP, did all it could to support the ADUs, and its influence reached its peak in the fifth provisional government. The ADUs were viewed as "consultative" organs that advised the command of the MFA (see Domingos et al., 1977, for the role of progressive military and the popular movement). Finally, the radical SUV began to emerge once the PCP had lost

its position in the government and a united front had developed between the PCP and the more radical COPCON (see Soldados Unidos Vencerão, 1975). The SUV groups appeared to favor democracy and class struggle, but Charles Reeve (1976) argues that they were manipulated by the left in the search for new means to win state power. Reeve shows how their mystifying façade collapsed when fewer than two hundred commandos overcame the challenge of several "red" regiments on November 25. The rank-and-file rebels were undermined by their officers: "Isolated, divided, without links with one another, without information, and above all without initiative, the rank and file soldiers were in a state of total dependence upon the military hierarchy, upon the 'progressive' officers" (15–16).

In spite of the moderation of the PCP and even the hostility of mainstream socialists, the radical and popular left, made up of small parties, escalated its rhetoric and mobilization in the workplace, the neighborhoods, and the countryside. Its demands were expressed in pamphlets and leaflets and in rallies against bourgeois democracy. It aimed to raise class consciousness and to spur on the working class against capitalist domination at the point of production (see Chilcote, 1998, and the list of acronyms at the end of this book for full names).[7]

The evolution of what is considered to be the founding group of Marxism-Leninism, the CM-LP, is displayed in figure 7.1.

The CM-LP was founded in Portugal in April 1964 and published six issues of *Revolução Popular* from October 1964 to December 1965. It was formally organized in Paris during March 1965 and in Portugal in June under Francisco Martins Rodrigues, who had been expelled from the PCP in January 1964. Its newsletter complemented the *Acção Popular* published by a parallel group, the FAP. The Núcleos O Comunista were founded in Paris in 1968 and five years later joined with the Grito do Povo to form the OCM-LP.

Figure 7.2 shows the typical structure of a Marxist-Leninist organization. The upper portion depicts the MRPP, which was founded September 18, 1970, with Arnaldo Matos as its secretary-general. Its subsidiary organizations were fronts such as the anticolonial Comités de Defesa da Revolução (Committees in Defense of the Revolution—CLACS), Movimento Popular Anti-Colonial (Anticolonial Popular Movement—MPAC) and Resistência Popular Anti-Colonial (Anticolonial Popular Resistence—RPAC), and the Federação dos Estudantes Marxista-Leninistas (Federation of Marxist-Leninist Students—FEM-L) and Federação Revolucionária dos Estudantes Portugueses (Revolutionary Federation of Portuguese Students—FREP). The lower portion shows the Organização Comunista Marxista-Leninista Portuguesa (Portuguese Marxist-Leninist Communist Organization—OCM-LP) and its fronts, such as the Organização Revolucionária de Soldados e

	Internal	**External**

Internal   **External**

1964–1965   CM-LP Revolução Popular   CM-LP

              FAP Acção Popular   O Vermelho

                                                          Núcleos O Comunista

                                                          ↓

1965   PCP (M-L)

1969–1970   CCR (M-L)

              Grito do Povo   MRPP

                |

              OCM-LP   PCP (M-L)

1973   Mendes   Vilar

    CARP (M-L)

1974

    ORPC (M-L)

1975   CM-LP

        PCP (R) OCM-LP   MRPP   PCP (M-L)

Figure 7.1.   Evolution of a Portuguese Marxist-Leninist Movement
Source: Interview, José Pacheco Pereira, Porto, June 16, 1986

Marinheiros (Revolutionary Organization of Soldiers and Sailors—ORSMU) for mobilizing soldiers and sailors, the Grupos de Estudantes Anti-Colonialistas e Anti-Imperialistas (Anti-Colonial and Anti-Imperialist Student Groups—GEAICAIS) for students opposing colonialism and imperialism, the Comités Revolucionários de Estudantes Comunistas (Revolutionary Committees of Communist Students-CREC), and União da Juventude Estudiantil Comunista-Marxista-Leninista (Union of Communist Marxist-Leninist Student Youth—UJEC [M-L]) for revolutionary youth, as well as radical union groups. All these were combined in the electoral Frente Eleitoral Comunista (Marxista-Leninista) (Marxist-Leninist Communist Electoral Front—FEC [M-L]).

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                              MRPP
                             /    \
                            /      \
        RPAC      MPAC    FEM-L      \
                   |                  \
                   |                   \
                 CLACS                FREP
                                        \
                                         \
                                    Comités Ribeiro dos Santos
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                         OCM-LP
            ┌──────┬────────┴────────┬───────┐
            │      │                 │       │
         ORSMU  GEAICAIS         UJEC (M-L)  FEC (M-L)
                                     │
                                     │
                                CRECs Sindicatos
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
Figure 7.2. Typical Structure of a Marxist-Leninist Organization
Source: Interview, José Pacheco Pereira, Porto, June 16, 1986

Party: PREC (M-L)   PCP (M-L)   OCM-LP   PCP (M-L)

               CCR   Vilar

               UR (M-L)
                   │   │   │
                   │   │   │
                   │   │   │
Fronts: UDP   PUP   FEC (M-L)   AOC

Figure 7.3. Elections of 1975
Source: Interview, José Pacheco Pereira, Porto, June 16, 1986

A third illustration, in figure 7.3, identifies the major Marxist-Leninist parties and their respective electoral fronts. Figure 7.4 shows an attempt to unify Marxist-Leninist organizations, beginning with the formation of the Comissão de Apoio aos Revolucionários Presos (Commission of Support for Imprisoned Revolutionaries—CARP [M-L]) by Marxists-Leninists who had been in prison during the middle 1960s and a fusion with the Luta Comunista on July 18, 1974. Later the group joined with the Comités Comunistas Revolucionários (Revolutionary Communist Committees—CCR [M-L]) and Unidade Revolucionária Marxista-Leninista (Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Unity—UR [M-L]) to form the Organização para a Reconstrução do Partido Comunista Maxista-Leninista (Organization for the Reconstruction of the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party—ORPC [M-L]). By 1976 various tendencies had fused into the PCP(R). Evolving from these efforts was the UDP, formed in December 16, 1974, as a Maoist front of the CARP (M-L), the CCR (M-L), and the UR (M-L), whose aim was exposing the "bourgeois" electoral process but which participated in and actually gained a seat in the Assembly in the 1975, 1979, and 1980 elections. Figure 7.5 shows the fragmentation of a Marxist-Leninist organization during the decade 1964–1974.

Figure 7.4.   Unification of a Marxist-Leninist Organization
Source: Interview, José Pacheco Pereira, Porto, June 16, 1986

Núcleo José da Sousa + UCM-L = UCRP---PC (M-L)

                                                          OCM-LP

            Grito do Povo (1971)

              Núcleos O Comunista (1968)

                                      PCP (M-L)---CM-LP Mendes (1974)

                                                |

CM-LP (1964)   (Organismo Engels) ————————— PCP (M-L)

                                                PCP(M-L)--PT Vilar (1974)

   Grupo de Base   Comités Comunista   Comité Marxista-Leninista

A Vanguarda (1968)   Revolucionários (1968)   de Portugal (CM-L de P) (1970)

                                                          Bolchevista

              CCR (M-L)   PC de P (M-L)

Figure 7.5.   Fragmentation of a Marxist-Leninist Organization, 1964–1974
Source: Interview, José Pacheco Pereira, Porto, June 26, 198

    Among Trotskyist currents, the LCI, affiliated with the Fourth International
and founded in Coimbra in 1969, held its First Congress in December 1973
and was active until 1978. At its Third Congress it was argued that Spínola's
Bonapartist strategy for resolving the crisis with the MFA had failed (Liga
Comunista Internacional, 1976). It viewed the November 25 events as above
all a defeat of the left military, along with "a strengthening of the bourgeoisie
over its apparatus of the State, partially recomposed, above all in the military,
and a demoralization of important sectors of the working class" (31). Further,
it argued that the defeat of ultraleft politics would serve to isolate the working
class and the defeat of the military left would bring about the demise of the
SUVs and undermine the autonomous movement of soldiers (31). The LCI
urged struggle against this "reformist hegemony" (43).
    The LUAR had become notorious with its armed robbery of a Banco de
Portugal branch in Figueira da Foz, and its members had participated with

Henrique Galvão in the seizure of the *Santa Maria*, the hijacking of a TAP plane in 1961, and the attack on the Beja barracks on January 1, 1962. It viewed the April 25 coup as militarily profound but politically timid. It pledged to provide the MFA its "critical support" and to give priority to promoting the autonomy of the working class, supporting workers' struggles and providing them with conditions of work and assistance, encouraging the unity of revolutionary forces, and defending victories already achieved (LUAR, 1974: 3–4).

Another revolutionary movement of some prominence was the PRP, organized in 1970 and involved in its first armed action in November 1971. In 1973 it formally established itself at the founding congress of the PRP and the Brigadas Revolucionários to form the PRP-BR. The BR had been established in Algiers on September 5, 1970, and in November 1973 it had attacked a NATO base at Pinhal do Armeiro. After April 25, 1974, its renowned leader, Isabel do Carmo, maintained ties with Carvalho. Later Carmo and Carlos Antunes were arrested and charged with a bank robbery, allegedly with the support and arms of COPCON, in an incident dating to November 25, 1975 (Carmo, 1981).

Among the hundreds of left revolutionary movements, the MES was conspicuous for its linking the radical left and the PS. Originally formed in 1970 after separation from the MDP/CDE by radical socialists and progressive Catholics, its ranks were strengthened after April 1974 by dissident socialists. The MES pushed for popular power in the workplaces, neighborhoods, and latifundia as a basis for a socialist transition. Although it wavered in its ties with the PCP, the MES generally favored direct over representative democracy and provided ideological and intellectual leadership to the struggle.[8] In its assessment of the revolutionary period, it concluded that the "coup of 25 November had inflicted a great defeat on the revolutionary forces and the popular movement of masses." In its view, the coup represented the end of a revolutionary military that had tolerated a struggle for power among revolutionary forces desiring to improve society. Self-criticism was also the theme at its Fourth Congress in 1979, when the MES divided over two positions that reflected a crisis among the revolutionary movements in general. One position advocated unity through a fusing of revolutionary forces and the adoption of the PS's definition of left socialism. This current called itself "democratic and independent socialist" and tended toward spontaneity in its expression of ideas and opportunism in the pursuit of alliances. The other position called for the establishment of a central pole for the reconstitution of the revolutionary camp as a means of breaking the isolation of the

TABLE 7.1
The Political Parties of the Revolutionary Period

Social Revolution *State Capitalism* *Producing Classes*					*Bourgeois Ideology* *Monopoly Capitalism* *Dominant Classes*
PUP	MDP				
FEC	FSP	PCP			CDC
	UDP	MES	PS		PPD
MRPP	LCI				PPM
	AOC				PDC
Left			Center		Right

revolutionaries while precluding the construction of a revolutionary party in a nonrevolutionary era (see critique in *Análise, Formação, Debate Militante* 4 [July 1979], 2–7).

Table 7.1 establishes a relationship between the radical and popular movements and parties and the mainstream and right political parties. The groups located to the left in the table advocated social revolution and a state capitalism that would lead to socialism and the participation of the producing classes. The bourgeois groups to the right favored monopoly capitalism and represented the dominant classes. The groups are also aligned in the figure according to left, center, and right political preferences.

Popular Justice

In place of large formal organizations the Portuguese revolution produced a myriad of small dispersed movements. Conflict over issues of justice and human rights pervaded the cities and the countryside. The new urban and rural popular and social movements frequently engaged in a discourse of rights and fair dealing in the search for autonomous cooperation among small-scale producers. Forms of urban and rural mobilization and conflict often evolved outside established institutional and legal frameworks. In noting the diversity of grassroots initiatives, Manuel Castells suggests that we tend to underestimate the economic potential and internal differentiation of working-class urban communities. Political democracy may be ambiguous. The communities must make an impression on the authorities, but distrust over political clientelism pervades the grass roots: "The practice of patronage, nominal employment, bribery, and the traffic in influence are very deeply embedded" (1983: 176). Despite hostility toward authority and formal politi-

cal practices, the social movements tend to rely on the state or other outside sources of material support: "Even the most apparently autonomist are up to their eyeballs in local pressure-group politics" (194).

Boaventura de Sousa Santos explores the politics of informal justice. Popular justice, he argues, was "understood by its participants as the embryo of popular power that, in a transitional phase, would constitute a parallel power or counterpower" (1982b: 272). The revolutionary forces that supported popular power chose a strategy of confrontation with the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois legal system. He observes that, rather than testing the bourgeois system, taking advantage of its contradictions, progressive lawyers generally resorted to a strategy of confrontation: "The revolutionary forces were probably aware of the risks of a strategy of confrontation but thought that the final collapse of the bourgeois state and the bourgeois legal order was imminent and that every effort should be aimed at accelerating that process" (274). The state bureaucracy was relatively autonomous and representative of a bourgeois rule that was temporarily paralyzed, and the other social forces momentarily allied themselves with it and, in the defense of official legality, followed a very different strategy: "They avoided open confrontation and sought to minimize the practical effects of all attacks, keeping the legal system as intact as possible and ready for action in the better days they hoped would come" (275). Consequently, few progressive laws were passed, legal cases went unresolved, and trials were postponed (275):

> Whereas the revolutionary forces saw the postponement of trials as the neutralization and paralysis of official justice, the state bureaucracy saw it as the best way to keep the cases under control in a period of intense (though probably short-lived) class struggle. . . . The strategy of the revolutionary forces revealed a strength made out of weakness, whereas the strategy of official justice revealed a weakness made out of strength.

Thus, although the popular jury could dramatically force entry into the official courthouse, popular intervention never succeeded in penetrating the official procedures (276).

Santos also examines the struggle of the popular classes for the right to work through occupation of land and for the right to a residence in the occupation of a house: "The former fight related to the very core of capitalist domination—the relations of production—whereas the latter related to the conditions for the reproduction of labor power. The difference played an important role in mobilization since the political consciousness of the land occupation movement (its causes and its objectives) was greater" (277–278). He contrasts the struggle in the Alentejo "against the rural monopolistic bourgeoisie who, by their wealth, their style of life, and their repressive behavior

toward the workers, had long ago been recognized by the people as their implacable enemies," with the house occupation movement "against a much more complex and heterogeneous enemy—sometimes the state, sometimes middle levels of the bourgeoisie, and sometimes even the petty bourgeoisie" (277–278). This situation made mobilization difficult.

Assessing the Popular and Social Movements

The overthrow of the fascist regime produced a political vacuum. The MFA's first task was the institutionalization of the ensuing revolutionary period. This occurred through the organization of the MFA on behalf of the state apparatuses, which experienced some change in personnel but remained intact and indeed were strengthened by the nationalizations and the devastating blow to the monopoly bourgeoisie of March 14, 1975. In the interlude between the coup and the nationalizations, the political vacuum was partly filled by the efforts of the political parties, the PCP and the PS having the upper hand, to establish a formal representative parliamentary system and to moderate the spontaneous and sometimes organized activism of the popular and social movements that appeared in the aftermath of the coup. The popular left parties were divided over what to do, the result of favoring the MFA over the PCP and PS but also of adopting allegiances to one military faction over another.[9] The analysis has shown how the neighborhood groups served to pressure government to be more responsive and humanistic in its policies. Political leaders at the local level served as brokers and facilitators for constituents in confronting government at higher levels. Enormous advances in independent organization, self-defense, and workers' control were evident in the formation and considerable autonomy of neighborhood and workers' commissions organized in the urban industrial belts around Lisbon and Porto.

Despite the revolutionary fervor and a dramatic leap in political consciousness and organization, the popular movement was unable to consolidate power in revolutionary Portugal: "It did not create a socialist society or even maintain all the gains which it had made in 1974 and 1975. It was not sufficiently organized or united to transform its society" (Hammond, 1988: 253). Yet despite its setback, it had shown Portugal and the world that a revolutionary course was possible.

Notes

1. Ribeiro (1995) provides a useful synthesis on nongovernmental organizations within and outside Portugal.

2. Ecological movements were important even before the 1974–1975 period. See Cautela (1977) for ecology movements and the class struggle focused on a defense of ecology before and after April 25. This chapter does not focus on feminist and women's movements, which were conspicuous. It might also be useful to examine movements around emigration that served as a moderating force in the process of the growing capitalist mode of production in agriculture, simultaneously resulting in increases of income and mitigating the proletarianization of the countryside (Medeiros, 1978: 61).

3. The CM constituted a component of the popular movement. Three major currents impacted the movement: first, the historicist, an evolutionary current influenced by the thought of Durkheim and Weber, with the urban phenomenon seen as part of a global effort, not an autonomous one; second, the culturalist, following in the tradition of Spencer and Parsons, based on industrialization and modernist values and represented by the Chicago School; and third, the Marxist, focused on a materialist analysis of society, with Manuel Castells as a key proponent (see Movimento de Moradores, 1979).

4. In Setúbal, the council served to organize the struggle around urban problems such as housing, health, and transportation; it was unitary and nonpartisan—serving as the vanguard of the people's struggle for their rights, it acted collectively and repudiated individual actions; and it linked struggle in the neighborhoods to that in the factories (Downs, 1989: 50–51).

5. Strasser (1975) refers to the Red Star Agricultural Cooperative in the Alentejo as the first formed from a land seizure.

6. Hammond distinguishes between the collectives favored by the PCP and the cooperatives preferred by the PS but refers to all of them as cooperatives (1988: 181).

7. Most of the research on these parties was conducted in the personal library and archive of José Pacheco Pereira, and the list of acronyms at the end of this book was drawn from interviews with him on June 16, 1986, and June 25 and 26, 1987. To date there has been no comprehensive study of these parties, but some useful information is available in Prata, Ferreira, and Lopes (1974) and a schematic map of the far left may be found in Martins and Loureiro (1980).

8. See António Sousa Ribeiro (1993) for an analysis of the role of the intellectual in the 1974–1975 period.

9. Maurice Brinton (in Reeve, 1976: 16) argues that the Leninist groups failed to expose the mystification in the alliance between the MFA and "the people." Instead they favored one clique of officers against another: "Constantly to emphasize the preponderant role of the Army was tantamount to injecting deeply bourgeois ideas (submission to leaders, the centralization of power into very few hands, the abdication of the right to determine objectives or to participate in decision-making) into what was undoubtedly a movement for social change."

8

Social Classes in Struggle

THE EVIDENCE THUS FAR SUGGESTS THAT UNDER the dictatorship a dominant state largely controlled efforts to organize the evolving capitalist order while containing the political scene through repression and control. At the same time, the bourgeoisie remained relatively cohesive and hegemonic over the economy. Major institutions such as the Church and the military were supportive, with the result that, during the Salazar regime, institutional conflict and class struggle were inconspicuous. Liberalization under Caetano did not alter state structures, but fragmentation of the institutional forces that traditionally had supported the regime and dissension within the bourgeoisie itself accompanied the growing instability associated with the disastrous colonial wars and a deteriorating economy. The April 25 coup led to a struggle to control the state apparatuses, to develop a political form within which formal and informal democracy could function, and to restructure the productive system. The appropriation by the state of a good share of national productive enterprise signified a greater role for the increasingly influential technobureaucracy. It also represented the decline of the large landowners and the comprador bourgeoisie of urban financial and commercial interests that had supported the previous regime and the demise of the traditional family and economic blocs that had benefited from their sheltered ties to the fascist capitalist state (table 8.1).

Against this background, I shall consider two propositions in relatively recent Marxist thought: that class struggle is to be found not just in production but in the function of the state and that the political struggle for the transition

TABLE 8.1
Class and Institutional Forces

Regime	Supporters	Opponents
Salazar (1932–1968)		
	Latifundists (Alentejo)	Petty bourgeois intellectuals
	Family peasants	Rural & urban workers
	Church hierarchy	
	Bourgeoisie (families & economic groups)	Progressive Church & military
	Merchants	
	Small & medium-sized industrialists	
	Salaried state employees & technocrats	
	Traditional military & police	
Caetano (1968–1974)		
	Latifundists	Progressive military (MFA)
	Traditional military	Rural & urban workers
	Family peasants	Popular Church
	Church hierarchy	European-oriented economic groups: industrial, commercial, & financial
	Colonial economic groups: commercial & industrial	
MFA (1974–1975)		
	Rural & urban workers	Latifundists
	Petty bourgeois intellectuals	Family peasants
	Salaried state employees	Industrial, financial, & commercial bourgeoisie
	Export industry	

to socialism must be democratic, expanding both direct and indirect forms of participation (Carnoy, 1984: 9).

Examining the Portuguese situation, Nicos Poulantzas (1976) distinguishes between the dominant and the popular classes. Within the dominant classes he identifies a *domestic bourgeoisie,* involved primarily in light industry but also in heavy industry and not a genuine national bourgeoisie because of ties to foreign capital, and a *comprador bourgeoisie,* whose interests were subordinated to those of foreign capital. Within the popular classes, he distinguishes the working class, the new urban petty bourgeoisie, peasants, and other elements. I employ this useful simplification of the class structure in the following analysis, but I am also sensitive to a number of class categories: the *bourgeoisie,* owners of capital who purchase means of production and labor; the *petty bourgeoisie,* small capitalists who directly or indirectly control their means of production but do not control capital; the *new middle class* or

new petty bourgeoisie, an intermediate stratum of professionals, bureaucrats, and managers who may influence capitalists but, like workers, usually do not own means of production; the *proletariat,* workers who do not own means of production and sell their labor power for money; the *peasants,* farmers who do not own their land and are usually associated with precapitalist modes of production (for example, squatters, renters, and unpaid family workers); and the *lumpenproletariat,* the unemployed or idle. The bourgeoisie can be subdivided in terms of property relationships: the *monopolistic bourgeoisie,* large owners of industry and banking capital who may have ties with foreign capitalists and imperialism and own factories, insurance companies, banks, and large commercial companies and are also large landowners, and the *non-monopolistic bourgeoisie,* owners of certain industrial and commercial firms who are sometimes allied with the monopolistic or foreign bourgeoisie, may be owners of small industrial and commercial enterprises or middle-sized and small farms, and sometimes are nationalist and opposed to imperialism. It can also be subdivided in terms of the type of capital or means of production possessed: the *agrarian bourgeoisie,* modern landowners who run farms with machinery, pay salaries to workers, and make profits, and large traditional landowners who operate large estates, live in urban areas, and invest little in their land, the *industrial bourgeoisie,* the *commercial bourgeoisie,* and the *financial or banking bourgeoisie.* A further classification might be based on the amount of capital owned, differentiating the *large bourgeoisie,* the *middle bourgeoisie,* and the *small bourgeoisie.*

The following discussion draws upon many but not all of these class categories in analyzing the roles of various classes in the dramatic events of 1974 and 1975.[1]

The Dominant Classes

In the past Portugal was described principally as an agrarian society, somewhat marginalized and backward, with some commercial ties to its colonies and to Europe (especially England). Most of the active working population resided on small farms or worked the large estates to the south, which implies that the traditional nobility and the aristocratic landowning families probably exercised considerable influence.

Agrarian Capitalists

A few historians have discussed the nature of an aristocratic class or the emerging role of a landowning agrarian bourgeoisie. For example, Medeiros

(1978: 19) stresses the dual aspect of Portuguese geography, with the Tagus River separating the large agricultural properties of the south from the minuscule properties of the north. With the expansion of the vineyards in the north and center of the country, capitalism was decisively established during the late nineteenth century. In agriculture the emphasis was on family farming, with renters giving a portion of their production to the property owners, both in the north (where they were known as *pequenos parceiros* or *pequenos rendeiros*) and in the south (where they were called *seareiros*). The two groups were similarly exploited (47). In the areas of the Alentejo and Ribatejo, extensive and poorly capitalized and scarcely mechanized agriculture was practiced (50). However, much of the land belonged to powerful agricultural companies such as the Sociedade Abel Pereira da Fonseca (49), which diversified their cultivation, used more modern practices, and maintained permanent salaried workers. In another useful examination of capitalist penetration into agriculture from 1950 to 1970, Freitas, Almeida, and Cabral (1976: 30–43) provide distinctions among social classes in the countryside based on theoretical writings: absentee latifundists, capitalist farmers, the peasantry, the semiproletariat, and the rural proletariat. Then, looking at census data for 1950, 1960, and 1970, they identify patrons and exploited unpaid and marginal workers (45) as a means of affirming class differences.

Of particular significance was the organization of agriculture in terms of *grêmios de lavoura* or farmers' guilds under Salazar. Manuel Lucena describes the effort to eradicate these guilds, which were formally abolished in September 1974 but instead of disappearing tended to extend their influence along with the expansion of credit and other measures in the countryside. This experience exemplifies the continuity of institutional life before and after the revolution (1984a: 24). Old and new cooperatives replaced the old guilds in the effort to dismantle the corporative structures, but the dismantling of the old structure was superficial and formal, permitting the system to continue as long as the state failed to alter the relations of production in the countryside. This implied that most small farmers were backward in technology and training, weak in their associations, and dependent upon traditional means of support. The prosperous farmer, in contrast, was more oriented to modernization and new technology and interested in reducing the need for intensive labor (26–27). Lucena sees the process as involving several phases: the cautious liberal strategy of the ALA-Associação Livre de Agricultores (Free Association of Farmers-ALA) in the summer of 1974; the prerevolutionary strategy of "institutional occupation" from September 28, 1974, to March 11, 1975; the attempt to transform the former guilds into instruments of agrarian reform and construction of socialism; and after November 25, 1975, the counteroffensive by the Confederação dos Agricultores de Portugal (Confederation of

Portuguese Farmers—CAP) as the successor to the ALA, with the support of the PS and the PSD (29). Lucena (1977b: 573) argues that the agrarian reform allowed for an agrarian capitalism dependent on the state and moderated by the discretionary powers of the ministry. While confronting communist domination in the Alentejo, it also definitively eliminated the latifundio.

Class relations were also affected by the industrialization of agriculture and the integration of agriculture with industry. Bandarra and Jazra (1979: 39) show that from 1964 to 1974 integration was slow and did not affect all sectors of agriculture. They explain how, despite the initiative of the state, the weak industrialization of agricultural production prevented the development of an agro-food industry. The major firms, principally in agricultural machinery, were tied to foreign producing units. Farmers tended to limit their consumption of intermediate agricultural products, because of their price. These writers see links with the EEC as eventually leading to more economic integration of industry and agriculture.

Emigration had served as a moderating force in the development of the capitalist mode of production in agriculture, simultaneously resulting in increases of "precapitalist surplus" and mitigating the proletarianization of the countryside (Medeiros, 1978: 61). Exploitation of labor in large and medium-sized farms was profound. These entities were dependent on a surplus of labor in the traditional small family plots that provided seasonal workers until many of them eventually emigrated abroad.

Industrial Capitalists

Portuguese historiography portrays the emerging domestic bourgeoisie as limited by its ties with the state through incentives and protective measures and by its failure to function aggressively as a capitalist class. Nevertheless, the beginnings of an industrial bourgeoisie date to the late nineteenth century. In a detailed analysis of this period, Mónica (1987) refers to "hundreds" of industrialists, identifying their factories and industries. In 1886 some of them received titles of nobility. Many carried names such as Graham, Daupias, Peters, Gilman, and Robinson, the consequence of the efforts of Pombal a hundred years earlier to attract foreigners to Portugal. Among the renowned and recognizable family names a century later were Burnay, Silva, and Pinto Basto. Henry Burnay, viscount of Gandarinha, organized the Aliança Fabril. Alfredo da Silva was "the first big Portuguese industrialist" and head of Silva & Irmão, whose merger with Burnay resulted in the founding of Companhía União Fabril in 1898. His only daughter later married Manuel de Melo, who inherited this industrial empire and later became a supporter of the New State, accepting a seat in the Chamber of Corporations in 1932. José Ferreira

Pinto Basto founded the renowned Vista Alegre porcelain factory in 1824. Mónica says that no fully developed industrial bourgeoisie existed in the late nineteenth century. Instead, industrialists of diverse origins and traditions fell into two groups: one of merchants and financiers, constituting the big bourgeoisie, with access to diplomats, politicians, and high officials, and the other a social grouping of more modest means without access to political power. Industrialists such as Henry Burnay and Duarte Pinto Basto used their governmental connections to advantage, while the state depended on them for financial stability and business, and this interdependence between the state and industrialists grew in the following years (1987: 855).[2]

Among the few studies of the bourgeoisie during the first half of the twentieth century, the work of the distinguished historian A. H. de Oliveira Marques (1967–1969) examines the governing class across three historical periods—the last years of the monarchy (1900–1910), the First Republic (1910–1926), and the early phase of the dictatorship (1926–1932)—and reports that the percentage of the nobility who held ministerial posts declined from 40 percent in 1900–1910 to 5 percent in 1926–1932. This decline simply reflected the fall of the monarchy. Their role in the national economy was not diminished, nor did the conspicuous involvement of petty and middle bourgeois elements in government overshadow the importance of the high bourgeoisie in economic affairs. Over the same period, Marques reports, the percentage of military officers who served as ministers was 42 percent in 1900–1910, 44 percent in 1910–1917, 60 percent in 1917–1919, 36 percent in 1919–1926, and 56 percent in 1926–1932.

These trends reflect the difficulties of the shift from monarchy to republic and eventual consolidation under the Salazar dictatorship. The emerging capitalism under fascism evolved alongside programs of infrastructure and import substitution through the development plans of wartime production and postwar adaptation to a changing international order. The economy was largely driven by a concentration of monopoly industry and finance, which eventually aligned itself with the multinational groups and secured the basic areas of the infrastructure and productive apparatus and expanding areas of manufacture that dominated the postwar economy. At another level a large number of small undercapitalized and labor-intensive businesses and traditional industries with low level of manufacture were able to survive.

Harry M. Makler studied 306 heads of manufacturing and service industries in 1965 and found that the top industrialists in the guilds, the corporative institutions representing the interests of the industrialists, tended to be drawn from the bourgeoisie, some as sons of businessmen and landowners who had inherited their enterprises. Businessmen who held public office were likely to be older, middle-class in origin, and sons of white-collar and profes-

sional workers. Thus, the guild system did not serve as a basis for recruitment of administrators in the government. The main participants in government were technocrats, middle bourgeoisie in origin, many of them academics co-opted into civil service and then into executive positions of the state. Some of them were drawn from the larger, modern corporations in Lisbon, but they tended not to include the wealthier founders, heirs, and owners of traditional industry in the north. Arguing that it would have been difficult for an efficient corporative system to represent the expanding industrial sector, Makler (1969 and 1976) notes the failure of the state to assimilate all the diverse interests because institutional channels of interest articulation were lacking and special interests tended to align themselves with cliques and become involved in intragovernmental struggles. Many persons in prominent positions in the Salazar and Caetano regimes, however, often became executives in large corporations (Makler, 1979: 152–160). Early on it was evident that the fascist model of development could never correct Portugal's vulnerable trading position, and the economy survived only at the cost of intensive colonial exploitation, low wages, emigrant remittances, and foreign and monopoly financing: "Precisely because of these costs, the process of development was conducted by means of a radical repression of its basic components: the colonies and the work force" (Kayman, 1986: 27). Thus during the 1960s the regime encountered increasing resistance at home and independence struggles in the African colonies.

The state and the ruling classes were destined to fail, but these studies demonstrate that rule at the top was decisive both for the economy and for politics up to 1974. They also contradict the prevalent assumption that the dictatorship was primarily bolstered by large landowners or that large landowners were closely aligned with the comprador acting as a local bloc as Poulantzas (1976) suggests. Data on the occupations of persons sitting in the National Assembly and Chamber of Corporations from 1934 to 1938 reveal that the power structure came from the north rather than the south. Since the comprador bourgeoisie did not have to be concerned with holding government positions to protect its privileges and interests, its absence from the legislative bodies should not be particularly surprising. University professors from Coimbra and military officers became the new generation of administrators. Not controlled by "a liberal, internationally linked, modern industrial-commercial bourgeoisie or a conservative, provincially bounded, feudal landed aristocracy" (Schmitter, 1979: 21), they were persons of modest social origins appointed to positions in the state and eventually given the opportunity to serve in private or state enterprise. Schmitter argues that the relationship that evolved was one promoted from above in which the regime appointed persons of modest social origins to key positions in private or state

enterprise after their service to the state but not before it. They constituted a middle bourgeoisie, and their ranks included persons of petty-bourgeois origin.

Prestigious personalities of the traditional economic groups that were prominent prior to 1974 included Cupertino de Miranda of the BPA, Jorge and José Manuel de Mello of the Companhia União Fabril, António Champalimaud, Ricardo Espírito Santo, and Miguel Quina (see Silva and Soares, 1989). Some of these entrepreneurs remained active outside Portugal after their principal holdings had been nationalized in 1975—Champalimaud in Brazil, Quina in France, and Espírito Santo in Brazil, England, Luxembourg, and the United States—while Manuel Boullosa built up banking interests in Brazil. Jorge de Melo moved into vegetable oils and maintained some manufacturing interests in Porto, and José Manuel de Mello collaborated with international banking and shipping interests. Among the prominent businessmen of the older generation, Jorge de Brito negotiated state compensation for some of his interests and owned significant property in Portugal, while João Mendes de Almeida passed his interests to his son in Portugal. Still active among the big industrialists of the north were Pereira Coutinho, Cupertino de Miranda, Agostinho da Silva, and Teodoro dos Santos. While the nationalizations had eliminated the old monopolies within Portugal, those entrepreneurs who had international interests recovered their positions as capitalists. In contrast, those who remained in Portugal attempted without success to maintain the remnants of their economic groups and remained dependent on the state banks (Santos, 1986).[3] After the fall of the dictatorship and especially after the November 25 countercoup, a renovated bourgeoisie of entrepreneurs was discernible.[4]

The Bourgeoisie and the Class Struggle

The rise of a liberal bourgeoisie during the nineteenth century altered the traditional class configuration. The bourgeois problematic, however, was achieving hegemony and finding harmony with the political and economic forces dominant within the state. Despite its backwardness, Portugal benefited from years of depression and protection under the fascist regime during the 1930s and neutrality during World War II. Kayman (1986: 26–27) suggests that the country's "modern" economic structure was forged during these years through infrastructural programs aimed at import substitution and encouragement of a concentration of monopoly industry and finance:

> Together they secured the basic areas of the infrastructure and productive apparatus and expanding areas of component manufacture which dominated the post-war economy, whilst permitting the survival of a large number of small un-

dercapitalised businesses, limited to the lighter, labour-intensive and traditional industries of low levels of manufacture.

The economy thus continued uneven in its development, leading to a crisis due to "ever-growing dependence on a coalition of monopoly industrialists, banking groups, and multinational corporations, and the continuing necessity of maintaining low labour costs" (27). The inability of the fascist model to adapt to changes in international commerce undermined expansion of the import-substitution model.

We have uncovered some clues as to the validity of the proposition that an analysis of the dominant classes is important in the political sphere as well as in relations of production. The identification of aristocrats in government positions early in the twentieth century permitted Marques to demonstrate that members of the ruling classes often assumed policymaking positions in the upper reaches of the political economy. Mónica's work suggests that an important segment of the early industrial bourgeoisie not only had access to policymaking in government but also was a beneficiary of state protection and subsidiaries and tended to rely on the state for its survival. The industrial bourgeoisie was weak, dependent, and contentious only when its privileged position was threatened by outside capital.

Two factions were identifiable among Portuguese businessmen: One was made up of representatives of the large consortia. The other was an ideological bloc of "medievalists" whose survival depended on protectionism under the Salazar regime, including the large latifundists in the Alentejo, who benefited from subsidies and price controls, the small and medium-sized industrialists, who imported raw materials from the colonies at prices considerably lower than the world market, the investors in the colonies, who benefited from contractual labor and low wages among African workers, and the state bureaucrats (Bandeira, 1976: 47–48).

Under Caetano some of the old monopolies entered into joint enterprises with foreign corporations and complemented their colonial and domestic ventures with more profitable investment in Brazil, Europe, and the United States. The internationalization of the conglomerates represented an undermining of the old alliance between landowners and financial and industrial interests in the metropolis as the latter were updating and modernizing their activities and the former maintaining their traditional properties using old techniques (Maxwell, 1974: 19). A further problem was the development of new technology under multinational and domestic monopoly capital. The planning priorities of these new industries brought them into conflict with the traditional producers, with their lower capital costs and greater dependence on low wages and cheap raw materials (Kayman, 1986: 47).

The conspicuous presence of middle- and petty-bourgeois elements in government under Salazar and Caetano, however, suggests that the administration of the New State fell to civil servants and technocrats whose intention was to maintain stability and order. Class relations within the state, however, were not always peaceful (Kayman, 1986: 27):

> The small and medium-bourgeoisie were partly bought off by the system of differential returns, their colonial privileges, low labour costs and their share of the markets controlled by the monopolies, with the state as a sort of protective buffer between them and their "partners." To that extent, the rigidity of the state strained under—but held in check—the various middle-class interests that it assembled. But the middle-classes were by no means always malleable and were, in their own way, pressured and repressed by the state. As the monopoly-multinational model developed, the non-monopoly industrialists found themselves increasingly squeezed out of a market which remained restricted as concentration intensified.

At issue was whether the dominant classes were neutralized or marginalized as the state achieved a degree of autonomy. Gallagher argues that Salazar transformed the bureaucratic-military regime into a purely bureaucratic one but not into an organic statist one. The linkage between the state and civil society was essentially administrative and not political in character. The failure of the regime was due in part to its desire to stay in Africa but also to its autonomy at home: "The autonomy of the New State from the general population was, then, a source of weakness not strength" (1983: 61).

The technocrats who emerged influential in the Caetano government pushed for a more open economy and integration in the capitalist market. This internationalization of the economy was to end the protectionism of the Salazar regime and the power of the finance minister and to attract foreign investment. Preference was for a model of import substitution, agrarian reform, and export-led modernization.

After April 25 a "new" middle class or petty bourgeoisie of state employees was expected to abandon the patronage politics of the authoritarian period and support a revolutionary course. In fact, they tended to evolve in a technocratic direction and eventually to support neoliberal policies. The dissident communist Francisco Martins Rodrigues (interview, Lisbon, November 14, 1990) attributes this to the fact that most state employees remained in their positions: "The state structures were essentially untouched although democratic processes were implemented. The apparatuses of administration and police for the most part remained in place." The Socialist deputy Raúl Rego agrees (interview, Lisbon, November 19, 1990): "All those appointed to administrative posts generally were technocrats—a generation without political

formation." The respected left intellectual Francisco Louça (interview, Lisbon, November 19, 1990) distinguishes between two generations of technocrats: "The principal leaders of the technocratic generation that evolved with Caetano do not now have an important role. They differ from the present generation. Today's group is more or less a second line. Cavaco and his associates emerged in the postcoup period."

With the nationalizations after March 11, 1975, the provisional governments faced the alternative of managing either a growing capitalism of the state or a mixed economy made up of a large public sector alongside individual private initiative and collective and cooperative forms (Lucena, 1977b: 572). The regimes after November 25 tolerated but placed limits on the nationalizations as the state set about reorganizing the public enterprises in a typically bureaucratic and centralizing fashion. Rather than a struggle of socialist construction against private capitalist recovery, the struggle became one of state capitalism versus a mixed economy. In order to regain its position, the bourgeoisie had to recover its enterprises, move forward with new capital, and prevent the formation of a new and extensive "caste" of public servants (many of them recruited from the old private sector and others from the armed forces). In fact, this was taking place, and if there were to be reprivatization, too many enterprises would fail. Those responsible for the deposed Salazar and Caetano regimes could never resolve one problem: that of the large size of the state and its tendency to control and absorb everything in the modernizing process alongside a capitalism that long ago ceased being "liberal" (Lucena, 1977b: 573–574). In fact, after the nationalizations of 1975, the economy evolved toward a new dependence on the Finance Ministry, especially during the Cavaco government after 1985 and during a phase of privatization of state enterprises.

The bourgeois revolution is commonly a product of an emerging capitalist class, a national or domestic bourgeoisie that builds its economic and political power around capitalism. Traditional historical analysis suggests that the feudal and aristocratic ruling classes are sharply distinguishable from the emerging domestic bourgeoisie, the roots of the former being in the countryside and those of the latter in the cities. In his analysis of late nineteenth-century Germany, for example, David Abraham interprets these class relations as separate, not interdependent and linked, although political ties became important in the era of industrialization: "Although it had partially merged into the bourgeoisie, the agricultural elite continued as an autonomous class or fraction within the ruling bloc dominated by industry" (1986: 11). In the case of Portugal, the latifundists suffered in the initial agrarian reform and the occupations of large landed estates, but the revolutionary interlude did not destroy the legacy of the old order. The dismantling of the corporate state

was a long and slow process in which many of the old organizations remained intact. Lucena suggests that the events of March 11 represented more a military and bureaucratic coup than a conquest of the working classes: "What must be denied is that the agitation of 1975 evolved into an autonomous revolutionary project of the Portuguese working classes" (1977b: 563). The Portuguese revolutionary process, he argues, became a struggle for control of the state apparatuses, local government, socioprofessional organizations, and the means of communication between the reform and reconstitution of the politically dominant groups and the emergence of other movements pushed by petty-bourgeois intellectuals and civil or military technocrats. The revolution headed by Vasco Gonçalves tended toward "a double isolation": internationally because of the incompatibility of Gonçalvismo and the old political allies, particularly the United States, and internally because of the enormous hostility toward peasants and the middle classes as well as a good part of the working class (568).

The Popular Classes

Juxtaposed to the dominant classes are the popular classes, and our analysis examines these classes in urban and rural areas and, in particular, their structure, role, and influence in shaping a revolution. After the coup of April 25, 1974, Portugal was caught up in the mobilization of people in factories, farms, military barracks, and urban neighborhoods. As we have seen, the urban popular movement involved workers' unions and commissions, neighborhood commissions, and organizations of soldiers and students. In the countryside farmworkers and landless laborers were mobilized through cooperatives based on the expropriation of land or occupation of estates. These popular movements offered the possibility of direct democracy en route to a socialist transition. The revolutionary left, splintered into a maze of small organizations, favored a strategy of armed struggle or a situation of dual power modeled after Lenin's conception of smashing the state and its powerful apparatuses. Such a confrontation with capitalism would probably have led to civil war not only pitting the bourgeoisie against most of the urban and rural workers but also provoking the conservative peasant farmers of the north to resist radical change. Another strategy was the taking over of state power through the infiltration of bureaucratic positions, and indeed the MFA and its allies, especially the PCP, resorted to this approach not only because of gaining power over the political system but as a means of constraining the radical pressures of the far left. A further strategy ultimately adopted and shaped to the political process was the reformist path through social democracy. This

strategy would forestall the possible intervention of foreign governments and pressures of domestic and international capital, and it offered the possibility of a popular alliance of diverse elements. It also guaranteed a brake on the revolutionary process and deterred the far left and the popular classes from realizing their vision of control through direct democracy. Eventually, organized labor in urban centers succumbed to the pressures and influences of the major political parties, and rural workers suffered from the rollback of the agrarian reform and government inattention in the countryside.

The Rural Proletariat and the Peasants

Life in the countryside may appear to be simple, but in fact rural society is complex, necessitating understanding of land tenure and class formation in an emerging rural capitalist economy. Among the essential classes are the big absentee landowners, capitalist entrepreneurs, peasantry, semiproletariat, and the rural proletariat (Cabral, 1978). Among the central issues are the degree to which capitalism and exploitation have penetrated the countryside and the forms and extent of resistance by peasant farmers and workers.

Exploitation breeds discontent and resistance. In a book on the period 1891–1895, José Pacheco Pereira (1980) identifies early manifestations of discontent, including banditry. Much of the activity was never mentioned in official records, but data on crime in the Alentejo were better recorded than for the rest of Portugal, except for Lisbon. He suggests that defensive and offensive acts were linked, the former as resistance and the latter as part of the ongoing class struggle. The early banditry, linked to the strikes after 1910, represented a turning point in working-class struggle (156). Various books have identified additional evidence of rural labor resistance after 1910, and this legacy is a prelude to the widespread mobilization, especially in the Alentejo, and the struggle for a better life in the period 1974–1975.[5]

Small farmers and rural workers in northern and central Portugal, however, were less inclined to be involved in the revolutionary activity. They were conservative for reasons elaborated by Gallagher (1977), who shows that a lack of government support, intense population pressure, local famines, and emigration are all characteristics of those regions. He contrasts the influence of the Catholic Church in the countryside with the anticlericalism in urban areas.[6] He is critical of the MFA collaboration with the PCP, its uneasiness about the potential takeover of property in the aftermath of the March 11 events and the summer of 1975, and its uneasiness over decolonization because so many peasants had emigrated to the colonies.

In his examination of smallholding agriculture, Boaventura de Sousa Santos shows how agriculture has supplemented low industrial wages. He

considers peasants significant as a social class in the Portuguese social for-
mation and argues that large segments of working-class families are "semi-
proletarian" because their income is supplemented by work in agriculture
(1986: 183):

> Given the recent proletarianization of large sectors of the popular classes, the
> process of urbanization of the countryside goes along with the opposite process
> of ruralization of the city. The ties between peasant families and working-class
> families allow not only for the exchange of material goods (mutual gifts) but also
> for symbolic exchanges. The lifestyle of many working class families still reveals
> consumption habits and forms of interaction between the family and the outside
> world that are typical of rural society and that coexist in complex combinations
> and juxtapositions with habits and forms of interaction usually associated with
> urban society.

He notes that for the agrarian working class, especially in the coastal region
of the Center North, "the social experience of these relations is crossed by
the memory of other (rural) relations of paternalist and clientelist subordi-
nation, of relations also of solidarity and human understanding realistically
or mythically ascribed to social relations in the countryside" (184). Some of
these workers' income, of course, is supplemented by income from emigrant
children and by an underground economy that includes artisan activities,
door-to-door sales, and smuggling (see Cabral, 1983a).

Agrarian reform especially motivated rural workers in the south to struggle
for changes affecting their lifestyle. Their life is described as passive by
Cutileiro (1977) in his book on latifundista rule and peasant behavior in a
small community in the Alentejo and as traditionally turbulent by Pereira
(1984), who shows how conflicts and social struggles had become mitigated
by the twofold process of mechanization and the exodus of rural workers.
Indeed a certain harmony was evident in the social relations of rural society in
the Alentejo before the April 25 coup, with social struggles having more or less
disappeared because of mechanization, the resulting exodus of rural workers,
and the formation of modern agroeconomic enterprises. These conditions
are incorporated into the analysis of Reis and Nave (1988), who understand
agrarian reform as a social process toward the improvement of peasant farm-
ing. In adopting this approach they take issue with Barreto (1984b), who
characterizes agrarian reform as an initiative of the state driven by the power-
ful influence of the PCP and other radical groups on the far left.

Four phases in the process of agrarian reform are identifiable (Bandarra
and Jazra, 1976): (1) after the coup of April 25, 1974, as workers sought salary
adjustments and their conflict with the ALA, (2) the beginnings of land occu-
pations and collective forms of production, (3) the institutionalization of land

occupations and production collectives and the evolving alliance between the rural proletariat and the urban proletariat, and (4) the birth of the CAP and its response to land occupation and collectivization.[7]

The events of 1974 and 1975 were accompanied by some changes in the agricultural workforce. Afonso de Barros (1979b: 58–59) identifies three economic sectors in the agrarian reform zones: (1) agrarian capitalism, representing 35 percent of the area or 1.2 million hectares and 25 percent of salaried workers, which remained powerful despite the marginalization of its important fraction of agrarian capitalists; (2) small and medium-sized family agriculture, with 32 percent or 1 million hectares and 40 percent of wageworkers; and (3) new units of production, with 35 percent or 1 million hectares and 59,000 rural workers. He characterizes agrarian reform as a collectivist phenomenon of substantial political impact and in conflict with the process of capitalist reconversion and recovery (62). He goes so far as to suggest that the agrarian reform was the only nationalized sector in agriculture in which the capitalist profit motive was not relevant and cultural changes were possible (68). He identifies three phases of the agrarian reform: the first reform was communist, a collectivist version that gained importance in 1974 and lost ground in 1976; the second, from 1976 to 1978, was influential among cooperatives and small farmers; the third, evident in the 1980s, comprised pure capitalist and agrarian needs on farms of a thousand acres or more and represented an end to the influence of cooperatives and small farmers and eventually to the existence of the peasant altogether (interview, Lisbon, August 1, 1989).

Some of the early changes are illustrated by Bermeo in her book on farmworkers in the south: "These cultivators rebelled with a high degree of autonomy, and their rebellion led, not to trade unionist demands, but to extensive land seizures and to the emergence of the largest network of worker-run farms in Western Europe" (1986: 8). She reports that worker-controlled farms were more productive than the units they replaced and that worker-managers were "radicalized" by the workers' control. Cooperative members were also much more likely than nonmembers to participate in elections, parties, campaigns, and demonstrations, but their principal activity was the defense of the worker-controlled farms: "In Portugal, the success of the rural revolt depended not just on organization and force of numbers but on the force of resistance from the state. The men and women of the Alentejo seized land because they saw that their subsistence was threatened, but they also acted because they recognized that a state weakened by crisis might not move against them." She goes on to dispute the prediction by many observers that the era of agrarian revolts may be drawing to a close: "The actions of the landless laborers of the Alentejo and the maturation of rural proletariats elsewhere

suggest not the decline of rural revolt but rather the potential for more rural proletarian struggle" (1986: 219 and 222).[8]

Delineating the changes among the class associations that emerged after April 25, Bermeo distinguishes rural wageworkers, employer-landowners, and, outside these categories, several hundred thousand individuals who earned most of their income from farming but were not wageworkers and whom she classifies as peasants. Within the peasantry there were several categories: semiproletarianized peasants who owned plots too small to sustain a family, necessitating that they become seasonal wageworkers to supplement income earned on their farms; landless peasants, who rented land either on a short-term basis for the production of a single crop or over many years; and independent peasants, who subsisted on income from their farms and occasionally hired labor (1986: 41–43).

Assessing the reform and the struggle for land in the south, Barros attributes the persistent agrarian crisis to lack of productive growth, the need to import agricultural products to satisfy internal consumption, and a form of land tenure that blocked development. For example, consumption of agricultural imports increased from 35 percent in 1961 to 61 percent in 1973 (1979b: 54–55). Although legislation referred to agrarian reform as a national problem, reform was attempted only in the areas of the Alentejo and Ribatejo that suffered from low population density and a predominance of capitalist agriculture, with salaried rural workers constituting 80 to 90 percent of the active working population (57). Barros argues that because the capitalist profit motive was not applicable to the areas of reform, cultural changes were likely to affect the population in positive ways. He believes that the PCP wished to make the Alentejo a very different region from the rest of the country, more in conformance with its socialist projects. The PCP thought that agrarian reform would advance its projects in the Alentejo, but because the reform was rolled back and land returned to the old landowners, it was a failure. While it was being implemented, however, the reform was successful because many workers were involved in cooperatives. However, the farmers were not prepared to implement or to increase productivity with new technology (interview, Lisbon, August 1, 1989).

Despite having cut off an important fraction, agrarian capitalism remained strong and in conflict with the reform. Socialist governments aiming to undermine communist influence in the Alentejo reacted by depriving agrarian legislation of its revolutionary potential and permitting former owners to recover their land. Gradually, the number of cooperatives began to decline and unemployment to increase. In an interview in August 1989, Barros concluded the agrarian reform project had failed.[9] On the basis of fieldwork and a synthesis of existing studies, Olivier Balabanian and Guy Bouet (1987) conclude

that agrarian reform in the Alentejo was a failure, although it brought about a rapid increase in commercial transactions and services and an unprecedented infusion of fresh currency into the south (1987: 168). They point to the illusion that it would be possible to possess more than a million hectares of land without needing to invest in equipment and/or letting debt get out of hand; the reality that outside support, subsidies, and credits resulted in a debt thirteen times more in the occupied zones than in other zones; difficulties with international capitalism because Portuguese agricultural produce primarily went to the internal market; a large illiterate workforce; seizure of land that appealed to some but not all peasants and caused disruptions and political conflicts (such as between the extreme left and the PCP); inadequate administration; slowness and confusion in implementing the agrarian reform; underestimation of results; and the marginalization of agricultural managers and businessmen (217–250).

The MES position on agrarian reform emphasized the plight of the poor peasantry and the organization of rural syndicates. The principal causes of the manipulation of the peasants were the absence of strong political leadership in the face of the CAP and the PPD and CDS, extreme uncertainty about the level of wages because of lack of guarantees, and the influence of the reactionary clergy and the *caciques* of the countryside on cultural development (Movimento da Esquerda Socialista, 1977: 21).[10]

These varying perspectives assess agrarian reform in both positive and negative terms. The literature emphasizes the rapid increase in commercial transactions and services, the unwillingness of the state to radicalize social relations in the countryside, the technological backwardness of small farmers, the weakness of their association, and their dependency on traditional means of support. Further, productive growth was not strong, and industrialization of agricultural production was limited, requiring imports to meet consumption needs. Agrarian capitalism also remained strong despite reform, and foreign investment in the Alentejo reinforced this tendency (Sousa et al., 1988).

In his comparison of agrarian reform in Portugal in 1974–1975 and in Spain during the early 1930s, Malefakis (1980: 459–466) identifies similarities: initial passivity among peasants; the reformism characteristic from the outset of the new revolutionary regimes; rural conflict over labor questions rather than agrarian reform; wage increases that resulted in increased costs, setting small entrepreneurs against workers and leading the owners to launch a counteroffensive that united day laborers with impoverished rural entrepreneurs; early land seizures independent of the major labor organizations; land occupations coinciding not only with the winter plowing but with the radicalization of the governments; government acceptance of the farm occupations and inaction linked to complex internal struggles outside agriculture; worker distress and

the intensification of labor conflict; and increasing conflict associated with the involvement of the PCP in the agrarian problem.

This comparison suggests to Malefakis that (1) peasant revolution in societies with a fairly homogeneous rural population depends "almost completely on the prior appearance of a power vacuum at the uppermost reaches of the state apparatus" (1980: 484); (2) peasant radicalism is found only in certain regions of each nation experiencing a peasant revolution and tends to arouse counterrevolutionary responses; (3) a unified state can control the agrarian reform process and overcome rural radicalism; and (4) the basis of peasant radicalism and pressure for reform is sufficiently strong to sustain public interest (485).

The Working Classes

The roots of a proletariat in Portugal date to 1839 with the founding of the Associação dos Artistas Lisbonenes. The Associação dos Operários was founded in 1850 and the Centro Promotor dos Melhoramentos das Classes Laboriosas in 1852 (Costa, [1978]: 32–33). The period of 1860–1910 was especially important for the formation of a labor movement when a working class emerged along with the strengthening of the industrial bourgeoisie in textiles, canning, glass, tobacco, and transport. Most of the workforce resided in the countryside, and both urban and rural strikes were evident, beginning with strikes in Lisbon during 1871–1873. An especially large strike of canning workers in Setúbal and the Algarve took place in 1902–1903.

The early labor associations that formed in the nineteenth century were dominated by the petty bourgeoisie and were more like mutual-aid societies than trade unions, with links to the incipient left parties. The PS was based on a coalition of intellectuals, small employers, and workers. Anarchism was influential in the labor movement during the First Republic (from 1910 to 1926), a period often characterized as a second stage of the bourgeois revolution in Portugal, in which the new commercial, industrial, and colonial bourgeoisie began to enter into conflict with the comprador bourgeoisie of exporters and importers tied to English capital and the latifundista nobility that had become capitalist. It was also the period of the founding of the first labor central, the União Operária Nacional, and the CGT.[11]

Most of the workforce was in the countryside, with artisans and artisan workers in the towns. Historically, the working class emerged through the commercialization of agriculture and was gradually absorbed by monopolistic industry to become a small industrial proletariat in urban areas while maintaining some degree of common cause with the less-developed rural population. After the republic was established in 1910 there was rapid growth

in the working class, and with the recognition of the right to strike (with constraints) in 1912 the working class gained some independence from bourgeois tutelage. The general strike of 1912 was accompanied by a reorganization of labor influenced by anarchist and communist elements and the founding of the União Operária Nacional in 1913 (see Cabral, 1979, and Pacheco, 1986a).

The PCP, founded in 1921, was influential in the labor movement, and it backed strike activity throughout the Salazar dictatorship.[12] At its Second Congress, meeting on May 28, 1926, it called for the formation of a united front. A republican coup failed on February 7, 1927. Thereafter, a Comissão Inter Sindical (Interunion Commission—CIS) was formed under José de Sousa. The regime's promulgation of the Statute of National Work in September 1933 produced an abortive revolt in 1934 (Patriarca, 2000). The collapse of another revolt in August 1936, led by Manuel Guedes and the Organização Revolucionária da Armada, was a low point for the working class and brought a decline in the anarchist movement and the suppression of the PCP—prompting the party to reorganize with a radical petty-bourgeois orientation in 1943 and resulting in its marginalization from the Communist International. The reorganized PCP established the MUNAF in December 1943 and launched the GACs in early 1944. The PCP proclaimed a line of "national or bourgeois democratic revolution," but in 1946 it dissolved the GACs and replaced them with its youth wing. During this "ultraopportunistic" period the party's secretary-general, Álvaro Cunhal, was arrested along with other party leaders.

Antifascist resistance characterized a relatively passive labor movement from the early 1930s until 1940. Protest appeared thereafter as a strike movement emerged between 1942 and 1947. The strikes included one of twenty thousand workers in Lisbon in November 1942, one of fifty thousand in Lisbon, Almada, and Madeira, organized by the PCP in July 1943, strikes supported by agricultural workers near Lisbon in May 1944, strikes in Alentejo and Ribatejo in 1944 and 1945, a strike in Covilhã and one in São Pedro da Cova in 1946, and a strike in the Lisbon naval shipyards in April 1947. During the 1950s peasant masses migrated to industrial zones and eventually abroad in search of work (see Pinto and Moura, 1972).

A restructuring of the working class and revisionism of the PCP occurred from 1955 to 1966 as peasant masses migrated to industrial zones, a reformist leadership emerged in the labor movement, and demands for wage increases multiplied. The proportion of industrial workers rose from 25 percent in the early 1950s to 32 percent in 1970, and their share of the national income increased from 39 to 47 percent over roughly the same period, but overall unemployment also increased, leading to both legal and clandestine emigration

(Kayman, 1986: 24–29). Weakened by arrests of its leadership, the PCP shifted to the right after a February 1956 Soviet Communist Party call for a possible peaceful solution to the Portuguese political problem. With a Fifth PCP Congress in 1957 the party split, with the main faction opposing revolutionary proletarian policy and calling for democratic and national revolution and a diminished role for the working class. The Marxist-Leninist current moved to integrate the revolutionary left with strong criticism of the PCP and eventually emerged as a force after the 1974 coup.

Ideological differences became especially evident in the labor movement after union membership had increased from 760,000 workers in 1950 to 940,000 in 1960 and 1,028,000 in 1970 (see Sindicats au Portugal, 1977). Among the currents were anarcho-syndicalists, mainstream communists, dissident socialists, and left revolutionaries. After 1974 the CGTP included a supportive majority of workers influenced by the PCP, influential PS dissidents, left revolutionaries, and critical militants of the UDP. Mainstream PS and CDS members opposed the CGTP and eventually joined the Confederação Democrática dos Trabalhadores (Democratic Workers' Confederation-CDT).

The cautious liberalization of the Caetano government offered the PCP the possibility of enhancing its organizational base, and by April 25, 1974, its control over labor appeared assured. The abrupt change in regime and the limits on the state's repressive capacity also unleashed a wave of spontaneous strikes, factory occupations, and ad hoc workers' commissions and assemblies. Most offices of the old unions formed under the 1933 legislation were taken over by workers, new leaders were elected, and new unions formed. In the Alentejo, the workers' associations were seized and turned into unions, many often retaining their original designations (Valente, 2001).

Labor emerged militant though not always unified, and there were important strikes involving more than eight thousand workers and twenty-seven unions between April 1974 and July 1975 (Patriarca, 1977 and 1978).[13] The disputes involved union recognition, reinstatement of workers punished for previous strike activities, wage increases and labor agreements, and replacement of management personnel. From July to September there were more than four hundred labor disputes.[14] Among the most conspicuous strikes in the monopolies and multinationals were the following:

1. Postal and communications workers. On June 17, twenty-five thousand workers affiliated with the Correios, Telégrafos e Telecomunicações (Mail, Telegraph, and Telecommunications—CTT) went on strike for improved wages and other grievances. This was the first large confrontation between organized workers and the government, and the PCP at-

tacked it as "irresponsible" and characterized by "impossible demands." A June 29 communiqué by the CTT accused the PCP of "attacking, misrepresenting, and falsifying our struggle" and having "been the standard bearers of the struggle against us and the principal force which supports the offensive against us" (see Mailer, 1977: 371–372).

2. The Lisnave shipyard. Demands for salary increases and refusal to work overtime resulted in a major strike among workers at the Lisnave shipworks (see Mailer, 1977: 373–374, 376).

3. Timex. With the rejection of their demands by management, workers occupied the Timex factory for a month, kept production flowing, and issued a "proclamation to the nation" that denounced Timex as "part of a great and brutal system of exploitation and domination carried on in many parts of the world by imperialist American capital." Supported by other unions but rejecting all efforts of Maoist groups to take over their struggle, the Timex workers called for a just wage and the end to a bonus system that resulted in a speedup of work (see Mailer, 1977: 90–92; Sindicato das Indústrias de Ourivesaria, Relojoaria e Correlativos de Sul, 1976).

4. Strikes at the Fábrica de Escrever Messa (Mem Martins) and other enterprises (see Santos, Ferreíra, and Ferreira, 1976), at the national steel company, Siderurgia Nacional, and at the national airline, TAP.

Attention is given to the role of the labor movement in the transition in a number of recent reassessments. Ruth Collier (1999) points to the vacillation of the PCP and the MFA, which wavered between liberal democracy and social revolution and thus allowed moderates to assume the upper hand. Through it all, she argues, the working class was a major protagonist. This view is affirmed by Alan Stoleroff: "The union movement came to life in such a way as to establish itself as one of the principal actors of the transition to democracy and to determine in a large part the class character of this process" (1988: 19–20). André Corten (n.d) lends credence to this position with his analysis of the role of the working class and the peasantry during 1974–1975. Patriarca (1999) synthesizes the impact of labor struggle and agitation. Of 149 labor disputes during March 1974, 69 were of a traditional form involving production slowdowns and simple strikes, 11 involved work stoppages as a result of demonstrations outside factories, and 39 were tied to factory takeovers. The general concern was with salary increases, followed by a demand for reduced work hours and the purging of factory administrations of fascist tendencies (1999: 140–142).

The experience and proximity of the PCP to these workers and unions permitted it a major but often moderating role in the takeovers. In the

absence of legislation and the extent to which the PCP and CGTP were able to contain and control it the labor movement "solidified support for the MFA and promised in principle a disciplined mediation of economic and political demands" (Kayman, 1986: 78).

The new government, usually supported by the PCP, increasingly mediated and imposed settlements. As a major employer, especially after the nationalizations of March 1975, the government was able to limit wage demands and constrain strike activity. Eventually, worker mobilization was subordinated to party politics (Logan, 1983). During 1974 and 1975 the PCP controlled most registered unions through the CGTP but, as its influence in the provisional governments waned and especially after the November 25, 1975, countercoup, other political parties began to compete for union support. By 1984, 60 percent of 208 unions were affiliated with the CGTP, while 14 percent or 48 unions were under the socialist-influenced UGT, and 26 percent or 90 unions were independent. Under Cavaco's social democratic government, the Trabalhadores Sociais-Democratas (Social Democratic Workers—TSD) was organized within the PSD (Pacheco, 1986a). Stoleroff (1987; 1988) shows that the relationship between trade unions and enterprise in Portugal can only be mediated through the political arena. He does not see in Portugal the routinization of labor relations characteristic of most of Europe, and he attributes this in part to an ongoing economic crisis and antagonistic ideologies.

Moderated by the political parties but potentially a destabilizing force, labor lost some ground after 1975. Hammond (1988: 253) argues that the destruction of the old oligarchy and its latifundios, the nationalization of the monopoly groups, and the liberation of the colonies were undertaken in the interest of the working class, "despite a dramatic leap in political consciousness and organization, the working class did not consolidate power in revolutionary Portugal."[15]

Another problem was a reorganization of the workforce in some sectors of the economy. The crisis in textiles affected a substantial portion of the Portuguese industrial workforce and some twenty thousand families who worked in the mills and were gradually being laid off in the Vale de Ave. Of twenty-eight firms in the region, two had closed, leaving their 1,450 workers unemployed. Three of them with a total of nine hundred workers were about to declare bankruptcy, and most of the others were lagging in salary payments (Peixote, 1990).

A massive influx of capital from abroad led to negotiations in search of an accord between business and labor to restrain wages and prices. Labor saw its share of gross domestic product decline to 40 percent, while a drop in state spending affected workers in public enterprises. The CGTP and the UGT managed in 1990 to condemn "the antisocial policies" of the government and

explore the development of a strategy for improving wages, benefits, and job security for the 2.4 million organized workers.

Finally, the informal economy was impacting the workforce. Cabral (1983a) concludes that family income was larger than represented in official data because of the informal economy. This illegal work contributed to the ongoing process of decentralization that was influencing the delayed and disarticulated character of the Portuguese economy.

What conclusions can be drawn from our analysis thus far? The revolutionary classes were prepared to demonstrate and in some instances to carry their struggle to the barricades. They were constrained by the progressive political parties, the PCP and the PS, but urged on by the radical left parties and popular movements. The constraints of traditional institutional life and the fervor of a disparate revolutionary left, however, militated against a deep revolutionary transformation. The process was very complex and unwieldy even where the commitment to change was clearly manifested in day-to-day politics. It seems likely that the retreat from class struggle and the collapse of the popular movement were due to uncertainty in the face of forces desiring stability and especially to bourgeois forms such as the market and parliamentarism. The rhetoric called for a transition to socialism, but there was no formula for ensuring the success of such a transition.

Despite a low level of culture, delayed industrialization, and urban life sharply distinct from life in the countryside, the workers were not divorced from radical ideas, including Marxism. Given the gap between intellectuals and the mass population, Marxism was not well developed ideologically after about 1850 (Dinís, 1979: 138–139). It was introduced in two ways: through the workers' movement, which maintained ties with labor in other countries, and through conferences, pamphlets, and books by intellectuals who were generally sympathetic with workers.[16] The Marxism of the revolutionary era was founded on the traditional thought and experience of Marx and Lenin, but the discrediting of Stalinism and sectarian ideas also inspired it. Thus the thought of Trotsky, Mao, and Gramsci was conspicuous in the search for a new left that transcended the traditional communist and socialist parties.

Labor militancy over time had split into two opposing tendencies, initially (early in the twentieth century) separating anarcho-syndicalists from socialists and later (during the revolutionary period of 1974–1975) separating communists from socialists, one generally committed to local direct action and ambivalent about electoral or political solutions and the other in favor of political reform: "This split, at the very moment that workers' organizations and left-wing political parties had come into being, manifested an ambiguous and contingent relation between labour organizations and the parties, and in the unions, a general skeptical neutrality towards the state" (Kayman, 1986: 31).[17]

The emerging political parties of various tendencies on the left and in the mainstream, resulting in several labor organizations of competing ideological tendencies, soon undermined labor unity. The CGTP generally aligned itself with the PCP[18] and the UGT with the PS[19] and eventually the TSD.[20] During the 1960s the Communists' strategy had envisaged a long-term extension of party influence and control of the working class and resistance movements in anticipation of a coup. Their methodical, cautious, and orthodox approach was seen by many elements as conservative restraint and a "drift to the right" dating to the 1964 splits and the emergence of Maoist, Marxist-Leninist, Trotskyist, and other radical left activity.

Strike activity during 1974 and 1975 was sporadic and disparate, tending to immobilize and destabilize the provisional governments, but labor provided much of the popular surge and revolutionary impetus in the direction of a socialist transition. One of the problems for workers was the threat of a capital strike in the face of government policies and legislation that affected capitalist interests. During November 1974 a new law against "economic sabotage" permitted government intervention when owners were withdrawing capital or not using it efficiently. Workers' commissions became vigilant with regard to management malpractice. When owners abandoned their firms or threatened to lay off workers, some commissions took over management altogether as a way of keeping a factory open. Commissions made demands and organized activities for workers, but they were not victorious or always unified in their struggles.[21]

Struggle within the labor movement tended to be autonomous but linked to a state that had long served to assimilate workers and repress agitation.[22] Eventually, this legacy of state control and manipulation played out in a new arrangement in the form of social pacts designed to mitigate tension between the state and labor unions (Moura, 1983, and Ulrich, 1983). Historical splits in the labor movement were often due to divisions within the PCP, which had traditionally exercised influence over workers, especially in enterprises that were either protected or absorbed by the state (Rodrigues, 1975). After the coup, the role of labor was somewhat diminished and compromised, early on by the moderating influence of the PCP in the unstable revolutionary period and later by social pacts. A consolidation of democratic and revolutionary processes evolved from the April coup to the nationalizations of March 11, a period noteworthy for absence of decisive antimonopolistic measures (Topalov, 1975). This experience confirms the propositions, mentioned at the outset, that class struggle may be found in the state as well as in production and that the political struggle for the transition to socialism can be democratic through an expansion of both direct and indirect forms of participation. The state administration and even, in modified form, the repressive apparatuses

remained in place, limiting the force of popular participation and direct democracy.

With the breakup of the strong authoritarian state—the fascist one with the coup of April 25, 1974, and a socialist one with the countercoup of November 25, 1975—the political system opened to elections and new parties. The collapse of right and left authoritarian governments in Portugal as throughout Europe also opened the markets and weakened the role of the state in managing the drive to socialism. After 1975 a central issue was whether political and economic forces would ultimately become "free" or, in the face of instability, there would be a return to state control. This was an issue for laissez-faire capitalists and committed idealist socialists alike. Once revolution or rapid change was averted, it appeared that at best only incremental changes were possible.

Notes

1. The literature on Portugal contains various formulations of class. The major classes are identified in the program of the Movimento de Esquerda Socialista (1975). See Abreu (1975b: 351–354). Paul Sweezy (1975) bases his discussion on this source. A different classification is in the useful book by Hermínio Martins (1971). See also António Firmino da Costa, Rosário Mauretti, Susan da Cruz Martins, Fernando Luís Machado, and João Ferreira de Almeida (2002).

2. Mónica reviews the important historiography, including the work of Pereira (1983), Serrão (1971), Godinho (1971), and Reis (1984), and examines the fiction and journalism of the nineteenth century that perpetuated misperceptions about the early capitalists and industrialists.

3. Personal perspectives and details of their activities are in interviews with Champalimaud and Quina in *Semanário*, July 8, 1989, and *Olá Semanário*, July 8, 1989. Entrepreneurial attitudes toward Portuguese politics are evident in public statements and publications of the Confederação da Indústria Portuguesa (Portuguese Industrial Confederation—CIP), the Associação Industrial Portuguesa (Portuguese Industrial Association—AIP), and the Confederação do Comércio Português (Portuguese Commercial Confederation—CCP), for example, their disappointment over the election of the socialist Mário Soares as president in 1986 (*Semanário*, March 1, 1986). Fortunato (1993) shows that as of 1986 the participation of the state in industries nationalized in 1975 had not significantly been reduced. Among the powerful groups nationalized in 1975, only the Espírito Santo and the BPA groups had successfully reorganized. He notes that the Companhia União Fabril and Champalimaud groups were in the process of reorganization. Those in an advanced stage of construction were the Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), the BPA, the Banco Espirito Santo e Comercial de Lisboa (Holy Spirit and Commercial Bank of Lisbon—BESCL), the BCP, and the BPI, with the first three dominating the financial sector. The CGD was controlled by the state

and was the largest financial group in Portugal. Other important groups included the IPE (the largest industrial group), Sonae, and the Amorim group. The presence of foreign capital was quite limited in Portugal.

4. On the upper level were Belmiro de Azevedo of the Grupo Sonae, Alexandre Soares dos Santos of the Grupo Jerónimo Martins, Américo Amorim of the Grupo Amorim, Alvaro da Costa Leite of the Grupo Vicaima, António Dias da Cunha of the Grupo Entreposto, Macedo Silva of the Grupo RAR, Ferro Ribeiro of the Grupo Interfina, and Illídio Pinho of the Grupo Colep. A secondary level included important family groups led by Salvador Caetano of the Grupo Caetano, Fernando Guedes of Sogrape, Manuel Violas of the Grupo Violas, Nélson Quintas and six brothers of the Grupo Quinta, and João Mendes Godinho of the Grupo Mendes Godinho (see Azevedo et al., 1989).

5. Books on classes in the countryside include Freitas, Almeida, and Cabral (1976), Almeida (1986) on class forces, Marques (1977) on theoretical questions such as class struggle in the countryside and historical forms of state and capitalism, Barros (1979a, b) and Barros and Mendes (1983) on forms of agricultural labor, and Cabral (1978) on rural movements and agrarian structure. See also Marques and Bairrada (1982) for a breakdown of social class categories in the 1950–1970 period and Barreto (1984b) and Mozzicafreddo (1984) for analysis of class conflict in the countryside. Almeida (1984b) provides a general theoretical overview based on traditional sources on stratification and power structure, and Freitas (1973) offers a tentative but early analysis of emerging class distinctions and conflict in the 1930–1973 period. For details on strikes from 1852 to 1910, see Fonseca (1975; 1978; 1983–1984, vol. 4: 149–170). Pereira (1984) examines the strike movement from 1910 to 1912 in the Alentejo (32–35) and labor conflict during the Salazar period (118–156) from 1947 to 1961 (187–220). Also see Barros and Mendes (1983) for a useful book on forms of agricultural labor. Their analysis dwells on capitalist penetration and forms of exploitation (122) in the countryside.

6. Pinto (1982) delves into religious and conservative attitudes of the peasantry. For useful journal articles on the peasantry, see Pinto (1983) and Almeida (1984a).

7. Cardoso (1976) provides an overview and analysis with some data for the period as well as some writings during and after his term as minister of agriculture.

8. Bastos (1977) examines the history of the cooperative movement after April 25, describes the philosophy of cooperatives, looks at the principles and rules of cooperatives, their problems and difficulties, the role of the state and constitution, and the relationship of the political parties to the cooperative movement. See also Collin (1976) and Figueiredo (1979) for a general account of agricultural cooperatives.

9. A similar view was expressed by the former government minister in charge of the agrarian reform, António Lopes Cardoso (interview, Lisbon, November 14, 1990).

10. Baptista (1978), Bosshardt (1976), and Estrela (1978) look at rural development and the agrarian reform, including objectives and definitions; the prerevolutionary situation, with breakdown by class and group in 1960 and 1970; and the agrarian reform of the 1974–1977 period, with attention to the political struggle and to positive and negative results. Macedo [1985?] maps the agrarian reform, examining physical conditions, the dispersion of population, the reform and its structure,

production in and outside the agrarian reform zones, political attitudes and electoral results in the zones, and interventions, occupations, and expropriations. Fernandes (1978) overviews agrarian reform in 1974 and 1975 and discusses the implications of the PS-CDS government program.

11. Of anarchist persuasion, the CGT published a newspaper, *A Batalha.* One of the first labor organizations was the Fraternidade Operária, founded in 1871, with its periodical, *Pensamento Social.* During the late nineteenth century a Sociedade do Melhoramento das Classes Laboriosas was established to deal with the needs of the emerging working class in Lisbon. For a brief but critical history of labor and its ties to the PCP, see Rodrigues (1975).

12. There were strikes in November 1942, July 1943, May 1944, January 1946, and April 1947 (see Rodrigues, 1975).

13. For a list of forty-two firms in which workers took actions of resistance and strike after the April 25 coup and another fourteen firms during 1975, see "Liste des entreprises en lutte," *Autogestion et Socialisme* 33–34 (1976), 54–67.

14. On strikes during 1974 and 1975 see Santos, Ferreira, and Ferreira (1976), especially an essay by Cabral, "Sobre a greve na Fábrica de Máquinas de Escrever Messa (Mem Martins)," pp. 241–250 in vol. 2. See also Fernandes (1977a, 1977b, and 1978), Cunhal (1976), and *A Revolução,* January 3, 1976.

15. In an interview, Francisco Martins Rodrigues (Lisbon, November 14, 1990) attributes the workers' lack of consciousness to the PCP and its "incapacity for struggle." During the revolution, he says, "many workers' commissions were not revolutionary but were organized to ensure continued employment in factories that had been abandoned by their owners."

16. Dinís (1979) reviews the history of Marxism in Portugal through three periods: from the polemic between Marx and Proudhon and the French Revolution of 1848 to the formation of the Portuguese branch of the Associação International do Trabalhadores in 1871; from 1872 to the First World War; and from the Russian Revoluion of 1917 to 1930, when Bento Gonçalves tried to restructure the PCP. For further history of Marxism, see Margarido (1975).

17. Most revolutionary communists had earlier split from the PCP to form a variety of movements favoring direct action within the party and the labor movement, while the mainstream PCP was not always consistent in favoring direct action and indeed succumbed to participation in elections in 1975. Likewise, revolutionary socialists within the PSP were sympathetic to direct action and in the ensuing period either withdrew or were expelled from the party. Even within the mainstream PS, a split over labor was evident, for example, between the wing led by Mário Soares and the UGT leader José Manuel Torres Couto, who supported Vítor Constâncio for secretary-general of the party after Sôares was elected president in 1986 (see Pires, 1986).

18. The issue of a single labor central dates especially to the coup and was an issue in 1975 (see Foley, 1975, and Michaloux, 1977).

19. See Pacheco (1982; 1984; 1986a, b; 1988a, b), d'Anunciação (1987), Sousa (1988); and *Revista Expresso,* September 9 and 23, 1989.

20. See Pacheco (1986a, b); Júdice (1986b); *Revista Expresso*, February 14, 1986; and *O Diablo*, March 11, 1986.

21. See Hammond (1988: 103), who reports "divisions which were reflected in what was often a long process of adopting a formal constitution and in battles for election to the commission." Also see Michaloux (1977).

22. Bourdet (1976) suggests a number of scenarios, including restoration of the status quo, establishment of pluralist democracy, or implementation of popular democracy. Among his possibilities were the imposition of a populist authoritarian regime determined to maintain order and stability but reaching out for reform and even revolutionary change and devolution of authority to allow a system of workers' self-management.

9

Legacies of the Revolution

Two important theoretical considerations deserve deeper analysis and understanding in our assessment of the success and failure of revolution in twentieth-century Portugal and, in particular, during the dramatic moments of 1974 and 1975. The first concerns the attainment of hegemony through the state and the cluster of social classes competing for power in the political economy. If through its apparatuses the state mobilizes institutional and popular support, then what happens when consensus and stability are challenged? What of ruling classes and their dominance over society in the face of the disadvantaged social classes and social movements struggling to overcome their disadvantage, exclusion, or oppression? Second, what are the prospects for socialism as a means for achieving a balance among diverse institutions, social classes, and social movements and meeting the social, political, and economic needs of the people? A central question would be which path is available and feasible in socializing the means of production. What of theoretical and practical significance pertains to issues such as agrarian reform, the vanguard party or movement, the role of the state, and the prospects for democracy in a transition to socialism?

Hegemony and Counterhegemony

The Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci used the terms "hegemony" to characterize the forms of bourgeois ideological and cultural domination in society and "counterhegemony" as a means of opposing those forms. His

conceptualization cut through mechanistic interpretations and permitted understanding of capitalism's pervasive influence in advanced society. He emphasized economic considerations, acknowledging the importance of the mode of production in periods of institutional stability, but he also directed attention to the political and cultural or ideological sphere and referred to an "ensemble of relations" and a "historical bloc" in an effort to break away from the abstract economism and dogmatism of some progressive thinking in the early twentieth century and to focus analysis on concrete situations. "Hegemony" implied ideological manipulation and consensus that transcended the state and civil society, and Gramsci employed the concept to suggest that sustaining a social order over time depended not only on the organization of state power, repression, and violence but also on ideological consensus and popular support. He moved beyond an instrumental view of the state as a coercive bureaucratic apparatus imposed upon civil society to a view of the state as an arena for ideological and political conflict and as a means by which the dominant class seeks popular consensus. For the dominant class to achieve hegemony, "the mechanisms transmitting values, life-styles, and cultural orientations [must] succeed in transforming popular consciousness; for this to occur the ruling ideas must become deeply-embedded in the fabric of social relations and national traditions" (Boggs, 1984: 161). Intellectuals, with their coherent worldviews, facilitate this transmission process and serve as a link between the state and civil society. The contrasting notion of "counterhegemony" denoted the challenge of insurgent movements in both civil society and the state.

The premises of hegemony and counterhegemony relate to democracy and citizenship. In the past the framework of parliamentary democracy served to facilitate autonomy for labor unions, but today new forces of liberation may involve an environmental movement and those seeking racial, ethnic, and linguistic autonomy.[1] Counterhegemony might lead to a new historic bloc. Thus, the struggle for a new society and a socialist transformation could include both a working class and autonomous contemporary social movements of liberation.[2]

An analysis of hegemony in any particular case suggests that hegemony changes, as Abraham discovered in the German situation: "The dominant element within the unity of dominant classes, what we call the hegemonic class or fraction, did not remain the same throughout the Weimar years" (1986: 12). In Portugal a hegemonic bloc dominated the period of the monarchy, with the state compromising with latifundists and sheltering the early industrialists. The rise of a labor movement in the cities and peasant mobilization and agitation in the countryside during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, together with the political opposition of the liberal and socialist

intelligentsia, undermined this hegemony, ushering in the First Republic. From the beginning of the New State in 1926 the agrarian bourgeoisie, in alliance with a subordinate class, the commercial bourgeoisie, was hegemonic, sheltered by the bureaucratic machinery in the interest of the state, which later under Salazar also promoted domestic industry: Boaventura de Sousa Santos has observed that "the relationship between class hegemony and the political supremacy of the state is more important than the unchanging hegemonic bloc during the long existence of the regime" (1984: 8). After Salazar's death, this situation was altered by the disastrous colonial wars. A division appeared in the bourgeois interests between defenders of policy in Africa and businessmen and financiers demanding alignment with Europe, and the traditional opposition was able to reassert itself, joining with a progressive segment of the armed forces and overturning the old regime.

After the April 25 coup, the ascendancy of the MFA represented a challenge to the old hegemony but was threatened initially from the right by counter-revolutionary plots and from the left by opportunistic and divisive political groupings and issues of struggle among workers and peasants that remained unresolved. Santos argues that the economic hegemony of the agrarian bourgeoisie had declined in the early 1960s and so had its ideological hegemony by the end of the decade (1984: 8–9), and he points to the small but dynamic fraction of the industrial bourgeoisie made up of the big industrial groups associated with foreign capital. He considers the crisis of the Portuguese state fundamentally a crisis of legitimacy and a crisis of hegemony: one of legitimacy because the political system had failed to assimilate the new social and political interests emerging from the economic changes of the 1960s and one of hegemony because an industrial-financial bourgeoisie, holder of economic hegemony, and the landed bourgeoisie, for which the colonial war meant renewed ideological hegemony, were unable to maintain a power bloc or establish a political direction for the guidance of subordinated forces. These crises culminated in the April 25 coup and eventually in a revolutionary crisis, with the form of state power and the role of class becoming the objects of a class struggle. With the events of November 25 the crisis of legitimacy was transcended, but the crisis of hegemony continued and was combined with a crisis of public administration in the face of the legitimate social interests of the juridical-political system (1984: 45–46).

Joaquim Aguiar (1983) points out that the notion of a conservative bloc was associated with the presidency and a strategy for reducing the role of the PSD in the Acção Democrática alliance. He identifies the notion of political rotation with a presidentialism with a personalist, conservative or progressive component. He sees the idea of a systematic counterpower involving constitutional revision as a negative strategy aimed at diminishing the authority

of the president. Finally, he focuses on the alternative new party. All these ideas emerged from the political infighting of the 1970s and 1980s and the difficulty of forming and maintaining a bloc that would ensure continuing hegemony over Portuguese society (1983: 150–151).

Although democracy is usually associated with pluralism and bourgeois politics, Robert Dahl (1978) recognizes the compatibility of pluralism and socialism in Western and Eastern Europe. The Spanish communist Santiago Carrillo (1978) argues that even where democratic control by the people is gained though elections, it is limited by the capitalist class that uses its economic power to dominate the political process. He believes nevertheless that a peaceful democratic socialist revolution may be achieved by electoral means and by penetrating the state apparatuses and converting their individual members to socialism. This conception approximates that of Eurocommunism in France and Italy during the 1970s and, in fact, is not altogether dissimilar from the views of the Portuguese communist Álvaro Cunhal, whose party vacillated between a democratic parliamentary and a revolutionary course. Nor is it radically different from that of the socialist Mário Soares, who bitterly denounced the PCP as Stalinist and extremist. This apparent convergence of views suggests the possibility of various forms of politics under democracy and socialism. At issue is a pluralist analysis that assumes that a polity is democratic if it is responsive at least to those who participate in political affairs, whereas Marxist analysis recognizes that all individuals in a society are affected by and therefore must participate in political decisions if it is to be democratic. In the Portuguese case intellectual and cultural life had been limited to a small stratum of the population and in large measure manipulated by the fascist corporate state for nearly half a century. These intellectuals and politicians became intensely involved in the revolutionary interlude after April 25, 1974, but their role was limited by tradition and the mystique perpetrated by the old regime and by a plethora of perspectives on the future society.

Gianfranco Pasquino argues that the struggle for hegemony, for the political-cultural control of the processes of change, was at the center of the MFA (1977: 703–704). The MFA had to conserve its leadership in trying to form a new historic bloc, mitigating its internal divisions through the July–August crisis, but party pressures and the actions of the PCP and the popular left kept it from doing so and thus provided an opening to the right. For a brief period the MFA appeared hegemonic in its efforts to build a new historic bloc, and it elicited support for its program not only from its PCP ally but also from a broad consensus of other political groupings. Once it had resolved the question of independence for the colonies and relinquished its authority in favor of a parliamentary system, its own ranks divided over the decisive economic

issue of how to move toward the socialist transition. "There was no leading political force with hegemony over the process. There was no centralized revolutionary power. Except for a point of departure (the Program of the MFA), the MFA and government were unable to define a line for the advance of the revolution" (Cunhal, 1976: 125).

The countercoup of November 25 served to ensure the unity of the military as an institution. It also ensured a dominant role for the moderate politicians favoring social democracy, formal government, and compromises with capital. The revolution had rested on a base of agricultural workers in the Alentejo and Ribatejo, where agrarian reform was effective, the industrial workers of the great industrial belts around Lisbon, Setúbal, and to some extent Porto, and the radicalized soldiers, sailors, and officers. Missing from this alliance were large sectors of the urban petty bourgeoisie and small and middle farmers of the north and center of the country. Fauvet (1978) suggests that the PCP strategy precluded any middle road between advancing toward socialism and reverting to an authoritarian state or any stable bourgeois democracy. Thus, he says, Poulantzas was correct (110):

> He argued—quite correctly—that what was lost on November 25 was not an immediate advance to socialism, but the hegemony of the popular masses over the process of democratisation. He then drew the conclusion that November 25 had restored bourgeois hegemony over the democratisation process, and that that process itself was not really threatened. To quote Poulantzas' final sentence on Portugal, "the democratization process" had been "incontestably stabilized in favour of the bourgeoisie."

Poulantzas concludes that divisions in the forces of the left had undermined the popular struggle and "contributed to a stabilization of bourgeois hegemony over the democratization process" (1976: 162). In this judgment he anticipated but underestimated the impact of the ensuing rollback of the revolutionary reforms.

Ferreira (1980) points to a dissociation between civil society and the political class in power and considers it impossible for the dominant classes to identify themselves with a coherent political project by exercising any "natural" political hegemony. Under Salazar, hegemony was almost always exercised in an authoritarian and repressive form on behalf of the commercial and financial bourgeoisie and the latifundists through police and military power that permitted a relatively slow but adequate capitalist accumulation. Nataf and Sammis (1990) show that this dominant class was similar in its orientation, on the one hand, to a classic comprador bourgeoisie with strong ties to foreign capital and colonial markets and, on the other, to a domestic bourgeoisie whose production and industry were shielded by the state. The

compromise inherent in the Salazar model of dominance protected domestic industry and agriculture from direct foreign capital intervention. They identified the requirement for entrepreneurs to obtain government support before establishing a business as a means of constraining competition and ensuring some balance between large and small or medium-sized capital and between industrial and agricultural capital. Foreign investment was restricted to insurance, shipping, etc.

In reality, the Salazar state emphasized various forms of capital. Sammis (1988) shows that some of the groups were associated with the colonial sector that opposed industrial capital, in particular, the Banco Espírito Santo, the Banco Burnay, and Banco Nacional Ultramarino, whose capital was nonindustrial, involved in extractive enterprise or in agricultural and export commodity production, and was often associated with foreign capital. Toward the middle 1940s, Sammis argues, there was an attempt to shift the balance from agriculture to industry through a law that identified and protected certain industries that could already satisfy internal demand. The law caused division in the ruling circles as landowners sided with small and medium-sized industrialists fearful of change, and it was never implemented. The Development Plan of 1953 was directed toward infrastructure and industrial projects and import substitution. The entry of Portugal into the EFTA undermined the classic capitalist model of a class alliance between agriculture and industry. Also undermining that alliance were splits between agrarian and industrial capital, between commercial and industrial capital, between small and medium-sized and large industrial capital, between African and European capital, and between advocates of modern and advanced industries and hardliners in the regime and ruling classes. This disparate bourgeoisie, however, was essentially dependent on the state and consequently weak in advancing its own interests, and this is one important reason the regime was able to hold its elements together.

Under Caetano this balancing act was less certain. He did not perceive the formation of the Sociedade para o Desenvolvimento e Social (Society for the Study of Social and Economic Development—SEDES) as a direct political threat, and his acceptance of some of its views gave it legitimacy. Operating as a pressure group within the Caetano government because it would not have survived otherwise, it is characterized by Blume (1977) as an "opposition under constraint." After the April 25 coup, its leaders formed the PPD.

The fall of the old regime was followed by a brief interlude of relative autonomy for the state. Reformists wanted a protracted and negotiated process of association and autonomy for the colonies, whereas the opposition to the regime pushed hard for immediate decolonization and independence for the

African colonies and the hard-liners held onto the mystique and practices of the imperial regime.

One of the dominant parties in the parliamentary period, the PS, contributed substantially to the fragility of the political system. Ferreira (1976a) points out that this opposition party, founded in 1973 by 150 intellectuals, largely of bourgeois origin, consisted mainly of lawyers and middle-class liberal and republican antifascists. Its organization was weak, especially in the labor movement, and though its program was progressive, even somewhat Marxist, during the first four provisional governments, it never took a firm stand on breaking with capitalism. Its involvement in the CDE/CEUD did not include viewing the state as an instrument of class domination; it considered the state above classes. Its program envisaged a classless society oriented to bourgeois parliamentary democracy, and it tended toward positions favoring Portuguese dependency on Western Europe.

The PS controlled the first two constitutional governments, but its programs were vague and ambiguous (E.S., 1978: 7–8).[3] Its moderate inclinations were apparent in its social democratic character and its rightist leadership. It advocated democratization under the leadership of the domestic bourgeoisie. It did not attempt to represent the comprador or international bourgeoisie or the large landowners. Rather than ally itself with the PCP and the MDP, it leaned toward the PPD. Its anticommunist stance served to concentrate the centrist forces behind a façade of democratization. Celso Ferreira (1980) goes so far as to argue that its indecisiveness and ambiguity and its weak programs allowed the right to recapture power. It even joined with the CDS to agree to terms with the International Monetary Fund.

In the context of the parliamentary instability that characterized successive governments after 1976, Santos argues that "the prolonged non-resolution of the crisis of hegemony could eventually evolve into a crisis of legitimation of the democratic regime" (1986: 167). He suggests that the crisis could be averted only if a new hegemonic bloc were to emerge to implement a new model of development and provide stability to the political system. There could be no return to the power bloc of monopolistic groups that dominated in the decade of the 1960s; instead the new bloc would organize around an alliance of "modern sectors of the national bourgeoisie" and "a strong and dynamic economic state sector."[4] Nationalism would serve to mobilize the urban petty bourgeoisie, the working class, and the peasantry in support of negotiations with international capital. These classes would be organized into a social pact that would promise material concessions and incentives. Without a rapid consolidation of the new hegemonic bloc, the state would disintegrate, the parliamentary system would become more unstable, repression of the

popular classes would be used to check their resistance, and the "boundaries of the democratic process [would] have been violated" (168).

These propositions can be examined in light of the experience of the Cavaco PSD government. As president, Mário Soares, elected in 1986 through a rare combination of PS and PCP votes, represented a balance with the PSD majority, but he served as a consensual and moderate figure with limited powers of intervention. The Cavaco government, in contrast, was successful in implementing constitutional changes that reduced the size of the state by returning state enterprise to private ownership.[5] Further, it deliberately worked toward economic stability and steady growth (real growth 4 to 5 percent annually) and a decline in inflation (from nearly 20 percent in 1985 to close to 13 percent in 1990). As Portugal prepared for full integration, it benefited from developmental grants to ease integration with other European markets and currencies, but it continued to face structural problems, including an inflation rate twice that of the rest of Europe and a substantial foreign and public debt. The political majority of the PSD did not enjoy ideological hegemony, and the PS was to rise to power and remain there throughout much of the 1990s. What was significant, however, was the tacit political bloc of forces around the PS and the PSD, given their consensus over the decline in state power, deregulation, and incentives for capital investment and internationalization of the economy. Additionally, there was the evolution of Portugal as a peripheral part of the European balance of power, leading Barbosa, Cunha, and Júdice (1990: 5) to the observation that "financial, economic, and political integration, however, is transferring out of Portugal much of the real decision-making power over Portuguese society." Indeed capitalism, not socialism, was on the prevailing political and economic agenda.

Thus, threads of continuity define the possible configuration of a future political and economic hegemony in Portugal. Although the military's role was drastically reduced after November 25, 1975, it was not necessarily subordinated to the civil power; the 1976 constitution (article 273) gave the armed forces "a historical mission to guarantee the conditions that permit a peaceful and pluralist transition of Portuguese society to democracy and socialism." Despite changes, the military continued to be a holder of power (Civicus, 1979: 15). Ferreira argues that the MFA intervened because of the inaction of the armed forces throughout the twentieth century and played an autonomous role in mediating conflicts between the revolutionary fronts and the political parties. With its second MFA-parties pact of February 1976, direct elections for the presidency were established, and this helped perpetuate military influence in politics through the dispute between Eanes and Carvalho in 1976 and between Eanes and Carneiro in 1980 (1984: 53).

It may be assumed that the financial power that Salazar had held during the dictatorship was considerably diminished by the revolutionary events and ensuing parliamentary democracy, but one astute observer, José Manuel Rolo, notes that structurally "nothing changed in the Finance Ministry. No one moved. Cavaco is a specialist in public finance. He is the Salazar of our times. He is an ultra-Salazarista. . . .The character is austere. . . . The weight of finances and of the state is completely Salazarista. This is a major obstacle" (interview, Lisbon, November 15, 1990). He points out that the economic groups were shielded by the regime under Salazar and, though different today, function somewhat similarly:

> In the past each group had a bank, an insurance company, an enterprise. Today, each group has become a representative of foreign capital. . . . They are simply an expression of foreign interests. . . . They buy everything cheaply in Portugal in order to sell at a profit. . . . Everything is being exchanged with the foreigner at cheap prices. Portugal will become another point of contact for foreign investment similar to what happened in Asia, investments for cheap labor and also for tourism and so on.

He identifies the deficit in the public sector as a problem: "There is an accumulation in foreign exchange in the manner of Salazar . . . a country oriented toward accumulation of reserves. Thus reserves can be offset with the internal debt and achieve a kind of balance along lines always desired by Salazar." He goes on to explain that the unions are under control in the traditional way through social pacts and the labor leaders are tied to the parties: "There is no tradition of worker practice."

These examples make problematic the question of hegemony and the possibility of establishing a new historical bloc of forces able to steer Portugal in a direction other than the one implanted by the Salazar regime.

The Socialist Vision

A transition from capitalism to socialism depends in large measure on changes in the labor process in the countryside. For example, with the buying up or seizure of peasant holdings and their conversion from subsistence agriculture to cash cropping, peasants lose not only their land but their ability to subsist from foodstuffs they grow and may even become employees of the capitalist in order to earn wages to buy their own food in the market. Contradictions, tensions, even struggle may ensue between landowning capitalists and the rural proletariat. Reform of the agrarian structure may also diminish

the influence of large landowners in the countryside and the merchants and rich farmers who rule in rural villages. Karl Kautsky believed that, whereas feudal institutions persisted in the bourgeois revolution and change was marked by violence, the liberal organizations of bourgeois society were flexible and capable of being developed further rather than destroyed en route to socialism. Generally, this pattern has been evidenced in Western Europe. Lenin, in contrast, argued that the representatives of capital could not become hegemonic without experiencing a bourgeois revolution and would then have to be overthrown by the revolutionary movement or party as vanguard and agent of the transition. Such was the revolutionary experience of China, Cuba, and Russia.

In general, control over the means of production in society may determine whether a socialist outcome is possible in a society. Control may be achieved in a variety of ways: by seizure through popular revolution, by reorganization of the system in the interests of the people, or by taking over the means of production but allowing capitalists to use part of it. The first of these approaches moves more decisively toward socialism, while the second is likely to involve state planning and decisions, and the third is tied to a strategy of compromise and cooperation with capitalists in order to build up the forces of production before moving on to socialism. Thus, different socialist outcomes may be possible, and many forms of socialism have been envisaged. Marx and Engels were critical of the utopian socialism of St. Simon, the scientific socialism of Bakunin, and the free socialism of German thought. They also attacked state socialism (sometimes called Bismarckian socialism or monarchical socialism) and distinguished Bonapartist or imperial socialism from their own. Socialist theory also identifies social democratic, democratic socialist, market socialist, and communist forms. Focusing on the Portuguese experience, Fonseca illustrates various ways of confronting and overthrowing the bourgeois state en route to the transition to socialism: urban proletarian insurrection, as in the case of the abortive European revolutions of 1848 or the successful Bolshevik revolution of 1917; prolonged guerrilla warfare, as in the cases of the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique or Cuba and Nicaragua in Latin America; the occupation of a capitalist country by the socialist army of a rival country, as in Eastern Europe after World War II; and the patriotic military coup, involving progressive sectors of the bourgeois army, often including a Marxist leadership as in several African cases or the Portuguese situation in 1974 and 1975 (1983: 7–15).

Socialist aspirations and ideals in Portugal have been apparent in scattered insurrections, political parties, the labor movement, the colonial struggles, and the April 25 revolutionary coup and persist to this day, but socialism has

yet to sustain itself in practice. Some of the theoretical issues associated with the socialist transition are as follows:

1. *The agrarian question.* Transitions from feudalism and capitalism involve changes in the labor process in agriculture, whether serf, peasant, rural, or cooperative work. These changes may be the consequence of political mediation, social policies, or even state intervention. Further, the progressive role of capital in agriculture and the food system extends beyond such categories as peasant, worker, or farmer, and technology in agroindustry, food processing, and marketing can be instrumental in transforming agriculture and moving on toward socialism. As capitalism took hold in Portugal, land tended to become concentrated, especially in the south, in large holdings, some productive (of crops) for domestic and foreign markets and employing rural workers mostly organized through the PCP and others unproductive under absentee owners. Disputes between owners and workers occasionally appeared throughout the twentieth century and were particularly acute after 1974 in the large agricultural units oriented to the market. Land seizures occurred as well. In the north, landholdings were relatively small, in the hands of peasant farmers who tended to be influenced by the Church and politically conservative.

2. *The vanguard movement or party.* Although Lenin rejected the model of an evolutionary socialist transition in favor of a revolutionary seizure of the state, he argued that workers could not by themselves become fully conscious of their destiny and that the revolutionary movement or party as vanguard and agent of the transition would serve this purpose. He recognized the inevitability of tensions between the proletariat and its organized agent of political expression and believed that the party must not lower itself to the level of the masses but instead assert its leadership in the revolution and avoid reformism. Since its founding in 1921 the PCP has thought of itself as a vanguard party, and in the aftermath of the 1974 coup, it sought to play that role but ultimately was subordinated to the progressive military Movimento das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement—MFA), which early on manifested vanguardist aspirations.

3. *The state.* Especially prominent under capitalism, the state has also played a role in every historical case of socialism to date. Its principal function is to reinforce and ensure the cohesion of economic, political, social, and cultural processes and relations. In contrast to the situation under feudalism, production under capitalism does not necessarily depend on politics. Political relations can develop independently of economic relations, with the result that the state can become relatively

autonomous. Institutionalized bargaining and competition under the representative democratic form of the state presumably increases the possibility of autonomy. Theoretically, the state is often thought of as a regulating mechanism that ensures equilibrium in society, but equilibrium has been more an ideal than reality in the historical experience.

In Portugal under the monarchy, under the fascist dictatorship, and even after the revolutionary coup of 1974, the state failed to achieve such relative autonomy, but it did guide the economy toward capitalism in a variety of ways. It guaranteed the organization and legal framework of the capitalist system. It provided the infrastructure and the conditions for state and capitalist enterprises. It intervened to ensure stability and to mitigate economic crises. It mediated conflicts and tensions between capital and labor. Finally, it legitimized its activities through propaganda aimed at keeping the masses passive. Clearly, it is under the agency of the state that the dominant classes are organized and the different classes are maintained at the level of their interests. This organization took different forms under the dictatorship and in the revolutionary period of 1974 and 1975, when banks and private enterprises were nationalized, but in the ensuing period of parliamentary democracy, the state carried on with its traditional functions while fostering a resurgence of private capital.

4. *Contradictions with regard to planning versus the market.* Planning may keep producers from dominating the conditions of their production, whereas identification of the market with capitalism and planning with socialism may overlook the fact that planning can be an instrument of bourgeois politics in any case. Planning, for instance, was important to the image of development promoted by the Salazar regime whose intentions inclined toward fascism. Whatever planning was associated with a socialist vision in the 1974–1975 period, whether promoted by the MFA or by progressive movements on the left (including the PCP and the PS), it is clear that the salient features of capitalism remained intact in the ensuing years.

5. *The pursuit of democracy during the transition.* Attempts at democratization usually revolve around the representative and formal systems of voting and representation typical of advanced industrial societies or participatory practices that are undertaken as experiments but rarely institutionalized. Traditional approaches to political democracy may incorporate bourgeois, liberal, social democratic, or representative forms under capitalism or its democratic socialist or revolutionary form under socialism. The success of socialism will probably be based on combining democratic institutions with socialist market economics to ensure egalitarianism in the market.

All these issues are relevant to any assessment of the drive toward socialism after April 25, 1974. What, if any, evidence suggests that a transition had begun? Santos questions whether control over the means of private production is decisive in knowing when a transition takes place. He argues that we have to differentiate between the nationalization of the means of production as occurred in Portugal and the socialization of the means of production: "The nationalization implied a determined socialist model, less as a plan toward a new socialist society than as a defense against a fascist bourgeoisie that wanted to liquidate the revolution" (interview, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Coimbra, July 22, 1988).

In an analysis of this question, José Serras Gago and Luís Salgado de Matos (1977) looked for a shift in the dominant capitalist relations of production and conclude that the advances of the 1974 coup undermined but did not destroy them. Even when the state took over the reins as in the nationalizations, the principle of private ownership of the means of production remained intact, and capitalist value persisted as the global regulator of production (1977: 13). The Portuguese market continued to function with units of production tied to the world market. Although the political offensive of the masses had weakened the impact of some of these relations, it lacked any class cohesion and solidarity.

Despite its manifestation, the drive toward socialism was obscured by the maneuvering of the left parties. The PS response to the question of production relations was to promote self-management, political democracy, and the market as a means of checking the power of the PCP. In order to be successful, self-management would have to be more effective than the capitalist system and would exclude the state from the transition process. The PS, however, did not distinguish the market from profit as the regulator of the economy and limited economic democracy to the cooperative or self-managing sector of the economy, a position no different from that of the First International before World War I. This position necessarily shifted to a socialism of distribution and to the sphere of circulation of capital, a process that evolved over two years through two elections (Gago and Matos 1977: 15).

The position of the revolutionary left focused on the question of the state, which was not necessarily seen as related to socialist relations of production. Nationalizations and agrarian reform represented for the PCP the possibility of destroying the capitalist mode of production and establishing new relations of production. The PCP considered capitalist relations of production predominant but not dominant in the popular offensive (Cunhal, 1975c: 215). Although it judged that monopolistic capitalism had been destroyed, it recognized that class antagonisms continued to repress the working class. It envisaged an economy in transition with different types of economic forms

(nationalizations, collective production units, small commercial production, industrial capital, and state capitalist firms, including firms of the mixed economy). This led to the conception of "islands of socialism," sectors that were socialist and independent of the rest of society. This PCP analysis had practical consequences for agrarian reform, since fixed salaries were guaranteed in the collective production units and social relations among members of the units were considered an initial form of socialism even though the market was still capitalist. It did not recognize in Portugal, as Preobrajensky had in Russia, that there was a basic conflict between the law of capitalist value and the law of socialist accumulation (Gago and Matos, 1977: 17).

Another question addressed by Gago and Matos is when socialist relations of production began to be dominant. The popular movement favored the establishment of socialist relations of production through the occupation of latifundios, the replacement of capitalist enterprise, the occupation of empty houses, and so on. Although these socialist relations did indeed advance, they did not dominate; unemployment, high prices, and lack of housing persisted. The workers' offensive failed to accomplish the objective of socialism because of the continuing capitalist domination of the economy. The autonomous organizations of workers were in their infancy after two generations of suppression, the orientation of the state continued to be bourgeois, and socialist relations were limited in the context of overall production (1977: 18).

The PS may have believed that socialism had arrived because of the nationalizations and the power that democracy had given the workers. The PCP also identified the nationalizations with socialism and believed that the capitalist relations of production would cease to dominate. The attention of the left, however, was absorbed by state policies and the pursuit of further nationalizations (19) at the expense of considerations of class and the power of the state in the transition to socialism. Gago and Matos associate the popularity of nationalization with three themes: the profit of the firms and the consumption of the bourgeoisie, the belief that the state would correct the inequalities of a capitalist society and contradictions between various modes of production, and the lack of any progressive criticism of the nationalized firms (21). They point out that nationalization and state dominance inhibit the working class from appropriating the relations of accumulation or establishing a regime of proletarian hegemony, and therefore only class struggle can lead to the establishment of a proletarian state. "Any other system, once private ownership of the means of production is abolished, would imply repression of the working class in the name of the working class" (23).

A further question relates to primitive socialist accumulation—the need to transfer surplus value in the capitalist sector to the nationalized sector. In the Portuguese case, the nationalized sectors and the agrarian reform were

beneficiaries of such transfers, even though these sectors were not socialist, and their new owners could consider them as points of reference for a socialist sector in Portugal. This model was incoherent, according to Gago and Matos, because of the existing institutional structure around private ownership of the means of production, regulation of surplus value, and integration into the world market. Thus a crisis would ensue because of these contradictions, and the only solution would be to reduce salaries in the capitalist sector, but this would lead to economic depression. The alternative of reducing salaries of workers in the nationalized sector would have similar consequences (1977: 23–25).[6]

Our analysis began with an overview of the political economy and when and how capitalism implanted itself in Portugal, viewed through various periods and perspectives. Then it turned to an examination of state formations throughout the twentieth century, and it focused on the revolutionary rupture of 1974–1975, the counterrevolutionary offensive, and the rollback of many reforms and changes as a bourgeois hegemony began to reassert itself and socialist aspirations diminished. As a postscript to these events, the following chapter looks at the aftermath of the revolution and the consequences of political and economic happenings up to the end of the twentieth century.

Notes

1. Stanley Aronowitz argues: "There would be no question of the hegemony of the working class, as traditionally constituted, over the historic bloc, nor of the claim of Marxism to represent more than its own historic perspective" (1990 [1981]: 167).

2. My theoretical discussion of hegemony in the thought of Gramsci draws heavily on the work of Carl Boggs (1984: esp. 153–198). See also Perry Anderson (1976–1977). For a detailed analysis of Gramscian theory, see Chantal Mouffe (1984), especially the chapter "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci." Gramscian thought has influenced contemporary dialogue on the prospects for democracy and socialism in advanced industrial societies and in less developed societies as well. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe make use of the concept of hegemony "to outline a new politics for the Left based upon the project of a radical democracy" and extend their analysis to "a post-Marxist terrain" in which "it is no longer possible to maintain the conception of subjectivity and classes elaborated by Marxism, nor its vision of the historical course of capitalist development" (1985: 3–4).

3. Indices of economic problems during the Soares governments included industrial production increase from 6 percent in 1975 to 11.5 percent in 1978, unemployment at 13 percent, an increase of 30 percent in prices, and a devaluation of the currency (Rodrigues, 1977b).

4. It is important to distinguish "bloc" from "group." A "group" is a specific industrial grouping of companies under the leadership of a capitalist, a family, or a conglomeration of capitalist and family interests; a "bloc" is an aggregation of differing class interests organized with the purpose of achieving hegemony in society. In his book on Weimar Germany, Abraham (1986: 17) suggests:

> We can map several blocs composed of rural and urban, dominant and dominated classes. Through these power blocs, the economic sphere, where individuals appear as the carriers of determinate social relations, shaped the political sphere, in which members of all classes appear as equal citizens with equal claims. It was largely through state activity that intrabloc conflicts were mediated and the interests of a bloc as a whole pursued.

5. See Lopes (1976) on the 1976 constitution and Morais, Almeida, and Pinto (1984) for a comparison of a presidential system with a semipresidential one.

6. For a general theoretical discussion on the socialist transition, see Harnecker et al. (1976). On Portugal, see Bernardo (1975) for a theoretical treatment and guide, Pereira (1971) for an abstract reflection on liberalism in the era in which the liberal wing of Caetanismo emerged, Fonseca (1977) for a critique of Pereira (1976), Grupo SL (1976: esp. chapter 2 for focus on issues of the transition), and Pereira (1983) for an overview. Other useful works are Murteira (1977 and 1984), Nunes (1975), Oliveira and Belo (1975), Santos (1977), and Wolff (1977). Santos (1977b) examines five models of development in the 1969–1978 period that provide perspective on the prospect of a transition.

10

The Aftermath

The Portuguese upheaval was more like the European revolutions of the 1820s and 1848 than like the "great" revolutions of 1789 in France or 1917 in Russia. That is, it was startling in psychological power, yet limited in its ability to reorder society; significant enough in its impact to transform the context of social and political discourse and the institutional context within which political power is exercised but, once over, hard for many outsiders to take seriously. (Maxwell, 1995: 1)

THE REVOLUTIONARY TURMOIL NOT ONLY CAPTIVATED the interest of people everywhere; it raised hope for a new society. The collapse of the provisional revolutionary government, the countercoup of November 25, 1975, and the rollback of the revolution, however, constituted a dilemma for the state in its drive to socialism. If political and economic forces ultimately become openly "free" and uncontrolled, might not the ensuing liberal dream of unbridled competition lead to a reassessment, necessitating a new emphasis on state controls and regulations? Would not state controls prevail to the frustration of laissez-faire capitalists and committed idealist socialists? Would only incremental changes or perhaps stagnation prevail in the face of crisis situations?

A legitimacy crisis had been momentarily overcome but not significantly resolved, and the struggle over how to shape a new society would continue. A decade later, Boaventura de Sousa Santos predicted a crisis of legitimacy emanating from the political instability, the impact of integration with Europe, and the accompanying ties to imperialism and dependency. Only a new hegemonic bloc of forces, including a modern national bourgeoisie, a state that

was a strong economy, and ties and concessions to the urban petty bourgeoisie, the working class, and the peasantry could avert a crisis of legitimacy.

Pursuit of Legitimacy

The revolutionary years left the impression of a deep structural change, but the counterrevolution also reflected the continuing influence of a half century of authoritarianism and fascism. The revolutionary euphoria was offset not only by the emerging moderating forces in power but also by sporadic evidence of conservative and reactionary activity. For example, Jaime Nogueira Pinto's magazine *Política,* a prominent political voice in the years after the countercoup, represented an ongoing line of neofascism. The conservative PP drew on the reactionary sentiments of the past, especially among returning colonists from Africa, yet only one legal party, the PDC, survived to represent the extreme right, and it proved incapable of unifying the factions of the right and was eventually banned from electoral activity after March 11, 1975. The ELP and the MDLP were right-wing terrorist parties led by former military officers. After November 25, admiral and former president Tomás returned to Portugal, as did many of the ministerial elite of the old regime (but not former prime minister Caetano, who refused to return and died in Brazil in 1980). General Kaúlza de Arriaga, associated with the extreme right, founded the Movimento Independente de Reconstrução Nacional (Independent Movement for National Reconstruction—MIRN) later known as the Partido da Direita Portuguesa (Party of the Portuguese Right—PDP), a last effort to unify the diverse sectors of the old regime. The MIRN dissolved soon after the PDC failed to obtain representation in the 1980 elections (Pinto, 1989).

Militants of the PDC joined with the CDS, led by Freitas do Amaral (who was to become a prominent conservative and eventually presidential candidate in 1985 and who twenty years later surprisingly turned left to become foreign minister under the PS), in 1982 to advocate revising the 1976 constitution, which, it believed, substituted democratic legitimacy for revolutionary legitimacy and suppressed the governmental obligation to construct socialism. In effect the CDC assimilated most currents to its right.

The continuation of fascist elements in the governments led by revolutionaries was revealed by Jaime Serra, who spoke of the need to strengthen the democratic tendencies within the state apparatus as fundamental for ensuring the defense of the democratic gains achieved since April 25. He insisted that the state apparatus in many sectors and various levels was not yet cleansed of notoriously corrupt and fascist elements: "The grand gentlemen of the private banks, the monopolies, and the latifundios are the same

who occupied ministerial posts under Salazar and Caetano, and democracy is constantly threatened by these people either through capital flight or through counterrevolutionary conspiracy" (*Diário de Notícias,* February 4, 1975). The events of March 11 had intended to resolve this problem as the state formally nationalized the banks and monopolies, but after November 25 and into the ensuing years the various PS and PSD governments began to dismantle the state enterprises and auction them off to private capital. Ties to the past were apparent in these governments; for example, Veiga Simão, once education minister under Caetano, was appointed defense minister in the PS government of Mário Soares in 1983. Another 147 persons who prior to April 25 had participated in the SEDES later were conspicuously influential (Pereira, 1990).[1]

The revolution moved against abuses of power within the secret police under the dictatorship. Yet, in 1984 legislation, several secret agencies were formed, including a Serviço de Informações de Segurança (Security Information Service—SIS) under the Ministry of Internal Administration, the Serviço de Informações Militares (Military Information Service—SIM) under the Ministry of Defense, and the Serviço de Informações Estratégicas de Defesa (Service of Strategic Defense Strategies—SIED) linked to the prime minister. These agencies were apparently not subject to any official control; according to the communist deputy João Amaral, they functioned in "a sea of illegalities, abuses, dysfunction, and violation of fundamental rights" (Garcia, 1994: 10). The traditional Guarda Nacional Republicana was a continuing presence in Portugal (*O Jornal,* March 17, 1992). The Divisão de Informações do Estado Maior General das Forças Armadas (Division of Information of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Services—DINFO), an investigative arm of the armed forces, was criticized by Correia (1994) for its obsession with the "internal enemy" and vigilance that ignored basic democratic rights. DINFO apparently engaged in surveillance of the political parties, especially the PCP but also the PS. The Lisbon press reported that Portuguese terrorists of the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberatação (GAL) were trained in the Acadêmia Militar da Amadora as members of the security service of the U.S. embassy in Lisbon.

Throughout the world two hundred million people speak the Portuguese language, but in Portugal the educational deficiencies of the past are still evident in the present. The level of illiteracy in Portugal was 20 percent in 1980, with five million over the age of fourteen not having progressed beyond the sixth grade but down to 8 percent with the level of education still relatively low at the end of the century. Despite this poor record, Portuguese literature and all its rich traditions were recognized worldwide when the celebrated novelist José Saramagowon the Nobel Prize for literature in 1998. The son of poor farmers and once active in the PCP, he wrote of historical situations and

the resistance of the common people. In 2004, as an unsuccessful candidate of the CDU for European Parliament elections, he called upon the people to vote blank ballot.

This position may have been a reaction to shifting attitudes associated with integration with Europe, including a consolidation of democracy, and a shift from worker emigration to movement from the countryside to the cities. In this process Portuguese expression of national values and patriotism remained strong alongside the belief that integration into the European Union was a good thing (Monteiro and Costa Pinto in Costa Pinto, 2003)

The press, long censored under the dictatorship, was prolific during the revolutionary years, when workers seized many of the dailies from their owners or management, but after 1976 many of them closed down. *A Capital* ceased in 1980 and then was privatized in July 1988 and reappeared. *O Século*, founded in 1881, was taken over by communist workers in 1974, but its ownership changed in October 1975, and it stopped publication in 1977 and was resuscitated only briefly thereafter. *Diário de Lisboa* shut down in November 1990. Major dailies included *Diário de Notícias* and *O Público* along with the major weeklies: the independent socialist *Jornal Novo*, the independent but moderate *Expresso*, whose publisher, Pinto Balsemão, was prominent in PSD circles and a former prime minister, and the conservative *O Tempo*, founded in 1974 and aligned with the CDS. Another daily, *O Diário*, filled a political role close to the PCP and attracted a large following exceeding that of *Avante*. While an objective observer needs to examine most of these periodicals, readership in general was guided by partisan preferences. Partisanship was tied to the political party in power, also a carryover from press control under authoritarian rule. Eduardo Dámaso relates this to "political power historically held by the PSD or PS and dependent on the pure instrumentality of the information services which serve over the years to spy on political rivals, with the enemy within the party, unions, students, police, and public servants." The historical record of the media, past and present, thus reflects "successive crises, power vacuums, absence of democratic fiscal practice, low levels of operational efficiency" (2004: 4).

Whither Democracy?

These remnants of the past undermined the search for legitimacy and democracy, yet what really differed after 1975 was formal parliamentary democracy, a plurality of diverse political parties, and genuine elections and voter participation. A neoliberal and social democratic consensus permeated the electoral regimes, enabling center-right and center-left regimes to come to power and

marginalize extreme right and left forces, including the PCP. A decisive role for the state, the evolving impact of capitalism, and integration with Europe offset overt efforts to provide the parliament with a major political role. On the left the PS shifted its attention from welfare reform to neoliberal modernization, and factionalism developed within the historically important PCP. These trends were part of the complex process involving the dominant classes and rulers of the emerging capitalist-democratic regime.

Normally such regimes try to maintain hegemonic power in the face of a majority that may suffer from exploitation, domination, inequalities, and material limitations. Ralph Miliband (1991) suggests that the left must take seriously the building of a counterhegemonic presence of feminist, ecological, antiracist, and other new social movements alongside the working class and labor movements and incorporate them into its struggles. The PS, however, has generally ignored these movements, welcomed the demise of the popular radical left political parties, sought to divide labor, and moved toward the center to gain power and build political hegemony.[2]

Electoral participation and results for the period 1975–2005 are shown in table 10.1. Four political parties dominated over this time, with the PCP in decline after 1983 and the PS and the PSD gaining approximately a third of the votes from election to election. The PSD was the only party to win a majority (in 1987 and 1991), while the PS pushed its plurality to 44 percent in 1995. The short-lived PRD picked up 18 percent in 1987 and dropped to 5 percent four years later, while the right-wing CDS garnered generally less than the PCP, which by the 1990s had lost half its support. The UDP, which could count on roughly one in ten voters during the 1980s, faded into obscurity during the 1990s.

Parliamentary democracy formally commenced with the April 25, 1975, elections, an event of "enormous political importance . . . with one of the highest turnouts ever recorded in a national election (91.7 percent)" (Maxwell, 1995: 113). It was a victory for the moderate parties, with the PS winning a third (a plurality) of the votes, followed by the PPD, the PCP, and the CDS. The elections signified and subsequent events demonstrated that a parliamentary alternative and formal representative democracy would prevail over any aspirations for radical or democratic socialism and effective participatory democracy.

The 1976 elections consolidated the role of the parties and the drift toward moderate civilian rule. The formation of an alliance of anticommunist forces after August 1975 had isolated the PCP and the popular and radical left and, within the military, the Gonçalvistas: "During the November 25, 1975, showdown, this alliance delivered the decisive coup de grace to the dream of socialist revolution" (Maxwell, 1995: 157).

TABLE 10.1
Results of Elections for Assembly of the Republic, 1975–2005

(percentages and number of seats)

	1975	1976	1979	1980	1983	1985	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002	2005
PS/FRS	37.87% (116)	34.89% (107)	27.33% (74)	26.65% (71)	36.11% (101)	20.77% (57)	22.24% (60)	29.13% (72)	43.76% (112)	44.06% (115)	37.79% (96)	45.03% (121)
PPD/PSD	26.39% (81)	24.35% (73)	AD	—	27.24% (75)	29.87% (88)	50.22% (148)	50.60% (135)	34.12% (88)	32.32% (81)	40.21% (105)	28.77% (75)
PCP+APU	12.46% (30)	14.39% (40)	18.80% (47)	16.75% (41)	18.07% (44)	15.49% (38)	—	—	—	—	—	—
CDU	—	—	—	—	—	—	12.14% (31)	8.80% (17)	8.57% (15)	8.99% (17)	6.94% (12)	7.54% (14)
CDS	7.61% (16)	15.98% (42)	AD	—	12.56% (30)	9.96% (22)	4.44% (4)	4.43% (5)	9.05% (15)	8.34% (15)	8.72% (14)	7.24% (12)
AD	—	—	42.52% (121)	44.91% (126)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
MDP	4.14% (5)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
PRD	—	—	—	—	—	17.92% (45)	4.91% (7)	—	—	—	—	—
PSN	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.68% (1)	—	—	—	—
PSR												
UDP	0.79% (1)	1.67% (1)	2.18% (1)	1.38% (1)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
ADIM	0.03% (1)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
BE	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.44% (2)	2.74% (3)	6.35%

The pact of February 1976 resulted in a compromise. The first constitutional president would not be a civilian politician, and the continuing ascendancy of the moderates within the armed forces and their military victory in November would be ratified by the choice of a moderate military figure, supported by a broad coalition of political parties excluding only the communists and the far left.[3] The elections of April 25 produced a plurality for the PS, followed by the PPD/PSD, CDS, and the PCP. Lieutenant Colonel Ramalho Eanes decisively won the presidential elections on July 27 with 61.5 percent of the vote, followed by other military figures, Carvalho with 16.5 percent and Azevedo with 14.4 percent, and the Communist candidate with 7.6 percent. The historian Kenneth Maxwell comments that the pact of February 1976 ensured that the first constitutional president would not be a civilian politician: "The continuing ascendancy of the armed forces and the military victory of moderates in November was ratified by the choice of António Ramalho Eanes as the first constituent president, standing at the apex of the two major forces—military and civilian—which had achieved victory in the armed confrontation of November 25, 1975" (1995: 160). Subsequent presidents would also be moderate and civilian representatives of the Socialist Party.

The postrevolutionary period breaks into six phases, beginning with minority governments controlled by the PS but evolving toward eventual dominance of the PSD during the late 1980s and PS control in the latter half of the 1990s.[4] During the first phase, from 1976 to 1979, the Socialists ruled with a plurality of the votes, but together the PS and the PCP controlled close to two-fifths of the seats in the new parliament. Instability characterized the first constitutional government under Prime Minister Mário Soares, who concentrated on the economy and on integration into the EEC. While implementing austerity policies, the government attempted to restore international confidence in the Portuguese markets. Striking out on this moderate course, Soares had to balance the reformist mainstream within his party with the revolutionary faction. This minority government fell at the end of December 1977 because of lack of parliamentary support. The second government under Soares, supported by the conservative CDS, continued with its austerity measures, and ruled until July 1978.

The disintegration of the PS governments under Soares and the growing popularity of President Eanes in the aftermath of November 25 posed a dilemma for the left. One interesting analysis saw this as a struggle between two alternatives: either reconsolidate the instruments of bourgeois power and ensure a recovery for capitalism or permit the workers' commissions to take charge of the socialist economy. The former course proved determinant as the PS and other bourgeois forces turned the tide against workers through agreements with the PSD, legislation constraining agrarian reform, cutbacks on agricultural credits, and wage increases (Gomes, 1977).

The second phase began with an impasse, prompting Eanes to choose an independent prime minister. There were three "presidential governments" between August 1978 and December 1979, and while pursuing policies to stabilize the economy, they essentially failed because of the imposition of austerity measures by the International Monetary Fund. Parliament obstructed the initiatives of these governments and resented intervention by Eanes, who finally resolved the stalemate by calling new elections. On December 2, 1979, a center-right coalition known as the Aliança Democrática (Democratic Alliance—AD) gained 46.5 percent of the votes and a slim two-seat majority in the Assembly and formed its first government. Its victory was based on an alliance of the CDS, the PPD/PSD, and the PPM. It also won in the legislative elections of October 5, 1980, increasing its vote total to 47 percent and 166 seats, in contrast to its opposition, the socialist Frente Republicana Socialista (FRS), with 27 percent and 71 seats, and the communist APU, with 17 percent and 41 seats. Four AD governments ruled from January 1980 to June 1983, a period marked by the tragic death of the popular PPD leader Francisco Sá Carneiro, disputes within the coalition, and the dominance of Eanes in foreign affairs and defense policy. Eanes was reelected president on December 7, 1980, with 56.4 percent of the vote (see Matos, 1983).

Pinto Balsemão succeeded Sá Carneiro as prime minister and presided over several governments characterized by political instability, including the resignations of the CDS leaders Freitas de Amaral and Basilio Horta (which led the prime minister to claim that he was a victim of treason). He was successful in revising the constitution, however. On August 14, 1982, the Revolutionary Council was abolished and replaced by the Constitutional Court. Thereafter, the CDS faded while the PSD gained strength. The government was partially successful in blunting the impact of the first general strike on February 12, 1982, a one-day stoppage throughout the industrial area around Lisbon, when it leased hundreds of taxis and private buses to compensate for the shutdown of the public transportation system. This action was assisted greatly by Soares, who urged workers in PS-affiliated unions to report to work. Balsemão finally resigned in December 1982. Summing up this phase, Magone attributes the political instability to external influences, political inexperience, personalism, and the cultural mix "of patrimonial practice, of radical politics, and of incipient democratic behavior" (1997: 30).[5]

A third phase, from 1983 to 1987, which is described by Nataf as a period of "continuing dishegemony," began with the narrow legislative victory of the PS, which won nearly 37 percent and 101 seats compared with the PPD/PSD share of 28 percent and 75 seats, that of the PCP of 18.6 percent and 44 seats, and that of the CDS of 12.9 percent and 30 seats. In his formation of a majority coalition, Soares rejected a communist bid to join the government and instead

sided with the PPD/PSD in the formation of a central bloc. The new government intensified its efforts to reform the public sector and implement the austerity program imposed by the International Monetary Fund. Divisions in the PPD/PSD and Soares's candidacy for president brought an end to the coalition in June 1985 and the rise of the PSD leader Aníbal Cavaco Silva.

The October 1985 elections were decisive in shaping the political system, and the PCP began an irreversible decline. Socialists faced an electorate frustrated over bad times, and the PRD emerged as an alternative to the PS in the image of Eanes. The PSD won nearly 30 percent of the votes and 88 seats, followed by the PS, with 21 percent and 57 seats, the communist coalition APU, with nearly 16 percent and 38 seats, and the CDS, with 10 percent and 22 seats. The PRD was a surprise, winning 18 percent and 45 seats. Cavaco Silva formed a minority government that initially benefited from integration with Europe and European funding for infrastructure in Portugal. The presidential elections of January 26 did not produce a majority for any candidate, and in the second round on February 16, Soares won 51 percent to his rival Amaral's 49 percent. In October Eanes emerged as head of the PRD and joined the opposition to Cavaco's economic measures. Subsequently, the government fell for lack of parliamentary support.[6]

The fourth phase began with the elections of July 19, 1987, with the PSD emerging with 50 percent of the vote and 148 seats, followed by the PS with 22 percent and 60 seats, the communist coalition CDU with 12 percent and 31 seats, the PRD with 5 percent and 7 seats, and the CDS with 4 percent and 4 seats. Magone suggests that Cavaco Silva's success was due to international confidence in the Portuguese economy and to his American-style appeal for popular support (1997: 33).

In his analysis of the rise of the PSD, Nataf points to cleavages between traditional and modern outlooks. For instance, the old right, represented by the CDS, maintained values of strong nationalism and defense and religion, with less concern with political freedoms. Supporters of the PCP took a more liberal position, while socialist voters were less liberal. Social Democrats were more nationalist and religious but generally more liberal and modern than supporters of the CDS. Another cleavage was between materialist and postmaterialist values, with the far right and left being more materialist. PCP voters tended to support, more than PS voters, attempts to deal with poverty and the distribution of income. PSD voters tended to have a positive view of the economy in contrast to voters of the PRD, the PCP, and the PS. The PSD seems to have done well in convincing voters that it was responsible for an economic upturn.

The majority vote signaled the possibility of a political stability not experienced previously. The PSD's success seems to have had something to do with

its optimism about the economy and the belief of voters that conditions were gradually improving. It signified the emergence of a coherent and modern (capitalist) right wing able to impose a credible popular national program. Nataf (1995: 186) argues that the Socialists were in the wrong place at the wrong time, and although the PS declined in its vote percentage, the PCP dropped even more. In short, the 1987 elections were a disaster for the left.

The German socialist Willy Brandt once called Maoism "the best school for social democracy" because of its reaction to the PCP. In fact, the Cavaco Silva era served to unite many former revolutionaries around the government. For example, José Freire Antunes and student activists in opposition to the PCP as well as the Caetano government were active in the MRPP from 1973 to 1975. The collapse of the regime left a vacuum in which an organized group like the MRPP could influence politics. After November 25, Antunes joined with supporters of Eanes and later was involved in the euphoria around the presidential candidacy of Lurdes Pintasilgo in 1986, when the popular left grouped momentarily around her. A year later he became an adviser to the PSD government, believing that Marxism was exhausted ideologically and that there was a need for government by absolute majority rule in Portugal. In a retrospective on his trajectory from the far left to the center-right, he observed that the PS had evolved from its liberal roots in Europe to its political involvement in Portugal, while the PSD, founded in Portugal, evolved in line with other conservative social democratic influences in Europe (interview, Lisbon, November 19, 1990). Another former radical, Durão Barroso, served as foreign minister under Cavaco Silva and later became a prime minister. He describes his opposition to the PCP and his personal experience in the MRPP, which he had joined after the April 25 coup. He justifies his adaptation to the PSD in terms of opposition to the PCP and a desire to remain politically active. For him the dedication, commitment, and experience of their earlier political activity, their anticommunism, and their class origins ("many were of the upper class") made the shift to moderate and right politics rather simple (interview, Lisbon, November 13 and 15, 1990).[7]

Other people formerly in the revolutionary left also joined or gravitated to the Cavaco Silva government. José Pacheco Pereira served as a deputy of the PSD. Vilaverde Cabral, João Carlos Espada, and Pacheco led some important intellectuals in a movement they called the Esquerda Liberal (Liberal Left). These individuals had evolved politically in Maoist and Marxist-Leninist groups and turned to the right because of their opposition to the PCP and the Soviet Union. Many were skeptical of the PS, which had even aligned itself with the PSD. An exception was João Carlos Espada, who served as political adviser to Soares, but earlier as a Maoist was imprisoned and later understood

April 25 as a coup that evolved in a revolutionary process in which two revolutions simultaneously were evident, one a liberal democratic revolution and the other a socialist communist or popular democratic revolution (interview, Lisbon, July 27, 1989). They were ambitious, aggressive, and disciplined, and they readily adapted to capitalism. For example, Vicente Jorge Silva, once editor of a Maoist journal, became an editor of *Público*, a popular daily under the control of one of the powerful economic groups (interview, Francisco Martins Rodrigues, Lisbon, November 14, 1990).

The decision of former radical leftists such as Antunes to align themselves with the PSD rather than the PS was a result of their skepticism about Soares, but in fact the two parties often worked together. As president, the always opportunistic Soares cultivated his relationship with Prime Minister Cavaco Silva. The PSD even supported Soares in his reelection on January 13, 1991, when he won 70 percent of the vote. Then on October 6, 1991, the PSD again won a majority of votes and an absolute majority of seats in the legislative elections, with the Socialists gaining nearly 30 percent and the Communists 9 percent. The PSD program rested on four points: state modernization in a Portuguese context, development through the market economy, investment in infrastructure for the future, and raising the standard of living. Signs of economic improvement were, however, offset by a decline beginning in the second half of 1992 and extending to a major crisis in 1994 and eventually to the decision by Cavaco Silva to resign as prime minister, presumably to run for the presidency in 1996.

A fifth phase was marked by the rise of the Socialists and a shift in the mix of political parties. The PS took 43 percent of the vote and 112 seats in the legislative elections of October 1, 1995, while the PSD received nearly 35 percent and 88 seats, and the PCP and CDS each about 9 percent and 15 seats. This victory included substantial gains and majorities in all the major cities of the north, which had been PSD strongholds. António Guterres became prime minister and began to roll back some of the PSD measures. On January 14, 1996, Jorge Sampaio, the popular mayor of Lisbon, defeated Cavaco Silva with 54 percent of the vote in the presidential elections, with two-thirds of the eligible voters casting ballots. Cavaco Silva's support was in the north and Sampaio's in the south. The change of government signified "the collapse of Cavaco Silva, a brutal end of an epoch, and a change never before experienced in Portugal" (Saraiva, 1995: 4).[8]

The PS again emerged victorious in the legislative elections of October 1999, and Guterres formed a government with a majority of one deputy. The Socialists won 45 percent and the PCP 9 percent against 33 percent for the PSD. The decline in PS influence was attributable to the failure of some 278,000 adherents to vote (*Revista Expresso*, October 16, 1999).

Nataf (1995: 74–79) had projected several outcomes in the electoral arena: a victory for the PSD with a parliamentary minority, a grand coalition of the PSD and the PS, and a merging of the PS and the PCB. In fact, the PSD continued as the major party until 1995, and as the major opposition party the PS eventually emerged hegemonic within the political spectrum as a social democratic party trying to manage democratic capitalism. The Communists' decline continued. Thus, the concept of hegemony for the left would become much less based on class control over the state and more tied to the struggle for redistribution of income typical of contemporary Western European politics. Nataf believes that the left was becoming assimilated to the pluralist politics of a bourgeois hegemony, obscuring any goal of socialism as a class-based alternative to capitalism. He distinguishes between radical counterhegemony and democratic dishegemony. Radical counterhegemony assumes that the vast majority of the agricultural and industrial working class would support the left and the working class would be disproportionately highly mobilized in comparison with the rest of the electorate. A bourgeois democratic hegemony could be achieved, he believes, through a deradicalized working class and the partial support of other social strata, particularly in the service sector. Its concerns would be modest reforms within capitalism based on electoral support among classes and groups not committed to a left political economy and/or a relatively low turnout among radicalized workers. Thus, a rightist strategy might emphasize an internally divided working class won over as the economy faltered under the revolutionary alternatives. Working-class electoral participation would decline over time, especially among left voters, and service-sector voters would support the right rather than the working class; the rural petty bourgeoisie could be counted on for support; and Catholics and women would swing to the right in significant numbers. He sees the PS and the PSD as both similar and dissimilar. Programmatically, the parties represented different approaches to the problems of Portugal, but compromised with elements of a dominant class. Still, competition between them slowed down the implementation of a European model of parliamentary corporatism (229). Their ties also reflected that a dominant class had persisted in the face of hard-line revolutionaries who were indecisive in implementing their alternative hegemonic project.

While ruling throughout the late 1990s, the PS suffered from internal division, and its popularity was undermined by policies of continuity and inability to move decisively in new directions. One political observer, José António Saraiva (2001), commented that forthcoming elections might clarify a confusing political situation and suggested four scenarios for the future. First, the PS might win with a plurality of votes, bringing instability under a minority government. Second, the PSD under Barroso might win a plurality and form

a minority government, but its position would be tenuous. Third, the PSD might coalesce with the PP to form a majority government that would have to contend with the contrasting perspectives of Barroso and the PP leader, Paulo Portes. Finally, the PS might align itself with the PCP to form a majority government fraught with antagonism between the two.

In January 2001 Jorge Sampaio was elected to a second five-year term as president with 55.8 percent of the vote and some 20 percent above his nearest challenger in an election in which only half of the 8.7 million of the electorate voted—a record low for a presidential election. The fragility of the PS had prompted Guterres to reshuffle his cabinet in July 2000 and turn the party in a liberal direction, and it declined to its lowest point in 2001 (Saraiva, 2001). By aligning itself with the PP, the PSD won parliamentary control in March 2002, but the differences between Barroso and Portes ensured political instability and a succession of PSD prime ministers until Sampaio dissolved parliament in December 2004, and the PS emerged with a majority under José Sócrates in the February 2005 elections.[9]

Social Democracy and Marginalization of the Left

With politics centering around the PSD and the PS during the decades after 1974, it is useful to explore the possibility of a left coalition. Animosity between the PS and the PCP undermined any serious alliance that could have ensured a parliamentary majority and a political hegemony of the left. Elements within each party, however, would occasionally reach out in the hope of coming together.

Gallagher has argued that the PCP played no part in the April 25 coup but became a major player after the coup because of the respect the working class held for it and its organizing ability, and this allowed it to be deeply involved in running state agencies, especially the media. Cunhal participated in the first provisional government, and at its Seventh Congress in the fall of 1974 the PCP toned down its image by disavowing the dictatorship of the proletariat as an aim (Ferreira, 1983: 97). The party struggled to preserve its popularity through the summer of 1975. In the general parliamentary elections of April 1976, it won two-thirds of the vote in urban and rural areas where it held a commanding presence, but two months later in the presidential elections its vote was undermined by the candidacy of radical left hero, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, in such strongholds as Evora, Beja, and Setúbal. Aligning itself with the MDP to form the Frente de Unidade Popular (Front of Popular Unity—FUP), the PCP consolidated its vote in those areas and emerged as the largest party in the local elections of December 1976. It was the only party to improve

its electoral participation, and it was also able to mobilize its supporters in the elections of 1979 and 1982 as it won control of some 250 municipalities, mainly in the south. The PCP was effective in local areas because of its own organizing capabilities and the weakness of local government (Gallagher, 1986: 58–59). The seizure of latifundia was accompanied by improved living standards and job security for rural farm laborers in the Alentejo, thus ensuring support for the party among rural workers. By 1982 the PCP and its then electoral front, the APU, controlled all twenty-eight councils in the districts of Beja and Evora and the province of Alentejo. In 1985 the PCP suffered losses at the hands of the newly emerging PRD, which assimilated some of the marginalized left. For instance, PRD participation in local elections during December 1985 resulted in victory for a center-right coalition in the Communist stronghold of Setúbal. In May 1986 the Communists proposed an alliance in opposition to Cavaco Silva with the aim of forming a new government that would unite the PS with the PCP, the PRD, and the MDP/CDE (Cunhal, 1986).

The crisis of the party during 1986 to 1990 resulted not only from the sterility of its stance in favor of a democratic and national revolution but also from the rise of Gorbachev and perestroika in the Soviet Union. Early in 1988 Vital Moreira (1990) called for an open dialogue on the role of the party in the contemporary period and an assessment of its past policy and errors. A group of six dissidents, led by Moreira, Veiga de Oliveira, Vítor Louro, Silva Marques, Dulce Martins, and Sousa Marques, objected to the expulsion of Zita Seabra from the Political Committee of the PCP and later from the Central Committee for her views (*Revista Expresso*, May 7, 1988, and *Diário de Notícias*, July 26, 1988). This provoked a crisis within the PCP (Saraiva, 1988) regarding the party's future. Another group, led by António Borges Coelho, pursued "a third path" in support of Vítor Cabrita Neto, who had resigned from the Central Committee with the support of some intellectuals and workers in the party (*Revista Expresso*, June 25, 1988).[10] In 1989 the Núcleo Duro resisted an alliance of the PCP with the PS in the city council elections of Lisbon but did join it in backing the candidacy of the PS leader Jorge Sampaio.

Historically, the PCP had suffered from internal dissidence attributable to personality conflicts as well as policy differences. The former party leader, Cândida Ventura (1984), for example, left the party in 1976, criticizing it for its dogmatism, its centrism, and its falsehoods. J. A. Silva Marques (1976), expelled from the party in 1970, contends that with the fall of Salazar, the PCP also had declined. One had been dependent on the other, and the PCP had been able to sustain itself because of the attention of the regime to anticommunism. The events of November 25, 1975, not only signified the end of the revolutionary period but also reflected the weakness of the PCP.

The criticisms of Vital Moreira and others seeking reform within the PCP were a reflection of the party leadership's resistance to change (see Saraiva, 1989). Although Cunhal eventually stepped aside, he remained adamant in his criticism of the PS and his insistence that the party adhere to its principles in the face of changing conditions for communist parties everywhere (Avilez, 2000).[11] His successor and secretary-general, Carlos Carvalhas, headed a majority of moderates and nonaligned members in the Central Committee but was able to work with both the majority and the minority members, the latter representing the more sectarian and conservative view (Ramires, 2000).

The evolution of the contemporary PS dates to April 19, 1973, when in the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bad Munstereifel twenty-seven socialists founded the party (see Stock and Rother, 1983, who delve into the antecedents to this founding and the opposition to the Salazar regime). Reis (1988) argues that the PS suffered from the struggle between Soarismo and Eanismo by pointing out, for example, that differences over such questions as a mandate favoring the institutional interests of the military while maintaining parliamentarism and political parties in support of a presidential-military institutionalization led to an electoral defeat for the PS in 1985, an internal rethinking, the eventual demise of Eanismo, and only much later the reemergence of the PS as a dominant political force in Portuguese politics. Artur Portela (1980) describes the conflict between Eanes and Soares in terms of a dispute over how the left could achieve power, with one side favoring a left remaining in opposition within the parliament and gaining power through the presidency and the other insisting that Soares and the majority of his party intervene and seize the opportunity of participating in politics. One problem for the PS, in the view of Saraiva (1988), was that its intellectuals, including Vítor Constâncio, Jorge Sampaio, Jaime Gama, and António Barreto, were more inclined to ponder rather than problem-solve, to speculate rather than take action, to relate to a reality that did not matter to ordinary people, and to use language that was not simple, direct, or efficient. In the ceremonies of April 25, 1981, in commemoration of the 1974 coup, the revolutionary captains were represented by Vasco Lourenço and Pezarat Correia rather than Vasco Gonçalves or Carvalho, and the PCP was the only political party with a representative. (Eanes attended, however, with his representative, Lurdes Pintasilgo.) Saraiva (1981) suggests that the event revealed that Soares was "a false alternative to the right" and that "there could be no left alternative in Portugal without the Communists."

The election of Soares as president represented an opportunity for renovation of the left, according to Marques (1986), who identifies three stages in this process since the April 25 coup. The first was represented by the conflicts

and tensions that were repressed through the autocratic period of 1974 and 1975. The second began with the counterthrust of November 25, 1975, and a normalization under Eanes as president. The third involved the left's attempt to reform, especially the PS's efforts to establish its hegemony over Portuguese society. Commentators of the period believed that it was time for the PS and the PCP to seek new leadership and move on (Abreu, 1986; Saraiva, 1987; Vale, 1986).

Acknowledging the changes in the communist world and the weaknesses of social democracy, José Barros Moura (1990), a PCP deputy, appeals for an alternative politics in which the PS and the PCP make common cause, neither party being capable of coming to power alone. José Pacheco Pereira (1986), however, wonders how the left can change without involving the PCP.

A decisive transitional moment occurred in October 1988 when Constâncio resigned as secretary-general of the PS and an accord was signed with the PRD, which was then in decline. With the PS in the ascendancy, Jorge Sampaio was elected mayor of Lisbon, having secured his victory by an agreement among the PCP, the MDP, the Verdes, and the PS to support him against Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa of the PSD and the CDS (Madrinha and Marques, 1989). Infighting in the PS was evident thereafter. For instance, Manuel Alegre and a half-dozen Socialists abstained in the vote for constitutional revisions of August–September 1997, alleging that the PS was providing "a gift to the PSD." The changes opened elections to emigrants and reduced the number of deputies in the Assembly (*Expresso*, August 30, 1997).[12]

In 1995, when António Guterres became prime minister with the victory of the PS, a conservative observer (Rebelo de Sousa, 1995) criticized him for modeling his organization after his image of previous years when he was a member of SEDES. He characterized Guterres's government as based more on technocrats than on politicians and as differing from the previous Cavaco Silva government in its reliance on academic rather than bureaucratic technocrats. He wondered whether this government would produce a new type of clientelism on the left and whether it could meet social needs while coping with budgetary limits and ensuring security for the people.

Late in 2000 Guterres announced his candidacy for another term as leader of the PS and the government and possibly later for the presidency, a position that João Soares also desired. At the time, the PS was divided over a budget, and its solidarity was being undermined. In October the PCP was debating changing its ideological allegiance from Marxism-Leninism to Marxism alone. The PCP, the Verdes, and the Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc—BE) stood firm and refused to participate in the commemorations celebrating the anniversary of the November 25 counterrevolution.[13]

What was the implication of this symbolic gesture? Did it signify that parliamentary maneuvers of the mainstream parties had not totally marginalized and obscured the revolutionary and popular left parties and movements after 1975? All these developments suggest the demise of a radical or popular left after 1975. Indeed, a prominent political scientist asserted that the revolutionary left of "opportunistic groups" had experienced a small window of opportunity in 1974–1975 but "ultimately it was not important to the historical trajectory" (António Costa Pinto, interview, Lisbon, March 29, 2004). In fact, a semblance of a left was evident but not prominent in the ensuing period. Francisco Louçã identified two tendencies, the first being the unification of the LCI and the PRT into the PSR in 1978. The PSR presented a broad perspective, including currents influenced by Marx, Gramsci, and Luxemburg. With the 1985 elections, its bulletin, *Combate*, was widely circulated, and it was able to garner thirty-five thousand votes in the 1987 elections and sixty thousand in 1995. Second, the Partido Operário de Unidade Socialista (Workers' Party of Socialist Unity—POUS) was a small group whose strategy was to join the PS, resulting in the election of two of its activists, Carmelinda Pereira and Aires Rodrigues, as deputies through the PS (Rodrigues ran for the presidency under the POUS in 1980, receiving ten thousand votes, and later broke with the PS). A selection of texts from *Combate* edited by Francisco Louçã, João Martins Pereira, and João Paulo Cotrim (1993) includes an essay by Louçã looking to the possibility of a renovation of the left (interview, Francisco Louçã, Lisbon, November 19, 1990).

One problem for the left was that it had become less vocal and its ideology was ineffective. Coelho (1982) attributes this condition to questions about the position of the left in the postrevolutionary period, the role of Marxism after Althusser, the prominent Marxist philosopher, and the irrelevance of existing socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. These questions were associated with a call for a new left in association with the currents in the PS. Fernando Pereira Marques (1982) identifies various factions within the left, among them those who were moving rapidly toward a merger with the PS, those (such as Constâncio) who defended a process of fusion within the PS through a special congress that would unite its factions and integrate elements of the UEDS, Acção Social Democrática Independente (Independent Social Democratic Action—ASDI), and other independents, and those who insisted on the creation of an autonomous force with its own theses and direction, the UEDS and the FSP being examples. The ASDI represented the "technocratic tendency" of the PSD, which split Sá Carneiro's "populist tendency" in April 1979. The FSP established itself in Lisbon after January 1975 and was led by Manuel Serra, the radical Catholic socialist.[14] Lopes Cardoso had formed the

UEDS in 1978 as an "authentically socialist" alternative to Soares and the PS executive, but it ran candidates under the PS in the 1983 and 1985 elections. It dissolved itself in 1986 as a consequence of a split in left politics between Soares and Pintasilgo in the first round of the presidential elections and the gravitation of the left to Soares in the second round. Many of its members backed Pintasilgo, while others such as Lopes Cardoso returned to the PS (*Diário de Notícias*, April 21, 1986).

The struggle for renovation also resulted in the formation of the Esquerda Democrática in December 1986. It included former militants of the MES, elements of the PS, and people such as Alberto Martins, a leader of the Associação "Pintasilguista."[15] In an assessment of this effort, Duarte Lima (1987) describes the three elements of the parliamentary left, the PCP, the PRD, and the PS, as having been unable to provide an alternative.[16] He saw the PCP as the most cohesive and free of contradictions in its policy and action; the PRD as indecisive, inactive, and lacking ideological direction; and the PS as seeking to pursue an alternative without having reached an agreement to rule the country. The difficulties of an alliance between the PS and the PRD revealed the hesitancy of socialists to cede space that they legitimately held and the weakness of the PRD as a party formed from above by Eanes and not structured at its base (Saraiva, 1986).[17]

By the turn of the century, Louçã and his BE represented a voice of dissent in the parliament. For example, working together in the assembly, the BE, PCP, and Os Verdes raised objections to the Durão Barroso government for its support of U.S. President George W. Bush in the Iraq war. In March 2004 antiwar sentiment swept socialists to power in Spain, where the conservative government had also supported Bush. Barroso suddenly no longer appeared in photos with Bush. Although the March 30 visit of British Prime Minister Tony Blair signified their political alliance in the war, change was inevitable. Barroso resigned shortly thereafter, and by the end of the year the PSD government had fallen.[18]

The fiasco of the coalition government PSD-CDS presided over by Durão Barroso, followed by the brief but unstable government of Santana Lopes, signified incompetence that was closely scrutinized by the media and resulted in a drastic decline in the electoral possibilities of the PSD. The disastrous reign of Santana Lopes as prime minister led Sampaio to dissolve the Assembleia and convoke new elections, the result being the victorious PS emerging with an absolute majority.

Sociologist Mário Machaqueiro has offered several observations (personal communication, July 28, 2008) about this changing political scenario. First, the rise of the PS with José Sócrates, with a shift toward neoliberalism and the monetarism of the EU, enabled the PS to achieve an absolute majority

for the first (and probably last) time. Alongside this political achievement was the emergence within the PS of conservative Freitas do Amaral, who as party foreign minister and eventually president of the UN General Assembly turned left and became a vocal and prominent critic of the Bush administration. Although Sócrates and the mainstream of the PS favored Mário Soares as a candidate for the 2006 presidential elections, Manuel Alegre also ran as a presidential candidate, representing the left wing of the PS. The split vote resulted in victory for Cavaco Silva, a respectable second place for Alegre with more than a million votes, and a humiliating third place for Soares. Thereafter, Alegre, still a PS deputy, participated in a rally for the Bloco de Esquerda with criticism of the Sócrates government. With the approximation of Alegre and the left wing of the PS to the BE, it was believed that in the next presidential elections the PS would run Alegre as its candidate as a means of "buying his silence."

Second, despite Cavaco Silva's presidential victory, his PSD had suffered from disastrous leadership and, with its future in doubt, the party named Manuela Ferreira Leite as its leader. The hope was that her experience as minister in past PSD governments might reverse the decline of her party.

Finally, the appearance of the BE as a new electoral force offered interesting possibilities for the left. The political scenario had completely changed in contrast to the late 1990s. In contrast to the decline of communist parties within Europe, the PCP showed signs of a resurgence and a steady gain in votes. It continued to be a significant force in Portuguese society, especially with influence within the labor movement.

The State and the Resurgence of the Dominant Classes

Hegemony under Salazar was a project and a strategy of capitalist accumulation. In contrast, the 1974–1975 rupture involved deposing the dominant class and radicalizing the subordinate classes while setting up the conditions for a counterhegemony of the subordinate classes. Our analysis suggests that the dominant classes were weakened by radical reforms, especially the nationalization of private banks of March 1975. Given political space and the possibility for organization and mobilization, the popular classes were strengthened during the 1974–1975 period, but after the countercoup of November 25, 1975, they declined in importance because their allies were afraid of losing control over the process. Organized labor in urban centers, for example, succumbed to the pressures and influences of the major political parties, and rural workers suffered from the rollback of the agrarian reform and government inattention. The ensuing period of parliamentary democracy was

associated not with a politics of power and control but with fragmentation and uncertainty. In the economy it was clear that the countercoup did not signify the immediate dominance of domestic capital or a return to prominence of the traditional classes, but it did allow the state to consolidate its hold: "It represented a step, a pause, an attempt by the state to catch up with itself, to draw its breadth and to generate policies from above to put its house in order" (Mailer, 1977: 344). Although a class struggle between workers and factory owners was clearly in evidence in 1974–1975, the revolutionary process had suffered from a lack of hegemony and a setback for the left in pursuit of a way out of semiperipheral capitalism. Only after the last revision of the constitution in 1989 and the privatization of nationalized industries under the tutelage of a majoritarian rightist government did a dominant bloc of forces emerge whose hegemony was tied to Portugal's integration with the European Union (interview, Maria de Lourdes Lima Santos, Lisbon, July 24, 1989).

Our glimpse of the dominant classes has provided some hints about who really rules in Portugal. The main participants in government were technocrats, middle bourgeoisie in origin. Although some were drawn from the larger modern corporations in Lisbon, they tended not to include the wealthier founders, heirs, and owners of traditional industry in the north. It is argued (Makler, 1979: 152–160) that it would have been difficult for an efficient corporative system to represent the expanding industrial sector. The state failed to assimilate all the diverse interests because institutional channels were lacking and special interests tended to align themselves with cliques and become involved in intragovernmental struggles.

Capitalism in Portugal had advanced because of the existence of the colonies. Historically, the domestic bourgeoisie had lacked confidence and failed in the confrontation with English capital, but under Salazar it gradually took hold in the colonies. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, foreign and domestic capital, mobilized through state initiative and incentives, moved rapidly to the colonies to exploit natural resources and to offset the threat of the African liberation movements. The initiative of Soares and the PS to integrate with the EEC would have accelerated foreign investment in the country, and it was opposed by both nationalists on the right and communists on the left in the belief that the industrialists would align themselves with foreign capital in the exploitation of cheap labor and small landowners would disappear as agriculture reorganized (Francisco Martins Rodrigues, interview, Lisbon, November 14, 1990). Under the Caetano regime some of the old monopolies entered into joint enterprises with foreign corporations and shifted or complemented their colonial and domestic ventures with more profitable investment in Brazil, Europe, and the United States. The internationalization of the conglomerates represented an undermining of the old alliance between landowners and financial and industrial interests in the metropolis.

Although the 1975 nationalizations disrupted its activities within Portugal, the traditional entrepreneurial class would come to have a role in subsequent years alongside the emerging new one. It had prospered during and since the Salazar dictatorship, losing the colonies and the dictatorship but continuing to benefit from cheap labor and the "comparative advantage" of low labor costs even after April 25 and integration with Europe (Rosas, 2004b: 11). One important segment of the domestic bourgeoisie, the textile owners, illustrated the difficulty for capitalists of carrying on without outside capital and technology: "The textile industrialists are simple people, provincial, discrete. They are in trouble. These are self-made and paternalistic men" (Maria Filomena Mónica, interview, Lisbon, November 14, 1985). Traditionally, Portuguese entrepreneurs were able to flourish through their ties with the state. Despite limited markets, which they controlled in a sort of internal monopoly, in the postcoup era the economic groups continued to depend on state support.

Changes in 1974–1975 were reflected in the relationship of the old and new economic groups not only to the state but also to foreign capital. José Manuel Rolo has argued that both groups were shielded by the state in their quest to integrate with Europe: "Today each group has become a representation of foreign capital . . . simply an expression of foreign interests" (interview, Lisbon, November 14, 1985). António Lopes Cardoso confirms this tendency: "The new economic groups are tied to foreign capital and are large potential forces that will impact Portugal. They are not patriotic in their interests, motivated by profit, and quite willing to tie into foreign capital. Foreign capital dominates over these groups. In real estate, foreign capital is substantial, especially Spanish, German, and Scandinavian capital" (interview, Lisbon, November 14, 1990).[19]

Gramsci and his influence upon contemporary Italian thinking may be helpful in differentiating transnational relations from historical forms of national exchange. William Robinson (2003: 48) draws on this distinction to argue that all modes of national accumulation within national capitalism tend to erode in the face of globalization so that the focus today should be not on national but on global social structures of accumulation. He suggests that in some parts of the contemporary world a weak national bourgeoisie should be examined in the light of its possible relations and assimilation to an international bourgeoisie. He distinguishes between a world economy made up of national capitals and a global economy in which there is globalization of the production process and a shift from national to globalized circuits of accumulation. Globalization of transnational capital and the suppression of the nation-state, he believes, represent an epochal shift in the evolution of capitalism: from its feudal origins and mercantilist expansionism to 1789, competitive or classical capitalism marked by the industrial revolution and the rise

of a bourgeoisie in the late nineteenth century, and the rise of corporate or monopoly capitalism in the late 1970s. He also focuses on a global conception of class while looking at transnational class formation, transnational state, and transnational hegemony (35–36). Essentially, he restates traditional categories of class in terms of the transnational bourgeois and transnational class fractionalization and argues that transnational capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a world scale and that the new bourgeoisie or capitalist class is part of the world bourgeoisie that represents transnational production as embodied principally in the transnational corporations and private financial institutions. He notes that traditional national fractions of dominant groups are in decline whereas transnational fractions are in ascent. The new technocrats have become the transnational fraction of the national bourgeoisie in contrast to the old bourgeoisie and state bureaucrats. The state in each nation reorganizes as a transnational state within world capitalism (47).

Imperial Mystique and Dependence

It is premature and indeed it is not my task to delve into how the Portuguese economy is being shaped by global capital today. Portugal's global destiny, however, has been shaped by its past discoveries, commercial expansion, international trade, and the illusion of empire while finding itself often disadvantaged in relations with more advanced countries.

Historically backward and geographically on the margin, Portugal after 1974 cast off its imperial network of colonies and joined the developed and developing countries of Europe. During the Salazar years economic policies had emphasized stability, insulating the economy from external forces and keeping structural change to a minimum. Relying on national resources and minimizing external dependency, the "inward-oriented corporatist economy" was kept isolated (Baer and Leite, 1992: 20). State regulation, minimal public ownership, and a monopolistic private sector characterized this economy: "The system stifled competition, misallocated resources, strengthened existing monopolies, encouraged favoritism, and discouraged foreign investment" (Corkill, 1999: 15). Pressure for change during the 1960s, including the colonial wars in Africa and integration with Europe, culminated with the coup of April 25, 1974, and the ensuing revolutionary period turned the economy upside down, with instability, nationalization of monopolies, and a widespread desire for implementing a socialist economy. With the collapse of the empire and especially the colonies in Africa, Portugal had to find a new way forward, and this problem was not really worked out until the first constitutional governments under Mário Soares.

The dilemma was what to do about colonialism in Africa while integrating with Europe. This demarcation shifted with the liberation of the colonies after the April 25 coup. Decolonization evolved into two positions, one arguing unsuccessfully that self-determination did not necessarily lead to independence and that Portuguese sovereignty over the territories would be maintained until a referendum was held and the other favoring self-determination and independence and transfer of power to the national liberation movements as the legitimate representatives of the new nations (Teixeira, 2003: 113). The African option, once independence was attained, was symbolically and diplomatically represented in the Paises Africanos de Lingua Oficial Portuguesa (PALOP). The European option involved a request for accession to the EEC in March 1977 and formal entry in June 1985 and becoming a full member on January 1, 1986 (116). Teixeira observes that four changes ensued for Portuguese relations abroad: a shift from an Atlanticist to a European position; maintenance of an Atlantic and European balance geographically with Portugal strategically oriented to Europe while recovering its influence in the South Atlantic and its former colonial possessions; an approximation of diplomatic ties between Portugal and Spain; and an evolution of Portuguese bilateral diplomacy into multilateralism.

Britain and the United States have both played significant roles in the internal affairs of Portugal. U.S. relations with Portugal have been shaped in many ways by the influence of one and a half million Portuguese, including many Azoreans, in the United States, by the treaty allowing the military base at Lajes on the island of Terceira in the Azores, by relations with Europe, and by U.S. involvement in Angola. The Lajes base was the outgrowth of a Portuguese policy dating to World War II that allowed the U.S. Navy to use facilities at Ponta Delgada and Horta (Chilcote, 1962). This arrangement carried on through the colonial wars and into the revolutionary period, and a renewal of the treaty was signed in the mid-1980s.

During the revolutionary period, the involvement of U.S. Ambassador Frank Carlucci and the Central Intelligence Agency and of German Social Democrats under Willy Brandt and the complicity of Mário Soares were evident (Antunes, 1986). In a retrospective interview, Carlucci recounted how he had worked closely with such MFA figures as Vítor Alves, Melo Antunes, Ramalho Eanes, and others, allegedly not to counter communism but to question the commitment of President Costa Gomes to the democratic process (Vieira, 1994: 18). Kenneth Maxwell refers to an October 18, 1974, luncheon at the State Department at which Henry Kissinger admonished visiting President Costa Gomes and Foreign Minister Soares for tolerating communist participation in the revolution and making possible the loss of Portugal, a NATO ally of the West. Kissinger had dismissed Ambassador Nash Scott for

his passive stand toward the revolution and replaced him with Carlucci and other aides who had been involved in the U.S.-backed coup against Brazilian President João Goulart in 1964 (Maxwell, 1995: 95). Although U.S. foreign policy soon became entangled with the Portuguese revolution, with the CIA serving as a conduit for covert funds for the right-of-center political parties and possibly for financing riots and the burning of Communist headquarters in northern Portugal, Tad Szulc (1975–1976) notes that Carlucci opposed Kissinger's policy of isolating Portugal during its revolutionary phase. Ingmar Oldberg also asserts that the CIA was involved with the transfer of secret funds to right-wing parties and even to the Socialists through Western European social democrats. He argues that "the American reaction to the Portuguese revolution was to a great extent colored by anxiety over the role and influence of the Communists. . . . Different policies were conducted simultaneously. There was a certain penchant for repressive measures" (1982: 183).[20] In his fascinating memoir (Cruzeiro, 2002: 267), Vasco Gonçalves alludes to the roles of Carlucci and Mário Soares and their complicity in CIA intervention as well as the British Callahan Plan and the MI6 in support of the PS in undermining the Fifth Provisional Government.[21] A former CIA operative in Portugal during 1974, Oswaldo Le Winter, claiming to be exiled in Lisbon, has elaborated on U.S. clandestine activities and their impact on events over the past half century and especially during 1974–1975.[22] In a retrospective summary of U.S. involvement, Tiago Moreira da Sá (2004) summarizes the American involvement and the shifting U.S. position in regard to Portugal in this period of crisis: from April to July 1974, cautiously tolerating the transitional regime but opposing communists in the government; July 1974, involvement of Kissinger; July–October 1974, pessimism in the American camp; October 1974 to January 1975, Kissinger on the offensive in determining the outcome of the transition; January to April 1975, Washington deeply preoccupied with Portugal; April to June 1975, U.S. pressure to push the regime toward representative democracy through the threat of expelling Portugal from NATO; June to August 1975, optimism and activism with marginalization of the PCP and Gonçalves; August to November 1975, support for the November 25 coup; November 1975 to July 1976, U.S. support of the moderate regime and the isolation of the PCP and radicals. The outcome of the U.S. involvement, according to Moreira da Sá (2004: 148), was a loan of $240 million, creation of an international consortium with commitment of $1.5 billion, and access to credit from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

These financial ties, Rosa (1978 and 1982) argues, signified a tendency of the PS and PSD governments to drift toward a compliance with imperialism, a position based on legislation that modified the agrarian reform and restored power

to the monopolists, the large agrarian capitalists, and landowners and under-mined the advances by the working classes, including devaluation of the escudo, an increase in taxes, and other measures that weakened workers' organizations.

Another prominent Socialist, Raúl Rego, is more conciliatory about his party's ties to imperialism. Although Portugal has always been dependent on the outside world, he predicts that within two decades capital will be pre-dominantly international as Portugal becomes more like the United States and Britain (interview, Lisbon, November 19, 1990).

Economic Stagnancy

> It may still be peripheral to the European core but is no longer semi-peripheral in global terms. Portugal no longer ranks among the world's poor or even Europe's poorer nations, rather it is located among the less well-off richer countries. It has achieved political stability, posted a solid macroeconomic performance, is highly rated by foreign investors, and is gradually developing an infrastructure commensurate with an advanced economy. (Corkill, 1999: 49)

The past imperial strategy and the dependence on its powerful ally, Eng-land, and its relations to the United States did not necessarily correlate with advances in the Portuguese economy.[23] David Corkill balances his optimistic assessment at the end of the twentieth century with awareness of weaknesses. Pedro Lains (2003) notes that after 1950, under Salazar and a closed economy, a considerable shift occurred from the agrarian to the industrial and services sectors along with growth, but with the opening of the economy after 1973 and integration with Europe, the economy slowed down overall. António Barreto (2003 and 1996) amasses an array of data showing positive changes: women represented 20 percent of the economically active population in the 1970s and today represent about half; unemployment has never been above 10 percent, in contrast to the rest of Europe, where it generally has been higher; wages are below the European average; and the welfare system has increased substantially over the years. Within the country there has been dramatic change: "the past four decades represent a period of progressive and almost constant increase in collective and individual well-being . . . compared to the situation of real backwardness in which the country found itself in 1960" (2003: 173). He argues that today Portugal has ceased being different from the rest of Europe. It may suffer from low levels of productivity and a shortage of capital and public resources, but the expectations and aspirations of its people are among those of the wealthiest of European nations (182).

Despite this optimism, important problems remain. In contrast to the of-ficial figure of 6.6 percent, Eugénio Rosa estimates that real unemployment

reaches nearly 10 percent when it includes workers who have stopped looking for work and the underemployed (*Diário de Notícias*, March 30, 2004). Some two hundred thousand persons suffer from hunger, according to a full analysis in *Público* (March 21, 2004), and 15 percent of homes in Portugal are in need of repair (*Público*, March 3, 2004). Fernando Rosas (2004b) is critical of the government and its efforts to take advantage of the comparative advantage of low wages in Portugal and argues that, with the EU opening to the markets of China and India, Portugal no longer has any comparative advantage and it is time for the government to dedicate itself to the real needs of people.

Corkill elaborates on the many problems. First is a weak transportation infrastructure. The ports, crucial to Portugal's opening to the world since the age of discoveries, are in need of modernization. Roads have been improved with the financial assistance of the EU, but the rail system is deficient. He alludes to a Portuguese business culture built on "subsidy dependence" in which the state continues to play an active role and is interventionist so that subsidies to private enterprise absorb 10 to 15 percent of its budget (1999: 52). He also refers to the corporatist legacy: "Although old-line officials were purged, structures, procedures, and mentalities did not undergo an immediate transformation" (52). Further, the bureaucracy suffers from low wages, poor image, inadequate training, depressed morale, and absenteeism. When in 1975 the state assumed control of "the commanding heights of the economy," the public sector suddenly became the largest in Western Europe, representing about a quarter of the gross domestic product, a tenth of employment, and half of investment (56). When the PSD came to power in 1985, it set out to reduce state enterprise, and with a change in the constitution in 1989 it was able to move toward privatization. State assets were sold off thereafter, but the state did not withdraw from the economy altogether; it retained a majority interest in 400 firms and a minority stake in 732. Further, public investment levels were increasing. Nevertheless, the state-enterprise share of national income had been reduced to half its 1979 total, and the sector accounted for 10 percent of GDP and 3 percent of employment in 1998 compared with 20 percent and 10 percent respectively in 1988 (63). Most affected by the changing economic structure has been the agricultural sector, "in perpetual crisis, being overlarge, backward and inefficient, with a workforce suffering from falling incomes" (126), and since the late 1980s impacted by the dismantling of protectionist measures, market mechanisms, and efforts to cut costs: this underperforming sector represented the highest rate of rural depopulation in the EU, including the fastest-falling farm incomes and the highest food-import dependency (125). Its backwardness is attributable to poor soil, lack of rainfall, small size of farms, subsistence farming, low technology, and inadequate investment (128).

Changes in the economy are visible especially in tourism, the main foreign-export earner—well ahead of textiles and clothing. In industry, some sectors have traditionally benefited from protectionist barriers, and interventionism has spawned large state-owned industries and dependence on international demand. An initiative in the 1980s to develop a technological base for Portuguese industry, a sort of Silicon Valley on the European periphery, was never implemented. With the nationalization of industry in the Lisbon-Setúbal area in 1975, business interests in the north gradually gained prominence with the emergence of new economic groups (Corkill, 1999: 155).

The labor market includes a working population of 4.2 million of whom slightly more than 3 million are self-employed, mainly in services and agriculture. Low rates of unemployment, especially for Europe, are partially accounted for by workers who lose jobs and return to family homes and smallholdings in the countryside. An example from the polluted Vale de Ave reveals the plight of such workers. In this case, twenty thousand families who worked in textile mills were gradually being laid off. Of twenty-eight textile firms in the region, two had closed, leaving their 1,450 workers unemployed, three others with a total of 900 employees were about to go bankrupt, and most of the others were behind on salary payments (Peixote, 1990: 38–47). Elsewhere in the countryside, a revolt of farmers in Bombarral, characterized as the largest farmers' movement since the April 25 coup, discredited a CAP leadership linked with the government and allowed a new leadership to emerge in the area (Rodrigues and Cardoso, 1991). According to one former minister, the agrarian reform movement no longer exists (António Lopes Cardoso, interview, Lisbon, November 14, 1990).

Santos argues that new kinds of employment—clandestine work, subcontract work, increasing feminization of the workforce, growth in agencies that provide workers, and an increase in the number of the self-employed—have ensured a new regime of accumulation through the consolidation of the new industrial and financial monopoly sector (1993: 38–39) and helped to disguise underemployment. Emigration, which historically has served to ease unemployment, has fallen off in recent years (see Black, 1993).

Various approaches have been implemented for easing tensions between capital and labor, including the agreements after 1974, but the package of labor reforms introduced by the Cavaco Silva government after 1987 permitted dismissals, firm reorganization, and the introduction of new technology. General strikes united labor in 1988 and 1989 against these measures, which were eventually approved, and allowed for reductions in the workforce in relation to market conditions. In 1984 the social pact, a neocorporatist measure designed to allow government, trade unions, and employer organizations to develop consensus on economic and social policy and to reduce tensions,

was formally established, and it was considered a means for modernizing Portuguese industry, including implementation of security reforms, realistic wage increases, and reduction of the work week from forty-four to forty hours (Corkill, 1999: 195).

Corkill sums up with attention to two recent growth periods, one from 1976 to 1985 and the other from 1985 to 1994. The first was characterized by political instability, uneven macroeconomic policy, imposition of two International Monetary Fund stabilizations, and two external shocks set off by rises in oil prices. The second was affected by similar conditions plus the shock of integration with the EU and the infusion of funds to build infrastructure for growth.[24] Per capita income increased as a percentage of the EU average from 46.6 percent to 62 percent (209), implying that Portugal lags far behind, yet Corkill optimistically suggests, "It is better placed than at any time during the last three hundred years to make an important contribution once again" (242).[25]

Prospects for Portugal

What should we conclude about this period of parliamentary democracy and the pursuit of legitimacy and hegemony? In theory the new constitution was to institutionalize a democratic transition and a pluralistic route to socialism. The MFA agreed to a pact that perpetuated its power for the next three years but ensured participation by the political parties. Although two-thirds of the parties participating in the April 1975 elections were Marxist and Leninist in orientation, the vote favored the PS and the moderate right PPD and also ensured representation for the right-wing CDS. At the same time, it exposed the dominant and disproportionate position in government of the PCP. The 1976 elections reaffirmed the moderate course in parliament.

Thereafter, the constitutional governments and the political parties assumed more and more influence, with the result that by 1982 the constitution had been revised to diminish the authority of the military and eliminate reference to a transition to socialism, the democratic powers of the working classes, and the transformation into a classless society, and to eliminate the Revolutionary Council and any reference to the MFA. The second revision in 1989 purged any remaining language relating to a socialist transition and the socialization of the means of production and shifted from the original irreversibility of the nationalizations to the possibility of privatization of state enterprise. Another revision in 1997 deleted references to the prohibition of the formation of private monopolies and added language facilitating reprivatization (Cunhal, 1999b: 307–311). These changes demonstrated that

through parliamentary maneuvering, moderate and conservative tendencies had obscured the more radical popular and social movements and effectively thwarted any counterhegemonic bloc or consensus.

The question, "What kind of democracy?" was important in the commentary of important figures who participated in these events. After 1974, the state had changed structurally, having appropriated a considerable part of the national productive apparatus and enterprise, and was served by a technobureaucracy with roots in the Salazar-Caetano regime. Acknowledging that the ideology of the state was initially socialist, Lucena argues that there was no consensus about it (1977b: 583). Given the absence of leadership, there was little chance for ideological hegemony, and politics would be guided by shifts and compromises within the limits imposed by the new constitution (585). The once radical left and later moderate PSD leader Durão Barroso argued that the revolutionary years had transformed the Portuguese political culture in the direction of democracy and participation. Eduardo de Souza Ferreira complained that Portuguese politicians did not understand democracy and lacked any political tradition. He felt that "those who wish to exercise power in Portugal are not prepared to do so" (interview, Lisbon, November 15, 1990). This assessment was shared by Raúl Rego, who commented about the years of the Cavaco Silva governments: "Cavaco is a technocrat, without political sense and without political formation and political culture, who was placed at the head of a party and lacks understanding of democratic structures" (interview, Lisbon, November 19, 1990). Francisco Louça saw a very slow process of institutionalization and system autonomy since after November 25, 1975, including a pluralization of rightist forces and a marginalization or absorption of the left (interview, Lisbon, November 19, 1990). Fernando Rosas argues that in the aftermath of 1974–1975 a negative discourse evolved attacking the revolution as undermining the large economic groups and interrupting the economic growth of the sixties, imposing a totalitarian and antidemocratic regime that prevailed under the military well into the 1980s, and, under the influence of the Soviet Union abandoning the colonies (Louça and Rosas, 2004: 17–18).

Francisco Martins Rodrigues reflected upon the surprise for the left to discover that the electorate supported the right. "The mass of the population desired stability and was not prepared for a left push." The movement, he argued, was not led in a way that it could come to power. There was no unity. The conservative spirit of the great mass of the population wanted a different system, one of order (interview, Lisbon, November 14, 1990). Louça also felt that a socialist alternative was impossible within the existing capitalist system: "the PS's project was only to moderate reform in the capitalist system." He insisted that Soares had no real power and indeed could not acquire any:

"Soares will want a minority PS government so that he can rule from above as President." He saw little hope for a significant socialist alternative in the near future (interview, Lisbon, November 19, 1990).

Raúl Rego revealed that, except for Soares, the first set of ministers had never been in jail. They were men of the mainstream, for example, the leaders of the PS. The Grupo de Intervenção Socialista (Socialist Intervention Group—GIS) that came to dominate the PS included Sampaio and Guterres, who as moderate intellectuals had left the MES in December 1974. Louçá felt that in the long run there was a need for a new political culture. He saw intellectuals as having shifted to the right, with João Carlos Espada as the head of Portuguese liberalism. As leftist intellectuals shifted from the MES to the PS, a second line of leftists mobilized around Soares in a conciliatory centrist position. The intellectual is close to the state if not necessarily dependent on it for a living. Cavaco Silva, for example, appointed Eduardo Prado Coelho and Eduardo Lourenço, both from the left of the PS, as cultural attachés to Paris and Rome (interview, Lisbon, November 19, 1990).

The events of 1974–1975, according to Rego, represented a transition but not a revolution. The structures of the state today are similar to those of the Caetano, not the Salazar, period. In one sense, Catholic religious influence was important under Caetano, but the mainstream PS leaders were also fundamentally religious. Rego felt that socialism was a consequence of liberalism: "You have to have liberalism first. You must provide everyone with a minimum of dignity to deal with their needs." There also was continuity in the economy, he believed. The big businessmen, young during the Caetano period, were conspicuous after 1975. Many technocrats of the old regime continued their activity. "Cavaco and Salazar were similar, the latter being more doctrinaire and more reactionary, the former simply a technocrat" (interview, Lisbon, November, 19, 1990).[26]

In his look back at the revolution and its demise, Álvaro Cunhal (1999b) suggests that the formation of a socialist government in 1976 marked not only the extinction of the revolutionary dynamic but a shift toward the counterrevolutionary process through the political power of the government and the assembly (1999b: 268). Whereas the revolutionary process lasted only two years, the counterrevolutionary process lasted more than twenty years, attributable to the persistent struggle of the working class, the promise of the revolution that the needs of the people would be met, the defense of a democratic regime, the revolutionary drive toward socialism and the end of monopoly capital, and the implantation of an agrarian reform (271). The counterrevolution aimed at restructuring monopoly capitalism, allowing the revival of large economic groups and restoring latifundista property in the countryside. This goal involved the privatization of state enterprise and revisions in the consti-

tution, the building of an effective counterrevolutionary alliance among the rival PS, PSD, and CDS parties, and integration with Europe and a sacrifice of national interests to the EEC.

The economic prospects for Portugal are expressed in widely differing analyses. Teixeira (1999: 187) identifies two thrusts of the MFA program: the development of a new economic policy on behalf of the Portuguese people and especially the underprivileged and a new social policy for all, including the working class. The Melo Antunes plan of early 1975 included political control over economic power within an economic democracy; an economic and social policy to benefit the majority of the population, especially the underprivileged; pursuit of a policy of national independence to confront commercial and international relations; control over basic economic sectors and natural resources; and the leveling of excessive concentration of power, working with the private sector to ensure the evolution of the economy so as to benefit the majority of the population (Teixeira, 1999: 188). Political dissension and the rise of counterrevolutionary forces, both within the military and in civil society, however, undermined any efforts to implement the plan. Eduardo de Souza Ferreira is pessimistic about Portuguese progress: "The Portuguese do not understand development. But it will take decades because it is difficult to change the Portuguese mentality." He also believes that those who wish to exercise power are not prepared to do so (interview, Lisbon, November 15, 1990). A more optimistic assessment by Vivaldo Mendes (1999) concentrates on the convergence of the Portuguese economy in the process of European integration and challenges claims that the Portuguese economy is faced with entrenched obstacles, insoluble social problems, and the threat of foreign domination. He cites a Central Bank report showing that whereas in 1986, when Portugal formally joined the EEC, its purchasing power in terms of GDP per capita was 54.4 percent, by 1998 it had increased to 72 percent. Portuguese per capita growth over the period was high, he says, compared with that of most other economies, and the Portuguese economy was one of the most open to international competition.

Despite the large infusion of EU funds for infrastructure, inclusion in the EU had become a problem, however. In 2005, for a second time in several years, the EU rebuked Portugal for its increasing budget deficit (4.2 percent in 2002 and 6.82 percent in 2005), well above levels required within the EU (*El Pais*, June 21, 2005). The press commonly characterized this condition as "the monster," attributing its origins to excessive expenditures associated with the criticism of Miguel Cadilhe, a former finance minister of the PSD who focused the problem on the policies of Cavaco Silva with the increase in state employee salaries (*Expresso*, 1700, May 28, 2005). Additionally, in May 2005 the French and Dutch voters rejected the EU constitution, throwing

Europe into turmoil as nationalist sentiment on the right and left and con-
cern over the expansion of the EU and opening up to immigration became
issues of deep concern. Coincidentally, Durão Barroso, after the fall of his
PSD government to the PS and just seven months into his job as president of
the European Commission, appeared unable to manage the crisis. While the
breakup of the EU was highly unlikely, another constitutional draft and vote
would probably ensue. The dilemma for Portugal was its standing as one of
the poorest of the fifteen early members of the EU, the realization that it no
longer would be the beneficiary of handouts from the EU, and an economy
that seemed unable to move forward dramatically.

In a pessimistic assessment Mário Murteira recalled the euphoria of the
revolutionary days when he served the provisional government as planning
minister and the intense bitterness and pessimism that today permeates the
worldview of the Portuguese people. He described the period of 1974–1975 as
a rupture followed by a transition to the market in 1976–1985, with the way
set forth by Cavaco Silva and his government, who inspired this direction but
really did not implement it. The IMF stabilization plan placed constraints on
growth so that the PS victory and integration with Europe in 1986 cleared
the way for a slow conservative development. However, since the turn of the
century, Portugal has lived with a more vigorous economy but with each step
confronting negative outcomes and possibilities because of the constraints
of ties with the EU. More people are being trained at higher levels, for ex-
ample, but there are no positions for them, as the gap between rich and poor
increases and the middle class withers away (see *Diário de Notícias*, June 6,
2005, for a report that the middle class had suffered impoverishment in the
past four years, with a decline of 15 percent in its purchasing power). Portu-
gal today, in Murteira's view, also lacks people of stature with conviction and
principles like Vasco Gonçalves and Álvaro Cunhal, prominent personalities
in the revolution who died within a forty-eight-hour period during June 2005.
Francisco Louçã exemplifies someone of the contemporary generation who
combines intelligence, knowledge, and conviction (Mário Murteira, inter-
view, Lisbon, June 22, 2005).

Louçã largely agrees with this assessment, arguing that integration with
Europe in 1986 represented the end of the transition period. Thereafter there
were changes: in the population, due to emigration, reduction of mortality
rate, and longevity for the people; in education, with improvement in lit-
eracy; and in social structure, with a decline in agricultural population from
43.6 to 7 percent and movement of people to the cities in search of work in
industry. The revolution destroyed the dictatorship, democratized social rela-
tions, opened space for social movements, legalized the parties, shut down
censorship, and increased the franchise from half a million to seven million

electors. Portugal entered into a period of "conservative modernization," with 20 percent of the wealthiest holding 46 percent of income and 20 percent of the poorest with 6 percent of income (93). A period of "liberalizing modernization" appears with the twenty-first century. However, burdened with substantial deficits and the other consequences of neoliberalism, Louçã asserts that Portugal was not benefiting from its European option (in Louçã and Rosas, 2004: 93–95).

Louçã and Rosas (2004: 233–242) set forth a series of theses:

1. "The left in the name of the future does not wait for the future."
2. Conflicts initiated in the 1974–1975 period "did not exhaust themselves in that short period."
3. The revolution defeated the social system long imposed by the dictatorship, followed by "a conservative modernization," whose strategy was to challenge the revolution and destroy forms of social participation that could evolve into democratic modernization.
4. The Portuguese revolution came to an end as a moment in which "the past and future, the old and new, and continuity and change confronted each other."
5. Modernization is incomplete because it was always conservative and preserved the older forms of social hierarchy with a mode of accumulation based on low salaries and economic protectionism and later on external subsidies.
6. The forms of power, the social alliance, and the dominant political policies were defined over two decades of "conservative modernization," and with the recession of 2002–2004 the liberal modernization took hold under the PSP and PP.
7. The neoliberal model, a form of triumphant capitalism, represented the first great change since 1974: "the nation-state has been the institutional space that defines the hegemony of the bourgeoisie and its domination . . . in order to guarantee stability of the process of accumulation."
8. Neoliberalism represents another "social change" leading to permanent unemployment, reduction of public services, and so on, and it establishes a hegemonic consensus.
9. The neoliberal strategy is to appropriate the giant funds and pensions under the state to the corporations and to bring public health services to the market.
10. Power in the information age serves authoritarianism.
11. As the world broke into large political and military blocs, there occurred the collapse of the USSR and the reformulation of U.S. hegemony.

12. An anticapitalist left will continue to build through world social fo-
rums and new means of communication.

As to the several questions raised at the outset of this chapter, clearly the
advances of the revolution were undermined by uncertainty over socialism
and a commitment to open to the domestic and especially European capital-
ist markets, yet despite the dismantling of some state enterprise, the state
carried on with controls and regulations, in some cases reminiscent of past
authoritarian rule. Reliance on the past practices may have been due to the
cautious outlook of leadership, the political impasse of competing parties, and
the parliamentary system. Bourgeois democracy had been consolidated at the
cost of the socialist ideals that resonated through the revolutionary years and
once had been implanted in the new constitution. Political instability and the
impact of European integration also affected the direction of the economy,
which continued weak and was largely dependent on the infusion of outside
capital for infrastructure. By the end of the century the struggle for hegemony
was ongoing. No new hegemonic bloc of forces had emerged, no modern
national bourgeoisie had decisively entrenched itself in the economy, and the
state continued tied to the dominant classes and uncommitted to resolving
the crisis of the urban and rural working classes and the peasantry.

Notes

1. Positions in finance were occupied by Rui Vilar, president of the Caixa Geral de
Depósitos; João Salgueiro, president of the Banco de Fomento e Exterior and former
finance minister; Artur Santos Silva, president of the Banco Português de Investi-
mentos; Jorge Jardim Gonçalves, president of the Banco Comercial Português; Raúl
Capela, of the Banco Internacional do Funchal; and Father Vítor Melícias, of the Santa
Casa da Misericórdia. Prominent businessmen in its membership included António
Sousa Gomes, former public works minister and head of Investimentos e Participa-
ções do Estado; Alberto Regueira, president of Companhia de Seguros de Créditos and
a former secretary of state; Vítor Constâncio, former head of the Central Bank and a
PS leader; Mário Murteira, former minister of planning and economic coordination;
and Xavier Pintado, a former ambassador and economist (Pintado, 2002).
2. Abraham (1986: 16) argues that "there are two ways of looking at coalition poli-
tics, both actual and potential. . . . The first is in terms of the social classes or forces
represented by various political parties; the second is in terms of the political parties
and electoral coalitions themselves." For a recent analysis of political parties in Portu-
gal after the 1974 coup, see Bruneau (1997).
3. The previous presidents had been military figures (Gomes and Bruneau, n.d):
Oscar Carmona (1928), who assumed executive functions between November 29,
1926, and 1928 (reaffirmed in 1935, 1942, 1949, died in 1951); Craveiro Lopes (1951),

who was not permitted to run again; Amêrico Tomás (1958 to 1974); António de Spínola (May 1974 until late September 1974); Francisco da Costa Gomes (September 1974, until April 25, 1976); and Ramalho Eanes (April 25, 1976, until 1986). Thereafter the presidents were civilian and socialist, with Mário Soares (1986 to 1996) and Jorge Sampaio (1996 to 2006).

4. The literature suggests other ways of synthesizing the period. In a brief overview of democratic and liberal tendencies throughout Portuguese history with emphasis on "the great revolution after April 25," José Medeiros Ferreira (1995) characterizes two revolutionary contexts: first, in terms of space, implying decolonization, the rise of local power, and the perception of a cleavage between North and South, together with Portugal's integration into the European community, and, second, in terms of cultural periods (the republic of revolutionaries, 1974–1975; the republic of politicians, 1976–1982; the republic of businessmen, 1982–1991; and the republic of financiers and journalists, since 1991) (also see Medeiros Ferreira et al., 1995).

5. Party leaders were negligent in attending parliamentary meetings, including Álvaro Cunhal of the PCP, who missed 29 of 41 (70.7 percent); Mário Soares of the PS, 21 of 41 (51 percent), and Freitas Amaral of the CDS, 15 of 41 (36.6 percent) (Bom and Almeida, 1981).

6. Apparently ignored, the MFA legacy was still alive during the 1980s. D'Anunciação (1985) writes that the MFA officers of the Associação 25 de Abril rallied around the candidacy of Pintasilgo. Referring to Vasco Lourenço as an ex-Soarista, he examines the political role of the MFA in the post-1975 period. Júdice (1985) refers to the "excessive politicization" of the armed forces and its potential for conflict. Rebelo de Sousa (1985) claims that the military officers of April were becoming involved in politics by running for office, using the PRD as a base: "We are witnessing an effort of the captains of April to return to the leadership of the national political scene." He sees this as a third phase in the evolution of Eanes's political career, an effort to regain national stature under the cover of the PRD and "the loyal support of the PCP" (see also Alves, Carvalho, and Lourenço, 1982).

7. Barroso stressed that militants of the PCP who became dissatisfied tended to vote for the PSD rather than the PS because of their traditional hostility to the PS and social democracy, but another factor was sympathy for Cavaco Silva, who was from humble origins and was thought of as genuinely interested in the welfare of people in general (see Cabrita and Maldonado, 1990).

8. In 2004, with the launching of the second volume of his political autobiography, Cavaco Silva was considered by his PSD party as the likely candidate for the presidential elections and in fact was elected in 2006. See interview with Ana Sá Lopes and Helena Pereira and for nationalist and anti-European sentiments evident in the PSD according to Antonio Sousa Franco in *Público* (March 8, 2004: 12).

9. The PS majority gave credence to Magalhães's observation that the political system was shifting from "consensualism" to "majoritarianism" with the PS and PSD representing the dominant center parties and increasing their percentage of votes through time.

10. Osório (1988) describes the alignment of factions in the PCP as follows: in addition to the Group of Six, the "third path" (Anónio Hespanha, José Saramago, Gomes

Canotilho, António Borges Coelho, Mário Vieira de Carvalho, and Zita Seabra), the SIP-Transparência (Chico Costa Gomes, Carlos Antunes, Tomaz Figueiredo), the Núcleo Duro (Domingos Brantes, Angelo Veloso, Octávio Pato, and others), the Martyres (Dias Lourenço, Alda Nogueira, Vitoriano), and the Angustiados (Vítor Dias and Carlos Brito).

11. Journalists have attempted to unravel the mystique around Cunhal (Rodrigues, 1986) and the women in his life (Plantier, 1986). José Pacheco Pereira, who was not a member of the PCP but closely observed Cunhal from both left and center-right perspectives, offers a crucial assessment of his life (Pereira, 1999, 2001, and 2005). The first volume provides sufficient detail on the background of Cunhal's early years, with emphasis on his formation within party circles during the middle 1930s and his experience in the Soviet Union and during the Spanish Civil War. The second volume emphasizes Cunhal's rise to party leadership and years in clandestinity during the 1940s. The third volume traces Cunhal's imprisonment during the 1950s, his literary and artistic activity, his relations with Humberto Delgado, and his escape from Peniche prison.

12. The tendency for constitutional reform to benefit the bourgeoisie is discussed by Galhordas et al. (1980). Alegre's celebrated career as a deputy included a failed run for the presidency in 2006 and speculation that he might seek the presidency in the future. He also published an autobiographical novel, *Rafael* (2004). See review by Eduardo Prado Coelho in *Público* (March 30, 2004: 18).

13. The PCP was also concerned with the commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the April 25 coup and revolution, which was coordinated by political scientist António Costa Pinto. The PCP accused the PSD government of desiring to destroy the legacy of the revolutionary moment. The PSD-appointed committee overseeing the celebration insisted that partisan preferences not be included while the party itself was talking about replacing "revolution" with "evolution" as a description of the process during 1974–1975, arguing that the majority of people prefer such characterization: "the government coalition PSD-PP wants to change the term 'revolution', substituting it for 'evolution' in the constitutional text" (*Público*, March 11, 2004).

14. In December 1974 at the First PS Congress, Manuel Serra sought the leadership of the party and obtained 35 percent of the delegate votes in a contest with Mário Soares. He represented a radical left tendency within the PS. When he left the party to found the FSP, many considered this a strategic error, and indeed the FSP became one of many small groups involved in the revolutionary years (Mário Machiqueiro, personal communication, July 16, 2008).

15. Oliveira, Lourenço, and Prado (1976) analyze the political crisis associated with the MES, PS, and the PCP and point out the failure of the left to offer other self-criticisms after April 25 and to provide originality in the revolutionary process.

16. Duarte Lima was a parliamentary leader of the PSD. One of his colleagues, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, was adamant in his view that the PRD was only a "more sophisticated and intelligent arm of the PCP" (*Semanário*, June 20, 1987: 6).

17. Manuel Vilaverde Cabral led another left deviation in the formation of the Clube de Esquerda Liberal. At the time of its formation in the early 1980s it supported the PSD, largely because Soares as prime minister had failed to transform the PS into

"a great party of government capable of hegemonizing the area of the center-left in a modern and open society that is belatedly being realized in Portugal" (Cabral, 1987). After 1987, however, it supported Soares and his PS.

18. Two adversaries dating to Salazar days offered dissenting views over the war. Mário Soares, who had become a PS deputy in the EU parliament, startled with his view that he favored negotiations with Al Queda terrorists, while conservative political scientist Adriano Moreira argued that negotiations with terrorists would serve only to legitimize their actions (see *Público*, March 22, 12).

19. The argument that Portugal is about to fall under the economic control and influence of the Spaniards is in a book by Rui Carinha (2004), who reveals that Spain and its "total, devastating, and probably irreversible invasion" today absorbs 25 percent of all Portuguese exports. Some forty-five hundred Portuguese firms export to Spain, and fourteen thousand Spanish firms do business in Portugal, whereas no Portuguese enterprise has been successful in Spain.

20. Antunes was not received well by Soares and those implicated with Carlucci and the CIA. Based on five years (1982–1986) of fieldwork in Washington, the research was drawn from archives and interviews with all the key people who had mounted a team in Portugal ("equipe de guerra"). He interviewed important personalities involved in Portugal, including Carlucci and General Vernon Walters. The role of the United States in undermining the revolution is further discussed by Pereira and Amaral (1990).

21. Perhaps because of the covert ties with the United States, Portugal later became involved in shipments of Iranian arms for the U.S.-sponsored contra war against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua (*Revista Expresso*, January 24, 1987; January 31, 1987: 1; February 14, 1987: 23R–25R; March 21, 1987; May 16, 1987: 30R–32R). Antunes (1986) delves into other relations and ties between Portugal and the United States (see Júdice, 1986a, for a review).

22. He identifies a "sinister" Bilderberg Group as made up of powerful capitalists and politicians favoring globalization whose participants include Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and Francisco Pinto Balsemão (2002a: 275–287). In another work, Le Winter (2001) describes his role in Portugal in 1974 as facilitating a bloodless coup through Costa Gomes, who had had contacts with the CIA ("an old sympathizer"). He mentions the 1980 "October Surprise," the title of a book by Gary Sick (1991), when George Bush went to Paris to negotiate with Iranians a release of hostages for arms and undermine the reelection of Jimmy Carter, with arms planned to pass through Portugal en route to Iran. Le Winter seems to have had a role in some of this, according to his personal account (171). He goes on to recount how the Portuguese minister of defense at the time uncovered the plan for transshipment of arms in violation of Portuguese law. The issue was so disturbing to Prime Minister Sá Carneiro, according to Le Winter, that he planned to travel to New York to ask the UN Security Council to take up the matter as a violation of Portuguese sovereignty. This was alarming to others: he never made it to New York, and he died in a plane accident (175).

23. Joseph Love (2004) argues that the Latin American doctrines of structuralism and dependency had important repercussions in Spain and Portugal during the 1950s to the 1970s (in particular, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the

Caribbean and the ideas pioneered by Raúl Prebisch and Celso Furtado). He identifies an early influence as François Perroux, the French political economist who briefly held a chair in economics at the University of Coimbra in 1936 and whose lectures were published that year as *Lições de economia política* (Coimbra: Editora Coimbra, 1936).

24. Jorge Braga de Macedo (1984) analyzes the contradictions of integration with Europe.

25. After 2004–2005 the data weakened as to unemployment, economic growth, and so on. Mário Machiqueira confided in me his belief that Portugal would remain one of the poorest countries in Europe during the next twenty years. He attributed this in part to the neoliberal policies of the PS government and, in his view, to the undermining of the advances of labor after April 15, 1974 (personal communication, July 28, 2008).

26. As an illustration of continuity in the economy, Rego revealed that when his newspaper, *República*, was taken over by leftist workers, it was immediately replaced by *A Luta*, thanks to the support of one of the brothers controlling the Companhia União Fabril group, José Manuel, who had sympathized with the opposition before the April 25 coup and allowed his home to be used for running the newspaper.

Conclusion: Assessment and Implications

T HE DRAMATIC EVENTS OF APRIL 25, 1974, and the ensuing nineteen months offered the possibility of a profound revolution and a socialist outcome. An authoritarian and fascist period of history was abruptly terminated, the colonial empire disbanded, and a transition to parliamentary democracy begun. All the world was curious about the prospects for change in Portugal, long considered a backward and at best a semiperipheral country in the world capitalist order. Thousands of books and articles, both scholarly and journalistic, were written describing various aspects of this experience. Voluminous archives have appeared that document what happened. Long after this revolutionary moment, it is time to put the Portuguese case into perspective.

This book has attempted both to offer a retrospective interpretation and analysis of the events of 1974–1975 and to pursue the roots of the crisis by examining the role of the state and its evolution in the twentieth century. Rather than a definitive history of political and economic life in the twentieth century, I have tried to provide a historical context for considering the continuity of the state and its apparatuses and of a class struggle that was latent in the early years, conspicuous in 1974–1975, and less overt thereafter. In examining the Portuguese case in terms of a class theory of the state, I recognize that there is little consensus on a theory of the state and little clarity as to what constitutes a useful class analysis of society. It is clear, however, that the Portuguese experience is an outcome of a capitalist-class hegemony supported by the state and its ideological apparatuses. Although the outcome may have been in doubt during the revolutionary years, continuing capitalist development has become inevitable.

Four themes are recurrent in this book: structural revolution and the prospects for a transition from capitalism to socialism, the state and its forms in the course of regime change, class struggle, and hegemony and counterhegemony in the search for a new and stable society.

Revolution and the Transition to Socialism

The drive toward socialism was deeply embedded in the rhetoric and writings of the revolutionary period. Prominent on the left was the traditional Leninist notion of dual power or the mobilization of the working class into a counterstate organization under the leadership of a revolutionary vanguard party. The Marxist theorist Nicos Poulantzas accepted this strategy of dual power in his early writing, but after visiting Portugal he altered his position, arguing that struggle within the state apparatus itself was a possibility. Clearly, he recognized the mobilization, organizational ability, and influence of the PCP as it assumed a command position alongside the MFA in the early stage of the revolution, but he was also undoubtedly influenced by the forces of the popular left and the new social movements that were rapidly filling the political vacuum left by the demise of the old regime. These disruptions offered the distinct possibility that a transition from capitalism to socialism would occur. This was largely dependent on how deeply revolutionary forces could penetrate the popular classes. The impact of class struggle within the state was a determining factor. At the same time, Poulantzas advocated maintaining the institutions and liberties of representative democracy so as to prevent power from degenerating into an authoritarian system. In assessing this apparent paradox, I have been interested in how the Portuguese bourgeoisie manipulated this informal democracy to its own ends and to what extent the popular left parties and social movements were able to push their own agenda. Thus, the fundamental struggle over democracy involved these contrasting forces, and socialism was pursued along various lines, from social democracy and democratic socialism to revolutionary socialism and command socialism.

Poulantzas observed that class struggle might take place within the apparatuses of the state, intensifying its basic contradictions and mobilizing fractions to support the transition to socialism. At the same time, he recognized the legacy of the forces of reaction and the power of capitalism itself. He anticipated the possibility of ruptures in the power centers and the building outside the state of class struggle aimed at organizing mass opposition and disrupting the balance of forces, but it would seem that an assault on the state by the popular left did not fit the European situation—especially in Portugal, given the culture of passivity that had prevailed for a half century under authoritar-

ian rule and the difficulty of building a mass revolutionary party. Eventually, as in Europe generally, parliamentarism, representative democracy, and a plurality of political parties reduced the possibility of a return to a traditional corporative system or a shift to one under intransigent communist control. Poulantzas believed that only a national path to socialism could prevail in Portugal, and although he did not advocate a commitment to international proletarianism, integration into Europe and its capitalist network soon became the preferred direction.

Control over the means of production in society may determine whether a socialist outcome is possible. The state's seizure of large Portuguese monopolies signified control over a portion but not all of the private means of production. It represented a decisive move in the direction of socialism, but there was not enough time between March 11 and the November 25 countercoup to reorganize the system of production in the interests of the people.

In Portugal the progressive role of capital in agriculture was minimal because of weakness in technology and sophisticated marketing. Capitalism in the countryside, especially in the south, was associated with the development of large holdings with the potential for producing crops for domestic and foreign markets. Disputes between owners and workers occasionally occurred throughout the twentieth century and were particularly acute after 1974 in these large agricultural units oriented to the market. Land seizures occurred as well. In the north landholdings were relatively small and in the hands of peasant farmers who were not inclined toward socialism. Historically, the PCP had thought of itself as a vanguard party, and although it sought to play that role after April 25 it was ultimately relegated to a role subservient to the MFA, which had similar aspirations. Given the diversity of political parties and interests, it was clear that a vanguard party would not lead the Portuguese revolution.

The state might have been expected to play a role in bringing about socialism by reinforcing and ensuring the cohesion of economic, political, social, and cultural processes and relations and even becoming relatively autonomous. However, in Portugal under the monarchy and the fascist dictatorship and even after the revolutionary coup of 1974, the state had failed to achieve such relative autonomy. It facilitated the consolidation of the capitalist economy by backing up the legal framework of a capitalist system, providing the infrastructure and the conditions for state and capitalist enterprises, intervening to ensure stability and mitigate economic crises, and mediating conflicts and tensions between capital and labor. The state also legitimized its activities through propaganda aimed at maintaining different classes with their particular interests. Thus, in 1974–1975 banks and private enterprises were nationalized under the state, but in the ensuing period of parliamentary

democracy, the state carried on with its traditional functions while fostering a resurgence of private capital. The state also wavered over the contradictions inherent in either a capitalist or a socialist orientation to planning. Planning can, however, be an instrument of bourgeois politics under a state bureaucracy in a capitalist country striving to be socialist. Popular left forces pushed Portugal toward socialism in the aftermath of the April 25 coup, but the salient features of capitalism remained intact, ultimately subverting the progressive movement. Finally, the pursuit of democracy during the transition revolved around representative and formal systems of voting and representation typical of advanced capitalist industrial societies. The discourse in Portugal involved traditional approaches to political democracy—bourgeois, liberal, social democratic, or representative forms under capitalism or its democratic socialist or revolutionary form under socialism.

Although the advances of the 1974 coup may have undermined capitalist relations of production, they did not destroy them. The Portuguese market continued to function within the international capitalist system. The maneuvering of the left parties undoubtedly interfered with any move toward socialism. The PS, for instance, promoted self-management, political democracy, and the market as a way to counter the strength of the PCP. In order to be successful, self-management must work more effectively than the capitalist system, and it would exclude the state in the transition process. The PS, however, did not distinguish the market from profit as the regulator of the economy, and it limited economic democracy to the cooperative or self-managing sector of the economy. In contrast, the PCP and the popular left thought that the nationalizations and the agrarian reform represented the possibility of destroying the capitalist mode of production and creating new relations of production. Believing that monopolistic capitalism had been destroyed, the PCP also understood that class antagonisms would continue to repress the working class. It envisaged an economy in transition with various economic forms including collective production units, small commercial production, industrial capital, and state capitalist firms. Within the agrarian reform the social relations among members of the collective production units were considered an initial form of socialism even though the market was still capitalist.

The sentiments of the popular movement favored socialist relations of production through occupation of latifundios, replacement of capitalist enterprise with collective entities, occupation of empty houses, and so on. These socialist relations were, however, unable to eliminate continuing capitalist repercussions such as unemployment, high prices, lack of housing, and so on. The offensive of workers was insufficient to overcome the continuing capitalist domination of the economy and the bourgeois power of the state.

The various left forces looked to a change in the role of the state and in the relations of production. The PS considered that socialism had arrived with the nationalizations and the power that democracy had given the workers. It supported the popular movement as a political power base but concentrated on the nationalizations in the conviction that socialism would ensue. The PCP felt that the nationalizations represented a decisive moment in the abolition of monopolistic capitalism, identifying socialism with the nationalizations and believing that the capitalist relations of production would cease to dominate. The attention of the left was absorbed by state policies and the nationalizations, and thus there was little concern with the question of class and the power of the state in the transition to socialism.

The State and Its Forms through Regime Change

Essential questions with regard to the role of the state are whether it served capitalism and the dominant classes by mitigating the crisis brought about by the aftermath of the April 25 coup, to what extent class conflict operates within it, and whether the state bureaucracy can function autonomously from the capitalist class. I have been interested in examining the proposition that the form of the state evolves from the relations of production in capitalist society and that the state is the political expression of the class structure inherent in production.

The state assumes many functions on behalf of the civil society and may mitigate fundamental contradictions between private and public life and the conflict generated by the division of society into classes. The institutions of the state include its repressive apparatuses of army and police, which ensure order and stability, and its ideological apparatus, which influences public opinion. In my assessment of the Portuguese state, a central issue has been whether the state functions as the coercive instrument of the ruling class or can sometimes be autonomous. If the power of the bourgeoisie was weakened after April 25, it was less able to count on the bureaucracy to act on its behalf. Given the ascendancy of the MFA and the PCP, civil servants could not be expected to rule autonomously. The power of the newly emerging groups was limited in many ways, however, and there may have been a brief period of autonomy when the bureaucracy carried on.

Capitalist development shaped mercantilism under monarchical and republican rule, and financial and industrial investment was closely associated with the fascist corporate model and, more recently, the advances stimulated by integration with Western Europe. Through changing regimes, the Portuguese state has remained stable and continuous in its administration of

government agencies, in law through its control of military and police, in the economy through its regulation of production, finance, and distribution, and in ideology through its influence in education and the mass media.

Through an analysis of the origins and evolution of the state and its formations and apparatuses, I have identified a mercantile state during monarchical and republican rule early in the twentieth century, a fascist corporate state with public and private capital, a progressive authoritarian state with its mix of socialized enterprises and private capital in 1974–1975, a parliamentary state during the two republican periods from 1910 to 1926 and from 1976 to the present, a democratic socialist state envisaged in the 1976 constitution, and a bourgeois state with privatization of state enterprise, concessions for international capital, and new economic groups after 1975. Although the state theoretically makes policy within recognized rules, procedures, and institutional bargaining, it may allow the bourgeoisie and its allies to mobilize around national interests. Similarly, it may promote the disunity of the dominant classes so that individual capitalists or capitalist interests do not prevail. Coherent state policy is facilitated when the competing interests of the dominant class fractions are reconciled. The state may also mediate social pacts between labor and business interests to ensure economic and political stability and enhance mutual interests. It may join with political parties to ensure hegemony over a hostile working class.

After World War II, monopolistic and oligopolistic groups influenced policy, and the state in turn shielded industry. Portugal moved deliberately in the exploitation of its African colonies and hesitantly in opening toward Europe in an effort to meet the commercial and technological needs of the monopoly groups while allowing some modernization of its backward capitalism. Foreign capital was eventually encouraged as well as a means of prolonging the colonial wars during the 1960s and possibly stimulating the exploitation of untapped natural resources in Africa. Formal affiliation with the EEC in 1986 ensured Portugal's integration into the capitalist world. Although the old groups were unable fully to recover their assets, by 1990 the state enterprises were being liquidated or sold to private interests and, simultaneously, new groups in the private sector were becoming prominent in the economy. Before April 25, technocrats had a decisive role in the political apparatus and the large monopoly groups, and thereafter they were to be influential in shaping the economy and opening it to foreign, particularly European, capital and modernization.

Structural changes over time have been more apparent than real, exhibiting persistent patterns of state centralization and dominant authority alongside aspirations to corporatism and pluralism in civil society and the illusion that mass participation would legitimize the political order. Economic groups with

ties to the state tend to cluster around commercial, financial, industrial, and agrarian interests, and these groups persist over time whether their interests are based on domestic or foreign capital or on private or public capital. Thus, continuity rather than deep structural change has characterized the evolution of the political economy in Portugal. Continuity in Portuguese politics has been the norm, including a tendency to centralize the "administrative" state and the concentration of the political class in Lisbon. Since 1974 this centralizing tendency has been evident in the growth of public enterprise and public administration. Also important has been the persistence of traditional practices such as patrimonialism, bureaucratic power, and networks of clientele affecting all levels of decision making. The regressive character of Portuguese development both during the dictatorship and in the revolutionary period after 1974 is attributable to the absence of a vigorous and autonomous national capitalist class, an economy dependent on the state, and delayed capitalist development.

Class and Class Struggle

A class theory of the state should relate to all classes and class fractions. My analysis has focused on Portugal's dominant and popular classes. A dominant class in capitalist society tends to be a ruling class in possession of the major means of production and political power. As a ruling class it is an economic class that also rules politically. It dominates the economy through control over corporations and financial institutions. It need not be monolithic and can incorporate varied interests that tend to become cohesive. The popular classes are the subordinate and usually exploited classes such as rural and urban workers.

I have concentrated on 1974 and 1975, when there was clear evidence of an emerging class struggle. I have described the historical context of the coup, the events leading up to it, the institutional fragmentation that ensured its success, and several important conjunctures in the ensuing revolutionary period. I have also analyzed the institutional conflict and the role of the MFA, the major left political parties, and the labor unions and have examined the configuration of new popular and social movements in this dramatic process. Finally, I have discussed the role of social classes in the class struggle.

The commitment to revolutionary change seems to have been genuine and deep, and the revolutionary leadership, although diffused into factions, was determined, competent, and disciplined. Yet the popular movement collapsed. It had had little historical experience in an open society, and bourgeois forms such as the capitalist market and parliamentarism obscured the ideals

of socialism and participatory democracy. The prospects for a socialist transition faded with the November 25 countercoup.

Moderates such as Mário Soares and Melo Antunes sought to obstruct the revolution in favor of social democracy and a slower drift toward the goal of socialism, but the socialist project succumbed to a desire to maintain stability and safeguard the bourgeois democratic order. The MFA's inclination toward a centralized command was offset by demands for participatory democracy. Pluralism appeared to counter any allegiance to authoritarianism. Spontaneity threatened the normal practice of pluralism. Additionally, although the opposition of the major monopolies to a socialist path was dampened initially by the granting of independence to the colonies and later by their nationalization, their absorption into the state was but a temporary setback. A further obstacle was the opposition of the MFA and the political parties, especially the PS and to some extent the PCP, to strike activity and their efforts to limit the autonomy of the labor movement. Eventually, the MFA was supplanted by a parliamentary system that shifted power to the political parties and placed constraints on the state while allowing its consolidation. The regimes after November 25 set limits on the nationalization process and reorganized the public enterprises in a typically bureaucratic and centralizing fashion. Rather than a struggle of socialist construction against the recovery of private capitalism, the struggle became one between state capitalism and a mixed economy. After November 25, agrarian reform was moderated so as to permit an agrarian capitalism dependent on the state through the Ministry of Agriculture. Thus, the implications of the countercoup involved not only thwarting the pressures of popular forces on the left and the working class but also ensuring the control of the state over Portuguese society.

Analysis of divisions other than those based on class helps in understanding the complex events surrounding the 1974 coup. Given the dominance of the MFA, the political parties, for instance, served as a means for rationalizing the intervention of the people in the revolutionary process. Pacts between the MFA and the political parties constituted the essential elements in the transformation of the revolution into a democratic state. The role of institutions in moderating crisis after crisis in the aftermath of the coup proved to be decisive as it had been in ushering in the coup itself. The institutionalization of corporatism under fascism has been compared with the persistence and modification of institutions in the revolutionary period to show that the state and public powers were important in a shift from what was envisaged as capitalism to a mixed economy. In this process the bureaucratic technocracy was being reformulated. The unity of the working classes was being undermined by the battle between centralism and autonomy. Thus, no hegemonic class or social and popular group was able to ascend to power. Given such

uncertainty, it was apparent that the structural apparatus of the state and government had remained largely intact, with power at the executive and to a lesser extent at the legislative level.

The rise of popular and new social movements represents a challenge to the power of the capitalist state. During 1974 and 1975 these movements initially resisted domination, pursued power, and represented an alternative to traditional institutions. They sought political rights and social justice in civil society. Their autonomy and influence depended on being able to coexist initially with the MFA and later with the parliamentary system. Their survival rested on their being independent of the state apparatus and untainted by official patronage.

State administrative apparatuses remained intact and indeed were strengthened by the nationalizations and the setback to the monopoly bourgeoisie. Between the coup and the nationalizations, the progressive parties competed for political power and the establishment of a formal representative parliamentary system. These parties also mitigated the spontaneous and sometimes organized activism of the popular and social movements that appeared in the aftermath of the coup. They were wary of popular participation and direct forms of democracy. Yet neighborhood groups effectively pressured government to be more responsive and humanistic in its policies, and political leaders at the local level helped people to confront government at higher levels. Autonomy and self-sufficiency characterized the neighborhood and workers' commissions in the urban industrial belts around Lisbon and Porto.

The bourgeoisie and all its fractions had been relatively cohesive and hegemonic over the economy prior to April 25. Major institutions such as the Church and the military were supportive, with the result that throughout the Salazar period institutional conflict and class struggle were latent. Measures of liberalization during the Caetano period did, however, provoke tension in institutional forces that had traditionally supported the regime and dissension within the bourgeoisie. After April 25, the nationalization of monopolies represented an expanded role for the state and the influential technocracy and a diminished role for the large landowners, the comprador bourgeoisie of urban financial and commercial interests, and the traditional family and economic blocs.

While the dominant classes were weakened by radical intervention, the popular classes were strengthened. The situation shifted dramatically after November 25, 1975, however, as financial, industrial, and international capital began to penetrate the economy. In urban centers the major parties were able to moderate the influence of labor, and rural workers suffered from the rollback of the agrarian reform. Although workers were well aware of radical ideas and strategy, the problem for labor may have been the low level of

culture. They were subjected to competing tendencies—anarcho-syndicalist, socialist, and communist—early on, and the left political parties also undermined their unity. Furthermore, although the sporadic strikes during the revolutionary period gave impetus to the popular surge toward socialism, workers had to be vigilant and resistant to management malpractice and government intervention favoring capitalist interests. Commissions were often successful in defense of workers, but they were not always unified in their struggles. Finally, despite gains in autonomy, the labor movement remained subject to state control and manipulation. Labor was also compromised by the moderating influence of the PCP. The state administration continued to be repressive in a new form and served as a constraint on popular participation and direct forms of democracy.

Counterrevolution, Bourgeois Democracy, and Hegemony

The parliamentary democracy that emerged from the counterrevolution of November 25, 1975, was associated with a politics not of power and control but of fragmentation and uncertainty. Initially, the countercoup did not signify the immediate reemergence of domestic capital or the traditional dominant classes, but it did allow the state to consolidate its affairs. The main participants in government were technocrats, middle bourgeoisie in origin, many of them academics co-opted into civil service and then into executive positions of the state. The nationalizations had eliminated the old monopolies, but many entrepreneurs with international interests had recovered their positions as capitalists. Less successful were those who remained in Portugal to maintain the remnants of their traditional economic groups. Thus, the newly emerging entrepreneurial class was associated with foreign interests, and, like the old groups of the past, it too would be shielded by the state.

The prospects for hegemony must be assessed in moments of conjuncture involving political, ideological, and class struggle. How the state functioned in this important period—facilitating or inhibiting the bourgeoisie, providing concessions to subordinate classes, and building unity with the mass of the population—was of particular interest in determining the importance of hegemony.

During the monarchy a hegemonic bloc was led by the state compromising with the latifundists and sheltering the early industrialists. This hegemony was challenged by the rise of a labor movement in the cities and peasant mobilization and agitation in the countryside, together with the liberal and socialist political opposition, thus ushering in the First Republic from 1911 to 1926. For a lengthy period after 1926, the agrarian bourgeoisie, in alliance

with a subordinate class, the commercial bourgeoisie, was hegemonic. The bureaucratic machinery in the interest of the state sheltered the agrarian bourgeoisie. After Salazar's death, this status quo was altered with the disastrous colonial wars in Africa. A division appeared in bourgeois interests between defenders of colonial policy in Africa and businessmen and financiers demanding alignment with Europe. The traditional opposition was able to join with a progressive segment of the armed forces that overturned the old regime. After the April 25 coup, hegemony was threatened initially from the right by counterrevolutionary plots and from the left by opportunistic and divisive political groupings, as issues of struggle among workers and peasants remained unresolved in urban and rural areas. The crisis of the Portuguese state was fundamentally linked with hegemony because of the failure of the industrial-financial bourgeoisie and the landed bourgeoisie to maintain a power bloc. This crisis culminated in the April 25 coup and eventually in a revolutionary crisis that was not immediately resolved by the events of November 25.

Parliamentary instability characterized successive governments after 1976. The prolonged crisis of hegemony could be resolved only through the consolidation of a new hegemonic bloc to provide legitimacy and stability for the political system and development for the economy. Without a rapid consolidation of the new hegemonic bloc, the state would disintegrate, the parliamentary system would become unstable, and repression of the popular classes would be necessary.

In politics the pursuit of hegemony can be interpreted through the political experience of the Cavaco Silva PSD government, which was successful in returning state enterprise to private ownership and reducing the size of the state. Despite a substantial foreign and public debt, it worked toward economic stability and full integration with Europe by 1992. No ideological hegemony was possible under the PSD alone, and the power of the PS increased throughout much of the decade of the 1990s. A political bloc emerged around the PS and the PSD and a consensus on limits to state power, deregulation, provision of incentives for capital investment, and internationalization of the economy. Capitalism, not socialism, was at the top of their political and economic agenda. Other elements of continuity and stability included a drastic reduction in the role and power of the military and the MFA in particular, the shielding by the state of the economic groups, emphasis on finance through the Finance Ministry, and control of unions in the traditional way through social pacts.

Under the firm rule of fascism and totalitarianism, the majority of the Portuguese people were largely supportive of economic and political stability, respectful of the strict demands of traditional society, and passive in the face

of authoritarianism. These attitudes eventually eroded into disillusionment with the colonial wars in Africa, disenchantment with compulsory military service, and revulsion against the censorship and repression carried out by the regime and its policy apparatus.

The progressive wing of the Portuguese bourgeoisie wanted a change from dictatorship to a liberal capitalist society. In spite of the apparent dramatic changes, accompanied by widespread popular demands for political freedom and participation in the economy, the ruling class, operating in piecemeal fashion, ultimately succeeded in reestablishing its order, its discipline, and its ownership of land, houses, and factories and, through a combination of coercion and co-optation, ensuring control over the productivity of workers.

Spínola was a moderating influence favoring the bourgeoisie in the transition. Once a fascist sympathizer and a supporter of Franco in the Spanish Civil War, he was perceived by many as a hero of the colonial wars for defying the dictatorship and acknowledging what had already become reality—the futility of the continuing presence of Portugal in Africa.

The PCP and some elements of the radical left tended opportunistically to co-opt or channel popular discontent to promote an aura of stability and cooperation and to enhance their role within the state or benefit the political party system. The Leninist groups tended to apply textbook models to situations that demanded creativity and new forms of class mobilization and struggle.

The working class was effective in mass worker mobilization both before and after April 1974. Its pressure produced some redistribution of income and other positive effects, but these efforts were, in the view of Maurice Brinton (quoted in Mailer, 1977: 11) only

> adaptations to specific circumstances: the need to raise the miserable living standards of Cabo Verdean building workers, to dispose of the products of some self-managed factory, to solve practical problems in some shanty town, or to administer some seized latifundio. More fundamental social objectives, such as the abolition of hierarchy, of wage labour and of commodity production were never really on the historical agenda.

Initially, the working class gained a wage increase and other benefits, but later, wages were frozen despite rapid inflation, a decline in the gross national product, and widespread unemployment.

The early consensus around a central labor union dissipated in the debates after 1974: the PPD and later its successor, the PSD, called for trade-union structure organized on the principle of pluralism; the PS insisted on unity and the PCP pushed for integration. The PPD argued that pluralism was associated with free assembly of the workers. The PS wanted trade-union unity but opposed a federation because of its lack of influence among industrial work-

ers and fear of the strength of the PCP through the Intersindical. The PCP wanted a single federation on the assumption that it would exercise control over labor. The MFA in January 1975 indicated its unanimous support for integration, although the vote (twelve to eight, according to Mailer, 1977: 146) reflected internal dissension, and a potential split was evident in a statement by Vasco Lourenço that while it was clear that "the vast majority of workers have opted for integration . . . certain people would like to see a split in the MFA" (*A Capital*, January 12, 1975). While the PS and PPD were concerned about PCP domination of labor, workers tended to see the PCP as an obstacle to their class struggle (Mailer, 1977: 149).

The small landholding peasants, especially in the north, were property-conscious and suspicious of central authority that might undermine their autonomy. Unemployment of large numbers of rural and even urban workers was mitigated to some extent by emigration to northern Europe, where low-paying jobs were plentiful during the 1960s and 1970s, and the remittances of the emigrants contributed to the balance of payments but did not affect domestic production or the market.

Finally, Portugal was undoubtedly a poor country, linked to and dependent on the international capitalist order. Much of its production was exported and many finished goods were imported, and this pattern was to continue through the 1990s. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, three major perspectives dominated intellectual circles in the search for development and a solution to this dilemma. First, the Eastern European view, associated with the PCP and traditional Marxists, favored close ties with Eastern Europe. Second, the Third World perspective of independent left and socialist dissidents linked Portugal with the struggles of Latin America and the former colonies and argued that as an underdeveloped country, Portugal should abandon its traditional imperialism and colonialism. Third, the Western European perspective, linked to the EEC, NATO, and U.S. investment, was oriented to bourgeois democracy and usually associated with the PS. After November 25, 1975, with the formation of the first constitutional governments, Soares pushed hard for ties with the EEC in a process that formally culminated in full membership for Portugal in 1986. The preference of the independent left for affiliation with the Third World or the search for an autonomous revolutionary path modeled on the revolutionary experience of other less-developed countries had evolved through the disastrous colonial wars but dissipated with the formal granting of independence to the African colonies. The outreach toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was a conspicuous preference of communists during the early governments of Vasco Gonçalves, but this tendency, opposed by Soares and most socialists as well as the independent left, was neither popular nor influential.

Several explanations can be offered for this situation. First, the impact of economic policies implemented after November 25, 1975, served "the interests of the modernizing monopoly bourgeoisie, both its technocratic and its small or medium-sized capitalist segments." The moderate officers who took control after November 25 were by origin and current position most closely identified with this class. All the assaults on the old oligarchy and its monopolies were ostensibly carried out in the interest of the working classes, but the changes also increased state control of the economy: "The segment of the bourgeoisie which took power in 1976 could use the centralized economic control to its own advantage" (Hammond, 1988: 251).

Second, the communists tended to combine democratization with the transition to socialism, which according to Poulantzas (1976: 147) led to vacillation. One revolutionary militant at the time has observed that Álvaro Cunhal "did not come to Portugal to make a revolution" and that the people and popular movements that were thirsty for change suffered from the pressure of the parties, especially the PCP and the PS. The movements sought to substitute structures of participation and direct democracy for the traditional state apparatus. The PCP opposed these "uncontrolled movements," and, because Carvalho himself was not under its control, it fought him too (interview, José Freire Antunes, Lisbon, November 19, 1989).

Raúl Rego, a prestigious and moderate socialist, explains the setback as follows: "There was no true revolution because the revolutionaries were afraid to establish a radical regime and to go from a regime in which everything was controlled and there was no freedom of expression to a regime in which everything was free." He described two lines of agitation: a front line of those who sought radical change and a second line made up of those who, like himself, had always been in the opposition. He felt that there had been a class struggle that really was more political than class-oriented—the PCP against other parties and these parties against each other. Above all it was a struggle of liberalism against totalitarianism: "Liberalism is the expression of right and left men who manifest all the opinions, even evangelical ones. Now we are in a transition and the PCP is becoming liberal too" (interview, Lisbon, November 19, 1990).

In contrast, Francisco Louçã sees the interruption of the revolutionary process as the result of a profound crisis provoked more by the state than by the popular movements. There was a tradition of a weak proletariat and no independent and political workers' movement before April 25. The popular movement, however, mobilized quickly, at first involving itself in the struggle against fascism and later, in 1974, serving as a vanguard without being proletarian or able really to represent a mass movement of the left. What happened had much to do with the conflicts within the MFA itself. Louçã points to a

duality of power with Carvalho as the last expression of the popular and social movement (interview, Lisbon, November 19, 19990).

For Francisco Martins Rodrigues, the rollback of the early popular and social movements was a consequence of the mobilization of foreign and domestic capital through state initiative and incentives and the belated effort in the colonies to exploit natural resources and offset the threat of the African liberation movements. Historically, the domestic bourgeoisie had lacked confidence and failed to transform the country. British capital had prevailed. Under Soares and the PS, however, foreign capital investment was accelerated through ties with Europe, industrialists aligned with foreign capital sought to exploit cheap labor, and small landowners disappeared as agriculture reorganized (interview, Lisbon, November 14, 1990).

To sum up our discussion, lessons can be drawn from the Portuguese case.

A first lesson is the risk of a genuinely radical uprising's being diverted into state capitalist channels. All the ingredients of a genuine revolution appeared to be in place: a movement and a leadership committed to resolving social inequalities at home and to the pursuit of economic progress, broad popular support for radical change, structural reforms aimed at undermining the hegemony of a ruling class and its blocs of family corporations, and resolution of the colonial problem. There were changes in institutional life and the alignment of class forces and a politics that amalgamated control from above with popular impulses from below. The early consensus around the prospects for a genuine revolution, however, was undermined by the political posturing and maneuvering of communists and socialists, whose distrust for each other can be traced to their differing views on ways of opposing the dictatorship and their respective allegiances to the Second and Third Internationals. The opposition of the popular left to both communists and socialists also undermined consensus on the left. Given these differences and the fact that, rather than smash the apparatuses of the state, all these political groupings sought instead to exercise influence through positions in agencies of the state, inevitably, structures and policies tended to remain intact, and decisive changes became increasingly difficult to implement in the months after the coup.

Second, the revolutionary process appears to have been subverted by bureaucratic organizational practices and prescriptions for action. A leadership unprepared for revolutionary practice also undermined initiative within the broad masses of people. As Mailer (1977: 354–355) puts it, "The revolutionaries—on a massive scale—were found to be part of the problem, not part of the solution." The Portuguese experience during 1974 and 1975 suggests that revolutionary activity does not necessarily develop from above but "emerges in the course of the struggle itself, and its most advanced forms are expressed

by those for whom it is a necessity to struggle" against an enemy from within their own organizations: "Every time they set up an organization, they found it manipulated by so-called vanguards or leaders who were not of their class and who understood little of why they were struggling."

Third, the desire for autonomy in struggle could not be worked out through the traditional political parties. The early balance between a strong but democratically organized executive and an emerging political party system premised on formal, representative forms of democracy inevitably tilted in the direction of an unstable parliamentary system. Lack of experience, a diversity of political parties, ideological differences, weak organization, and opportunistic leadership all contributed to the failure of the party system to take hold.

Fourth, the army, despite the pretensions of a progressive wing, often becomes a pillar of class rule: a militarist conception of the social revolution may lead to the defeat of the working class. While there were genuine aspirations within the MFA to implement a true social revolution, there was the political struggle between traditional military officers of high rank such as Costa Gomes and Spínola and the officers of lower rank. Respect for authority and the desire to maintain a political consensus and ensure economic stability were major worries of the younger officers. Working-class aspirations, labor strikes, and demonstrations for popular causes conflicted with the search for order and stability. The class allegiances of military officers differed from those of the proletariat and may have contributed to efforts to constrain the revolution.

Fifth, ideological mystification was evident in the formation of a new political ideal based on social democracy, and electoral alliances of the PS with the PPD aimed at undermining the influence of the PCP. Also wary of communist influence, the MRPP and other revolutionary groups on the left welcomed the counterrevolutionary coup, arguing that revisionism was being unmasked and urging their Maoist militants to support social democracy.

A final lesson to be drawn from the transitional years has to do with the constraints of self-management in a capitalist context (Brinton, in Reeve, 1976: 21): "In Portugal the price paid for the enhanced internal democracy of certain workshops or farms was often a lengthening of the working day, or an intensification of the labour process to 'allow' the self-managed unit to remain economically 'viable'. In this sense islands of self-management became islands of capitalist recuperation."

Acronyms

AD	Acção Democrática
ADS	Acção Democrático-Social
AIP	Associação Industrial Portuguesa
ALA	Associação Livre de Agricultores
AMI	Agrupamento Militar de Intervenção
AOC	Aliança Operária Camponesa
APU	Aliança Povo Unido
ARA	Acção Revolucionária Armada
ARCO	Acção Revolucionária Comunista
ARPE	Acção Revolucionária das Praças do Exército
ASDI	Acção Social Democrática Independente
ASP	Acção Socialista Portuguesa
BE	Bloco de Esquerda
BESCL	Banco Espíritu Santo e Comercial de Lisboa
BPA	Banco Português de Atlântico
BPI	Banco Português do Investimento
BPSM	Banco Pinto e Sottomayor
BTA	Banco Totta e Açores
CADC	Centro Académico de Democracia Cristã
CAP	Confederação dos Agricultores de Portugal
CARP (M-L)	Comissão de Apoio aos Revolucionários Presos (Marxista-Leninista)
CCP	Confederação do Comércio Portugués
CCR (M-L)	Comités Comunistas Revolucionários (Marxista-Leninista)

CDAP	Comissão Dinamizadora do Associativismo das Praças
CDE	Comissão Democrática Eleitoral
CDL	Comités de Defesa da Liberdade
CDS	Centro Democrático Social
CDT	Central Democrática dos Trabalhadores
CDU	Coligação Democrática Unitária
CEUD	Comissão Eleitoral de Unidade Democrática
CGT	Confederação Geral do Trabalho
CGTP	Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses
CIP	Confederação da Indústria Portuguesa
CIS	Comissão Inter Sindical
CLACS	Comités de Defesa da Revolução
CLMRP	Comité de Ligação dos Militantes Revolucionários Portugueses
CM-LP	Comité Marxista-Leninista Português
CNAR	Comités Nacionalistas de Acção Revolucionária
CODICE	Comissão Dinamizadora Central
COPCON	Comando Operacional do Continente
CP	Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses
CRECs	Comítes Revolucionários de Estudantes Comunistas
CTT	Correios, Telégrafos e Telecomunicações
CVRFA	Comissão de Vigilância Revolucionária das Forças Armadas
DRIL	Directório Revolucionário Ibérico de Libertação
EDP	Electricidade de Portugal
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ELP	Exército de Libertação Português
EMGFA	Estado Maior General das Forças Armadas
FAP	Frente de Acção Popular
FDU	Frente Democrático Unida
FEC (M-L)	Frente Eleitoral Comunista (Marxista-Leninista)
FEM-L	Federação dos Estudantes Marxista-Leninistas
FEPU	Frente Eleitoral Povo Unido
FMU	Frente Militar Unida
FPLN	Frente Portuguesa de Libertação Nacional
FRS	Frente Republicana e Socialista
FSD	Frente Social Democrata
FSP	Frente Socialista Popular
FUP	Frente de Unidade Popular
FUR	Frente de Unidade Revolucionária
GAL	Grupos Antiterroristas de Libertação

GAPS	Grupos de Acção Popular
GEAICAIS	Grupos de Estudantes Anti-Colonialistas e Anti-Imperialistas
GF	Guarda Fiscal
GIS	Gabinete de Investigações Sociais
GNR	Guarda Nacional Republicana
IPE	Investimento e Participações Empresariais
JOC	Juventude Operária Católica
JSN	Junta de Salvação Nacional
JUC	Juventude Universitária Católica
LCI	Liga Comunista Internacionalista
LCPR	Liga para a Construção do Partido Revolucionário
LOC	Liga Operária Católica
LUAR	Liga de União e de Acção Revolucionária
MAP	Movimento de Acção Portuguesa
MDLP	Movimento Democrático de Libertação de Portugal
MDP	Movimento Democrático do Porto
MES	Movimento de Esquerda Socialista
MFA	Movimento das Forças Armadas
MIRN	Movimento Independente de Reconstrução Nacional
MLP	Movimento Liberatário Português
MND	Movimento Nacional Democrático
MNP	Movimento Nacionalista Português
MPAC	Movimento Popular Anti-Colonial
MPP	Movimento Popular Português
MRPP	Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado
MSP	Movimento Socialista Popular
MUD	Movimento de Unidade Democrática
MUNAF	Movimento de Unidade Nacional Antifascista
MUV	Milicianos Unidos Vencerão
OCM-LP	Organização Comunista Marxista-Leninista Portuguesa
ORA	Organização Revolucionária da Armada
ORPC (M-L)	Organização para a Reconstrução do Partido Comunista (Marxista-Leninista)
ORSMU	Organização Revolucionária de Soldados e Marinheiros Unidos
PALOP	Paises Africanos de Lingua Oficial Portuguesa
PCB	Partido Comunista Brasileiro
PCP	Partido Comunista Português
PCP (M-L)	Partido Comunista Português (Marxista-Leninista)
PDC	Partido da Democracia Cristã

PDP	Partido da Direita Portuguesa
PIDE	Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado
PL	Partido Liberal
PNP	Partido Nacionalista Português
POUS	Partido Operário de Unidade Socialista
PP	Partido Popular
PPD	Partido Popular Democrático
PPM	Partido Popular Monárquico
PR	Partido Republicano
PRD	Partido Renovador Democrático
PRED	Partido Republicano Esquerdista Democrático
PRN	Partido Republicano Nacionalista
PRP	Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado
PRP-BR	Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado (Brigadas Revolucionárias)
PRT	Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores
PS	Partido Socialista
PSD	Partido Social Democrática
PSN	Partido de Solidaridade Nacional
PSP	Partido Socialista Português
PSR	Partido Socialista Revolucionária
PTDP	Partido Trabalhista Democrático Português
PUP	Partido de Unidade Popular
RML	Região Militar de Lisboa
RPAC	Resistência Popular Anti-Colonial
SAAL	Serviço Ambulatório de Apoio Local
SEDES	Associação para o Desenvolvimento Económico e Social
SIED	Serviço de Informações Estratégicas de Defesa
SIM	Serviço de Informações Militares
SIS	Serviço de Informações de Segurança
SUV	Soldados Unidos Vencerão
TSD	Trabalhadores Sociais Democratas
UDP	União Democrática Popular
UEDS	União da Esquerda para a Democracia Socialista
UGT	União Geral dos Trabalhadores
UJEC	União da Juventude Estudantil Comunista-Marxista-Leninista
ULR	União Liberal Republicana
UR (M-L)	Unidade Revolucionária (Marxista-Leninista)

Interviews

THE INTERVIEWS ARE OF FOUR TYPES: (1) extensive interviews, roughly one to two hours in length, that are tape-recorded and/or transcribed in my archive (marked *); (2) generally brief (thirty minutes to an hour), less-focused interviews based on handwritten notes; (3) interviews with important participants in the revolutionary events of 1974–1975; and (4) interviews reproduced in Hugo Gil Ferreira and Michael W. Marshall (1986), cited below as F & M, and other personal accounts identified in Ronald H. Chilcote, ed. (1987 and 1998). I wish to express my gratitude to Claudia Moura Pompan for transcriptions of the interviews marked with an asterisk; a few of these were also translated from Portuguese to English.

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About the Author

Ronald H. Chilcote is professor of economics and political science at the University of California, Riverside. He specializes in comparative study of Brazil, Lusophone Africa, and Portugal and is the author or editor of nearly three dozen books, several of them on Brazil and others on Africa. His works on comparative politics and comparative political economy have been translated into many languages, including Chinese, Portuguese, and Russian. He is a founder and the managing editor of the bimonthly journal *Latin American Perspectives*. He is also a landscape and nature photographer whose interests emanate from a family tradition in photography. He resides in Laguna Beach, California, and spends his summers in Wyoming and has published two books on photography: *Nature's Laguna Wilderness* (2003) and *Wind River Wilderness* (2006). He is a founder and director of Laguna Wilderness Press, a nonprofit whose mission is to depict beautiful photography of pristine wilderness areas and to raise public awareness of the need to conserve them.

About the Book

Building on decades of research, leading scholar Ronald H. Chilcote provides a definitive analysis of the 1974–1975 Portuguese revolution, which captured global attention and continues to resonate today. His study revisits a key historical moment to explain the revolution and its aftermath through periods of authoritarianism and resistance as well as representative and popular democracy. Exploring the intertwined themes of class, state, and hegemony, Chilcote builds a powerful framework for understanding the Portuguese case as well as contemporary political economy worldwide.